New Sources of Development Finance by Atkinson, A.B.
NEW SOURCES OF DEVELOPMENT FINANCE
UNU WORLD INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMICS RESEARCH (UNU-WIDER)
was established by the United Nations University as its first
research and training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland,
in 1985. The purpose of the Institute is to undertake applied research
and policy analysis on structural changes affecting the developing
and transitional economies, to provide a forum for the advocacy of
policies leading to robust, equitable, and environmentally sustainable
growth, and to promote capacity strengthening and training in
the field of economic and social policy-making. Its work is
carried out by staff researchers and visiting scholars in
Helsinki and through networks of collaborating
scholars and institutions around the world.
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)





A study prepared by the World Institute for Development Economics
Research of the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER)
1
UNIVERSITY PRESS 
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP 
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. 
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, 
and education by publishing worldwide in 
Oxford NewYork 
Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai 
Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata 
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi 
Sao Paulo Shanghai Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto 
with an associated company in Berlin 
Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press 
in the UK and in certain other countries 
Published in the United States 
by Oxford University Press Inc., New York 
The moral rights of the author have been asserted 
Database right Oxford University Press (maker) 
First published 2005
© United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics 
Research (UNU-WIDER) 2005. 
Some rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, 
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, 
for commercial purposes without the prior permission in writing of 
Oxford University Press.
OXFORD 
This is an open access publication, available online and distributed under 
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-Share 
Alike 3.0 IGO licence (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO), a copy of which is available at 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/igo. Enquiries 
concerning use outside the scope of the licence terms should be sent to 
the Rights Department, Oxford University Press.
ISBN 978-0-19-927856-5
Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and 
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials 
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
Preface
Two powerful and divergent forces grip the world at present. On the one hand, the
effectiveness of international organizations has been called into question. The role and
functioning of the UN are debated. Some nations exhibit frustration with multilateral
cooperation, resorting to unilateral action. Solutions are sought in regional groupings
rather than in worldwide coordination. On the other hand, the recognition is being
cemented that a global economy requires global institutions. International organiza-
tions are viewed by many as the key to the free movement of goods, services, and
capital. We have seen the adoption of ambitious development targets in the form of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Donor countries have pledged increases in
official development assistance.
The tension between these two forces pervades discussion of resources for world
development. On the one hand, there is talk of ‘donor fatigue’, and official development
assistance (ODA) has stood still for many years. The amendment to the IMF’s Articles
approved by the board of governors in 1997 allowing a special allocation of Special
Drawing Rights (SDRs) remains unratified. Proposals for any form of global taxation
meet immediate opposition from powerful elements in the US Congress. On the other
hand, there is widespread appreciation of the need for new resource flows to allow the
MDGs to be achieved. There are interesting proposals for new sources of revenue such
as a global lottery or the International Finance Facility (IFF). Individuals continue to
support development charities. US billionaires are personally funding development
and world health activities.
The direction taken at this juncture will depend largely on political events and
political decisions. But sober economic analysis has an important role to play. This
book reports the work of a project on ‘Innovative Sources of Development Finance’
undertaken at the request of the UN. As a result of the Five Year Review of the World
Summit for Social Development, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution
calling for ‘a rigorous analysis of the advantages, disadvantages and other implications
of proposals for developing new and innovative sources of funding, both public and
private, for dedication to social development and poverty eradication programmes’.
As the UN Secretary-General observed, there has been a great deal of innovation in
private financial markets, but less in the sphere of public finances. The UN Department
of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) in turn requested the World Institute for
Development Economics Research of the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER)
in Helsinki to commission the study of Innovative Sources.
The execution of this project has involved many people. First, as coordinator of
the project, I should like to thank most warmly the other members of the project
team, who in addition to the authors of chapters in the book included Ilene Grabel
of the University of Denver. They have not only written individual chapters but also
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contributed significantly to the development of the overall analysis. The introductory
Chapters 1 and 2, and the concluding Chapter 12, owe a great deal to their ideas, and in
a number of places I have used material that they have drafted. The project meeting in
May 2003, and extensive e-mail exchange, have helped considerably in trying to achieve
a book that, we hope, is both balanced in its views and integrated in its contents.
The work of the project group has benefited much from the comments of external
commentators. An earlier version of Chapter 2 was presented at the World Bank
ABCDE Meeting in Paris in May 2003, where most helpful comments were made by
the discussants, Adrian Wood, chief economist at the Department for International
Development, and P.-B. Spahn of the University of Frankfurt, and by conference
participants. An overall perspective of the report was presented at an open meeting
of the project in Helsinki in September 2003, attended by some 100 people. We are
most grateful for their comments to members of the panel: Ahmed Ndyeshobola of
the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States, Teresa Ter-Minassian, director
of the Fiscal Affairs Department of the IMF, and Adrian Wood. Individual chapters
were presented at the conference ‘Sharing Global Prosperity’ at UNU-WIDER on
6–7 September 2003. The comments of conference participants were most valuable, as
were those of the Oxford University Press referees. There are therefore many people
who have contributed. We should, however, single out Anthony Clunies-Ross of the
University of Strathclyde, Inge Kaul of UNDP, and Adrian Wood, whose work and
comments have had a significant impact on the structure of the report. However,
neither they nor any of those thanked should be held in any way responsible for the
views expressed.
UN-DESA and UNU-WIDER initiated the project and provided crucial support.
We are grateful to Ian Kinniburgh of the Development Policy Analysis Division, UN-
DESA, for his active encouragement. At WIDER, Tony Addison has not only managed
the project with a disarmingly light touch but also contributed the chapter on the
global lottery. Liisa Roponen has been unfailingly helpful and cheerful as project
secretary, ensuring that all ran smoothly, and Adam Swallow most efficiently steered
the manuscript through the publication process.
UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the support to the project from the United
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA). UNU-WIDER
also acknowledges the financial contributions to the 2002–2003 research programme
by the governments of Denmark (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Finland (Ministry
for Foreign Affairs), Norway (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Sweden (Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency–Sida), and the United Kingdom




Mobilizing additional finance to meet the challenges of the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) is now an urgent priority. Increased inflows of both private and public
money are needed in order for the world’s poorest countries to invest in the basic ser-
vices and infrastructure necessary to meet the MDG targets for human development,
and to improve livelihoods and employment for poor people. Developing countries
themselves are mobilizing resources to meet the MDG targets by 2015, but they will
fall short of the targets without additional external flows. The consensus adopted by the
United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development conference
in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002 noted the meagre level of official and private
capital flows to most developing countries. Official development assistance, although
on the rise since Monterrey, still falls far short of the level necessary to meet the MDGs,
and private flows to the poorer countries are small: Africa’s share of the flow of global
foreign direct investment is only 3 per cent.
As a result of the Five-year Review of the World Summit for Social Development,
the United Nations General Assembly in September 2000 called for the mobilization
of new and additional resources for social development and for ‘a rigorous analysis
of advantages, disadvantages and other implications of proposals for developing new
and innovative sources of funding’. The present book contains the results of the study
carried out by UNU-WIDER, under the direction of Sir Anthony Atkinson on behalf
of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
The book examines a range of innovative sources of finance. The best known of the
ideas under consideration is the tax on currency transactions, widely known as the
‘Tobin tax’. Well known also is the proposal for a carbon tax levied on fuel use. Both of
these have many advocates, but they are also controversial. Rigorous economic analysis
is therefore necessary. In particular, it is important to separate the argument for these
taxes as corrective mechanisms (reducing currency speculation and carbon emissions)
from the revenue raising function. The concern in this book is with revenue, which
may mean that low rates of taxation may be sufficient to make a major new contribution.
Taxes are only one of the possible new sources. The book examines proposals for
a development-focused allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), and the Inter-
national Finance Facility (IFF) proposed by the UK’s Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The terms of reference of the UNU-WIDER study asked the authors to consider the
potential for private funding. The study therefore considers the financing associated
with remittances by emigrants, and private philanthropy. It considers the scope for a
global lottery or a global premium bond.
The book brings new thinking to bear on these very important global questions.
The intellectual perspective that marks the book from others in the field is that the
authors bring to bear the tools of modern public economics, more commonly applied
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to national problems of finance. The book argues that this can provide new insights. We
can learn from the analysis of fiscal federalism within nation states. We can learn from
the analysis of the ear-marking of taxes and from the literature on political economy.
The findings of this book will be of considerable interest to the development
community, including not only national governments, the UN, and bilateral and multi-
lateral agencies but also civil society. The ultimate aim is to help break the present
impasse in external finance for developing countries, and we believe that this study will
make an important contribution to the debate.
José Antonio Ocampo
Under-Secretary General
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At the Millennium Summit in September 2000, the states of the UN affirmed their
continued commitment to sustained development and the eradication of poverty. They
set out a vision of a global partnership for development, directed at the achievement of
specific targets. Specifically, the world’s leaders signed up to the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDGs) summarized in Box 1.1. The concrete goals include the halving
by 2015 of the proportion of people living in extreme poverty, the proportion hungry,
and the proportion lacking access to safe drinking water. The goals include the achieve-
ment of universal primary education and gender equality in education, the achievement
by 2015 of a three-fourths decline in maternal mortality and a two-thirds decline in
mortality among children under five. They include halting and reversing the spread
of HIV/AIDS and providing special assistance to AIDS orphans, while improving the
lives of 100 million slum dwellers.
Since the declaration of the MDGs, a number of attempts have been made to estimate
the financing requirements. In the case of Africa, achieving the MDGs implies an
increase in the per capita consumption of over half of its population in order to reach
a minimum of US$1 per day. To achieve that level of consumption, it is reckoned
that African and other low-income countries must, on the average, grow at 8 per cent
per annum for the period. UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development) (2000) judged it unlikely that the poor nations could find the resources
to finance such growth from the traditional sources, that is, domestic savings (both
private and public) and foreign savings (existing levels of official development assistance
(ODA) and private capital flows). This made it essential to identify sources of additional
financing, while boosting the capacity to generate further resources from the traditional
sources and improving the effectiveness with which financing is employed.
At a global level, taking all the above considerations into account, the Report of
the Panel chaired by President Zedillo (UN 2001) estimated conservatively that an
additional US$50 billion would be required annually to achieve the international
development goals. The Panel argued that there was a strong case for international
financing of global public goods, and identified the goods that fell in that category as
2 A.B. Atkinson




• Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people
whose income is less than US$1 a day
• Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people




• Ensure that by 2015 all children will be able to complete




• Eliminate gender disparity in all levels of education by
2015
Goal 4
Reduce child mortality • Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-
5 mortality rate
Goal 5




malaria and other diseases
• Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of
HIV/AIDS
• Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of




• Integrate principles of sustainable development into
country policies and reverse the loss of environmental
resources
• Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without
sustainable access to safe drinking water
• Have achieved, by 2020, a significant improvement in the





• Develop the world trading and financial system
• Address the special needs of the least developed and
landlocked and small island countries
• Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of devel-
oping countries
peacekeeping; the prevention of contagious diseases; research into tropical medicines,
vaccines, and agricultural crops; the prevention of chlorofluorocarbon emissions, the
limitation of carbon emissions, and the preservation of biodiversity. Thus, in addition
to the financing needs of individual poor nations, there is also the need to finance global
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public goods in achieving those goals. The provision of global public goods is covered
in depth by Kaul et al. (1999) and Kaul et al. (2003). The UK government (HM
Treasury and Department for International Development 2003: para 1.11) estimated
that to achieve primary schooling for all it needs some US$10 billion more each year;
that to reduce infant and maternal mortality requires an extra US$12 billion a year,
and that halving world poverty requires an investment of up to US$20 billion a year.
All such figures are estimates, and involve matters of judgement. More detailed
calculations are being made, disaggregated by individual countries. But it seems
reasonable for present purposes to take a figure of additional US$50 billion as being
required annually to achieve the international development goals. This is the ‘ballpark’
figure used in what follows. The aim of the analysis that follows is to investigate ways
in which such additional resources can be financed. Our focus is on flows of resources
from high-income to developing countries. In so concentrating, we are not denying
the importance of resources channelled into development by developing countries
themselves; nor are we seeking to under-play the potentially significant contribution
of middle-income countries to development funding.
The first major delimitation of our field is therefore that our spotlight is on the role
of rich countries. The second delimitation is that our primary concern is with the
funding side, not with the spending side. As is discussed below, the two cannot be
fully separated. Use of resources may affect their availability. The two sides may
be interdependent in that more effective use of funds may stimulate additional supply.
But our ultimate objective in this book is to analyse possible sources of funds.
1.1.1. Official Development Assistance
An important vehicle for financing development is ODA. The need for an additional
US$50 billion per year must be seen against the current level of ODA, which was US$57
billion in 2002. Of this total, a half was provided by the European Union and its mem-
bers, and a quarter was provided by the United States. As is well known, ODA stagnated
in the 1990s. As a proportion of the gross national income of donor countries, ODA
has fallen from 0.33 per cent in the mid-1980s to 0.23 per cent in 2002 (figures pub-
lished by the OECD—Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development—
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) for net official development assistance
from DAC countries to developing countries and multilateral organizations). Few
countries reach the UN target of 0.7 per cent of GNP for official assistance.
The Zedillo Report for the UN concluded, ‘the inescapable bottom line is that much
more funding is needed for official development assistance’ (UN 2001: 10). ‘Meeting
the International Development Goals alone would require almost double the current
ODA total of more than US$50 billion per year’ (UN 2001: 16). At the Monterrey
Conference on Financing for Development in March 2002, donor countries recognized
that they needed to set more ambitious targets for ODA. The EU prior to Monterrey
had committed itself to raising its ODA to 0.39 per cent of gross national income, from
the then figure of 0.33 per cent. Three countries have given firm dates to reach the
UN 0.7 per cent target: Belgium, France and Ireland. The US government announced
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that it was increasing its core development assistance by US$5 billion annually, these
increased funds being placed in a ‘new millennium challenge account’ (MCA). The
new account is distributed to developing countries showing a strong commitment to
‘good governance, health and education, and sound economic policies’. (The MCA is
discussed in Chapter 6.)
Viewed in relation to previous aid achievements and aspirations, the US$50 billion
increase seems quite feasible. As noted by the World Bank, ‘a return by donors to
their early-1990s average aid ratio of 0.33 per cent of GNP would provide an extra
US$20 billion’ (2001: 89). If the average could be raised to 0.5 per cent, then the
US$50 billion additional ODA would have been realized. The search for alternative
sources would become redundant. The ballpark target is less ambitious than asking
all G7 countries to reach the UN target of 0.7 per cent of GNP for official assistance.
Nor is an increase of ODA by existing donors the only route by which ODA could be
increased. The world distribution of income is changing. At present the DAC countries
of the OECD account for over 95 per cent of worldwide ODA disbursements, but the
future funding of development should take account of the growth of middle-income
countries, which can be expected to come into the equation.
The funding of the MDGs could be achieved solely by increasing ODA. At the same
time, it would require a step change from the present, going considerably beyond what
has so far been promised. Increasing public spending on development assistance is not
an easy political option. The widening of the circle of aid donors is going to take time.
Time is, however, of the essence. For this reason alone, it is necessary to consider new
sources.
1.2. NEW DEVELOPMENT FINANCE: INNOVATIVE
SOURCES
The gap between current ODA and the amounts required to meet the MDGs is a major
reason for looking at alternative sources of development funding. These are the subject
of this book. In the chapters that follow, we examine a number of ways in which new
funding can be generated. The purpose of the project is not to devise new schemes of
funding, of which there is already a bewildering variety. (Although some novel ideas,
such as the global premium bond, have emerged as part of our work.) Rather our main
aim is to consider some of the best known, examining their design and implications.
Specifically, we are considering (see Box 1.2):
— Global environmental taxes (carbon-use tax);
— Tax on currency flows (‘Tobin tax’);
— Creation of new Special Drawing Rights (SDRs);
— International Finance Facility (IFF);
— Increased private donations for development;
— Global lottery and global premium bond;
— Increased remittances from emigrants.
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Box 1.2. Innovative sources of development funding considered
Source
Global environmental taxes Tax on goods generating environmental externalities,
with specific reference to a tax on use of hydrocarbon
fuels according to their carbon content. See Pearce
(1991), Poterba (1991), and Cooper (1998).
Currency transactions tax
(‘Tobin tax’)
Tax on foreign currency transactions, collected on a
national or a market basis, covering a range of trans-
actions to be defined (spot, forward, future, swaps,
and other derivatives). See Haq et al. (1996), Spahn
(1996), Mendez (1997), Patomäki and Denys (2002).
Creation of new Special Drawing
Rights (SDRs)
Creation of SDRs for development purposes, with
donor countries making their SDR allocation avail-
able to fund development. See Soros (2002).
International Finance Facility
(IFF)
Long-term, but conditional, funding guaranteed to
the poorest countries by the donor countries. Long-
term pledges of a flow of annual payments to the
IFF would leverage additional money from the inter-
national capital markets. See HM Treasury and
Department for International Development (2003).
Increased private donations for
development
Charitable donations by private individuals and firms.
Measures to encourage private funding of develop-
ment: tax incentives, global funds, corporate giving,
and the Internet.
Global lottery or global premium
bond
Global lottery operated through national state-
operated and state-licensed lotteries, with proceeds
shared between national participants and an inde-
pendent foundation established in conjunction with
UN. See Ahde et al. (2002). Global premium bond,
parallel to national bonds with lottery prizes.
Increased remittances from
emigrants
Logistics (reducing cost of remittances), financial
institutions (encouraging repatriation) and citizen-
ship rather than residence basis for taxation. See
Bhagwati and Hamada (1982), Mirrlees (1982),
Bhagwati and Wilson (1989), and Solimano (2001).
A number of these sources have already been extensively discussed in the literature,
and we owe a considerable debt to earlier writing. Citations are given in Box 1.2, but
we should make specific reference here to the paper prepared by Clunies-Ross (1999)
for the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly in the
Year 2000, to the Technical Note prepared by the Department of Economic and Social
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Affairs (UN 2002) for the Monterrey Conference, and to the paper prepared for the
ILO Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalization by Clunies-Ross (2003).
It will be evident that our coverage is far from exhaustive. There are a number
of other global taxes that have been advanced. These include a ‘brain drain’ tax, an
international air transport tax, taxation of ocean fishing, taxation of arms exports, a ‘bit
tax’, and a luxury goods tax. Each of these warrants examination. We are not arguing
that the global taxes investigated here are superior to those not covered. Rather we have
taken two of the most widely discussed—the Tobin tax and environmental taxes—as
exemplars of the potential for global taxation. If we conclude that they can serve the
purpose of raising the necessary US$50 billion, this does not mean that these two
taxbases should be adopted in preference to others. Alternatives certainly need to be
explored. And if we conclude that the two taxes cannot, singly or jointly, serve the
purpose, then the other taxes will certainly have to come into play. In this sense, the
project is part of an evolving debate.
The innovative sources considered in this book are not confined to taxation. Two
of the proposals are close to ODA. The proposal for a new round of SDRs involves
the high-income countries in making these available for development purposes. The
UK government proposal for an IFF in effect involves a pre-commitment of future
ODA in a way that allows leveraging on the capital market. The remaining three
schemes involve a degree of voluntary choice by individuals. The choices range from
a voluntary transfer, as where people give their small change to UNICEF or make
regular payments to Oxfam, to buying tickets in a global lottery, where the transfer
of profits to development purposes is only a subsidiary motive. It includes proposals
to increase the remittances sent home by workers abroad, which, if channelled into
development purposes, can increase the flow of resources available for development.
Again, however, it should be stressed that the coverage of non-fiscal measures is not
exhaustive. We do not, for example, cover measures to raise capital funds in developed
countries or measures to leverage the funds arising from trade.
1.2.1. Classification of Proposals
The seven proposals may be classified in different ways. They differ in the extent to
which they represent a radical departure. The encouragement of private donations, or
of emigrants’ remittances, may lead to significant changes in scale, but the activities are
not new. There would be no major changes in the rules of the game. More radical is the
special SDR allocation by the IMF, which is novel to the extent that donor countries
would make their share available for development purposes. The IFF works through
ODA but would involve a new international treaty. In organizational terms, it would be
a significant change; and the extent of pre-commitment would be unprecedented. Both
of these proposals represent new uses of existing instruments. The most radical are
the global taxes and the global lottery/premium bond. These would be fundamental
departures.
The proposals can be classified according to the lead actors. The SDR allocation has
the IMF at centre stage, with national governments having to ratify the IMF proposals.
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The introduction of global taxes requires national governments to agree to act multi-
laterally, via a new or existing international organization. This may require universal
agreement, or may only require a subset of major countries to agree. In Chapter 2,
we explore some of the possibilities opened up by allowing for ‘flexible geometry’,
where countries may or may not participate. The key actors may be national organiza-
tions. The global lottery requires the collaboration of national lotteries. The key actors
may be individuals. Increased private donations and remittances will only happen if
individuals (or enterprises) decide to increase their contributions to development.
Although the use of funds is not our primary focus, the intermediation mechanism
is a valuable way of classifying the different proposals. In some cases, the source and
use are closely aligned. The destination of increased remittances is largely under the
control of the individual making the transfer. A worker in California sending money to
India may decide to finance her parents’ consumption or to fund the construction of
a village school. Charitable contributions by the citizens of rich countries are likely to
flow via non-governmental organizations (NGOs), allowing the individuals to decide
on their relative preferences for disaster relief or water development or agricultural
improvement or medical care. In these cases, it is likely that the amount given will
depend on the choice of uses. A good example has been debt for nature swaps, where
environmental NGOs like the Worldwide Fund for Nature have cancelled developing-
country debt in exchange for agreed conservation projects. Donors will doubtless
appreciate that funds are fungible, and recipients may offer commitment devices that
increase confidence that the funds are indeed ring-fenced. The governmental sources,
on the other hand, are likely to disburse funds through existing bilateral or multilateral
delivery channels. These may tie aid to particular uses or to the adoption of particular
policies. Much of the literature is sceptical about conditionality (e.g., see Kanbur 2000),
but this does not mean that conditionality cannot affect the willingness of donors to
make transfers. Here it is useful to separate the perceived effectiveness and the actual
effectiveness of the funds. The actual impact of a transfer may differ from that intended
because of misadministration or because funds are fungible, but as long as it remains
credible that there is a link between the transfer and the stated purpose, then donors
may continue to provide funding.
1.3. ORIGINS OF THE PROPOSALS
In this book, we consider the range of innovative proposals described above. We seek
to evaluate them according to a variety of criteria, and these criteria are explained
below. First, however, it is important to consider the political origins of the proposals.
Why are alternatives being sought to ODA? What is the basis of support for different
proposals? What is the political context? The proposals considered in this book were
not developed in a laboratory; they emerged from a political debate about global policy.
They are a product of summit meetings and of street demonstrations. Understanding
their origins and political context helps us in turn understand the form of the proposals
and their likely impact. It helps us predict their chance of being put into effect.
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If we start with global environmental taxes, then these have been championed on the
grounds that they yield a ‘double dividend’. Such an argument has been made at the
national level for corrective taxes on environmental external diseconomies (the damage
done to the environment). A tax on the consumption of goods, such as hydrocarbon
fuels, which harm the environment has a positive allocational effect, switching spending
away from polluting goods towards those causing less or no environmental damage. In
contrast to the usual case with taxes, such switching behaviour is desirable. So we have
both the revenue and the environmental gain. This is discussed further in Chapters 2
and 3, but for the present the important point is that the tax proposal is designed with
two purposes in mind. Revenue is only one objective. Indeed, if we succeed through
the Kyoto Agreement and other means in reducing the use of polluting fuels, then the
resources available for development will be reduced.
The Tobin tax is another clear example of such a double dividend argument. Indeed,
the second purpose historically came first. James Tobin first put forward the idea for
a currency transactions tax to enhance the efficacy of macroeconomic policy. The
subtitle of the book on The Tobin Tax, edited by Haq et al. (1996) was ‘Coping
with Financial Volatility’. The potential of the currency transactions tax as a gen-
erator of revenue was suggested ‘as a by-product of the proposed tax, not as its
principal purpose’ (Tobin 1996: x). This ancestry explains the differences in rates
proposed by different authors. As is made clear in Chapter 4, a rate of tax of 1
or 2 basis points may be considered too little sand to restrain the wheels of inter-
national finance but may generate revenue sufficient to make a significant difference
to development funding.
Ideas and policies have their time. Tobin (1996) reflected somewhat ruefully on the
fact that his 1978 proposal ‘did not make much of a ripple. In fact, one might say that
it sank like a rock’ (1996: x). A quarter of a century later, it features on many political
agendas. In considering the different proposals here, we have to bear in mind their
timing and dynamics. The adoption of the MDGs represents a moral commitment
from which governments will find it hard to withdraw. The poverty target is not a line
in the sand that will be gone with the next tide. This in turn means that the search for
revenue has acquired greater salience. Governments may reject particular proposals.
They may block multilateral action. But they cannot totally evade the question of
alternatives. As 2015 approaches, pressure will increase for results to be registered.
Just as policy goals have a degree of durability, so too policies themselves have a
high degree of persistence. This applies particularly to those reached after lengthy
inter-country negotiation, as is witnessed by the experience of the European Union.
The introduction of a global tax would not be easily reversed, if only because some of
the revenue would be necessary to finance the collection machinery. A global lottery
might be dismantled, but this would be a significant political reverse. In the case of the
IFF, there will be a succession of funding rounds, but the key feature of the proposal
is to pre-commit future flows of assistance. Future governments will not be able to go
back on the promises made today.
Proposals for new sources also find their origins in a search for alternatives to ODA.
Here it is helpful to distinguish three types of motive for seeking an alternative to
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increased ODA. The first is to reduce government spending. Many OECD govern-
ments are under pressure to reduce government deficits. In the case of the euro zone
countries, these pressures are institutionalized in the form of the Stability and Growth
Pact. The reactions of countries in this position will depend on the form of these
constraints. For example, the attractiveness of the IFF may depend on how the future
commitments appear in the government budget. The second concern is with the level
of taxation, which would need to rise to finance increased ODA. In this case, the
alternatives may not offer a solution. A globally administered Tobin tax may not enter
the government budget of a particular country, but it may contribute to the perceived
burden of doing business in that country. The profitability of London or Frankfurt
as financial centres, for example, might be reduced. Third, governments may be con-
cerned with ‘donor fatigue’ among their electorate. This would inhibit government
participation in the devising of new sources, as well as discouraging increased ODA.
Given the possible importance of such ‘fatigue’, it is significant that the OECD study
by McDonnell et al. (2003) reports that ‘public support in OECD DAC-member
countries for helping poor countries has remained consistently high for almost two
decades: there is no aid fatigue’ (2003: summary). They caution that concern remains
about effectiveness, and that public understanding of poverty and development issues
remains low. This is a further role for the present book: to contribute to public debate.
1.4. POLITICAL ECONOMY
This book is largely about the economics of new sources of finance for development,
but we need also to consider the political economy of new sources. The political
economy is important for at least three reasons. The first is that, as we have just seen,
politics influences the shape of the proposals. In the next chapter, we ask a number
of questions about the design of the proposals, and the answers reflect the political
context. Are the proceeds of a Tobin tax, for example, to be seen as a net addition
to the flow of resources or as an alternative to ODA? What is the fiscal architecture:
would global taxation be collected by national governments? The second reason for
examining the political economy is that it affects the economic consequences of the
new sources. The reaction of individuals and businesses to global taxes is influenced by
the degree to which the taxpayers accept the purposes for which the taxes are levied.
Avoidance and evasion are higher where the tax is regarded as unjustified. In a global
context, the economic impact of taxes and other measures depends on the actions
of national governments. The third reason is that the feasibility of new sources of
development finance is ultimately a political issue. Political acceptability should not be
a consideration that influences our economic analysis of given proposals, but it may
influence the choice of proposals to study.
The behaviour of the state, and its interactions with citizens, has long been an
important part of the subject matter of public economics. Analysis of public policy
has to take account of the process by which policy is made. We are, for example,
starting from a position where donor countries make significant transfers via ODA
and where the citizens of those countries make private donations. The co-existence
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of public and private transfers means that either the government is not providing
aid of the quantity and/or type that its electorate prefers or that there are differences
of views among voters. Citizens cannot spend less than their government chooses
but they can add private transfers to official aid. How, in such a context, can we
interpret the impact of the adoption of the MDGs? Have donor governments moved
closer to the level of ODA that their voters preferred? In that case, we might expect
the expansion of public transfers to be partially offset by a scaling back of private
donations. Have governments sought to bring about a shift in public opinion in favour
of increased support for development? In this case, we may even see an increased flow of
private donations. In the same way, we can ask how the innovative financing proposals
would enter into this equation. Are these new ideas a means to reduce the perceived
costs of development finance? Are the new institutions a vehicle for shifting national
political balances?
In evidence to the World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalization,
Clunies-Ross (2003) suggests that there are four factors that may reduce the political
cost of development funding. The first is where the revenue sources are not highly
visible. The global lottery may be an example, where participants are largely focused on
the possibility of winning. The second is the time required for legislation and negotiation.
Piloting a bill for a global tax through parliament may have a high political cost, whereas
measures to encourage private donations can be achieved without new laws. The third
is described by Clunies-Ross as the ‘two birds’ test: ‘the collection of revenue is itself
linked to the achievement of some widely desired end, such as a recognized global
public good, so that two birds can be killed with one stone’ (2003: 5). Finally, from a
national perspective, the cost is reduced when the effort is worldwide, and there are no
freeriders. Thus it may be feasible for the European Union, for example, to introduce a
currency transactions tax without the participation of the United States, but this may
run into political objections. Voters in the European Union may object to the Tobin
tax not being levied in the country of its inventor.
It should be emphasized that these considerations are positive statements about
political feasibility, not judgements about intrinsic desirability. Indeed, their desirabil-
ity can be questioned. Low visibility is not a property that would commend itself in an
open civil society. Legislation is a proper activity of democratic governments. A coun-
try’s policymakers should form their own judgements independently. There is a strong
normative element to political economy. Moreover, extension to a global stage raises
new normative issues. As is increasingly evident from public debate, there is question-
ing of the status of international organizations that are only indirectly accountable. If,
as we consider in this book, global taxes are to be introduced, then how are the taxpayers
to be represented? If tax revenue accrues to the UN or to international agencies, there
will be heightened pressure for democratic accountability. Falk (2002) has considered
how the UN could develop a people’s assembly. The political structure may therefore
itself be influenced by the introduction of new sources of development finance. Just as
at a national level, political structures may evolve in response to fiscal developments.
For these reasons, we do not allow considerations of political feasibility to dictate
the scope of our analysis of innovative sources. We cannot ignore the political context
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but one of the key roles of economic analysis is to spell out the menu of options. If
a politician asks which sandwiches are available, we should not leave the vegetarian
option off the list simply because we know that he comes from a cattle ranching state.
As put by Boadway, it is ‘inconsistent to rule out on a priori grounds options that are
normatively superior simply on the basis of a perception that the policy process itself
will choose not to adopt them’ (2002: 55). This does not mean that our analysis of the
consequences of a particular policy option should ignore the political context, for the
reasons given at the start of this section, but that we should not give it primacy.
Statements about political feasibility are, of course, predicated on a view about the
working of the political process. Consider, for instance, the proposition that the double
dividend argument strengthens the case for certain global taxes: the ‘two birds’ test.
This argument is related to the classic model of ‘logrolling’ where two politicians agree
to support each other’s pet projects. However, the logrolling model assumes a particular
distribution of benefits and losses from the projects, the former being concentrated
and the latter diffuse (Drazen 2000: 330). But the reverse may be true: the costs may be
largely borne by a small interest group, and the benefits widely dispersed. To be more
concrete, opening up two fronts also invites attack from both directions, particularly
if the two objectives require taxes at very different levels. In several of the proposals
considered here, the tax required for allocational reasons is likely to be considerably
higher than that needed to add significantly to development funding. The Tobin tax can
make a major contribution to raising revenue at a much lower rate than that suggested
as needed to stabilize exchange rates. (Taking this argument to the limit, we may note
that a carbon tax that reduced emissions to zero would be an environmental success but
a revenue failure.) The double dividend case risks attracting the hostility of opponents
of the exchange stabilizing level of taxation, who would not necessarily oppose the
much lower rate envisaged here. What is required is an analysis of the coalitions likely
to form in support or opposition of different proposals.
In what follows, our primary focus is on the economic impact of the different
proposals and on evaluation according to a set of economic criteria described in the
next section. But we have to take account of the political context, and recognize that
our analysis is itself part of the political process.
1.5. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION
The different proposals are here evaluated, in broad terms, according to the total, and
the distribution, of benefits and costs to the citizens of the world. Our analysis is an
application of global public economics (Chapter 10). The benefit is seen principally in
terms of securing funds for development, and the first question is whether the innov-
ative sources, singly or in conjunction, can raise in a guaranteed way the annual flow of
US$50 billion judged necessary to achieve the MDGs by 2015. How far is it feasible
to ensure a stable flow of substantial additional revenue from the proposed source?
‘Funds for development’ in turn raises the question of the relation between dollars
collected and development achieved. The meaning of ‘development’ is one of consider-
able subtlety, to which we cannot do justice here. The aim of the increased funding is to
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ensure a lasting rise in living standards broadly interpreted. ‘Broadly interpreted’ is very
much the spirit of the MDGs. The halving of extreme poverty is linked with improved
education and health, the empowerment of women, and environmental sustainabil-
ity. ‘Lasting’ means that the targets are to be reached in 2015 and then sustained.
The emphasis is on long-term investment to raise living standards. This means that
we have to ask how the use of funds differs across the different sources. Are private
donations more or less likely to contribute to investment than ODA? How far do emi-
grants’ remittances finance consumption rather than investment? Of course, current
consumption is of value. In that case, however, a continuing transfer is necessary.
Our primary focus is on the cost side, in that we are concerned with the economic
impact of the new sources and with the distribution of the burden. The impact may not
be immediately obvious. A new global tax will affect economic activity by households
and by enterprises. The reactions of those taxed may allow them to shift the burden
onto their customers or onto their workers or onto their shareholders. The reactions
may generate additional costs or may have positive economic outcomes. New sources
will affect—either negatively or positively—the efficiency of the working of the world
economy.
Who bears the cost is essential from the standpoint of assessing the justice or other-
wise of the proposed measures, and this too is a complex matter. To begin with, public
debate tends to think in terms of redistribution from rich to poor countries. But a
number of the proposed measures could potentially impose costs on people outside
rich countries. The Tobin tax would reduce the net sum received by the families of
migrant workers. A global lottery could attract customers from all round the world.
Nor is the world neatly divided. We have already drawn attention to the potential
role of middle-income countries. Even if the impact is confined to rich countries, we
have to worry about the distribution of the burden within those countries. An annual
flow of an extra US$50 billion is only a fifth of 1 per cent of the GNP of donor
countries, but there is no reason to suppose that the cost would be shared propor-
tionately. We need to ask how far it is the poor in rich countries that would bear the
burden.
1.6. GUIDE TO THE CONTENTS OF THE BOOK
The rest of the book contains three general chapters (Chapters 2, 10 and 11), seven
chapters (Chapters 3–9) considering separately the different innovative schemes
analysed here, and a concluding chapter (Chapter 12).
We believe that there are merits in setting different proposals alongside each other.
Such a joint analysis helps the reader assess their relative strengths and weaknesses.
We hope also that our book makes a contribution in terms of the methods of analysis.
This is the main function of Chapter 2 and Chapters 10–11, which approach the
question in a theoretical way, rather than examining individual proposals for sources
of funding. They may appear rather abstract to some readers, but there is considerable
value in standing back and asking hypothetical questions—such as (Chapter 11) what
would happen if there were a central world taxing authority? It may suggest new
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ways of viewing the problem. What is reality today was often hypothetical in the
past. These theoretical chapters deal with over-arching issues, and this is the title
of Chapter 2. Its aim is to set out a number of the common questions that arise
in considering sources of new revenue for development finance. These concern the
precise specification of the proposal, its relation with ODA, and the administrative
architecture.
The taxation of externalities is the subject of the first of the chapters examining
potential sources: Chapter 3 on environmental taxation. Much of the literature relates
to taxes as instruments of national environmental policy, and their role in relation
to economic development has been less discussed. The chapter begins therefore by
preparing the ground, setting out the welfare economics of environmental taxation
in a national context, including a detailed account of the double dividend issue. This
provides the basis for an analysis of global environmental taxation, with specific ref-
erence to the carbon tax. The second major proposal for global taxation considered
here is that for a currency transactions tax: the celebrated Tobin tax. As already noted,
Tobin first put forward the idea for a currency transactions tax as a means of combating
financial volatility. The potential of the currency transactions tax as a generator of rev-
enue was suggested as a by-product. Here, Chapter 4 focuses on the by-product: the
Tobin tax as a source of revenue for development. It examines the technical feasibility
and the revenue potential from this source.
There has long been a campaign for the issue of development-focused SDRs by
the IMF. The original purpose of SDRs was to increase international liquidity, but
Chapter 5 concentrates on the potential role of SDR creation in providing funds for
development finance. Calls have been made for developed countries to re-allocate their
share of the SDR issue to developing countries. The chapter describes the historical
development of SDRs and the recent proposals. It examines the arguments for and
against development-oriented SDRs, and the institutional mechanisms necessary for
their creation.
A starting point for this study was the observation that innovation in the sphere
of public finances has not kept up with innovation in private financial markets.
Making use of the latter to enhance the effectiveness of ODA is the essence of the
recent proposal for the IFF, which is the subject of Chapter 6. Taking the proposal
by the UK government as a case study, the chapter describes the possibility of a
limited duration substantial increase in ODA where the value is enhanced by pre-
commitment, allowing leverage by borrowing on the international capital markets. It
sets out the institutional machinery proposed, and assesses the potential advantages
and disadvantages.
Chapter 7 asks how far charitable donations by private individuals and firms can
contribute to funding the Millennium Development Goals. What are the prospects for
increasing donations for development, whether from small-scale donors, the super-
rich, or the corporate sector? Charitable giving in rich countries is very substantial:
in the US more than 1.5 per cent of national income. People give large amounts
of free time. Development, however, commands only a small share. The chapter
analyses the under-researched question as to how people determine the objects of
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their giving, drawing on other subjects, notably marketing. It asks why people give to
support the UN agencies, notably United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF), and
whether private donations are crowded-out by governmental contributions or by ODA.
It examines measures to encourage private funding of development: tax incentives,
Global funds, corporate giving, and the Internet.
A relatively new idea for new development funding is that of a global lottery, which
has received attention particularly on account of the recent proposal by the Crisis Man-
agement Initiative. World sales of gaming products are large and growing. Chapter 8
considers the prospects for tapping this market for the purposes of development finance
by means of a global lottery and—a new idea—a global premium bond (a loan instru-
ment where the interest takes the form of a lottery prize, the capital being repayable on
request). The chapter investigates the feasibility of these mechanisms and their poten-
tial as revenue sources for development. It assesses their strengths and weaknesses,
including both economic and ethical issues.
Remittances from migrants are a growing force, and Chapter 9 considers the role
that they can play in financing development. To an important extent, they finance
consumption. As Chapter 11 notes, they are an international mechanism of social
protection based on private transfers. They can also contribute to financing investment,
providing community infrastructure (such as schools) and funds for the financing of
new enterprises. The chapter considers the motives for making such remittances, and
the problems of measuring their extent. Remittances are channelled through a variety
of financial entities, ranging from the formal to the highly informal. The chapter
considers policies to reduce the cost of remittances and to enhance their development
potential.
One purpose of our study is to bring to bear the accumulated knowledge in the field
of national public finance, and more generally public economics. It is for this reason
that, in thinking how the subject can be taken forward, we have included Chapter 10
on global public finance and Chapter 11 on the lessons from the fiscal federalism
literature. The former considers the lessons from optimal tax design when applied at
a global level. The latter chapter highlights some of the similarities and some of the
differences between fiscal institutions in federations and those that might apply in a
global setting. It draws a number of conclusions about sources of new revenues for
development, dealing specifically with taxes on nations, taxes on global externalities,
and taxes on internationally mobile taxbases.
Chapter 12, which is the final chapter, summarizes the key points to emerge and
considers the way forward.
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Proposals for new sources of development finance are considered in detail in the
chapters that follow. Each of them raises a number of distinct issues, which are properly
discussed in the individual chapters. But there are also over-arching issues. What is
the role of new sources in relation to existing official development assistance (ODA)?
Should we be seeking new sources that generate a double dividend? Can the key elem-
ents of a proposal be achieved by another route? It is with these general concerns that
the present chapter deals. Its aim is to set out a number of the common questions that
arise in considering sources of new revenue for development finance.
One purpose of our study is to bring to bear on global public finance the accumulated
knowledge in the field of national public finance, and more generally public econom-
ics. This process is two-way. Public economics has increasingly had an international
dimension, as evidenced by the founding in the early 1990s of the journal International
Tax and Public Finance. There has been a close link between public economics and
development planning. However, changes in the world economy mean that a global
perspective has to be built in from the start. For both national governments and for
individual households and firms, we need to analyse public policy taking account of
the inter-relations between countries. As was observed by Mendez, ‘a critical element
lacking in the fields of finance and international relations is a theory and system of
international public finance’ (1992: 11).
The application of the public economics approach leads one to ask a number of key
questions. Those considered here are set out in the titles of Sections 2.2–2.6. The aim
is not to provide definitive answers, but to clarify the questions being asked and to
suggest possible answers that are not immediately apparent. To illustrate the issues,
I refer at different points to the seven schemes studied in this book. There is of course
a risk that by considering together such disparate measures we may be confounding
the issues. The different instruments raise different concerns. However, one of the key
lessons of modern public economics is that it is often valuable—indeed necessary—to
consider within a common framework different forms of government policy. The first
two questions concern the specification of the proposals; the remaining three questions
involve the economic impact of the proposals. In each case, precision requires a degree
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of economic reasoning, but every attempt has been made to render this accessible.
Bearing in mind the dictum of Stephen Hawking that each equation halves the number
of readers, there are no equations.
2.2. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF NEW SOURCES?
The first question we need to address is the relation between new sources of devel-
opment finance and an expansion of ODA. Are these to be seen as alternatives? As
we have seen in Chapter 1, many proponents of new sources view them as a way of
achieving an increased flow of development resources without recourse to increased
ODA. Other people see this as a reason for opposing the exploration of new sources:
Tobin taxes or other new schemes would, on this view, weaken the resolve of rich coun-
tries to meet the UN ODA target. Alternatively, the new sources would ‘crowd out’
other forms of finance. The new global lottery may generate new revenue but reduce
the receipts of existing lotteries that have been used to fund development projects.
According to this school of thought, the new sources should be a net addition to the flows
of ODA.
In this book, both kinds of argument are treated, and it is important to distinguish
between the case where the new sources are a net addition to the total of development
resources and the case where they are a substitute for ODA. Figure 2.1 seeks to clarify
the issue. We are agreed that additional resources are required to meet the development
targets. This involves moving from the starting point O in Fig. 2.1. This could be
achieved by increased ODA, moving from O to B horizontally in Fig. 2.1. Alternatively,
it could be achieved by exploiting new sources, which is the move from O to A vertically
in Fig. 2.1. In both cases, we have a package of increased resource flows and increased













Figure 2.1. Net addition to development resources or alternative source
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may contrast them with increased ODA. They may say that, holding the total transfer
constant, the position A is better or worse than the position B.
The importance of distinguishing between the two types of movement illustrated
in Fig. 2.1 is a key lesson from the public finance literature. The incidence of taxation
depends on what else is being varied at the same time. As Musgrave set out in his
classic Theory of Public Finance (1959), one possibility is ‘tax/expenditure incidence’,
where revenue is increased and spending goes up by the same amount. As shown in
Fig. 2.1, the introduction of new sources involves moving vertically. ODA remains
unchanged and the benefit from the additional revenue is seen in the contribution to
development goals. In this case, we have to consider the effectiveness of aid in achieving
these goals and the absorptive capacity of the recipient countries. Alternatively, we can
move along a line holding development-spending constant, while varying the sources of
funding. In Musgrave’s terminology, this is ‘differential tax incidence’: the differential
implications of different means of securing a given flow of resources. For example, if a
global Tobin tax raises new revenue, and this is used to reduce the need for additional
ODA, then it allows domestic taxation to be lower. The case for the new tax then turns
on the differential impact of the two kinds of taxation—and their relative political
appeal.
The distinction between two different types of incidence is drawn from the taxation
literature, but similar questions arise with other proposals for new sources. Consider
the global lottery discussed in Chapter 8. Opponents criticize this proposal on the
grounds that the burden falls predominantly on poorer people in rich countries and on
poor countries, whereas the cost of ODA financed through income taxation is borne
by the better off. This distributional analysis relates to a differential analysis of sub-
stituting a global lottery for increased ODA (moving from B to A in Fig. 2.1). In
contrast, a global lottery as an addition to existing funding may have quite different
implications. The transfer from rich countries may be distributionally progressive in
world terms, and the redistribution within the rest of the world may favour devel-
opment. We may think differently about a lottery that moves us from O to A than
about one which moves us from B to A. The International Finance Facility (IFF),
discussed in Chapter 6, involves an increase in ODA but of limited duration, timed to
achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015, and donors making a
pre-commitment, so that the promises can be ‘banked’. We can consider the proposal
either as a net addition to existing ODA (moving from O to A) or compare it with the
alternative of a steady annual flow of ‘un-precommitted’ ODA of the same present value
(comparing A and B).
2.2.1. Conclusion
When considering innovative sources, we need to be clear whether they are seen as a
complement to expanding ODA or as an alternative. In the former situation, the case
has to be made in terms of enhanced funding for development; in the latter situation,
the case is being made that the innovative sources are a better way of funding a given
development effort.
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2.3. WHAT FISCAL ARCHITECTURE?
New sources of development finance potentially involve a number of actors. In some
cases, private individuals acting alone, like Ted Turner, or the person putting coins in
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Change for Good envelope, can make
the key decision. In many cases, national governments are involved. They can simply
involve a country acting unilaterally. A single country could provide matching funds
for private funding of development by its citizens. A government could decide that a
fraction of the proceeds from its state lottery is to be allocated to development aid. A
country acting unilaterally could decide to allow emigrants’ remittances as a deductible
item against its national income tax. But in most cases, it is envisaged that there would
be a multilateral agreement. Indeed, in the case of the creation of new Special Drawing
Rights (SDRs), the constitution of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) requires
a super-majority (85 per cent) of members to ratify the agreement before it can be
put into effect. Where the source involves multilateral action, then two questions arise
under the general heading of ‘architecture’. In discussing this, I am presupposing
that the participating countries have agreed on the form and scale of the action to
be undertaken. What we are considering is the shape of the necessary institutions.
(The political economy of countries acting together has already been considered in
Chapter 1.)
2.3.1. Flexible Geometry
The first question is: Does the success and effectiveness of any particular proposal
depend on complete adhesion of all countries or all donor countries? The natural
instinct of many people is to assume that there is an inherent freerider problem and
that there has to be general, if not universal, agreement. In the present climate, with
multilateralism under question, this presumption provides grounds for pessimism
about the chances of making progress.
On the other hand, suppose that we start from the position that universal agree-
ment may be impossible and examine the implications of going ahead with a subset of
countries. The United States has so far prevented the creation by the IMF of SDRs,
and in this case, no action seems possible. But it does not follow that other measures
are also blocked. With the other six proposals, it would be possible, at least theor-
etically, for progress to be made even without the agreement of all major countries.
Here we can learn from the internal experience of the European Union. The European
Union has in the past faced situations where one member state chose to ‘opt out’
of collective decisions. In these circumstances, flexibility in the resulting institutions
has allowed the majority to respect the opting-out decision but still make progress
towards the majority objectives. Partial adhesion has had costs. For instance, a member
state opting-out of social protection may (or may not) enjoy a competitive advantage,
exporting unemployment to the rest of the Union. These costs have to be placed in
the balance. But the issue becomes one of balance, rather than of an absolute block on
action.
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We have to ask therefore in the case of each proposal whether we can in fact have a
‘flexible geometry’, where it is viable to go ahead with a subset of countries? The likely
answer to this question varies from one proposal to another. The costs of incomplete
coverage depend on the nature of the source of funding. Failure of countries to parti-
cipate in the International Finance Facility (IFF) means that the scale of the operation
is reduced, but the proposal is not undermined. The same applies to the global lottery,
or the global premium bond; indeed insofar as these schemes offer a new product (see
Chapter 8), those not participating may lose out. With global taxation, the free-riding
problems become potentially more significant. Significant opting-out from a global
carbon tax may erode the taxbase, as producers relocate to non-participating coun-
tries, and expose participating countries to intense lobbying from domestic interests.
With a currency transactions tax, ease of relocation of financial activity depends on
how extensive is the taxing jurisdiction. The larger the jurisdiction, the less elastic the
response, and hence the greater the revenue potential.
2.3.2. Fiscal Architecture
The second question concerns the institutional arrangements under which multilateral
action takes place. Where countries are acting in concert, then the organizational struc-
ture is important, as is illustrated in this section by reference to global taxation. A flow
chart for national taxation is shown schematically in Fig. 2.2. National governments
determine the rates of taxation and the taxbase. Individual taxpayers pay the taxes to
the government, which both enforces payment and is in turn accountable to the elect-
orate. Many taxes involve intermediary agents. The individual taxpayer, for example,
pays the aircraft departure tax to the airline, which then accounts for the revenue to
the government. Employers collect payroll taxes. Retailers or wholesalers collect excise
taxes.
One evidently cannot apply exactly the same process to global taxation (Fig. 2.3).
We have both global institutions and national governments, and it is the latter which
have to agree to the taxes being levied and which are accountable to their electorates.
It could indeed be that the global tax is treated as simply a glorified domestic tax, with




































Figure 2.3. Fiscal architecture in global setting
heavy lines in Fig. 2.3). But there are more possibilities, as shown by the dashed and
dotted lines. If there were an international air transport tax determined at the global
level, then the airline could transfer the money, not to the national government, but
to a global tax authority, in which case the new source of finance would bring a new
actor into play. The dashed lines in Fig. 2.3 show this. Whether or not such a world
tax authority is envisaged is one of the questions that have to be considered. (This may
be different from an international tax organization, see Tanzi 1999.) The feasibility
of creating such a tax authority depends on the universe of taxpayers. In the case
of airlines, there is already an international organization (IATA—International Air
Transport Association) and the international air travel tax could be collected by this
body. A world tax authority could not deal with taxes paid by individual households,
but one could envisage it operating a tax levied on multinational corporations, which
would have to be registered where their cross-border activity exceeded a certain amount
(just as there is an exemption level for VAT registration in national systems). In the
literature on the corporation tax, one of the arguments for such a taxbase is that the
status of incorporation confers benefits on organizations adopting this legal form. It is
normally agreed that this does not justify present levels of corporate income taxation,
but a more modest rate of global corporation tax could be seen as a form of benefit
taxation for engaging in cross-border economic activity.
Moving in the opposite direction from the introduction of a world tax authority
is the case shown by dotted lines in Fig. 2.3, where national governments retain not
only control over the administration of the tax process but also discretion over the
tax rates. In this case, participating governments would agree on their national tax
liability but retain freedom to decide how the revenue is to be raised. This would
in effect be applying the principle of subsidiarity adopted by the European Union.
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To give a concrete illustration, suppose that the participating governments agree that
each country should pay a tax related to national carbon emissions. This determines
the amount that each participating country has to pay, but the national government
would remain free to raise the revenue in whatever manner it thought fit. The national
government might consider, for example, that a tax on air journeys was unfair on
those living in remote rural areas, and choose for domestic reasons a different taxbase.
We would then have a two-tier structure, with the national tax obligation requirement
being agreed multilaterally, but the tax implementation being chosen locally. Countries
with more emissions would pay more total tax, but this would not necessarily mean
higher fuel taxes. Income tax or a broad-based VAT could be raised instead. One reason
why, under the subsidiarity architecture, a national government may choose a different
taxbase is that it faces political opposition to a particular form of taxation. The fuel tax
protests of 2000 in Europe provide a good illustration.
2.3.3. Fiscal Federalism
The United States and other federal states, such as Canada and Australia, came into
existence by a voluntary adhesion of previously sovereign states. The formation of the
United States of America represented a pooling of sovereignty, just as the acceptance
of a global responsibility for development involves some limitation on the freedom of
action of national governments. This leads us to ask what lessons we can learn from the
extensive literature on fiscal federalism, and this is the subject of Chapter 11. The reader
may object that fiscal federations involve a degree of symmetry among participants that
invalidates the application to the global context, where it is the inherent asymmetry in
the world that generates the very problem with which we are concerned. But many of
the federations that came into existence involved participating states that were unequal
to a significant—if not the same—extent. Much of the debate about federal finance is
concerned with the treatment of unequals: the design of equalization formulae.
2.3.4. Conclusions
Proposals for new forms of development funding raise important issues of institutional
shape. In designing the architecture of global fiscal system, there is considerable scope
for choice and it should not be assumed that all depends on universal support by donor
countries. As the references to ‘flexible geometry’ and to ‘subsidiarity’ illustrate, we
can learn usefully about the range of alternatives from the experience of supranational
groupings such as the European Union. The parallel with the public finances of federal
states seems worth exploring.
2.4. LEAKY BUCKET OR DOUBLE DIVIDEND?
As Arthur Okun expressed it in his book Equality and Efficiency (1975), transfers are
made using a leaky bucket. To raise US$10 billion for new development purposes may
cost more than US$10 billion. Put another way, the marginal cost of US$1 extra public
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funds for development may be more than US$1, because taxes and other interventions
distort economic decisions. ‘The cake gets smaller as we seek to share it out.’ On the
other hand, there are arguments, usually put under the banner of ‘double dividend’, that
there may be efficiency gains, so that the amount in the bucket is actually increased.
And the literature on the marginal cost of public funds has shown that there are
circumstances when the marginal cost of US$1 extra funds is less than US$1 (see
Atkinson and Stern 1974; Fullerton 1991; Sandmo 1998). In this section, I consider
these two different perspectives.
Why are buckets leaky? The first source of leakage is the cost of administration.
Currency transactors may pay $X billion in tax but $(X−A) billion is the net revenue,
where A is the cost of operating the tax collection and enforcement agencies. It may,
for this reason, be preferable to raise an existing tax, such as income tax, rather than
to institute new taxes with all the fixed costs of administration. The second source
of leakage is that a new revenue source may crowd out other sources of development
funding. One of the lessons of public finance is that in calculating the change in revenue
resulting from an increase in one tax, one has to take account of the possible impact on
the revenue from other taxes. A good example would be an international tourist tax (not
considered in this study). As Clunies-Ross (1999) points out, tourism is an important
source of government revenue for a number of poor countries. To the extent that
visiting tourists have less to spend after they have paid the tourist tax, these countries
will be receiving less sales tax on the purchases made by tourists and would have to be
compensated before the tax yields net additional revenue. Similarly, the introduction
of a global lottery will affect national budgets. Part of the customer base will be drawn
from existing national state lotteries, reducing their revenue. Part will be drawn from
spending on private gambling subject to national taxes, so that fiscal revenue will fall.
But these are not the only potential leakages. Most taxes have an impact on the
decisions of taxpayers apart from the pure effect of reducing their incomes. An income
tax may cause people to work less hard, or it may cause them to work harder to
maintain their level of expenditure. In the conventional public finance format, there is a
deadweight loss, or excess burden associated with taxation. The currency transactions
tax causes people to avoid activities that attract the tax. They will, for example, be
inhibited from switching their investment portfolio away from domestic securities
towards those denominated in other currencies. This has an efficiency cost, since they
are not allocating their investments according to the return at the margin. In the case
of the income tax, the choice between income and leisure is distorted (this applies
whether the tax causes the person to work more or to work less). Moreover, there is
a presumption that the distortionary cost increases with the tax rate. The distortion
is much more significant with a transactions tax rate of 20 basis points (0.2 per cent)
than for one with a rate of 2 basis points (0.02 per cent). This may be an argument for
seeking a new taxbase, rather than increasing existing taxes such as income tax. If one
adds to an already high tax, then the efficiency loss is larger.
Adjustments in behaviour, in turn, may induce market reactions. If a tax on carbon
use is passed on in higher consumer prices, then demand will shift away from goods
that are intensive in their direct or indirect use of fuels. This will make worse off those
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people who cannot shift easily from working in those industries, as well as those whose
budgets are particularly weighted towards those goods. The ultimate incidence of the
tax may be rather different from its initial incidence. In order to establish this, we need
to follow through the full general equilibrium effects, allowing for market clearing.
There may be effects on prices, as discussed in Section 2.4.
2.4.1. A Double Dividend?
The standard analysis of tax incidence is indeed based on examining a world of perfectly
competitive, perfectly functioning markets. In such a ‘first-best’ context, government
intervention—whatever its distributional advantages—has an efficiency cost. In the
currency transactions tax example, if it were not for the tax the market would be
efficient. The economies of the world are not, however, well characterized by perfectly
competitive, perfectly functioning markets, and one of the major contributions of
modern public economics has been to explore the implications of market failure. This
has led to arguments that taxes may serve a corrective function: that the excess burden
may become a benefit. The classic example is a corrective tax on environmental external
diseconomies. A tax on the consumption of goods that harm the environment has a
positive allocational effect, switching spending away from polluting goods towards
those causing less or no environmental damage. In these circumstances, switching
behaviour is desirable. Moreover, if the revenue is used to reduce other taxes that have
a negative allocational effect, we have a ‘double dividend’ (for overviews, see Goulder
1995; Sandmo 2000).
The double dividend can arise in the present case in two ways. If the new source is
seen as an alternative to ODA, then it can both make its own efficiency contribution
and allow a reduction in the taxes presently used to finance ODA. This is a good
example of the differential incidence argument in operation. Taxing air transport will
not only reduce the environmental damage of tourism but also allow the income tax to
be reduced, so making staying in the office financially more attractive at the margin.
Taxing carbon may allow payroll taxes to be reduced, leading to a fall in unemployment.
There is an ‘employment dividend’ as well as an ‘environmental dividend’. The second
possibility is that the new source is a net addition to development resources. In this
case, the double dividend consists of the reduced environmental damage and the benefit
from achieving the development goals.
2.4.2. Questioning the Double Dividend Argument
The double dividend idea appeals to the imagination. However, one has to ask why, if
a new revenue source can generate a positive sum outcome, have national governments
not already adopted such a policy? Why do Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) countries not operate lotteries to raise funds to finance
their ODA? If a carbon use tax would reduce external diseconomies, why is this not
already reflected in domestic taxes? If governments could reduce unemployment by a
switch in taxation, why have they not already done so? To this central question, there
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are several responses. Here I consider two. First, in a dynamic world there may well
be unexploited opportunities. Second, it may be that the dividend is global rather than
national.
In a dynamic world, new opportunities are always arising and reaction speeds are
not instantaneous. It takes time for new policy needs to become apparent and for
governments to react. A good example is provided in the present context by the issue
of remittances. The arrival of immigrant workers in a city creates a demand for money
transfer services. If entry into this industry is slow, then a few firms, able to extract
monopoly rents, may dominate it in the early stages. Government policy to encourage
competition in the sector can increase the proportion of the transfer that arrives in the
destination country. In this case, competition policy may combine with development
policy to yield a positive sum outcome.
2.4.3. A Global Double Dividend?
National governments may not impose corrective taxes because the benefits accrue dis-
proportionately outside their boundaries. The switch from general taxation to carbon
use taxation may be positive sum globally but negative sum nationally. The revenue
calculations of governments take account only of receipts and payments to the national
treasury. The impact of spillovers from one state to another is a staple of fiscal federal-
ism. Under certain circumstances, local governments may under-supply public goods
that benefit people living outside their borders; and they may over-tax where taxpayers
come from outside. There are fiscal externalities. In the present case, there is a possible
under-supply of fiscal correction to external diseconomies because the costs spill over
to others. It could be said that we have externalities squared: there is a possible under-
supply of fiscal correction to external diseconomies because there are externalities in
these very costs.
How is this potential argument for additional environmental taxation affected by the
fiscal architecture? We are presupposing that the tax is indeed levied on individuals and
firms in the form of a carbon levy (or other environmental taxbase). Suppose, however,
that we have subsidiarity, where the burden on national governments is determined by
their carbon emissions, but the national governments are free to decide how to raise the
revenue. As noted above, they may for political or other reasons choose another taxbase.
It is still, however, the case that the government faces a financial incentive to reduce
its emissions by other policies, such as auctioning emission permits or regulation.
2.4.4. Conclusion
The calculation of the leakage, or extra dividend, is a complex matter. Depending on
the circumstances, it may strengthen or weaken the case for new sources as opposed
to existing taxes. The framework needs to be broadened to recognize the departures
of real-world economies from the textbook world of perfectly competitive, perfectly
clearing markets with full information. These departures may mean that there is a
double dividend, where new taxes have a beneficial impact on resource allocation.
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Moreover, the double dividend may be global in character, not taken fully into account
in national decisionmaking.
2.5. IS THERE A TRANSFER PROBLEM?
Economists worry about the effect of policy changes on market prices. A substantial
resource transfer between countries may lead to changes in the prices of different
goods—those exported and imported, and those not traded—that have implications
for recipient and donor countries. These price changes may undermine, or re-enforce,
the benefits from the original transfer.
Keynes (1929) addressed this problem after the First World War, when he was
concerned with the impact of reparations being paid by Germany. He identified the
‘transfer problem’ that a country making a transfer might suffer an additional loss
through a shift in demand against their products, causing the terms of trade to turn
against them. The ‘terms of trade’ refer to the price of a country’s exports divided by the
price of its imports. If the terms of trade worsen, then a country has to export more units
to get the same number of units of imports. Applied to transfers for development, this
would mean that the recipient countries could enjoy a further benefit from improved
terms of trade, if demand switches towards the products they produce. As clarified by
Ohlin (1929) and subsequent writers (see Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1983: Lecture 12;
Brakman and van Marrewijk 1998: chapter 2), international trade theory shows that
the direction of the terms-of-trade effect depends on the relative marginal propensities
to consume in the donor and recipient countries (how much out of an additional US$1
of income is spent on home and on imported goods) and the magnitude depends on
the price elasticities.
It may be tempting to dismiss the terms-of-trade effects as of only footnote import-
ance. However, international trade economists take them seriously. Referring to the
inflows of loans to the United States in the early 1980s, Krugman and Obstfeld say
‘the transfer effect was a major contributor to the large temporary improvement in the
US terms of trade’ (1994: 102). According to them, US residents spend about 80 cents
of a dollar of additional income on US goods, whereas foreign residents spend only
10 cents. What then is the relevance of the transfer problem in the present context?
First, it should be noted that, as far as the impact on recipient countries is concerned,
the issue is only relevant when new sources of funding are a net addition. (When con-
sidering the differential effect of new sources versus increased ODA, the total size of
the transfer is assumed constant.) The transfer problem arises when we contemplate
increasing the scale of transfers. In that case, we have to consider the use made of
the funds. Here the balance between investment and consumption may be significant.
If the transfer is largely used to fund investment, then the pattern of demand may
shift towards manufactured capital goods exported by the donor countries. (This is
of course one of the possible functions of the practice of tying aid.) Account has also
to be taken of the intertemporal impact. If there is a process of catch up over time,
then the production possibilities of developing countries will come to resemble more
closely those of rich countries, and the terms-of-trade effects will become smaller. If
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the pattern of transfers is brought forward, as with the IFF, then the terms-of-trade
effect may be accentuated relative to a smoother time path. This may not outweigh the
advantage of earlier disbursement, but needs to be put into the balance.
The transfer problem also potentially affects the donor countries, and this may be
the case even when the total transfer is held constant. If we consider the differential
effect of new sources and increased ODA, then they may impact on different income
groups. In her analysis of the transfer problem, Chichilnisky (1980) distinguished
two income groups in the donor country, and identified circumstances in which the
recipient country only gained if the poorer group in the donor country were made
worse off. Reduced international inequality was achieved at the expense of increased
within-country inequality. Put differently, this is another example of the possibility
that, when we allow for the changes in market-clearing prices, the ultimate incidence
of a new source of funding may differ from the initial incidence.
2.5.1. Absorption and the ‘Dutch Disease’
For a small developing country, with no specific natural resources, it may appear
fanciful to suppose that its receipt of increased aid could affect the world prices for
the goods it exports and imports. As commonly assumed in economic analysis, many
countries are ‘small’, facing fixed world prices. If they wish to import new investment
goods, then there is an unlimited supply on the world market. In this sense, there is no
problem of ‘absorbing’ the increased flow of funds.
The position is, however, different once we allow for non-traded goods or services,
the prices of which reflect domestic supply and demand (see Corden and Neary 1982).
To the extent that the transfer increases demand for the non-traded good, its price
tends to rise. There is a real appreciation, in that domestic goods/services become
more expensive relative to the goods traded on the world market. This can cause the
movement of labour out of the sectors producing traded goods. This movement is
in the reverse direction from that required for development and worsens the foreign
balance. As is noted in Chapters 6 and 9, domestic policy has to take account of the
possible impact on domestic demand and inflation. As with the transfer problem, the
issue potentially applies to all proposals for increased transfers of aid.
2.5.2. Stimulus to World Economy
The treatment by Keynes of the transfer problem was ‘notable . . . for the classical, or
pre-Keynesian, way he analysed the problem, concentrating on relative price move-
ments’ (Skidelsky 1992: 309). The existence of involuntary unemployment and excess
capacity can, however, change the conclusions, in that the responses may be purely in
terms of expanded output, not price changes. One of the arguments for the creation of
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) is indeed that they would provide a macroeconomic
stimulus to the world economy. This depends on the extent to which the transfers of
SDR allocations from rich to poor countries lead the latter to increase spending. Clark
and Polak (2002) argue that a regular allocation will not lead to a rise in spending, most
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countries adding to their reserves (which in itself has a development benefit), but this
may not apply where there are substantial transfers of SDRs to poor countries.
Macroeconomic stimulus is another form of potential double dividend. Again,
we have to explain why this cannot already be achieved. The macroeconomic lit-
erature has extensively discussed the problem of international policy coordination
failure. The existence of failure does not mean that policy coordination necessarily
leads to efficiency gains, but it is possible that there may be a global positive sum
outcome to a creation of additional liquidity. Global spillovers apply at the mac-
roeconomic as well as the microeconomic level. More concretely, those European
governments seeking a way to re-stimulate their economies should be particularly
aware of the potential mutual benefit. Increased flows of resources for development,
generating additional world demand, may allow Europe to escape the constraints of its
macro-policymaking.
2.5.3. Conclusions
Consideration of the effect of new sources of finance takes us into the working of
the international economy. Substantial transfers may lead to changes in the terms
of trade with implications for both recipient and donor countries. They may affect
the relative prices of traded and non-traded goods, causing domestic inflation. Even
holding the level of transfers constant, different sources of funding and different
timing of the flows may have different effects on demand patterns. Once we allow for
involuntary unemployment and excess capacity, there may be a global double dividend
through stimulus to the world economy. Such a macroeconomic bonus would benefit
both developing and developed countries.
2.6. EQUIVALENT MEASURES?
Policy tools may look different but have equivalent effects. International trade theory
and public finance have demonstrated a number of important equivalences. A govern-
ment can set a tariff on the import of a commodity, or it can set a quota and auction
the import permits. If the quota is set at the level of imports generated by the tariff,
then in a competitive economy the impact is the same, including the revenue to the
government. An income tax with an exemption of all savings is equivalent to a uni-
form value-added tax (see Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980). Such equivalences operate at
the level of the impact on individuals and firms. It is, of course, quite possible that
individuals and firms perceive them differently (an example is given below) and that
their economic consequences are different. Moreover, the political attractiveness may
be quite different. Recasting a proposal in an equivalent form may convert it from an
election-loser to a vote-winner.
In the present context, consideration of such equivalences may allow one to see
existing proposals in a new light or the creation of new ideas. Pursuing the parallel
with tariffs and quotas, we can see for instance that there is a potential equivalence
between a global carbon tax, considered in Chapter 3, and the auction of tradeable
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permits (see Pearson 2000; Sandmo 2000). Attention has focused on the global carbon
tax, but another possibility is to auction permits, to produce the same level of revenue,
and, in a world of certainty and perfect competition, the same level of pollution.
There are reasons why in reality the two approaches may differ, but we need to ask,
when considering the global carbon tax proposal, whether it is clearly superior to the
alternative of auctioning permits.
A second example is provided by the discussion of the global lottery in Chapter 8.
The authors come up with the novel alternative proposal of a global premium bond,
which is a government bond where the capital is maintained (in money terms) but the
interest takes the form of lottery prizes. Experience in the United Kingdom suggests
that this appeals to a different market, with the middle- and upper-income groups
participating whereas they do not play the national lottery. Yet, the premium bond
is financially equivalent as a transaction to placing money in a regular savings bank
and drawing out the interest each month to buy lottery tickets. There are, of course,
differences in the prize structure and level, and in the tax treatment, but we need to
ask what lies behind the differences in reaction.
The third example concerns the IFF. Understanding this imaginative proposal is
aided by considering whether or not it is equivalent to a particular time path of ODA. As
noted earlier, it involves bringing forward the disbursement of funds, but it goes beyond
a variation in the time shape in that donors are precommitted. We have therefore to ask
how far the guarantee of funding by donor countries increases the net value of ODA.
How much net additional resources are generated by the certainty of underwritten
flows rather than annual allocations by donor governments?
2.6.1. Conclusions
Consideration of the equivalence of different policy instruments is a good discipline
and a source of new ideas. For each proposal, we have to consider how far there are
equivalent ways of achieving the same objectives.
2.7. CONCLUSION: CONTRIBUTION TO
THE POLICY DEBATE
The answers given to the questions posed in this chapter have been given in the
conclusions to each section. I hope that they will help provide the reader with a
framework to assess the contributions of the different proposals analysed in the next
seven chapters. Here I end with a reflection on the role of economic analysis in the
policy debate. As discussed in Chapter 1, the proposals for new sources of devel-
opment funding have to be seen in a political context. They have been put forward
in the light of political objectives and perceived constraints. This does not imply
that economic analysis should accept these objectives uncritically or that it should be
bound by these constraints (see Boadway 2002). But economic analysis has a role to
play in elucidating the implications of proposals for the achievement of the professed
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objectives, and in identifying the costs of political constraints. We might, for example,
conclude that the constraint that the taxbase be chosen by national governments,
weakens the contribution of a carbon tax to environmental goals and hence reduces
the double dividend. We might, for example, conclude that the objectives of the global
lottery are better served by designing a prize structure that does not compete with
that of national lotteries. Analysis of this type is intended to contribute to the public
debate.
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This chapter considers the possible role of environmental taxes for economic devel-
opment. This role is quite complex and has not so far been widely discussed in
the literature. It is therefore useful to start with a review of the basic economic
insights in the field of environmental taxation in order to prepare the ground for
the application of the theory to problems of economic development and the global
environment.
Section 3.2 below starts with a review of the welfare economics of environmental
taxation in a single closed economy; analytical details are provided in Appendix A.
Section 3.3 discusses alternatives to taxes as instruments of environmental policy,
considering both fixed and transferable quotas. Section 3.4 is a review of the
double dividend issue, which has received much attention in recent literature, while
Section 3.5 considers the extent to which distributional concerns should be reflected
in the design of environmental policy. Since much of the literature in this area
relates to the economies of industrialized countries, Section 3.6 takes up some
special problems in its application to developing economies. Section 3.7 extends
the analysis from the single country to the case of global externalities where each
individual country is affected by the environmental pollution of all other countries;
a formal analysis in the context of a two-country model is in Appendix B. The
political economy of global environmental taxes is considered in Section 3.8, which
also compares alternative tax designs with regard to the equity-efficiency tradeoff.
After a brief discussion of some practical problems of tax collection in Section 3.9,
Section 3.10 evaluates the revenue potential of such taxes with special reference to
the carbon tax. Some concluding remarks are collected in the final section of the
chapter.
This chapter has been prepared for the UNU–WIDER project on Innovative Sources for Development
Finance. I am indebted to the project participants, especially Tony Atkinson and Robin Boadway, for their
comments on an earlier version, and to Ottar Mæstad and David Wildasin for helpful suggestions.
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3.2. THE GENERAL THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
TAXATION
A basic economic insight is that a competitive economy, under ideal conditions, will
generate a socially efficient or Pareto optimal allocation of private goods, meaning that
it is not possible to reallocate resources in such a way that everyone becomes better off.
In partial equilibrium terminology, an efficient allocation of private goods is achieved
when, first, the marginal cost of producing a commodity is the same for all producers;
this requirement is what is known as production efficiency. Second, the marginal will-
ingness to pay for the commodity—the marginal benefit—should be the same for all
consumers, ensuring consumption efficiency. Third, the marginal cost of production
should equal the marginal willingness to pay; this final requirement ensures overall
Pareto optimality. In an ideal competitive environment, optimizing behaviour by firms
and consumers will ensure that marginal costs and marginal benefits will be equated
to the equilibrium prices for all goods. Thus, a competitive equilibrium is a Pareto
optimum, and there is no waste of resources.
One element of the ‘ideal conditions’ requirement is the absence of external
effects. Originally introduced by Alfred Marshall, the externality concept was fur-
ther developed by Arthur C. Pigou (1920), who also pioneered the application of the
theory to environmental problems in the modern sense. In recent decades, the increas-
ing awareness of the environmental damage caused by modern societies has greatly
increased the importance of externality theory as a tool for applied policy analysis.1
Environmental externalities may be both positive and negative, but we focus here on
the latter case. Externalities may arise both on the production and consumption side of
the economy. A famous type of production externalities is the category known as ‘the
tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968). If there is common ownership of land, each
owner has an incentive to let his cattle graze more than is rational from the viewpoint
of the group of owners as a whole. A more modern example is where a manufacturing
plant releases emissions into air, soil, or water so as to affect negatively the production
possibilities or costs of firms in the tourism or fishing industries. This case can be
seen as another example of the tragedy of the commons, since the natural recipients can
be defined as commons in a more general sense.2 A central example of consumption
externalities is traffic congestion, which arises from the fact that no individual car
owner has an incentive to take account of the additional cost imposed on other drivers
by his own car use. Thus, externalities may be generated by actions both by producers
and consumers, and they may also affect both producers and consumers. A common
element of the examples is that the agents who generate the externalities increase the
costs or reduce the benefits of other agents. The competitive price mechanism fails to
1 It is interesting to note that as late as 1957, George Stigler wrote that after Marshall, it was left for Pigou
‘to elaborate, and exaggerate, the importance of this source of disharmonies’ (1957). With the increasing
awareness of environmental problems over the last few decades, few would now argue that Pigou was guilty
of any exaggeration.
2 In addition to its effect on production possibilities, this type of emission also has negative consequences
for consumers through health effects and the degradation of natural beauty.
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equate marginal social costs and marginal social benefits. Another unifying perspective
on these examples is that negative externalities from the consumption or production
of private goods reduce the availability of public goods like clean air, clean water, or
uncongested roads.
It is far from obvious that, having identified potential cases of market failure, eco-
nomists should proceed to recommend government action for their resolution. In a
commons type of situation in which there is a relatively small number of agents, each
one of them will have an incentive to negotiate a contract with the other affected parties
in order to arrive at an efficient solution; this is the argument developed in the influen-
tial paper by Coase (1960). However, as the number of affected agents becomes large,
individual incentives to enter into costly negotiations become very weak. A natural
outcome in such cases is that the responsibility to arrive at a socially efficient solution
comes to rest on some political authority, be it local, national, or even global. Even
in the context of a large number of agents, however, attempts by the government to
improve on the market outcome may not be successful; there are policy failures as
well as market failures. Policy recommendations should take into account whether
or not government is in fact likely to improve on the performance of an imperfect
market.
The inefficiency generated by environmental externalities arises because individual
agents do not take account of the effects of their own actions on the welfare of others.
Levying a tax on the action in question that reflects the social impact of these harm-
ful effects, leads agents to act as if they take the effects into account. The optimal
environmental tax internalizes the externality and restores the efficiency of the market
mechanism.
How high should optimal environmental taxes be? There are two issues here, one
concerning the theoretical principles behind the determination of the taxes and one that
concerns the empirical implementation of these principles.
The theoretical principles can briefly be described as follows: If the damage takes
the form of deterioration of an environmental public good, the tax should reflect the
marginal loss of that deterioration to society as a whole, and that marginal value is the
sum of the losses suffered by all agents affected by the externality. In the perfect world
of first-best welfare economics, these corrective or Pigouvian taxes are the only indirect
taxes that are consistent with an efficient market equilibrium. Any further revenue to
finance public expenditure or redistribute incomes should be raised by individualized
lumpsum taxes.3 When, more realistically, distortionary taxes have to be used for
revenue purposes, a Pigouvian element should be included in the second-best optimal
taxes for the commodities that generate the externalities. In both cases, one sees the
operation of the principle of targeting; the tax incentive aims to affect the decisions that
directly influence the externality and to be as neutral as possible with respect to other
decisions.4
3 A simple model of the first-best case is set out in Appendix A.
4 The principles of second-best environmental taxation were discussed in Sandmo (1975); see also Sandmo
(2000: chapter 5).
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How should one estimate the marginal social loss or damage? Obviously, an estimate
that is built up from information about the losses suffered by thousands or millions
of individuals is not practicable, and simpler methods have to be employed. The
value of the ideal theoretical measure of marginal social damage is mainly to guide
one’s thoughts in the selection of a practical estimation procedure. Empirical analyses
of environmental taxes typically start with some target reduction in the amount of
emissions and then ask what level of taxes (or other instruments) is required to achieve
the target. For this procedure to be optimal, one must assume that the target reduction
has been chosen as a result of a cost–benefit analysis of the benefits and costs of the
reduction in emissions.
Although the use of taxes is not the only alternative for policy implementation, they
have a number of advantages from an efficiency point of view. Consider the case where
the externality is generated through the activities of a large number of individual firms,
and where the government’s aim is to reduce the aggregate level of these activities.
To reduce the activity in question imposes a cost on each individual polluter, and in
the interests of production efficiency one would like the total cost of achieving the
reduction to be as small as possible. Assuming that the marginal cost is increasing,
this is achieved when all polluters have the same marginal cost of pollution reduction,
which will be the case when they all face the same tax. If the polluters are consumers
instead of firms, the argument has to be modified in terms of expenditure rather
than cost, and the effect of the tax is to achieve consumption efficiency rather than
production efficiency, but the basic economic insight is the same: the environmental
tax can achieve the desired reduction of the activity in question at minimal sacrifice to
society as a whole.
3.3. ALTERNATIVES TO TAXES
The main alternative to taxes is the use of quantitative regulations or quotas. In
principle, it is clear that if one wishes to achieve a given reduction of the level of
some harmful activity, this can in fact be done either by taxes or quotas, and various
versions of a quota system have been widely used in practice. In judging the effi-
ciency aspects of quota systems, one has to distinguish between fixed and transferable
quotas.
In principle, any quota system presumes that a quota can be levied on each individual
polluter. With a fixed quota, the polluter must limit his emissions to the quota that has
been allocated to him; if he exceeds it, he is liable to punishment. The environment can
be regarded as a public good that is being ‘produced’ by the actions of a large number
of individual polluters; a reduction of emissions produces more environmental quality.
Since efficiency in production implies that the marginal cost of production should be
the same for all producers, quotas should be tight for polluters with a low marginal cost
of reducing pollution and liberal for high-cost polluters. Imposing individual quotas
on polluters according to this principle raises enormous informational problems if the
number of polluters is large. In practice, therefore, some simpler rule—like basing
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quotas on past emissions—has to be found, and this is likely to violate the requirement
of production efficiency.5
An alternative to the fixed quota system is to make quotas transferable between
polluters. Someone who finds that it is extremely costly to meet the demands of the
quota may buy additional units of quota from another polluter whose cost of reducing
emissions is relatively low. Suppose that there is a large number of polluters, and
consequently a large volume of quota units being traded. One could then imagine
a competitive equilibrium in quotas, where all polluters buy or sell quota units at a
uniform price so that the demand for quotas equals the supply. Cost minimization on
the part of polluters implies that they will reduce pollution to the point where the
marginal cost of reducing pollution is equal to the price of a unit of quota. But this
means that the marginal cost of reducing pollution will be the same for all polluters, so
that production efficiency is obtained under the system of transferable quotas, just as
with a tax on emissions.
In fact, the equivalence between the two systems can be pushed even further. The
optimal Pigouvian tax rate on emissions will result in some overall level of pollution.
Suppose that one starts with the optimal level of emissions and issues quotas in exactly
this amount. Then the equilibrium unit price of quotas will be exactly equal to the
Pigouvian tax rate. If initial ownership of the quotas rests with the government, it could
sell quotas to private polluters—either through some type of quota exchange system or
by auction—and collect the same amount in sales revenue as it would otherwise collect
in taxes. Thus, in terms of both production efficiency and in their implications for
government revenue, environmental taxes and transferable quotas are equivalent.
In choosing between the two systems, one must rely on considerations that have not
been included in the present discussion, and an obvious item that has been left aside is
the cost of administration. This includes, first, the cost of the necessary bureaucracy
in setting up the systems and running their daily operations. Second, it would include
the resources necessary to control environmental tax evasion and quota violations.
The relative costs of taxes versus quotas are likely to be specific to the particular type
of environmental pollution being considered, so that it is difficult to draw a general
conclusion concerning the relative costs of running a tax or quota system. Another
consideration that might be important for social and political acceptance has to do
with the perceived morality of the two systems. It is not unusual to hear it being said
that the government should not be allowed to earn money on socially harmful activities.
This viewpoint is based on a complete misunderstanding of the role of incentives, and
in any case, it is an argument against both taxes and transferable quotas.6 A more subtle
point is that under the tax system, polluters pay for the harmful activities that they
have in fact undertaken, whereas under the quota system they buy themselves the right
5 In Sandmo (2002), I consider the extent to which the expected fine for quota violations can play the
same role as an environmental tax in achieving production efficiency, and show that this will be true only in
very special cases.
6 In fact, it could also be seen as an argument against fixed quotas, since these, to be effective, must
obviously specify punishments for quota violations. If punishment takes the form of fines, the government
will be getting revenue from pollution activities in this case also.
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to carry out these activities in the future, and the latter case may possibly be seen as
morally more objectionable than the former.
We conclude that a system of transferable quotas is an alternative to the use of
environmental taxes that have many of the same properties. If wisely used, it leads
individual economic agents to modify their behaviour in a way that causes the market
system to function efficiently, even in the presence of external effects. Keeping this
result in mind, we now revert to the case of environmental taxes. Are there other gains
or ‘social dividends’ from the use of environmental taxes? So far, we have neglected the
possible benefit of the tax revenue that accrues to the government. Could this revenue
generate additional dividends for society?
3.4. THE DOUBLE DIVIDEND ISSUE
The introduction of environmental taxes creates a new source of tax revenue for the
government. Because this happens without any efficiency loss to the economy—at
least not in the ideal version of the tax system—the revenue can be seen as a pure
transfer between the private and public sector, just like the individualized lumpsum
taxes familiar from welfare economics. However, a number of researchers have pointed
out that this new source of revenue may in fact create a social gain for the economy
over and above its effect on the environment, so it has become customary to speak of
‘the double dividend’. The second dividend has been defined in several different ways,
but it may be useful to distinguish between three kinds.
First, if one assumes that the level of public expenditure is to be held constant during
the process of introducing environmental taxes, this implies that other taxes will have
to play a smaller role in the economy, leading to a reduction of other indirect and direct
taxes. The reduced role of distortionary taxes in the economy will diminish the overall
efficiency loss from taxation, so that this tax efficiency dividend is in addition to the
environmental dividend. This is the most fundamental notion of the double dividend.
Second, however, one may question the rationale of assuming constant tax revenue.
If the tax system as a whole becomes more efficient, it may not be rational to hold the
level of public expenditure constant. An optimal level of public expenditure should
satisfy the condition that the marginal value of the expenditure should be equal to its
marginal social cost. The latter has two components: there is the direct resource cost of
factor use, and in addition there is the efficiency cost of the taxes used to withdraw the
resources from the private sector. With the introduction of environmental taxes, the tax
system as a whole becomes more efficient and the efficiency cost goes down. This may
justify higher public expenditure, and the justification is obviously stronger, the less
efficient the tax system was at the time of introduction of environmental taxes.
Third, much attention has been given to the possibility that a ‘green’ tax reform
might lead to a reduction of unemployment. The idea behind this possibility is that
wages, for a variety of possible reasons, are in fact set above the level required for
full employment, with actual employment being determined from the demand side of
the labour market. An increase of environmental or ‘green’ taxation in combination
with a reduction of the payroll tax would lower labour cost to employers, increase
the demand for labour and consequently reduce unemployment (assuming a constant
supply of labour).
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All the three candidates for the second dividend have been subjected to intensive
theoretical research; for recent surveys see Goulder (1995), Bovenberg (1999), and
Schöb (2003). The research has demonstrated that any of the three versions of the
double dividend hypothesis are indeed possible outcomes of a green tax reform, but
that a positive second dividend is by no means assured. Here we can only touch on the
reasons for these ambiguities. In the case of the tax efficiency dividend, whether or not
it is realized depends on which distortionary taxes are being cut. Suppose, for example,
that the tax system discourages labour, but that the proposal for a green tax reform
does not involve the reduction of taxes on labour; instead, it is proposed to cut taxes on
consumer goods that are in fact complementary with leisure. It is easy to see that this
reform could exacerbate the distortion of the labour-leisure choice and increase the
overall efficiency loss from the tax system. This could also increase the marginal cost
of public funds and thus jeopardize the public expenditure dividend. In the case of the
employment dividend, a complicating issue is the incidence effect of the tax changes. It
seems unrealistic to believe that a trade union will not try to capture some of the benefits
from a reduction of the payroll tax in the form of higher gross wages; in addition, it
might demand compensation for the increase of indirect taxes. The result is that there
is no guarantee that employment costs will fall and that employment will go up.
To conclude this brief review of the double dividend arguments, there are no guar-
antees that a green tax reform will also involve a secondary dividend in terms of a more
efficient tax system, a lower social cost of public expenditure or a decrease of unem-
ployment. However, this should not be construed to mean that a secondary dividend
is not possible. What the literature does point out is that the secondary gain depends
on the precise nature of the reform, that is, on all the components of the proposed tax
reform. If the reform is carried out with careful attention to the interaction between
taxes and markets, it has the potential to result in a double dividend. Finally, it should
be stressed that the empirical magnitude of the dividends will depend not on the mag-
nitudes of the tax rates as such, but on their effects on quantities, as reflected in the
elasticities of demand and supply.
3.5. DISTRIBUTIONAL CONCERNS
One important objection to the introduction of environmental taxes focuses on the
distributional effects. A greater role for environmental taxes means, it is argued, more
emphasis on indirect taxes, and consequently a diminished role for the tax system in
the redistribution of income. A green tax reform may improve efficiency, but it does
so at the cost of redistributing income from the poor to the rich. This is particularly
important in the case of energy taxes. Expenditure on energy, particularly for heating
and cooking, weighs more heavily in low-income budgets, so that higher energy prices
redistribute income in disfavour of the poor. There are several reasons why this view
is too simplified, and one needs to consider more carefully exactly how such a reform
is carried out.
If one imagines, in line with the first of the three double dividend hypotheses, that
an increase of environmental taxation is combined with cuts in the direct taxation of
income and wealth, it is a reasonable assumption that the substitution of indirect for
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direct taxes will involve more inequality of after-tax income. But there is no particular
reason why the tax cuts should be carried out with a complete disregard for their
distributional impact. A society that cares both about efficiency and equity could let
any adverse distributional effects of a green tax reform be compensated by changes
in the degree of progressivity of the combined system of direct taxation and income
transfers, or it could substitute green taxes for other indirect taxes that have a less
egalitarian profile. Some economists would go as far as to argue that environmental
taxes should be set with sole regard for their main function, which is to internalize
environmental externalities, while there are other policy instruments which are better
suited for redistribution of income.
How convincing this argument is obviously depends on how effective the other
instruments are in terms of achieving redistributive goals. If a country has a
progressive tax system of direct taxation, a well-developed system of social assist-
ance and social security as well as a system of differentiated regional transfers, the
distributional argument against environmental taxes is weak. The less the degree
to which these assumptions are satisfied, the more important it becomes to strike a
balance between efficiency and equity considerations in the design of environmental
taxes.7
However, there is also a need to take a wider view. Suppose that an environmental
tax is levied on a consumer good, which has harmful environmental effects. This has
two distinct effects on the welfare of the consumer. On the one hand, he or she suffers
a loss of real income, since the price of one of the goods that he consumes has gone
up. On the other hand, the tax increases the quality of the environment, which is a
gain. In judging the overall distributional impact of the tax, one has to take account
of both effects. Even if the consumption of this good were proportional to income so
that a price increase had no effects on the distribution of real incomes, the tax increase
could still benefit the poor, provided that the environmental impact of the tax were
such as to benefit them in particular. Of course the reverse effect is also a possibility;
the main point is that both effects have to be taken into account in a serious study of
the distributional effects of environmental taxes.8
3.6. APPLICATION TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The theory of environmental externalities has been developed mainly with a view
towards application in industrialized countries. Nevertheless, when one reads the
literature on environmental taxation, one may easily get the impression that its policy
conclusions make a claim to almost universal validity. There are hardly any explicit
7 Dinan and Rogers (2002) analyse the related problem of the distributional effects of a system of tradable
carbon quotas in the United States. It turns out that the impact of the system across five income groups is
crucially dependent on the assumption that they make about offsetting changes in the tax system.
8 A further complication in the study of distributional effects of energy taxes is that energy is not only
a consumption good but also a factor of production. Higher energy prices will lead to higher prices of
consumption goods that are produced by energy-intensive technologies, and a full study of tax incidence
would have to take account of these general equilibrium effects.
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discussions of the institutional framework in which the policies are assumed to work,
and one has to look behind the formal apparatus in order to discover that there are
in fact some implicit assumptions that should make one cautious about applying the
conclusions to countries at a different stage of development. An example of such an
assumption is that markets work in a way that can at least roughly be described as
perfect competition. Another is that the statutory taxes are at least roughly equal
to effective taxes, that is, there is no major problem of avoidance or evasion. Last
but not least, it is assumed that a policy of environmental taxation can, to a large
extent, be designed without much regard for its distributional impact. The reason
for this view is the one mentioned above, viz. that any adverse distributional effects
can be neutralized by means of compensating changes in direct taxation. None of
these assumptions are completely realistic in industrial countries either, but in the
context of developing countries they are much more likely to be seriously misleading.
In particular, the assumption that environmental tax design can be completely isolated
from redistributive aspects becomes very doubtful in countries where direct taxes are of
little importance because of problems with taxpayer literacy and inadequate resources
for tax administration.
Another area where the theory of environmental taxation perhaps needs a differ-
ent emphasis is in the nature of the externalities caused by environmental pollution.
In industrialized countries, the emphasis has been on the environment as a public
consumption good. But as Dasgupta (2001) and others have pointed out, environ-
mental pollution and resource depletion in developing countries are likely to have
major effects on the productive economic base of society and so have more direct
material consequences for the standard of living of poor people. In fact, environmental
degradation not only worsens the material conditions under which poor people live, it
also causes poverty through the incentive mechanisms that exist in subsistence agri-
culture. One example of such a mechanism is where the need to provide cheap fuel for
heating and cooking leads poor farmers to cut down the trees on their soil. This may
start or speed up a process of soil erosion, which makes the conditions for farming
worse than they were before. This perspective on the link between the environment
and the standard of living is a different one from that which we find in some of the lit-
erature, where environmental goods tend to be regarded as luxury consumption goods,
something that one can afford once the more important consumer needs have been
satisfied.
3.7. GLOBAL EXTERNALITIES
Many types of environmental externalities are transnational; harmful emissions in one
country are carried by land, sea, or air to cause damage in other countries. In some cases,
like the emission of greenhouse gases that contribute to global warming, all countries
are both polluters and victims of pollution. A direct application of standard insights
should lead one to recommend taxes on polluters in order that they may internalize
the damages that they cause. But there are some difficulties with this solution in an
international setting.
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The most obvious complication is that there exists at present no international
authority to impose taxes and collect revenue. In a single country, the government that
makes decisions about tax rates can also provide the resources for tax administration
and enforcement. People, who are opposed to a new tax in their own country because
they stand to lose by it, will nevertheless be forced to pay it. But in the international
community of nations, with a proposal to impose a uniform tax on CO2 emissions, for
example, each nation has to agree to the proposal on a voluntary basis. This creates a
challenge for tax design, which has no direct counterpart in national tax policy.
In spite of this, it is of considerable interest to analyse the problem of optimal tax
design from the viewpoint of global welfare maximization.9 This must not be taken
to imply that there is in fact some world authority that can actually implement such a
policy, but it is a theoretical approach that leads to a better understanding of the tradeoff
between efficiency and equity considerations in global tax design. Thus, one issue that
can be discussed in this framework is whether such a globally optimal tax should reflect
equity consideration. Some proponents of the CO2 tax, which will be discussed in more
detail below, claim that it should be designed so as to satisfy the conditions for world
production efficiency. Indeed, to ensure that emissions will be reduced the most where
the marginal cost is lowest is claimed to be the main advantage of the tax. The question
is whether this will lead to an ethically acceptable distribution of the cost between rich
and poor countries. If not, should one design compensatory transfers, or should the
design of the environmental taxes themselves have built-in distributional elements?
Suppose for simplicity that the world consists of two countries, one rich and one
developing.10 Consumers in each of the two countries have preferences defined on
their own consumption of private goods; in addition, their utility or standard of living
is affected by a negative global externality, which is caused by total world production
of a particular commodity. Each country would have an incentive to impose a tax
on the commodity in question, but since it cannot be expected to take account of
the damage caused in the rest of the world, there is a strong presumption that the
taxes in all countries would be too low compared to the global cooperative optimum.11
Global welfare maximization would imply a tax that is related to the global sum of
marginal benefits to world consumers. This is obtained by first computing the sum for
all consumers in each of the countries and then summing across countries.
An important question is whether, in assessing the global sum of benefits, the
benefits received by consumers in rich and poor countries should receive the same
weight. The benefit received by each consumer is his marginal willingness to pay
for environmental improvement, and this benefit, assuming that it could be elicited
9 Although the analysis of this chapter relates to optimal tax design, the results are also applicable to the
problem of tax reform. The insights that we get from studying, for example, the optimal combination of
environmental and other indirect taxes have a direct application to the study of the welfare effects from
substituting environmental for other indirect taxes.
10 Appendix B develops a mathematical model of this case.
11 For theoretical analyses of this presumption and the extent of its validity, see Williams (1966) and Boskin
(1973). Their discussions are set in the related context of local governments providing public goods with
jurisdictional spillovers.
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in an empirically reliable manner, would reflect both his preferences and his ability
to pay. We may not find it ethically acceptable that the benefit received by a poor
African peasant should count for so little in the assessment of the global benefit just
because he is so poor, and from an egalitarian perspective it would seem reasonable
to give a higher weight to his benefit than to a representative consumer in a rich
country. This problem is of special importance in an international context because
redistributive taxation and transfers are clearly of much less importance internationally
than within any particular country. Appendix B analyses two polar cases of international
redistribution. In the first case, there is perfect redistribution in each country, but no
international redistribution. In the second case, the assumption of perfect within-
country redistribution is preserved, while now perfect international redistribution
is also assumed. The analysis then focuses on the characterization of the optimal
environmental tax under the two polar assumptions.12
Should the tax be uniform or differentiated between rich and poor countries? With
perfect international transfers and free international trade, the answer is clear: the tax
should be uniform. In this case, the world—at least in economic terms—is like the
single jurisdiction of the original Samuelson (1954) analysis of optimal public goods
supply. Then the policy objectives of efficiency and equity can be separated from each
other, and in particular we would have production efficiency: the marginal cost of
environmental improvement should be the same in rich and poor countries. However,
if there are no transfers and the social welfare function is egalitarian, more weight
should be placed on the willingness of the citizens in the poor country to pay. In that
case, production efficiency is no longer desirable, and the global optimum is a situation
where the tax and thus the marginal cost of improving the environment is lower in the
developing country.13 From the viewpoint of world welfare, it is rational to increase
the global cost of environmental improvement if by so doing one can ensure that the
poor country bears less of the cost burden. When lumpsum transfers are ruled out,
we are in the world of the second best where redistributive concerns may have to be
reflected in the design of the system of commodity taxes.
Which of the two polar assumptions is the more realistic one? Anyone who observes
the extent of world income inequality and the amount of international transfers will
have difficulties with concluding that his observations can be interpreted as the outcome
of global welfare maximization; the case without international transfers is therefore the
12 Both of the two polar cases are obviously unrealistic. National redistribution is not perfect and non-
distortionary, and international redistribution, while it does occur, is far from the lumpsum ideal of welfare
economics. But the study of polar cases has a long history in economics. In international economics, in
particular, there is a long tradition for studying the contrast between autarky and perfectly free trade, none
of which are realistic descriptions of actual economies. Another polar case assumption in international
economics of the Heckscher–Ohlin variety is that factors of production are perfectly mobile within the
national economies, but completely immobile internationally.
13 In the limit, as the relative weight put on the consumption of people in the poor country becomes
very large, the whole burden of reducing global pollution should fall on the rich country, and the tax on the
poor country should be zero. This case could be seen as an application of Rawls’ difference principle to the
problem of international redistribution. However, Rawls (1999) warns against a simple-minded application
of the principle to international relations.
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one that comes closest to reality. To implement such a scheme is, however, far from
simple. A major difficulty is that in the real world of many countries, there is no simple
division of countries into the ‘developing’ and ‘rich’ categories, and a system by which
every country pays the tax at a different rate raises major political and administrative
difficulties. The problem is even more complicated if one envisages several global
pollutants with associated tax rates, where for each tax rate one needs to strike a
balance between cost efficiency and distributional equity.
The approach to tax design via global welfare optimization leaves open the question
of its institutional and political foundation. Clearly, such a tax will have to be based on
some kind of international agreement, possibly in combination with the creation of a
world tax authority. To ensure voluntary participation by all countries, the tax would
have to be designed in such a way that all countries gain by it. All countries will gain
from a better global environment, but since both the gains and the tax payments are
likely to be unevenly distributed between countries, it is not clear that the net gain—the
environmental gain minus taxes paid—will be positive for all countries. But the income
received by the world tax authority could be redistributed to the participating countries
so that net gains are assured for all participants; the redistribution scheme could also
be designed such that the poor countries would gain more than the rich. These issues
are considered further below.
3.8. TAX DESIGN AND POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY
What are the prospects for establishing a system of global environmental taxation? We
have seen that a strong case can be established for such a system on the basis of welfare
economics, but what are the prospects for its implementation? With regard to the
case of greenhouse gas emissions, James Poterba no doubt expresses a common view
among economists when he writes ‘while efficiency considerations create a presump-
tion for using coordinated international policies to alter greenhouse gas emissions, the
prospects for such action are bleak’ (Poterba 1993: 48).
There are two main reasons for the pessimistic view. One is that actions taken to
prevent or slow down global warming involve the certainty of present costs against
the uncertainty of future benefits. The uncertainty element comes in because of our
incomplete knowledge concerning the effects of greenhouse gas emissions on the global
climate in the future. The time element is also of major importance in judging the
probability of political enactment. The time perspective in global warming is so long
that even with moderate rates of time discounting, the costs will easily come to dominate
the benefits. This particular ground for pessimism, it should be stressed, applies both
to a single country and to the world community.
The second reason for pessimism is the fact that an efficient tax policy for global
environmental improvement presupposes coordinated action among countries, but
with each country knowing that the main beneficiaries from its own actions will be other
countries. This creates an incentive for each country to be a freerider on the policies of
the others, leading to a political equilibrium where all countries believe that inadequate
action is taken, but where all feel powerless to break out of the low tax equilibrium trap.
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It would seem fruitful, therefore, to try to search for arguments that would increase
the probability of political adoption of global environmental taxes.
One such argument would be that of the double dividend. From a domestic point
of view, increasing the tax on fossil fuels would not only correct a market failure,
it would also enable the national government to cut other taxes or to expand public
expenditure at a lower efficiency cost. Note, however, that this argument provides
no answer to the pessimism stemming from the long time-horizon and the freerider
problem.
Another approach would be to introduce global environmental taxes in conjunction
with a commitment to use the revenue for a specific purpose, as in the current proposal
to use it for promoting economic development. The emission of greenhouse gases
contributes to a deterioration of the quality of the atmosphere, the most global of all
commons. Taxes on emissions could then be seen as charges for use of the common
property, to be redistributed to the owners—all the world’s countries—on the basis of
some criterion of distributive justice. Exactly what that criterion should be, would be
a matter for deliberation between the parties to the treaty, but it would clearly have to
favour the developing world, while the rich countries would pay the larger share of the
taxes. In coupling proposals of new taxes to improve the global efficiency of resource
allocation and redistributing income in favour of the poor, the approach might stand a
better chance of political acceptance than either of the two proposals would be likely
to muster on their own.
Is such a scheme likely to attract the support of the rich countries? The presumption
is that a slow-down of global warming would be a benefit to all;14 at the same time,
however, there would be a net transfer of tax revenue from the rich to the developing
countries. On a narrow calculation of national self-interest, some rich countries might
find the proposal unattractive. However, wider considerations of the fairness involved
in charging for the use of the global commons as well as the attainment of a more
equitable distribution of world income might still appeal to an extended notion of the
national self-interest.15
There are several alternatives regarding the construction of a system of global
environmental taxation that combines efficiency and equity considerations. From the
previous discussion two main alternatives emerge:
(A) A uniform tax designed to promote production efficiency combined with a separate
system for equity-based distribution of the tax revenue;
14 Cooper (1998) and Poterba (1993) cite evidence that countries like Canada and Russia might profit
from global warming mainly because of higher agricultural yields. This might seem a narrow concept of the
national interest, but in any case the possibility that a few countries could come to gain from global warming
is not a crucial argument against the scheme.
15 Newbery (1990) and Mäler (1991) analyse cost-efficient reduction of sulfur emissions in a European
context and identify the countries that gain or lose by an efficient policy. Mäler also develops a system
for revenue distribution that makes all countries that participate in the policy into net beneficiaries by the
arrangement. Something similar could clearly be worked out on a global scale, which would imply that the
rich countries would also get a share of the tax revenue.
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(B) A non-uniform tax with rates depending on the income level of the tax-collecting
country.
In addition, a simplified case of B would be:
(C) A positive efficiency-based rate of tax on the rich countries combined with a zero
tax on developing countries.
An important issue of system design is that a politically acceptable treaty needs to be
based to the largest extent possible on criteria that are capable of empirical verification
and are easy to understand. None of the three alternatives satisfy this requirement
completely; this is unavoidable because they all involve an element of redistribution,
which clearly must be based on value judgements. My own view is that alternative A is
better than B and C on this score. The basic issues involved are the same, but A has a
separation of efficiency and equity considerations which implies that the tax rate and
the redistribution system could more easily be negotiated separately than in the other
two cases. The ranking of alternatives B and C is more difficult.16 Alternative C has
much to recommend it in the way of simplicity. On the other hand, the redistributive
element is weaker than in B, since countries are simply divided into two groups with
no within-group redistribution. Having just two tax rates instead of the several rates
required by alternative B may be an advantage from an administrative and political
point of view; on the other hand, setting the dividing line (presumably in terms of per
capita income) between the two groups becomes significant, imposing a high marginal
tax on the country, which makes the transition from developing to ‘rich’.17 Perhaps
the simplicity of alternative C should be decisive in ranking it ahead of B.
It needs to be kept in mind that countries at present have widely different effective
rates of tax on the emission of greenhouse gases; even within each country there will be
a variety of effective rates, depending on the source of emissions. If countries were to
impose a new uniform tax on themselves, effective tax rates would not be equal. It is the
effective post-reform rate of tax which, according to alternative A, should be equalized
across countries, and this means that allowance must be made for pre-existing taxes.
Effective rates of tax should then be equalized within each country, and the single
effective rate should be brought in line with the international rate. In all probability,
this would lead to an increase of the overall rate of tax in a global perspective, but
it is also likely that some rates in some countries would have to be cut in order to
achieve global uniformity. This argument obviously has to be modified if one were
to adopt any one of the tax systems B or C instead of A, but there would still be a
strong case for a uniform rate of tax within each rich country and between the rich
countries.
16 The analysis of Appendix B does not provide much help in this ranking, since it assumes just two
countries, and the difference between alternatives B and C becomes really significant when there are several
countries.
17 However, even a developing country not obliged to pay any tax under the treaty could find it in its own
interest to levy such taxes for the purely domestic interest in reaping one or more of the second dividends
discussed above.
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3.9. COLLECTING THE TAX
The argument in favour of environmental taxes is that they change the incentives of
the individual economic agents whose actions are the causes of the externalities. A
treaty between countries which merely obliges the individual country to pay taxes in
proportion to its emissions leaves open the question of how the country passes this
obligation on to its citizens; see the more detailed discussion of ‘fiscal architecture’ in
Atkinson (Chapter 2, this volume). If the government in question decides to finance
this tax payment out of its general tax revenue, the individual incentives would not
be such as to promote domestic or global efficiency. On the other hand, the domestic
government clearly has an interest in designing a tax system with the right incentives;
giving firms and consumers incentives to cut back on emissions would at the same time
diminish the government’s tax obligations under the treaty. This issue is discussed in
more detail in the study by Boadway (Chapter 11, this volume).
As regards the institutional framework for collecting the tax and spending the
revenue, several arrangements might be considered, and the detailed institutional
framework would obviously have to be considered later. Nevertheless, a few general
remarks are in order. Taxes in each individual country, for example, on the use of
fossil fuels, would have to be collected by the domestic government and paid by it to an
international agency. Whether this should be a new and separate institution or whether
the tax-collecting task could be incorporated in an existing institution, is difficult to
say. There are presumably cost advantages to not having to build a new international
agency from the ground. However, if the agency is put in charge of collecting revenue
from a number of different sources (global environmental taxes, the Tobin tax, a global
lottery, etc.) there is more to be said for establishing it as a separate institution. One also
needs to consider the next step of channelling the revenue into development finance.
The agency would need to develop a system for passing the revenue on to institutions
that are actually in charge of allocating resources to development projects. A crucial
question is then whether the transfer of funds should take place according to some fixed
rule or whether the agency itself should develop priorities among projects and receiving
institutions. This should probably be among the first issues to be discussed among the
parties to international treaties about the various new sources of development funding.
3.10. REVENUE POTENTIAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES
There are a number of activities that give rise to external effects that cross borders and
could be said to be harmful to the global environment. However, at least for the purpose
of the present discussion, it will be useful to limit discussion to the types of pollution
that most directly affect the global commons, viz. the emission of greenhouse gases,
in particular a tax on carbon (CO2) emissions. What is the revenue potential of such
taxes? How important could they be in providing additional funds for development
finance?
The answer seems to be that they could be very important, but that there are a
number of uncertainties attached to the estimation of their revenue potential. The
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World Development Report 1999/2000 estimates world emissions of carbon dioxide at
22,754 million metric tons in 1996 (World Bank 2000: 249), equivalent at a conversion
factor of 3.67–6.2 billion metric tons of carbon. Clunies-Ross (2003) points out that a
uniform tax on carbon use at a rate of US$21 per metric ton of carbon (equivalent to
a gasoline tax of 4.8 cents per US gallon or roughly 0.01 EUR per litre)18 would yield
annual revenue of about US$130 billion per year. This assumes that the tax is levied at
a uniform rate on all countries. If instead it is assumed that it is levied only on those
countries that according to the World Bank are classified as ‘high income’, having a
per capita income of at least US$9361 in 1996, the figure drops to about US$61 billion
per year. When these figures are compared to estimates of the additional resources
required to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015, which are
in the range of US$30–70 billion per year (Atkinson, Chapter 1, this volume), it
is clear that the revenue potential is indeed very large, even for such a modest rate
of tax. Cooper (1998) cites an OECD (organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development) study that estimates the revenue from a carbon tax on a lower taxbase
(5.2 billion metric tons) at US$750 billion per year. This is almost six times the amount
suggested by Clunies-Ross, being based on a tax rate of approximately US$150 per
metric ton (the equivalent of approximately 35 cents per US gallon or 0.08 EUR per
litre.19 Both this and the more modest Clunies-Ross revenue estimates are very high.
Thus, even the latter would amount to about 2.5 times the current level of official
development assistance in the case of a worldwide tax, and to 1.2 times the level of
official development assistance (ODA) if only high-income countries are included.
The significance of the estimates lies of course not in the precise numbers, but in the
indications they give of the order of magnitude involved.
There are both economic and political reasons why these estimates might be too high.
One is that the calculations assume that carbon use is unaffected by the tax, presumably
because of an assumption that the demand price elasticity is very low. The assumption
of a zero price elasticity is of course somewhat paradoxical, because it means that the tax
has in fact no effect on CO2 emissions and that there is no environmental benefit from
it. Although the assumption appears to be consistent with experiences of short-run
fluctuations in, for example, gasoline prices, it is clearly the more long-run elasticities
that are relevant in this context. These are likely to be negative, which must lead to
a downward adjustment of the taxbase. There seems to be a consensus that although
short-run elasticities might well be close to zero, long-run elasticities are more likely to
be in the neighbourhood of −0.5 to −1.5 (Pindyck 1979). For illustrative purposes, let
us assume that the relevant long-run elasticity is −1. The Clunies-Ross proposal of a
tax equivalent to 0.01 EUR per litre of gasoline implies a price increase (assuming the
producer price to be constant at about 1.00 EUR) of roughly 1 per cent, which would
lead to a 1 per cent reduction of the taxbase. Thus, his revenue estimates would have
18 For comparison, this is about one-tenth of the current Norwegian carbon tax.
19 This is approximately 60% of the current carbon component of the Norwegian gasoline tax and less
than 10% of the total gasoline tax.
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to be reduced downwards by about 1 per cent, clearly a very insignificant revision of
the original calculations.
It should be kept in mind, however, that the rate of tax envisaged by Clunies-Ross is
very low compared to those suggested in the literature on global warming. For example,
Cooper (1998) and Poterba (1991) suggest that in order to achieve a significant reduction
of emissions, a tax in the range of US$100–120 per metric ton would be necessary.
Whalley and Wiggle (1991) estimate that a tax of about US$450—more than twenty
times the level assumed by Clunies-Ross—is needed to reduce carbon use by 50 per
cent. With a tax rate of this magnitude, the calculation of revenue on the basis of a
constant taxbase is apt to be more misleading. The size of the taxbase will in fact have
to be adjusted downwards by a percentage equal to the product of the tax rate and the
price elasticity. To illustrate, take again the Clunies-Ross case of 6.2 million metric
tons as the initial taxbase. With an elasticity of −1 and a tax rate of 20 per cent, the
taxbase must be reduced by a factor of 20 per cent. However, with the higher tax rate,
the tax revenue is still higher than with the lower tax rate; in fact, with an elasticity of
−1 revenue is increasing for all tax rates up to one hundred per cent.20
The role of the price elasticity of carbon use is worth emphasizing. If policymakers
want to use the tax in order to reach both a target level of emissions and a revenue
target, achieving the emissions target requires a lower tax, the more elastic the taxbase
is. On the other hand, a high elasticity means that a higher tax is needed to meet the
revenue target. If the elasticity is in fact quite low, it is therefore likely that a carbon
tax, which is decided with the objective of raising certain revenue for development
purposes, is likely to be lower than that required to meet environmental objectives.
In spite of the uncertainty that is attached to the magnitude of the relevant elasticities,
there can be no doubt that the revenue potential of a global carbon tax is very high. A
modest rate of tax, whether levelled globally or only on the rich countries’ emissions,
would likely raise huge revenues that could potentially be channelled into economic
development. But one needs to keep in mind that the estimate of the revenue potential
of the carbon tax might not reflect a corresponding increase in tax revenue available for
development assistance. Adoption of the global carbon tax would imply a large increase
in the outflow of resources for development purposes, and the political system could
well react to this by cutting back the amount of ODA over time, or increasing it by less
than they would have done, had the global carbon tax not been in place.
3.11. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The economic case for global environmental taxes, primarily to control the climate
externalities that are of increasing concern to public opinion, is very strong. Since
these taxes can be seen as charges for use of the global commons, there is also a
strong moral case for earmarking the revenue for global development purposes. There
20 If t is the tax rate and x is the taxbase, revenue is R = tx. The effect of a tax increase on revenue,
assuming the producer price to be constant, can be written as ∂R/∂t = x(1 + θε), where θ is the tax rate in
percentage terms and ε is the price elasticity of demand. For the special case where ε = −1, we accordingly
have that ∂R/∂t = x(1 − θ).
50 A. Sandmo
is at present wide-spread pessimism concerning the political realism of introducing
such taxes; however, earmarking the revenue for development purposes might in fact
enhance their political acceptability. The revenue potential of this type of tax appears
to be large. A global carbon tax even at modest rates could alone generate sufficient
revenue to finance the MDGs, and with a higher tax rate—one that is designed to
achieve a substantial environmental improvement—the potential could be increased
even further.
If such a system of taxes were to become enacted, one would clearly be justified in
speaking of an international double dividend. First, there would be an improvement
of the global environment. Second, there would be an increased flow of resources
into economic development, and at a lower marginal source of public funds than is
the case for most other taxes currently being used to fund development aid. Whether
this argument is persuasive enough to overcome the freerider problems inherent in all
issues involving global public goods and externalities, remains to be seen.
3.12. APPENDIX A
3.12.1. A Formal Model of Environmental Taxation: The
Single Country Case 21
It will be useful to establish a theoretical frame of reference in the form of a simple
model for a single country. It has a number of consumers, indexed by i(i =1, . . . , n),
with utility functions that depend on the quantity consumed of two commodities,
indexed 0 and 1, as well as on the amount of environmental pollution, e:
ui = ui(xi0, xi1, e). (3.A1)
The utility functions are increasing in the first two arguments and decreasing in the
third. Let total production of the two goods be y0 and y1, respectively, so that
ixi0 = y0 and ixi1 = y1. (3.A2)
The amount of environmental pollution is an increasing function of the output of
commodity 1, so that without loss of generality22 we may simply write
e = y1. (3.A3)
Industry 1 is cast in the role of the ‘dirty industry’, but the pollution technology is of
course a drastic simplification of real-life situations, where pollution is likely to depend
on the specific technology used in production. It would not be conceptually difficult to
take account of this, but it makes the analysis less transparent and does not add much
in the way of interesting economic insights.
21 The analysis in this and the following appendix is a further development of the model in Sandmo
(2003).
22 The unit function could be replaced by any increasing function without affecting the conclusions of
the analysis.
Environmental Taxation 51
We assume that there is an aggregate production constraint for the economy as a
whole, which has the quasi-linear form
y0 + C(y1) − ω = 0, C(0) = 0, C′(y1) > 0, C′′(y1) > 0. (3.A4)
We now characterize the optimal allocation of resources in this economy as the
maximum of a Bergson–Samuelson social welfare function
W = W (u1, . . . , un). (3.A5)
Letting subscripts denote partial derivatives, it is easy to show that the optimum can
be characterized by the conditions
(uh1/u
h
0) + i(uie/ui0) = C1(y1) (h = 1, ...., n). (3.A6)
The first term on the left is the private marginal benefit to consumer h of an additional
unit of commodity 1. The second term, which is negative, is the marginal social damage
of increased pollution. This affects all n consumers—including consumer h himself—
in a negative way. The condition implies, first, that at the optimum the private marginal
benefit of consumption should be the same for all consumers, and, second, that the
private marginal benefit adjusted for the marginal social damage, should be equal to
the marginal cost of production.
Let us now confront this optimality condition with a competitive equilibrium in
which consumers and producers face prices P and p, respectively, using commodity 0
as the numéraire. Utility-maximizing consumers, who take the level of environmental
pollution as given,23 will equate their marginal willingness to pay (their marginal rate
of substitution) to the consumer price. Profit-maximizing firms will set marginal cost




0 = P (h = 1, ...., n) (3.A7)
C1(y1) = p. (3.A8)
One sees immediately that the equilibrium will satisfy the optimality condition (3.A6)
only if a tax wedge is driven between the consumer and producer price, so that
P − t = p and t = −i(uie/ui0). (3.A9)
The optimal environmental tax is the aggregate marginal willingness to pay for environ-
mental improvement. It is of course no coincidence that the tax formula is reminiscent
of the Samuelson (1954) condition for the optimal supply of public goods, for the effect
of the tax discouragement of consumption is precisely to improve the quality of the
environment as a public good.
This is a very simple model in a number of respects. Most importantly, it assumes—
rather implicitly, as presented here—that lumpsum redistribution between consumers
23 This is equivalent to taking the total output of the dirty commodity as given and is just the standard
competitive assumption.
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is possible, so that the environmental tax can be set without any regard for distributional
effects.24 Moreover, it presents a very aggregate view of the production side of the
economy. However, we shall use the formulation as a building block for the construction
of a model of global externalities and environmental taxes, in which these complications
will in fact be moved to the forefront of the analysis. From this perspective, it is useful
to keep the single country case as simple as possible.
3.13. APPENDIX B
3.13.1. Extensions to a Two-Country Model—To make matters simple, we
assume that the world consists of just two countries, one rich and one developing
country. The model does not attempt to explain why one country is rich and one
poor; this could be either because of differences in productive resources or because of
differences in the technology of production. The environmental externality in question
is global in nature, being a global ‘bad’ for all consumers in the two countries.
Country-specific variables are distinguished by superscripts D and R, so that the
utility functions of consumers are written as
uiD = uiD(xiD0 , xiD1 , e) (i = 1, . . . , n), (3.A10a)
ujR = ujR(xjR0 , xjR1 , e) (j = 1, . . . , m). (3.A10b)
The materials balance equations (3.A2) become
ixiD0 = yD0 and ixiD1 = yD1 . (3.A11a)
jx
jR
0 = yR0 and jxjR1 = yR1 . (3.A11b)
For each commodity, domestic consumption should be equal to domestic production.
Note that there are no other constraints on individuals’ consumption than aggregate
output in the domestic economy. This is equivalent to assuming lumpsum redistribu-
tion between individual consumers in each country; however, it is also assumed that
there is no redistribution between countries. This is clearly not realistic. Domestic
redistribution has in fact to rely on second best instruments like income and com-
modity taxes while on the other hand there exists a significant amount of international
redistribution. The assumption must be seen as a simplified representation of the fact
that redistribution in most countries is carried out on a scale far exceeding anything
that exists for the world community as a whole, and with a set of instruments that, if
far from perfect, are much more targeted on transferring resources from the rich to
the poor.
24 Formally, one set of first order conditions requires that the marginal contribution to social welfare of
the consumption of the numéraire good is the same for all consumers.
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Environmental pollution is assumed to be global in nature and to depend on the sum
of the outputs in industry 1 in the two countries, so that
e = yD1 + yR1 . (3.A12)
The production constraints of the two countries may differ both with respect to the
availability of resources and alternative costs; in other words, production possibility
curves may vary with respect to both location and slope:
yD0 + CD(yD1 ) − ωD = 0, (3.A13a)
yR0 + CR(yR1 ) − ωR = 0. (3.A13b)
We now wish to study the implications of global welfare maximization. The global
social welfare function is
W = W (u1D, . . . , unD; u1R, . . . , umR). (3.A14)
Before turning to the formal analysis, it is useful to think about the questions that
the analysis of this model can help us to clarify. An interesting question is whether
it is desirable to have world production efficiency. Since equation (3.A12) shows the
amount of international pollution to be a function of the sum of output from the dirty
industries of the two countries, a natural feature of the optimum would be equality of
the marginal costs of reducing pollution. Another issue is to what extent distributional
weights on the two countries’ preferences should be taken into account in the design
of the optimal policy. These two issues turn out, in fact, to be closely related.
Consider first the condition for global production efficiency. The problem can be
formulated as the maximization of the output of commodity 0, subject to the condition
that the output of commodity 1 is equal to some constant level, so that yD1 + yR1 = y∗.
Using equations (3.A13a–b), we can write the maximization problem as
max(yD0 + yR0 ) = ωD + ωR − CD(yD1 ) − CR(y∗ − yD1 ).
Setting the derivative of this expression with respect to yD1 equal to zero, we obtain the
condition for global production efficiency:
CD1 (y
D
1 ) = CR1 (yR1 ). (3.A15)
The marginal cost of producing the dirty good, which is the same as the marginal cost
of reducing pollution, should be the same in both countries.
The more general welfare problem is to maximize the social welfare function (3.A14),
subject to the four materials balance equations (3.A11a–b) and the two production
constraints (3.A13a–b). We skip the details of the derivation and move directly to the
two conditions corresponding to (3.A6) for the single country case. For the developing
country we have that
(uhD1 /u
hD
0 ) + [i(uiDe /uiD0 ) + j(ujRe /ujR0 )(λR/λD)] = CD1 (yD1 ) (h = 1, . . . , n).
(3.A16)
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The expression in square brackets is now the marginal global damage from the
production of the dirty good. It has two terms, the first being the damage caused
in the poor country while the second term is the damage to the rich country, multiplied
by the term λR/λD. This term is the ratio of the social marginal utilities of income in the
two countries; these are equal between individuals within each of the countries because
of the assumption of domestic lumpsum redistribution. The social marginal utility of
income is actually the marginal contribution to welfare of increasing an individual’s
consumption of the numéraire commodity 0, that is:
λD = WiuiD0 and λR = WjujR0 (i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , m). (3.A17)
We assume that the global welfare function is egalitarian, which implies the relative
welfare weight λR/λD will be less than one. This means that the weight accorded
to the marginal social damage for the rich country consumers will be less than that
of the consumers in the developing country. Let PD and pD be the consumer and
producer prices in the developing country, with the tax rate being tD = PD − pD.
From (3.A16) and the competitive assumption (see equations (3.A7) and (3.A8)) we
may then conclude that the optimal tax in the developing country is
tD = [i(uiDe /uiD0 ) + j(ujRe /ujR0 )(λR/λD)]. (3.A18)
How does this correspond to the optimal tax rate in the rich country? This turns out




R/λD) + [i(uiDe /uiD0 ) + j(ujRe /ujR0 )(λR/λD)]
= CR1 (yR1 )(λR/λD) (k = 1, . . . , m). (3.A19)
Let PR and pR be the prices in the rich country and the tax rate the difference between
the two. Then we can write the optimal tax rate in the rich country as
tR = [i(uiDe /uiD0 )(λD/λR) + j(ujRe /ujR0 )]. (3.A20)
Comparing (3.A20) with (3.A18), we see immediately that
tD = tR(λR/λD). (3.A21)
Since the relative welfare weight is less than one, this implies that tD < tR. At
the optimum the optimal tax in the developing country is lower than in the rich
country. We may think of the ratio of welfare weights as expressing the degree of
egalitarianism embedded in the global social welfare function. In the limit, as the ratio
λR/λD approaches zero, giving all weight to the welfare of the developing country, the
tax in the developing country goes to zero, and the whole burden of discouraging global
pollution falls on tax policy of the rich country.
What about global production efficiency? Using the competitive equilibrium
conditions (3.A7) and (3.A8), we can rewrite (3.A21) as
PD − CD1 = (λR/λD)(PR − CR1 ). (3.A22)
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We cannot conclude from the lower tax rate in the developing country that the marginal
cost of reducing pollution should be higher in the developing country. However, in the
important special case in which international trade causes equality of commodity prices,




The reasons for the difference between the first-best optimal tax rates and the
desirability of global production inefficiency are clearly distributional. Both coun-
tries contribute to a cleaner global environment by discouraging the production and
consumption of the dirty good, but the poorer country contributes less. Only in the
case where the marginal utilities of income are the same in the two countries, so that
(λR/λD) = 1, will there be a globally uniform tax rate. In the model, this will be the
case if the first part of the materials balance equations (3.A11) is replaced by25
ixiD0 + jxjR0 = yD0 + yR0 , (3.A24)
which says simply that world consumption must equal world production of the
numéraire commodity. With this formulation, the only constraint on the consump-
tion of each country is the aggregate production of commodity 0 in the world as a
whole; domestic production is no longer a limit on domestic consumption. Clearly,
this is equivalent to assuming lumpsum transfers between the two countries, since the
only way in which a country can consume more than its domestic output (without pay-
ing for it in the form of international trade) is through transfers from other countries.
With this assumption, there is no longer any egalitarian case for differentiating the tax
rates, since any adverse distributional effect of the environmental tax is compensated
by the transfers.
Will this assumption also imply world production efficiency? As condition (3.A22)
makes clear this is not necessarily the case, since in equilibrium we have equality
between marginal cost and the producer price. Equality of producer prices between
countries will only result, except by coincidence, through free international trade.
Thus, it is the twin assumptions of lumpsum international transfers and free trade that
make the global community into one integrated economy, just like the single country
of Appendix A. In this perfectly competitive global economy with no constraints on
tax and transfer policies, there is perfect separation of efficiency and equity issues
of economic policy, and environmental policy should accordingly be based solely on
efficiency considerations.26
25 Equation (3.A24) should not be confused with a balance of payments equation, which is a constraint
on values, not quantities. Both versions of the model, with or without international transfers, are consistent
with the presence of international trade; see Sandmo (2003). Without trade, producer prices will differ
between countries; with trade, they will be the same.
26 Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) discuss the problem of international production efficiency in a multi-
country model with a similar structure to the one used here, but they do not discuss the tax implications.
Keen and Wildasin (2004) and Edwards (2002) discuss the desirability of world production efficiency in
more general settings, including second best situations where domestic tax systems are distortionary, an
obviously important set of cases that is neglected in the present analysis.
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The dramatic rise in cross-border financial flows in the post-Bretton Woods period has
been associated with the unprecedented increase in financial instability and crisis.
Indeed, while economic theory emphasizes the potential advantage of global financial
trading for economic development and world welfare, it is by now abundantly clear
that financial globalization entails genuine costs, risks, and hazards for participating
countries not only in their increased susceptibility to financial instability and crisis
but in the loss of autonomy in macroeconomic management—a condition known as
the ‘macroeconomic policy trilemma for open economies’ or the ‘inconsistent trinity’
thesis.1 The thesis stipulates that an open capital market deprives a government of the
ability simultaneously to target its exchange rate and to use monetary policy in pursuit
of other economic objectives.2
Financial globalization can also lead to a loss of fiscal autonomy, if financial open-
ness makes it hard to tax internationally footloose capital relative to labour due to the
The author gratefully acknowledges invaluable comments and suggestions received on early versions of
the chapter from the project director, Tony Atkinson. She has also benefited from helpful comments
received from Tony Addison, Anthony Clunies-Ross, Ilene Grabel, John Langmore, George Mavrotas,
Alice Sindzingre and participants at the UNU–WIDER project meeting in May 2003 and conference in
September 2003. She extends her gratitude to anonymous referees for their detailed comments for improving
the clarity of the chapter.
1 See Obstfeld (1998) for a summary exposition how economic theory weighs costs and benefits associated
with financial globalization. For a more critical literature review of economic propositions concerning the
effects of financial globalization on economic development and welfare, see Nissanke and Stein (2003).
2 Interestingly, the very constraints that financial openness places on the policymakers of emerging market
economies in macroeconomic management are often treated as beneficiary, since the international capital
market is seen to play the role of ‘disciplining’ policymakers ‘who might be tempted to exploit a captive
domestic market’ (Obstfeld 1998: 10).
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competition for foreign savings through tax incentives and general financial arbitrage.3
Many countries reduced or eliminated taxes on capital transactions and lessened the
rate of capital gain taxes or corporate taxes considerably in this process of tax com-
petition and in fear of asset migration and capital flight. A critical analytical work is
required to examine whether or not international tax coordination is welfare increasing
nationally as well as globally.4
The Tobin tax has been debated in the context of this particular historical trend
towards an accelerated pace of financial globalization over the recent decades. Tobin
proposed a currency transaction tax first at the Janeway Lectures delivered at Princeton
in 1972 and again at the presidential address to the Eastern Economic Association in
1977 (Tobin 1974, 1978). The currency transaction tax (CTT), widely known as the
Tobin tax, was initially proposed, therefore, for enhancing the efficacy of national
macroeconomic policy and the operation of the international monetary system by
reducing short-term speculative currency flows.
However, as Tobin himself notes (1996), his proposal did not receive serious con-
sideration from fellow academics or policymakers in the 1970s and 1980s. It was either
dismissed almost at stroke as impractical on the grounds of technical and political
unfeasibility or rejected as an unnecessary intervention that interferes with the effi-
cient functioning of markets by injecting ‘distortions’. However, in contrast to the its
disappointing response in the 1970s, followed by the long silence on the subject in the
1980s, there has been a sudden surge of interest in the Tobin tax since the early 1990s.
The renewed interest in the Tobin tax in recent years certainly reflects the growing
recognition that there is an urgent need for creating a new international financial
architecture governing cross-border capital flows in face of the repeated severe financial
crises, including self-fulfilling currency crises in a large number of European countries
in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) and emerging market economies. In particular,
in developing and transitional economies, some small initial changes in perception
towards their currencies could cascade into generalized financial and economic crises
in no time.
For the purpose of this chapter, however, it is critical to note that the surge of
interests in the scheme is also explained by its potential for generating a tax revenue of
substantial size, which could more than offset the declines in official aid from OECD
countries to developing and transitional economies. It has been argued widely that
the revenue from CTTs has the potential to serve as an important source of finance
for ‘global public goods’. Responding to these emerging interests, a number of recent
studies have assessed the potential of CTTs, not only for taming exchange rate volatility
and averting financial crises but also as an important tax instrument to generate revenue
for global development. Many of these studies have articulated modifications to Tobin’s
original CTT proposal in order to address a variety of technical and political concerns.
3 This also means less freedom for providing social safety nets to people adversely affected by globalization
(Rodrik 1997).
4 See Boadway (Chapter 11, this volume) and Fuest et al. (2003) for a detailed discussion on this issue.
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The principal objective of this chapter is to assess the potential of taxes on the CTTs
to raise revenues that can be used for developmental purposes. Thus, though Tobin
proposed and others assessed CTTs in terms of reducing exchange rate volatility and
improving macroeconomic policy environments, this chapter considers the CTT first
and foremost from the standpoint of revenue. Unlike other papers on this subject,
this chapter treats the assessment of the potential of the CTT to achieve valuable
double dividends, such as the promotion of financial stability and policy autonomy, as
a subsidiary objective.
With a view of establishing the ‘permissible’ range of tax rates to obtain realistic
estimates of revenue potential from CTTs, Section 4.2 reviews the debate on the
effects of CTTs on market liquidity and the efficiency of foreign exchange markets, and
assesses briefly the Spahn proposal for a two-tier currency tax. Section 4.3 discusses
a number of issues raised in the debate on the technical and political feasibility of
CTTs, followed by an evaluation of several new proposals, such as those advanced by
Schmidt and Mendez. Section 4.4 presents my estimates of the potential revenue from
CTTs in light of recent changes in the composition and structure of foreign exchange
markets. Section 4.5 presents my concluding assessment of the potential of CTTs as
a revenue-raising tax instrument. It also evaluates CTTs’ ability to achieve double
dividends.
4.2. THE DEBATE OVER THE EFFECTS OF THE CTTs
ON MARKET LIQUIDITY AND EFFICIENCY
At the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of adjustable pegged exchange rate
regimes with capital controls, Tobin proposed an idea of instituting a currency trans-
action tax to tackle excessive exchange rate fluctuations, promote autonomy of national
macroeconomic policies, and to improve the operation of the international monet-
ary system by reducing short-term speculative currency flows. Acting as ‘sand in
the wheels’, Tobin suggested that CTT could make short-term trades more costly
and by doing so, would increase the maturity structure of international capital flows
(Tobin 1994, 1996).5 In particular, it was conjectured to considerably reduce exchange
5 See Frankel (1996) for a mathematical model illustration of how a Tobin tax discourages short-term
destabilizing speculation without discouraging investment and trade flows with longer maturities. Indeed,
Frankel identifies the ability of the Tobin tax to penalize short-term roundtrips relative to transactions with
longer maturities as their most attractive attributes. Davidson (1997) argues, however, that the effect of
the Tobin tax on speculative flows is overstated when it is derived from calculations based on annualized
rates. He suggests that the Tobin tax, like all transactions costs, is independent of the roundtrip time
interval and therefore its deterrent capability is not a function of the time period. He argues instead that
investors/traders base their decisions in relation to transaction costs and that as long as the Tobin tax rate is
an insignificant addition to transaction costs and very marginal compared to expected gains from speculation,
it does not deter short-term roundtrip transactions. In my view, so long as a trader’s/investor’s decision
on asset portfolio is made in relation to a certain asset-holding period, calculation on relative returns based
on uncovered interest parity condition is relevant in measuring the effect of the Tobin tax on short-term
interest arbitrage. However, since traders’ decisions are also based on the relative cost–benefit configuration
in the immediate future, transaction costs are undoubtedly a critical parameter against which the tax rate
has to be evaluated (see Section 4.4).
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rate volatility by ‘penalizing short-horizon roundtrips, while negligibly affecting the
incentives for commodity trade and long-term capital investments’ (Tobin 1996: x).
Filtering transactions by maturity on the understanding that speculators would
have shorter horizons and holding periods, Tobin predicted that CTT is capable of
reducing ‘noise trading’ from foreign exchange markets. In Tobin’s own words, the
tax is to set to ‘make exchange rates reflect to a larger degree long-run fundamentals
relative to short-range expectations and risks by strengthening the weight of regressive
expectations relative to extrapolative expectations’ (Tobin 1996: xii).6
The proposal has drawn strong criticism on efficiency and liquidity grounds.7
Indeed, the debate on the effects of CTT on market liquidity and efficiency is inevitably
shaped by varied perceptions about how well foreign exchange markets function and
whether or not short-term speculation is destabilizing. A question is raised whether
speculators or traders make exchange rates excessively more volatile than warranted
by fundamentals.
Critics of the Tobin tax claim that speculators would not increase exchange rate vola-
tility as their expectations are guided by fundamentals, and that their presence tends
to reduce volatility by providing necessary liquidity to markets.8 In particular, specu-
lators, who could act as informed investors guided by their expectations about future
underlying fundamentals (i.e. as traditional fundamentalists or ‘informed’ traders), are
seen to keep exchange rate in line with the macroeconomic fundamentals and help to
stabilize markets around new equilibrium.
From the perspective of opponents, the Tobin tax is a device that tends to decrease
market efficiency by creating liquidity problems for the day-to-day operation of cur-
rency markets, adversely affecting the bid-ask spreads and hence deterring arbitrage
transactions. In the ‘wholesale’ segments of currency markets in particular,9 market-
makers’ position, whose act as arbitrageur provides a guaranteed counterpart, is seen to
be compromised with reduced liquidity by CTT, as they need liquid markets to avoid
large fluctuations in their net positions. It is thus clear that in most of the arguments
against the Tobin tax, the concept of speculation is conflated with that of arbitrage, as
noted by Davidson (1997).
In contrast, proponents of the Tobin tax argue that markets function inefficiently.
For example, Frankel (1996) notes that speculative bubbles—a deviation from the value
justified by fundamentals—are generated, as ‘noise traders’ (as opposed to ‘traditional
6 In this connection, it is also worth noting that in Dornbusch’s overshooting model, the assumption of
regressive expectations plays a critical role in ensuring a return of short-run overshooting exchange rates to
the long-run equilibrium level dictated by the purchasing power parity (Dornbusch 1976).
7 See Dooley (1996), Davidson (1997), Habermeier and Kirilenko (2003), and Dodd (2003), among other
numerous papers.
8 Habermeier and Kirilenko (2003), emphasizing the informational role of liquidity in the price discovery
process, argue that taxing financial transactions introduces additional friction into this process.
9 Interdealers and interbank transactions are referred to as ‘wholesale’ transactions, as opposed to transac-
tions involving non-financial customers in ‘retail’ segments. See Section 4.4 for the composition of currency
transactions by counter-party and its recent shifts in markets.
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fundamentalists’ or ‘informed traders’) follow the herd in the face of uncertainty.10 In
the analyses, a critical distinction is usually made between informed traders and noise
traders: while informed traders act on homogeneous rational expectation, noise traders
make their decisions on the basis of ‘fads’, which are unrelated to fundamentals.
In this context, Jeanne and Rose (1999) suggest that while the volatility in exchange
rates is generated both by fundamentals and noise, the source of excessive exchange rate
volatility (that is, speculative bubbles) is attributed to the presence of noise traders. In
particular, their model shows that noise traders are attracted to the market in search for
a risk premium, and that as the number of noise traders increases, so does the volatility
of exchange rates. It predicts that when the volatility of fundamentals is low, there is
a single equilibrium where noise traders are not active, resulting in a low volatility in
exchange rates. Conversely, when the volatility of fundamentals is high, a large number
of noise traders enter the market, producing a high volatility in exchange rates. When
the volatility of fundamentals is in the intermediate range, however, multiple stable
equilibria are possible, depending on the number of noise traders seeking for a risk
premium.
The excess volatility generated by noise traders is also analysed in the model of
asset markets, advanced by De Long et al. (1990a, b), with focus on the interesting
interface between arbitrageurs and noise traders. ‘Arbitrage does not eliminate the
effects of noise because noise itself creates risk’ (De Long et al. 1990b: 705). That is,
the unpredictability of noise traders’ beliefs and expectations, which can be erroneous
and stochastic in light of fundamentals, could create a ‘noise trader risk’—a risk in the
price of assets that deters rational arbitrageurs from aggressively betting against them.
This is because arbitrageurs are likely to be risk averse, acting with a short time-horizon.
Hence, they tend to have limited willingness to take position against risks created by
noise traders. As a result, ‘prices can diverge significantly from fundamental values even
in the absence of fundamental risk’ (De Long et al. 1990b: 705). Moreover, bearing a
disproportionate amount of risk thus generated enables noise traders to earn a higher
expected return than rational investors engaged in arbitrage against noise. Clearly, their
model challenges the standard proposition made by Friedman (1953) that irrational
noise traders are counteracted by rational arbitrageurs who trade against them and in
the process drive asset prices close to fundamental values.
Overall, these models support the view that speculators—acting on ‘fads’ or guided
by extrapolative expectations at short-term horizon—can exert destabilizing effects
on markets and ‘overshooting of the overshooting equilibrium’ takes place.11 Further-
more, destabilizing speculation of this type can be profitable, contrary to Friedman’s
reasoning. The Tobin tax is often viewed by its proponents as particularly effective to
10 Keynes (1936) uses a ‘beauty contest’ analogy to describe fund managers’ herd behaviour, in that they
must guess in an instant how other market players will interpret a new event and follow them accordingly.
11 In this context, it is worth noting that in Krugman’s model of the target zone (1991), the result that
speculators could have a stabilizing effect at margins of the target zone depends critically on two assumptions:
(i) speculators’ expectations are guided by macroeconomic fundamentals; and (ii) the government’s credible
commitment to intervene prevails.
Tobin Tax for Development Finance 63
countering such speculation and speculative bubbles in the floating currency markets
on short horizons by eliminating destabilizing noise trading.12 It is also argued that
the Tobin tax, by breaking the interest parity condition, could in principle allow
policymakers to pursue monetary policy for domestic consideration without a fear of
impending large exchange rate fluctuations (Eichengreen 1996).
Interestingly, Frankel (1996) reports survey results, which show that traders, using
the ‘Chartist technical analysis’ or the ‘momentum’ models, act on extrapolative
expectations at short horizon of under three months, while they act on adaptive,
regressive or distributed lag expectations at longer horizons of three months to one
year. Hence, he suggests that the former generates destabilizing speculations, while
the latter produces stabilizing effects. Further, Spahn (2002) notes that more chartists
may be found among the institutional investors such as investment fund managers than
among dealers-arbitrageurs. These empirical observations point to the importance of
distinguishing those who act as arbitrageurs from those whose behaviour tends to be
speculative, pushing markets away from equilibrium.
On one hand, Frankel’s empirical results tend to suggest that traders’ behavioural
pattern is a function of time-horizons over which they act, so the Tobin tax is seen as
effective for moderating destabilizing speculation by penalizing trading with a short-
term horizon. On the other hand, Spahn’s observation implies that traders’ behaviour
depends upon their motivation for participating in currency trading. However, a com-
plication arises, in my view, because the interaction between arbitrageurs and noise
traders in currency markets is very complex, as the former often has to respond to
the unpredictable behaviour of the latter rather than to expected changes in funda-
mentals (De Long et al. 1990a). Further, the market composition between the two
types of traders shifts, as market conditions change because the entry and behaviour
of noise traders are influenced by the level of volatility of fundamentals and the size
of risk premium, as shown by Jeanne and Rose (1999). Equally, depending on mar-
ket conditions, traders could switch their position from arbitrageurs to ‘destabilizing’
speculators.
Now, a critical issue is whether the Tobin tax could always be successful in dis-
tinguishing between these two types of traders. Williamson (1997) notes it is naïve
to equate short-term movements with market destabilization. Spahn (2002) further
remarks that the Tobin tax unfortunately cannot discriminate between destabilizing
noise trading and stabilizing liquidity trading. Davidson (1997) goes a step further to
suggest that the Tobin tax is more likely to be a constraint on arbitrage flows rather
than on speculative flows. If this is the case, the Tobin tax could adversely affect mar-
ket efficiency. Hence, critics argue forcefully that this ‘liquidity’ consideration alone
provides sufficient grounds to oppose the Tobin tax.
12 Applying the interest parity condition, Frankel (1996) estimates that even at the very modest rate of
transaction tax rate of 0.001%, for traders with a one-day time horizon to engage in speculative transaction,
the foreign yield would have to rise to 46.5%, compared to domestic yield of 10%. Similarly, Spahn (2002)
estimates that at a tax rate of 0.1%, foreign yields would have to rise to 50.7%, 18.5%, and 10.7% compared
to domestic yield of 5%, for traders with one-day, three-day, and one-week time-horizon, respectively.
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Certainly, the liquidity-efficiency dimension has a critical bearing on the question
of what the optimal (or permissible) range of the tax rate could be, when one attempts
to estimate the revenue potential of the Tobin tax.13 Liquid markets are certainly
necessary for arbitrageurs to perform the important functions of reducing price vola-
tility, settlement risk, and the cost of hedging. As discussed above, Jeanne and Rose
(1999) show that markets are likely to be dominated by arbitrageurs rather than noise
traders under ‘tranquil’ market conditions with a low volatility of fundamentals. Hence,
the tax rate cannot be set at a very low threshold level to undermine liquidity and market
efficiency. Rates that are too high certainly risk reducing unduly liquidity necessary for
arbitrage operations as well as deterring international trade transactions and long-term
investment.
While Kaul and Langmore (1996) set a ceiling at 0.25 per cent absolute maximum,
Felix and Sau (1996) assess tax rates at less than 0.05 per cent (5 basis point) as those
with no ‘sand in the gears’. Hence, these authors use tax rates between 0.25 per cent
and 0.05 per cent for their revenue calculation. Although we suggest in the following
the use of a much lower rate of 0.01–0.02 per cent (1 or 2 basis points) for revenue
estimation on the grounds of efficiency and feasibility, some consensus in literature
had emerged by the mid-1990s that the liquidity question is likely to favour 0.1 per
cent or lower as the tax rate ceiling. The lower rates are favoured on the basis of the
growing recognition that a loss of liquidity resulting from CTT should be kept to a
minimum, so that transaction costs and spreads as well as the trade volume and market
structures would not be affected adversely.
It is assumed that at a modest tax rate of 0.1 per cent or lower, CTT would not
entail a discernible disincentive to long-term investments or international trade, as
the tax could be a very marginal part of other larger trade- and investment-related
transaction costs. It can also be argued that a tax burden at this low rate is less likely to
exceed the cost of using derivative instruments to hedge against currency fluctuations
(Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1996). By affecting the cost of trading with a very short-
term horizon (see note 12), it has been argued that CTT at these low tax rates could
still reduce currency speculation and swings at margin.14
However, the low tax rates such as discussed here would certainly not be effective
in countering large-scale speculative attacks on pegged exchange rates, as observed in
recent currency crises. Yet, currency crises have increasingly become ‘self-fulfilling’
in character, where substantial financial gains are assured for speculators who take a
position against the viability of currency pegs as in the ERM crisis. In the self-fulfilling
crises, even though a fixed exchange rate is sustainable in terms of consistency between
exchange rate policy and other macroeconomic fundamentals as it stands, agents’
13 It has been suggested that the Tobin tax could be set as a percentage of spreads, which can eliminate the
need for setting a tax rate as a percentage of trade turnover. However, in our view, because of the fragmented
nature of the retail segments of currency markets, this would simplify neither tax administration nor revenue
estimation as such. We shall return to this question in Section 4.4.
14 Responding to Davidson’s arguments that the effect on trade volume of Tobin tax at a low rate is
minimum, Korkut (2002) suggests that the stabilizing effect of the Tobin tax is realized more through its
negative impact on the speed of reaction of market traders to price changes.
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expectations about possible inconsistency in the future can trigger a speculative attack
(Obstfeld 1996).
As in the first generation model of currency crises (Krugman 1979), the main issue
at stake here is still the credibility of a government committing to a fixed exchange
rate regime in the presence of market speculation. However, instead of facing a real
reserve constraint as a result of a deterioration of economic fundamentals as in the first
generation model, the government facing a possible attack from speculators tries to
address a tradeoff between the benefits of continuing to defend the currency and costs
of doing so in terms of hardships resulting from such economic costs as high interest
rates and unemployment. Speculators in turn try to second-guess the government’s
capabilities and intentions. A speculative attack occurs when the government is not
believed to be able or willing to defend the peg at high cost and is expected to devalue.
Importantly, agents’ expectations about possible future depreciation feed into cur-
rent economic variables and increase wages and prices. In short, speculation in itself
creates objective economic conditions that make devaluation likely, while macroeco-
nomic fundamentals determine the existence and multiplicity of possible equilibria. In
the end, the government is forced to validate the expectations ex post by devaluing.
Thus, the inability to maintain credibility has become self-fulfilling, as the expectations
of speculators regarding the behaviour of the government in a crisis situation might
per se generate the crisis. Under such conditions, a regime that could have been viable
in terms of economic fundamentals collapses. In effect, crises are not precipitated so
much by the actual mechanisms of the economy, but rather by the speculators’ expecta-
tions of the choices that a government would make in a tight crisis situation. Thus,
mechanisms of self-fulfilling crises work through market expectations.
Under these crisis conditions, the issue at stake is not merely whether specula-
tors increase exchange rate volatility, but also whether they generate and exacerbate
exchange rate misalignments in terms of fundamentals. This is because noise traders
could trigger a shift of exchange rate from an equilibrium with a low volatility of funda-
mentals to the one with a high volatility of fundamentals, by generating destabilizing
speculative bubbles, as shown by Jeanne and Rose (1999).
In this regard, Williamson (1997) raises an interesting question whether the Tobin
tax would curb misalignments. Referring to the fact that transaction tax would penalize
both stabilizing and destabilizing speculators, he observes: ‘if the object is to curb
misalignments, it seems inefficient to penalize all transactions rather than those that
are subverting policy’ (1997: 336). Hence, he regards the Tobin tax as an inferior
instrument to more discriminatory types of capital controls in its capacity to stabilize
the currency market.
Certainly, if CTT is considered as an instrument for dampening speculation to
avert self-fulfilling crises, the tax rate has to be set at a much higher rate than the
one envisaged to deal with ‘noise-trading’ speculators operating under less volatile
market conditions.15 The low range of the tax rates referred to above would not deter
15 Davidson (1997) emphasizes this problem, noting that to avert the speculative surge of the Mexican
peso crisis of 1994–5, Tobin tax exceeding 23% would have needed.
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speculative attacks on pegs, when much higher gains are at stake. Yet, as discussed
above, a high tax rate would create severe liquidity problems for normal market opera-
tions. In order to address this tradeoff and to deal effectively with speculators’ different
motivations depending on market conditions, a flexible multi-tier system of taxes would
be required, rather than a time-invariant uniform currency tax.
This issue is directly addressed in the two-tier tax system proposed by Spahn (1996,
2002). The two-tier structure embedded in Spahn’s proposal consists of ‘a low tax rate
for normal transactions and an exchange surcharge on profits from very short-term
transactions deemed to be speculative attacks on currencies’ (1996: 24), as applied to
a target zone.16 Under this system, ‘an exchange rate would be allowed to move freely
within a band, but overshooting the band would result in a tax on the discrepancy
between the market exchange rate and the closest margin of the band’, while the low
transaction tax is levied on a continual basis, raising substantial and stable revenues.
Importantly, this system has to be executed under a two-tier structure, since credibility
of the surcharge levy is anchored in the fact that the transaction tax system is already
in place. Thus, Spahn proposes that the exchange surcharge would be administered in
conjunction with the underlying transaction tax. The transaction tax would serve ‘as
a monitoring and controlling device for the exchange surcharge, which would be zero
so long as foreign exchange markets are operating normally within a band, but would
function as an automatic circuit-breaker at times of speculative attacks’ (1996: 24).
Thus, the exchange surcharge would be applied temporarily on a unilateral basis at
the ‘speculative end’ and would not affect the liquidity or the efficiency of market
functioning in a less volatile condition.
Indeed, once such a system is seen to be operating efficiently with credibility, the
threat of a surcharge levy alone may be sufficient to keep exchange rates within a
target zone, without depletion of official reserves or other interventions such as high
premium on overnight money deposits or excessively high interest rates as observed
during the ERM crises. The system is seen as providing monetary authorities with
breathing space for orderly realignment of exchange rates, which would reflect the
development of economic fundamentals. In this context, it should be noted that the
band in the proposed scheme would be a moving one that continuously reflects changes
in fundamentals. Thus, authorities would not choose to set and defend a particular
parity and its associated band, but rather their aim would be to prevent self-fulfilling
panic in the currency markets.
In my view, one of interesting aspects of this scheme is that its implementation is
deemed successful, when the exchange surcharge is never levied, while the background
low transaction tax generates steady revenues, as the two-tier currency tax manages to
drive ‘destabilizing’ speculation from the system. In particular, in relation to poten-
tial revenue estimate, which is the main objective of this chapter, it is important to
16 Spahn (2002) refers the exchange surcharge as an exchange-rate normalization duty (ENRD). Further,
Grabel (2003) classifies potential measures managing cross-border capital flows into ‘trip wires’ and ‘speed
bumps’. An exchange surcharge in the Spahn proposal is an example of a speed bump measure that might
be activated whenever trip wires reveal that a currency is vulnerable to speculative attack.
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emphasize that the two-tier system proposed by Spahn allows the first-tier tax to be
kept as low as 0.01–0.02 per cent (1 or 2 basis points).
Now, following on this scheme proposed by Spahn, others have proposed dual tax-
ation as a way of increasing the ‘double dividend’ through schemes such as the ‘dual
currency and securities transaction tax’. We shall come back to the issue of appropriate
exchange rate regime as well as the issue of achieving effective double dividends with
the use of the Tobin tax in the concluding section. However, it may be worth noting here
in passing that a multi-tier CTT such as Spahn’s proposal is not universally accepted as
a solution for averting self-fulfilling currency crises. For example, Williamson (2000)
sees no role of any variation of CTT in managing the intermediate regimes against
speculative attacks, while recommending the intermediate ‘target zone’ regime, gov-
erned by the BBC rule (where BBC stands for basket, band, and crawl), as a more
appropriate exchange rate regime for most emerging market economies in preference
over one of the two corner solutions of pure floating or hard pegs.17 Naturally, bands
are stabilizing when the credibility to defend is maintained.18 He argues, hence, that it
is important first and foremost to build credibility so that expectations are formed in a
stabilizing manner.
However, Williamson recommends ‘soft margins’ of the bands rather than ‘hard
margins’ as appropriate policy for emerging market economies in order to build cred-
ibility over time. He endorses the soft target zone system, analysed by Bartolini and
Prati (1997, 1998), in which the exchange rate is allowed to move outside the band
in the short run, at times of shocks to ‘the fundamentals’, in order to diffuse tension.
According to Bartolini and Prati (1998), such a softening of the target zone makes the
system less vulnerable to speculative pressures, as the edges to bands provide the mar-
ket with targets to attack. In their view, government interventions should instead be
focused on maintaining the obligation to hold the rate within the band in the long run.
Thus, Williamson argues that during times of large speculation the soft bands would
remove the source of vulnerability without losing the main advantage of the BBC
arrangement. By allowing a quick, temporary exit from commitments when a crisis
situation develops, it is conjectured that credibility to commitments is not eroded
permanently, while the exchange rate could revert back to the parity in the process of
crisis resolution. Obviously, under such a soft target zone regime, there is no role for
a circuit-breaker embedded in the two-tier CTT proposal, as commitments to defend
the edges of the zone are abandoned altogether.
17 In the recent literature on the appropriate exchange regime for emerging market economies, the term
of ‘two-corner solutions’ is used to refer to a freely floating exchange rate or hard pegs such as currency
boards, dollarization, or regional monetary union in the context of discussing the ‘impossible trinity’ thesis
(see Frankel 1999, for example).
18 Williamson (2000) lists the fundamental reasons found in literature for preferring a band system over
floating: (i) the band performs the function of crystallizing market expectations of where the equilibrium
exchange rate may lay, thus making expectations stable at the time-horizons relevant for influencing market
behaviour (Svensson 1992); (ii) a band has a pronounced effect in limiting exchange rate variability by
preventing noise traders, particularly stop-loss traders, from making money by introducing noise into the
exchange market (Rose 1996).
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However, it should be recalled that in the classic model on target zones (Krugman
1991), speculators could act in a stabilizing manner at the margin of the zone precisely
because of their confidence in the government’s commitment and ability to intervene.19
A credible commitment to the exchange rate target would have a stabilizing effect on
market expectations by discouraging the entry of destabilizing noise traders. Further,
the ‘hard’ margin could avoid the large misalignments associated with the soft margin
in terms of very high adjustment costs (even though they are claimed to be temporary).
Ultimately, in my view, several critical questions should be addressed in deciding
which target zone system (soft or hard margins) is appropriate: (i) how credibility to
commitment to the target zone can be best maintained; (ii) how costly is it to abandon
the zone even temporarily in terms of macroeconomic fundamentals and adjustments;
(iii) how quickly can market confidence be restored to allow the exchange rate to
gravitate back towards the reference rate or the parity if a soft band option is adopted.
The answer to these questions appears to vary case by case. If a soft band is too costly for
the economy, a hard band incorporating the two-tier CTT system remains an attractive
instrument to consider.
4.3. THE DEBATE ON THE TECHNICAL AND
POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF CTT
4.3.1. Earlier Debate on the Technical Feasibility of CTT
In Tobin’s original proposal, a currency transaction tax is applied on a universal basis
to spot transactions only. This raised strong scepticism on the grounds of technical
and political feasibility. In particular, it has been argued that such a tax could be evaded
too easily by market migration to offshore tax havens as well as asset substitutions.20
Kenen (1996) addresses these concerns in a comprehensive manner. To counter the
shifting of transactions to tax-free jurisdictions, he proposes two measures: imposition
of a punitive rate on transfers of funds to or from such locations,21 and taxing at the site
where the deal is made (at dealing sites) rather than at the site where the transaction
occurs, that is, at settlement or booking sites. The reason for the second measure is
both because too many transactions are netted out before they are settled and because
tax-free jurisdictions can be used for booking all transactions with minimum cost.
For example, booking and settlement sites could be easily relocated by just installing
computers without moving dealing rooms or dealers, whereas relocation of dealing
sites is far more costly. Hence, Kenen also proposes that tax collection is made on
19 The empirical rejection of this model is usually explained in terms of imperfect credibility and intra-
marginal interventions (Garber and Svensson 1995; Sarno and Taylor 2003).
20 Tobin (1996) remarks that the concerns about tax evasion may be generally overblown. Baker (2001)
also argues that the ‘evasion issue’ has got too much attention in relation to CTTs and even capital controls.
However, though this may be the case, a possibility of evasion can affect the efficacy of any tax as well as
the cost of enforcement, so the evasion issue should be carefully examined. See Umlauf (1993) for the asset
migration effects of transaction taxes on the Swedish stock market.
21 Kenen suggests imposing a 5% punitive tax on transactions with a new dealing site, rather than one-half
of the standard rate of 0.05% (i.e. 0.025% for wholesale trading).
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a market basis where the dealing site is located and each party involved in wholesale
transactions would pay half the tax in retail transactions in order to equalize the tax
burden across wholesale interbank transactions and retail transactions.
As regards to addressing the possibility of tax evasion by asset substitutions, Kenen
points to the need to extend the transaction base to derivatives such as forward and swap
contracts, which could be used as close substitutions for spot transactions.22 The case
for taxing futures and options contracts is more complicated, as they are not perfect sub-
stitutes for spot transactions or forward contracts and they are not typically settled by
delivering currencies. However, Kenen reckons that if substantial changes to derivative
markets are to be avoided, both futures and option contracts need to be taxed as well.
However, those derivatives, which require high-frequency trading involving four
or more transactions per contract instead of two transactions, should not be subject
to double taxation. Further, these derivatives are risk-hedging instruments, so taxing
them would make hedging very costly, as taxes would not eliminate exchange rate
fluctuations from the market. At least, in order to remove the resulting bias against
high-frequency trading for hedging purpose, Spahn (1996) suggests that transactions
involving derivatives should be taxed at half the rate for spot transactions, which would
allow the derivative markets to function for hedging purposes. In his more recent study,
Spahn (2002) proposes that in addition to all spot transactions, outright forwards and
swaps up to one month would be taxed, while options and other financial derivatives
would not be taxed (though they are taxed indirectly through the spot and forward
transactions they trigger).
Now, it could be envisaged that new ‘cash substitute’ instruments could emerge
as tax avoidance mechanism. Garber and Taylor (1995) and Garber (1996) suggest
that T-bills traded in liquid markets could be used for such a purpose, while Spahn
(1996) foresees other possibilities involving bankers’ acceptances, commercial papers,
or repurchase agreements made against collateral without cash settlements. Since the
use of these substitutes involve transactions costs and interest rate risks or other credit
risks, both Kenen (1996) and Tobin (1996) assess that the possibility of large-scale
use of these substituting instruments are rather exaggerated and could be avoided, if
a low transaction tax is applied. However, a heavy tax burden may well encourage the
development of liquid markets for new financial instruments and papers that could be
used for cash substitutes.
Indeed, one of most efficient approaches to discourage all forms of tax avoidance,
including migration and substitutions, is to keep the tax rate very low. Considering
that spreads in the wholesale interbank market are well below 0.1 per cent, Kenen
(1996) reckons a 0.05 per cent tax rate (5 basis point) to be the upper benchmark for
CTT rather than the lower benchmark, as in the study by Felix and Sau (1996), while
Spahn (1996) suggests an underlying tax rate of 0.02 per cent (2 basis point).
22 While spot transactions are settled in less than three days, forward transactions take three or more days
and swap transactions pair either a spot transaction with an offsetting forward transaction, or two forward
contracts with different maturities. Hence, if only spot transactions are taxed, forward and swap contracts
could easily be used as substitutes. Tobin acknowledges the need for this modification to the taxbase (1996).
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Furthermore, both Tobin (1996) and Kenen (1996) suggest that for a CTT system
to be operative, the currency transaction tax has to be adopted at least by the G7
countries and a few other major financial centres such as Singapore, Hong Kong,
and Switzerland. Others argue, however, that for a more effective implementation
and enforcement, a universal adoption of CTT under an international agreement is
necessary. In particular, the universality was initially viewed as imperative in order
to deal effectively with a race-to-the-bottom approach to tax competition for highly
mobile financial services (Garber 1996).23
Such an agreement should specify uniform rules and procedures for subsequent
amendments, as well as for the use of the tax revenue. Tobin forwarded a proposal
in which the administration of a transactions tax is assigned to the IMF, so that a
CTT levy can be tied to IMF membership and borrowing privileges, and hence,
‘universality’ can be ensured. While other existing international organizations such as
Bank for International Settlement (BIS) and World Bank can be considered equally as
the coordinating and enforcement agencies for CTT, the establishment of a specialized
new institution under the UN system for this specific purpose (e.g. an international
cooperation fund such as Global Development Fund or World Tax Authority) was
also discussed. It was envisaged that under such a proposal, some agreed portion
of tax collected by national authorities would be funnelled to a UN sanctioned fund
management system or a specially established institution.
4.3.2. New Schemes to Overcome Technical and
Political Impediments to CTT
While foreign exchange markets have hitherto been organized as decentralized dealer-
driven markets, there appears to be a clear trend towards more centralized automated
systems. While this rationalization may entail a reduction in the gross turnover of
foreign exchange transactions, it may ease considerably the problem of administration
and collection of CTT, as well as that of enforcement. In fact, as Frankel (1996)
argues, a CTT may indeed accelerate this centralization process. It has been suggested
that automated systems, increasingly used for currency interbank settlements, could be
effectively used for tax administration. Proposals made by Schmidt and Mendez fall
into this category (Mendez 1995; Schmidt 1999, 2001).
According to Schmidt’s proposal, CTT would be collected and enforced at the
settlement site, instead of the dealing site as in Kenen’s proposal.24 Currently, real
time gross settlement systems (RTGS) for payment vs payment settlement (PVP) are
used for eliminating settlement risk at the national level. In addition, the Continuous
Linked Settlement (CLS) Bank is being developed as a global system of processing
settlements involving a number of currencies. The CLS Bank’s settlement operations
would be linked to domestic systems to support PVP settlement for foreign exchange
23 For a more recent proposal on CTT coverage, see discussion below.
24 This means that tax revenues generated by the Schmidt scheme would be substantially lower than the
estimates based on CTT imposed at the dealing site, as many foreign exchange transactions are netted out.
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transactions. Seizing this new technological development, Schmidt proposes RTGS
as a mechanism for levying a Tobin tax at the national level and CLS Bank’s settle-
ment operations for the imposition of CTT for cross-border flows in offshore netting
systems. The latter will be monitored and supervised by central banks participating in
CTT to deal with the threat of offshore tax avoidance. Schmidt (1999) further suggests
that it is technologically easy to apply the Tobin tax to foreign exchange transactions
intermediated by an exchange of securities, as securities exchanges around the world
operate similar netting settlement schemes through clearing houses.
Mendez (1995, 2001) goes a step further to propose the establishment of a global
‘foreign currency exchange’ (FXE) under the UN system as alternative to the CTT to
involve the setting-up of an extensive administrative structure for taxation. Under the
Mendez’ proposal, the centralized exchange, as a public owned entity in the form of a
specialized agency, would be a global network of members comprising of frequent users
as well as brokers and dealers, with trading facilities in the major financial centres and
branches in other small cities. Members would pay a licensing fee as well as commission
on each transaction. In place of CTT, these licensing and user fees would constitute
revenues. Mendez predicts that the FXE would significantly lower the cost of changing
money to end users by giving them competitive rates due to increased efficiency in
exchange markets. In his view, it could also generate revenues of considerable size
through transaction fees, rather than a transaction tax, while offering the potential
of facilitating the operation of a Tobin type of tax with a view of reducing volatility.
Mendez (2001) suggests that the distinctive advantage of FXE over CTT lies in the
fact that it is a more market-based approach, and would therefore garner more political
support than the Tobin tax. However, under the current international climate, it may be
as equally difficult as with CTTs (if not more so), to reach an international agreement
for creating and organizing such a global currency market under the UN system, as
proposed by Mendez.
Adopting the Schmidt proposal of collecting CTT at the settlement site, Clunies-
Ross (2003) argues that a virtually universal application of CTT on wholesale
transactions could be achieved through the cooperation of five or so monetary author-
ities who issue ‘vehicle’ currencies, since almost all wholesale transactions have one
of these vehicle currencies on one or both sides. He suggests that CTT at the settle-
ment site would simplify the formidable technical issues associated with the Tobin tax
imposed on largely unregulated, decentralized currency markets at the dealing site.
It is worth noting here that taxing at settlement incidentally reduces risk penalizing
arbitrage transactions considerably, as a tax is applied to a trader’s netted out position,
rather than to each of his or her transaction flows.25 The problem associated with asset
substitution can also be addressed through security exchange taxes or taxes on de-
rivative instruments using a similar centralized mechanism, as suggested by Schmidt.
25 Thus, taxing at the settlement site would mitigate, to a certain degree, the criticism against a transaction
tax imposed on the flow in view of the understanding that speculative threats originate from an overhang of
a stock of short-term claims. I am grateful to John Williamson for pointing to the need for drawing sufficient
attention to this question.
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Clunies-Ross (2003) assesses further that using the Schmidt scheme, the higher tier
tax embedded in the Spahn proposal could be implemented unilaterally by countries
facing impeding currency crises, without having an international agreement.
While all these authors emphasize the technical feasibility of CTT, they recog-
nize that the most formidable obstacle is political (Mendez 2001). The main political
obstacle in the way to making the CTT universal is the intense opposition anti-
cipated from the US administration/congress and financial industry. So adoption
of the CTT on a regional basis has been actively considered. For example, Cecil
(2001) examines the possibility of domestic or regional adoptions of CTTs, such as
the European Union, with international cooperation for enforcement. Spahn (2002)
advances the distinct concept of a politically feasible Tobin tax (PFTT) in the pre-
vailing political reality. Foreseeing fierce opposition from the US administration
and Congress,26 Spahn (2002) reckons with the fact that the Tobin tax cannot be
introduced universally or multilaterally in the first instance, as the tax has to be legit-
imized first by existing parliamentary institutions, either national or regional (e.g. the
European Council). In the light of the political reality faced by the international com-
munity, he actively considers the case in which the Tobin tax can be implemented
unilaterally by a group of countries such as the European Union in cooperation with
Switzerland.
Following on these arguments, Patomäki and Sehm-Patomäki (1999) also suggest
an implementation of CTT in two phases: in the first phase, a group of countries,
such as the Euro-EU, would establish an open agreement and a supranational body
for tax administration. Member countries would agree to charge a small under-
lying CTT (e.g. 0.1 per cent) as well as high exchange surcharges, as the need
arises. (Their proposed tax rate is much higher than the rates I consider real-
istic and permissible in the prevailing market and political conditions.) A higher
CTT (e.g. 0.2 per cent) is charged in dealing with non-residents who are not in
the tax regime, in order to solve the tax evasion problem as well as to exert pres-
sure on outsiders to join. In the second phase, once all major financial centres
and most other countries have joined, a universal and uniform CTT would be
applied.
Patomäki and Denys (2002) develop this idea further in the ‘draft treaty on global
currency transactions tax’ and propose the establishment of a CTT organization
under a treaty, which will enter into force following the thirtieth ratification of the
treaty or on the date on which the preparatory group has established that the con-
tracting states, who have ratified the treaty account for at least 20 per cent of the
global currency markets, whichever is later. The draft treaty has adopted the basic
ideas contained in Spahn’s two-tier scheme as well as the Schmidt system collec-
tion, though it stipulates that the CTT be levied on both wholesale Sand retail
markets.
26 In the Second Session of the 104th Congress of the United States, Senator Bob Dole and three other
politicians introduced a bill to prohibit the UN and UN officials from developing and promoting Tobin’s
idea or any other international taxation scheme.
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Table 4.1. Global foreign exchange market turnovera daily averages in April,
in billions of US$
1989 1992 1995 1998b 2001
Spot transactions 317 394 494 568 387
Outright forwards 27 58 97 128 131
Foreign exchange swaps 190 324 546 734 656
Estimated gaps in reporting 56 44 53 60 26
Total ‘traditional’ turnover 590 820 1,190 1,490 1,200
Memo: Turnover at April 2001 exchanges ratesc 570 750 990 1,400 1,200
Notes:
a Adjusted for local and cross-border double-counting.
b Revised since the previous survey.
c Non-US dollar legs of foreign currency transactions were converted from current US dollar amounts
into original currency amounts at average. Exchange rates for April of each survey year and then
reconverted into US dollar amounts at average April 2001 exchange rates.
Source: BIS (2002: Table B1).
4.4. EVALUATION OF THE REVENUE POTENTIAL
OF CTTs
4.4.1. Recent Trends in the Composition and
Structure of Currency Markets
There are several important changes in foreign exchange markets in recent years, which
can have a critical bearing on our estimates of CTT revenues. As shown in Table 4.1,
according to the BIS survey data conducted in April 2001, average daily net turnover
was US$1.2 trillion, compared to US$1.49 trillion in April 1998, which is a 19 per cent
decline at current exchange rates and a 14 per cent fall at constant exchange rates as
calculated by BIS (2002).27 The decline in turnover between 1998 and 2001 is in sharp
contrast to the rapid steady increase in turnover over the last two decades, found in the
earlier surveys. The level of activities in currency markets in 2001 settled down to the
level reported for 1995.
The decline is largely accounted for by a sharp fall in spot transactions, and to a
lesser extent, in foreign exchange swaps, while outright forward transactions showed
a slight increase. Thus, there are some notable changes in the market composition by
type of transactions as shown in Fig. 4.1. The share of spot transactions has steadily
declined since 1992, while that of foreign exchange swaps has risen, now accounting for
over 55 per cent of transactions. According to the BIS survey, 38 per cent of outright
forwards and 69 per cent of swaps are with a maturity of up to seven days. Together
27 Forty-eight central banks and monetary authorities participated in the Triennial Central Bank Survey
of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activities conducted by the Bank for International Settlement













Outright forwards Estimated gaps
Foreign exchange swaps
Figure 4.1. Foreign exchange market turnover at constant April 2001 exchange rates
by market segment in per cent of global turnover
Note: Non-US dollar legs of foreign currency transactions were converted into original
currency amounts at exchange rates for April of each survey year and then reconverted into
US dollar amounts at average April 2001 exchange rates.
Source: BIS (2002: Graph B.1).
Table 4.2. Reported foreign exchange market turnover by
counterpartya daily averages in April, in billions of US$
1992 1995 1998b 2001
Total 776 1,137 1,429 1,173
With reporting dealers 540 729 908 689
With other financial institutions 97 230 279 329
With non-financial customers 137 178 242 156
Local 317 526 657 499
Cross-border 392 611 772 674
a Adjusted for local and cross-border double-counting. Excludes estimated
gaps in reporting.
b Revised since the previous survey.
Source: BIS (2002: Table B3).
with spot transactions, this brings the share of transactions with maturity up to seven
days to 76 per cent in 2001, close to the estimate of 80 per cent as transactions involving
roundtrips of seven days or less, as noted in Tobin (1996).
There are also some changes in the relative market share accounted for by the
different counterparties. As shown in Table 4.2, trading between reporting dealers
declined sharply, bringing its share in total turnover from 70 per cent in 1992 to 59 per
cent in 2001 (Fig. 4.2). A marked decline in trading between banks and non-financial
customers is reported here, which now accounts only for 13 per cent of transactions.
This may have reflected the acceleration of the consolidation process observed in the
non-financial corporation sector. The increased transactions between banks and other
financial institutions are accounted for by the increasing role of asset managers (BIS
2002: 2). At the same time, the role of hedge funds in foreign exchange transactions
has declined since their debacle in 1998.










With reporting dealers With other financial institutions
With non-financial customers
Figure 4.2. Foreign exchange market turnover by counterparty as per cent of total
reported turnover
Source: BIS (2002: Graph B.2).
The marked decline in global foreign exchange market turnover in the 2001 survey
undoubtedly reflects the general slowdown of the global economy and world trade as
well as the increased economic and political uncertainty of recent years. However, a
reduction of this scale as well as the significant changes in market structures is also
an indication of the growing trend towards the centralized, automated systems in the
settlement of wholesale currency transactions discussed above.28 Thus, BIS (2002) also
notes the growing role of electronic brokers in the spot interbank market, reducing the
need for dealers to trade actively. The decline in wholesale interbank transactions is also
explained by the steady trend towards concentration in the banking sector, observed in
the major currency markets as well as globally, thus decreasing the number of trading
desks (BIS 2002: Table B.5).29
The introduction of the euro has also reduced gross foreign exchange market
turnover, as it eliminated the need for intra-EMS trading (Table 4.3). Dollar/euro
trade constitutes 30 per cent of the global turnover, followed by dollar/yen with 20 per
cent and dollar/GBP with 11 per cent (Table 4.4).
Major trading locations such as London, New York, and Tokyo continuously dom-
inate foreign exchange transactions, accounting together for 56 per cent of global
transactions (Table 4.5). London remains the largest centre, larger than New York and
Tokyo combined. The ten trading centres listed in Table 4.5 handle 85 per cent of
global currency transactions.
28 However, as CLS Bank became operational only in autumn 2002, the trade volume revealed by the
BIS survey conducted in April 2001 could not be affected by this new technology applied to settlements in
global foreign exchange trade.
29 BIS (2002) suggests the decline in turnover can also be explained by the decrease in the risk tolerance
of banks after the financial crises in 1998, which led to a reduction in credit limits and proprietary trading.
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Table 4.3. Currency distribution of reported foreign exchange market
turnovera percentage shares of average daily turnover in April
1989 1992 1995 1998b 2001
US dollar 90.0 82.0 83.3 87.3 90.4
Euro — — — — 37.6
Deutsche markc 27.0 39.6 36.1 30.1 —
French franc 2.0 3.8 7.9 5.1 —
ECU and other EMS currencies 4.0 11.8 15.7 17.3 —
Japanese yen 27.0 23.4 24.1 20.2 22.7
Pound sterling 15.0 13.6 9.4 11.0 13.2
Swiss franc 10.0 8.4 7.3 7.1 6.1
Canadian dollar 1.0 3.3 3.4 3.6 4.5
Australian dollar 2.0 2.5 2.7 3.1 4.2
Swedish kronad — 1.3 0.6 0.4 2.6
Hong Kong dollard — 1.1 0.9 1.3 2.3
Singapore dollard — 0.3 0.3 1.2 1.1
Emerging market currencies(d,e) — 0.5 0.4 3.0 5.2
Other 22.0 8.5 7.9 9.3 10.1
All currencies 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0
a Because two currencies are involved in each transaction, the sum of the percentage
shares of individual currencies totals 200% instead of 100%. The figures relate to
reported ‘net-net’ turnover, that is, they are adjusted for both local and cross-border
double-counting, except for 1989 data, which are available only on a ‘gross-gross’
basis. More details about emerging market and other currencies are provided in BIS
(2002: Annex Tables E.1.1 and E.1.2).
b Revised since the previous survey.
c Data for April 1989 exclude domestic trading involving the Deutsche mark in
Germany.
d For 1992–8, the data cover home currency trading only.
e For 1992 and 1995, South African rand; for 1998 and 2001, Brazilian real, Chilean
peso, Czech koruna, Indian rupee, Korean won, Malaysian ringgit, Mexican peso,
Polish zloty, Russian rouble, Saudi riyal, South African rand, Taiwan dollar, and Thai
baht.
Source: BIS (2002: Table B.4).
Despite the marked decline in market turnover between 1998 and 2001, the relative
size of foreign exchange markets is still staggering, as shown in Table 4.6. Annual
world exports stood at US$6,121 billion, compared to the annualized global foreign
exchange market turnover of US$300 trillion. This means that the ratio of global
exports to global foreign exchange turnover is 0.02—an increase from the low level of
0.015 in 1998, but far less than the ratios observed in the 1970s. Felix and Sau (1996)
report that these ratios for 1977, 1980, and 1983 were 0.29, 0.09, and 0.06, respectively.
Critically, global official foreign exchange reserves, which have been increasing stead-
ily since the ERM crises in 1992, are equal to merely 1.7 days of global currency
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Table 4.6. Foreign exchange trading, world trade and global official reserves,
in billions of US$ and percentages
1989 1992 1995 1998 2001
Annual world exports 3,027 3,762 5,130 5,444 6,121
Annual exports of developing
countries
899 1,112 1,661 1,779 2,252
% share of developing country exports 29.7 29.6 32.4 32.7 36.9
Global official foreign exchange reserves 715 925 1,385 1,638 2,039
Foreign exchange reserves of
developing countries
262 434 729 968 1,260
% share of developing country
reserves
36.6 46.9 52.6 59.1 61.8
Annual global foreign exchange turnover
(250 trading days)
147,500 205,000 297,500 372,500 300,000
Exports/foreign exchange turnover (%) 2.05 1.83 1.72 1.46 2.04
Reserves/exports (%) 23.6 24.6 27.0 30.1 33.3
Reserves/daily turnover (days) 1.21 1.13 1.16 1.10 1.70
Source: Author’s calculation, based on data in International Financial Statistics (IMF) and BIS (2002).
in foreign exchange markets in the face of speculative self-fulfilling attacks on their
currencies. Monetary authorities have been trying to improve their defence capacity
by raising official reserve holdings from 25 per cent of global exports in 1992 to 33 per
cent in 2001. Table 4.6 shows clearly that developing countries, which are more likely
to face currency crises, are forced to hold larger reserves in relation to the size of their
economies at very high opportunity costs. The share of developing countries in global
reserve holdings has increased consistently from 37 per cent in 1989 to 62 per cent in
2001, in contrast to their share in world exports of 37 per cent in 2001.
4.4.2. Revenue Potential and Tax Implementation
Previous studies produced various estimates of potential revenue from the Tobin tax,
predicting a very considerable tax revenue, as tax rates of 0.25–0.05 per cent are
commonly used for calculation. For example, Frankel (1996) estimates that the 0.1 per
cent tax applied to the 1995 global foreign exchange would generate an annual tax
revenue of US$176 billion, after taking into account that the 0.1 per cent tax would
reduce transaction volume by 45 per cent and allowing for a 20 per cent deduction
for exempted official trading and tax evasion. Applied to the volume reached in 1995,
Tobin (1996) reckons that the revenue is more likely to be US$94 billion maximum.
His estimate is based on the assumption that only 30 per cent of the gross volume of
transactions constitutes a taxbase if banks’ end-of-day open positions only are taxed
with a 0.1 per cent one-way tax. He concedes revenue could be less than US$50 billion
if the tax-induced reduction of volume is taken into account.
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Felix and Sau (1996) produce a range of potential revenue estimates, applying varying
assumptions with regard to: (i) tax rates of 0.25, 0.1, and 0.05 per cent; (ii) pre-tax
transaction costs, ranging from 0.1 to 1 per cent; and (iii) elasticities of trade volume
in response to tax-induced changes in transaction costs, ranging from 0.3 to 1.75.30
According to their estimates, the 0.1 per cent tax applied to the 1995 global foreign
exchange would generate tax revenue of US$148 billion and US$180 billion, under
the assumption of pre-tax transaction costs of 0.5 and 1.0 per cent, respectively. The
0.05 per cent tax rate, suggested by Kenen (1996), is estimated to produce tax revenue
of US$90 billion and US$97 billion.
Felix and Sau are correct in estimating revenue potential on the basis of the elasticity
of the volume with respect to currency transaction costs, which should absorb a tax
burden. They note, ‘by adding to transaction costs, a Tobin tax not only reduces the
foreign exchange volume by an amount determined by the weighted average elasticity
of volume with respect to costs, but alters its composition by squeezing hardest the
low-unit-profit, high elasticity transactions such as covered interest arbitraging’ (Felix
and Sau 1996: 228). However, their estimated pre-tax transaction costs of 0.1–1.0 per
cent appear to be too high in relation to the wholesale segments of foreign exchange
markets as observed today.31
Transaction costs are reflected in the bid-ask spreads observed in markets.32 The
more liquid markets are, the lower spreads can be. Spahn reports that the spreads
currently observed in highly liquid interbank wholesale markets are 0.011 per cent for
the US dollar/euro transactions, 0.023 per cent for the US dollar/yen transactions,
and 0.021 per cent for the US dollar/GB pound (Spahn 2002: appendix 4). However,
reflecting a more fragmented nature with less competition because of asymmetric
information disadvantages affecting retail, non-financial customers, spreads observed
in retail segments are much larger and vary widely across markets.33
While CTT is supposed to reduce the transaction volume in short-horizon
roundtrips or to affect the speed of traders’ responses, it is unable to differentiate
between destabilizing noise trading and stabilizing liquid trading in the wholesale mar-
kets. Given the substantial changes taking place in market structures in the wholesale
interbank segments as a result of the new technological development discussed above,
it is now unwise to impose a high tax rate to trigger further significant disturbances to
market liquidity in the wholesale segments. Indeed, as many argue, it is best to adopt a
30 Felix and Sau (1996) allow a 35% reduction for exempted official trading and tax evasion, compared
to the 20% allowed in Frankel’s estimate.
31 Especially, it is not correct to assume uniform transaction costs across different market segments in
their model and estimation, where Felix and Sau use the weighted average size of pre-tax transaction costs.
32 The spreads also include risk premium and premium arising out of asymmetric information.
33 For this reason, the revenue calculation presented here is not based on an alternative method of
calculating tax revenue as a unified percentage of spreads (see note 13 above). Indeed, a unified CTT
calculated as a percentage of spreads across the two market segments could make tax effects on real cross-
border trade and investment more (not less) in most cases.
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phase-in approach, whereby markets would have time to respond to the introduction
of CTT gradually and in a stable manner.34
This line of thinking would set an upper limit to the CTT levied on interbank
transactions at 0.01–0.02 per cent (1 or 2 basis points) as a ‘permissible rate’ in the
light of the spreads in the wholesale segments reported above.35 Hence, these very low
tax rates, much lower than those used in previous studies, are selected and used in
the revenue estimation produced below with a view of minimizing the adverse effects
on the liquidity of the wholesale dealer markets, where also profit margins are known
to be very thin. Indeed, for this very reason, the transaction cost reflected in the
prevailing bid-ask spread in the wholesale segments is used as a yardstick for setting
the permissible tax rate. At the same time, I conjecture that, based on calculations
made by Frankel and Spahn,36 the tax rates considered here could still provide enough
disincentives to traders not to engage excessively in noise trading.
As mentioned above, the spreads are higher in less liquid retail foreign exchange
markets, where transactions are much less cost-elastic. From this point of view, retail
markets can in principle absorb a higher tax rate in transaction costs. However, the
tax imposed on wholesale trading is more likely to be passed to less competitive retail
transactions in the form of higher spreads, especially given the cost-inelastic demand.
Since a single retail transaction typically gives rise to a chain of subsequent interbank
transactions until a dealer closes his or her ensuing open position, an effective tax rate
resulting from the 0.01 to 0.02 per cent tax imposed on wholesale transactions could
be translated into additional spreads of 0.04–0.1 per cent or more in retail market
segments. This suggests that there may be a heavier tax burden on international trade
transactions than hitherto acknowledged and tax incidence of CTT may go far beyond
financial institutions, contrary to the claim made otherwise.37 For this reason, the scale
of the rise in the spreads as result of the CTT at 1 or 2 basis points proposed here
would, in my view, approach the maximum level that could be introduced to retail
segments. This transfer of burden across segments eliminates, at least partially, the
need to levy differentiated tax rates to wholesale and retail segments, as suggested by
Kenen (1996).
Hence, in my calculation of potential revenue from CTTs, two estimates are pro-
duced: (i) one estimate is based on the assumption that the tax rate to wholesale
transactions is one-half of that applied to retail transactions; and the other estimate
(ii) on the assumption that a unified tax rate is applied across the two segments of
foreign exchange markets. It is further assumed that a tax applied to all derivative
34 Felix and Sau (1996: 230) suggest that as ‘the increments to the Tobin tax rates are phased in, the
reduced annual global foreign exchange will become more stable, at least regarding further changes in
transaction costs’.
35 Spahn (2002) suggests that given that spreads in interbank transactions were in the range of 0.04-0.05
in 1995 when the traded volume was roughly similar to that observed in 2001, the 0.02% tax would not
damage market liquidity too much. 36 See footnote 12.
37 Considering this possibility, Davidson (1997: 679) suggests that ‘a Tobin transaction tax might throw
larger grains of sand into the wheels of international real commerce than it does into speculative hot money
flows’.
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transactions will be one-half of the rate applied to spot transactions, as derivative deal-
ings are high-frequency trading by their nature and function. The taxbase is assumed
to be virtually global in my estimate.
In my calculation I have also made the assumption that both retail and wholesale
transactions are taxed at the dealing site on a market basis, as suggested by Kenen
(1996). This assumption was adopted simply because the turnover at the settlement
site is not made available in the BIS survey. Hence, I assume that the major trading
cites listed in Table 4.5 would agree to participate in CTT. I also conjecture, for
the purpose of simplifying revenue estimates, that the very low tax rate used in my
estimate will produce a light tax burden on all transaction parties and considerably
reduce the incentive for tax avoidance through migration and asset substitution. The
latter possibility is minimized particularly if CTT is adopted universally, as assumed
in the estimates produced here.
My estimates presented below are based on the assumption that alternative tax rates
of 1 or 2 basis points are applied to the global taxbase as described earlier. It is also
assumed that the share of official transactions carried out by monetary authorities in
global turnover is about 8 per cent.38 Hence, this amount and other possible leakages,
amounting to 10 per cent of total turnover, are deducted from the taxbase as non-taxed
instruments. At these moderate tax rates, retail transaction volume is assumed to be
virtually unaffected, while excessive noise trading in wholesale segments would respond
to an introduction of CTT at these rates.
In this respect, my approach differs from the assessment by Felix and Sau, who
regard tax rates of less than 5 basis points as tax rates with no ‘sand in the gears’.
Instead, I reckon that tax rates of 1 or 2 basis points would still act as ‘sand in the wheels’
in the environment with equally low transaction costs and profit margins as observed in
interbank markets today. Naturally, a reduction in volume would be much less at these
low rates than the 33 per cent obtained with the elasticity about 0.32 used by Felix and
Sau (1996) and Frankel (1996). In my estimates, it is assumed that a 0.02 per cent tax
and 0.01 per cent tax would reduce the volume of wholesale transactions (i.e. excluding
transactions with non-financial customers) by 15 and 5 per cent, respectively. These
are somewhat arbitrary numbers as was the case in other estimates, since no estimate
on the cost-elasticity of foreign exchange trading volume is known a priori. I have
also proceeded with the calculations on the basis of additional information available in
the BIS survey on the share of transactions with non-financial customers in outright
forwards transactions (29 per cent) and foreign exchange swaps (9 per cent).
My estimates of the CTT revenue potential under alternative tax rates applied to
different modes of transactions are shown in Table 4.7. My estimates show that CTT
38 This figure is derived from the information in Table 4.4, where the share of the pair transactions
between US dollar and others is reported as 17% in 2001. It is assumed that about one-half of this was
carried out by monetary authorities of emerging markets and transitional economies who typically exhibit
‘fear of floating’ (Calvo and Reinhart 2002), whereas interventions by monetary authorities in transactions
between vehicle currencies were less in relative terms. With a view that a half leg of the US dollar/other
currencies would constitute 4% of global transactions, it is assumed that the share of official transactions
globally is about 8%.
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at 2 basis points applied to wholesale transactions would generate a annual revenue
of about US$30–35 billion, while CTT at 1 basis point would produce US$17–19
billion. My revenue estimates are much lower than the US$53 billion suggested by
Clunies-Ross (2003). My lower estimate of US$35 billion at 2 basis points under the
scenario of no volume reduction is accounted for by the half rate applied to derivatives
transactions. I have taken a view that CTT should not discriminate against high-
frequency transactions conducted for risk-hedging purposes, unless it could greatly
reduce exchange rate volatilities. In general, I applied an estimation procedure, so that
the estimate could provide us with a clue of the revenue size that the global community
could expect from CTT at the prevailing level of foreign exchange trading activities.
These revenues would be collected on a market basis by monetary or tax authorities
of the countries where these markets are located (see Table 4.5 for geographical location
of major market sites).39 Clunies-Ross (2003) regards CTT as ideal for global use, since
the burden would be borne more or less proportionately to a country’s income, adjusted
by the degree of openness. He continues to suggest that ‘whereas those that would be
collecting it would be rich countries, and even among those countries themselves, the
revenue collected would bear little or no relationship to the burden borne’ (2003: 7).
Hence, he concludes that revenue retention by the tax collecting governments would
be highly objectionable in a moral/political sense.
While CTTs should be carefully evaluated according to economic criteria set out
by Atkinson (Chapter 2, in this volume), CTTs present the potential of generat-
ing approximately US$15–28 billion for global public use, if the national retention rate
from CTT revenues is agreed at 20 and 70 per cent for developed and developing coun-
tries, respectively (Patomäki and Denys 2002) (though many argue that the retention
rate for developing countries could be 100 per cent).
4.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter, I have argued that the currency transaction taxes should be imple-
mented in an extremely cautious manner, starting with a very low tax rate. This is
deemed necessary in light of the recent structural changes in foreign exchange markets
as well as considerations of market efficiency, liquidity, and technical and political
feasibility. According to my preliminary estimates and assessments based on these
considerations, the contribution that CTT could make towards generating innovative
sources for global finance may be much smaller than those derived from earlier studies.
If CTT is collected and enforced on the netting settlement sites with the use of new
technology such as the CLS Bank’s operations, revenue from CTT may even be smaller
than those presented here. In my view, therefore, the very high expectations raised with
respect to CTT’s revenue-generating capacity on its own are not as yet warranted, in
light of the prevailing economic and political reality today.
39 Since banks and exchange transactions are under the supervision and regulation of the monetary
authorities, CTTs could be administered by monetary authorities rather than by tax authorities. Alternatively,
tax authorities could administer and collect CTT in cooperation with monetary authorities and with access
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Nor does CTT by itself, implemented at low rates, have sizeable effects on restoring
macroeconomic policy autonomy. However, if CTT is successfully administered in the
two-tier structure as stipulated by Spahn or in conjunction with other measures such
as capital controls or security transaction tax (STT) in a coordinated fashion, potential
benefits in double dividends from these measures would render support to the debate
over its implementation. The revenue generated by CTT and STT combined could
indeed far surpass the currently stagnating flows of official aid from OECD countries
to developing and transitional economies, which in recent years has been running at
the level of US$50 billions (see Atkinson, Chapter 2, this volume).40 At the same
time, these measures combined may create a new condition, in which many emerging
economies would no longer be forced into a two-corner solution of either ‘fearful floating’
with high, variable interest rates or ‘hard pegs’ such as full dollarization or monetary
unions at the cost of involuntarily losing an independent monetary policy.41
Indeed, the two-tier CTT structure proposed by Spahn or other dual taxation
schemes could have the potential of achieving what the unified single transaction tax at
a low tax rate alone would fail to deliver—the restoration of credibility to intermediate
exchange rate regimes and some autonomy of macroeconomic policy. That is, the
‘impossible trinity’ could be mitigated with the application of this system, as three
objectives—financial openness, exchange rate stability and monetary independence—
become more compatible in the triad.
Furthermore, the coordinated approach considered here would curtail the potential
for leakages from these policies, such as might result from asset substitution, mar-
ket migration, or tax evasion. Indeed, there are substantial economies of scale to be
gained from the combined application of CTTs and STTs with the use of centralized
settlement mechanisms, as discussed above. The coordinated approach also increases
the political feasibility of these measures by substantially lowering further the tax rate
necessary on any single tax measure. Finally, the cross-border harmonization of these
tax measures would reduce the potential for leakages.
The official development aid available today is vastly inadequate for the needs of
developing countries.42 The currency transaction taxes considered in this chapter
could serve as one critical innovative financial source for development finance. In
this context, possible merits of taxing capital transactions should be evaluated against
the historical background of the progressively reduced tax burden on capital income,
relative to labour income, in the current era of financial globalization.
The CTT may be regarded more as a new additional source for development finance,
rather than as a possible substitute for (or alternative to) official development assistance
40 UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) estimates that in 2000 the total
value of world stocks, bonds, securities amounted to US$50 trillion, while total global equity market
capitalization is estimated at US$37 trillion.
41 See Frankel (1999) and Nissanke and Stein (2003) for a critical literature review on the exchange rate
policy regime choice faced by emerging market economies.
42 In particular, an allocation of bilateral aid tends to be at least partially used by donor countries as a
foreign policy tool or for their economic gains (Maizels and Nissanke 1984).
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(ODA). Naturally, this may not be the case if the availability of vast revenues from CTT
would make ODA less generously available.
The technical feasibility of implementation and enforcement can be substantially
enhanced, and the cost of tax administration of CTT can also be reduced correspond-
ingly, with the introduction of automated clearing and settlement mechanisms adopted
globally, such as the CLS Bank settlement scheme discussed here. However, the cost
of reaching a political consensus and commitment towards the universal adoption of
CTT remains high. In light of this high political (and administration) cost, many
regard CTT as a ‘leaky bucket’, to use Atkinson’s terminology. Dodd (2003) argues,
for example, that the Tobin tax cannot be achieved politically, and hence the pursuit
wastes much effort and resources.
Furthermore, an introduction of CTT will trigger a further change in foreign
exchange market structures as well as in the structure of the financial industry. With
their small profit margins, smaller traders and dealers may be hurt more, leading to a
further consolidation of the industry.
Whether or not a flexible geometry—considered the practical way forward with a sub-
set of countries (Chapter 2, this volume)—can be successfully applied to this politically
contentious tax instrument has been debated, and several schemes in this regard have
been proposed, though yet to be carefully evaluated. The fiscal architecture emerging
from such an analysis would certainly involve not only tight coordination of the taxbase,
but also close cooperation in the implementation and administration of CTT under an
international agreement, such as envisaged in the treaty proposal by Patomäki and his
associates.43
Naturally, CTT implemented partially on the basis of regional tax coordination
alone is a second-best solution compared to global implementation, and would produce
a negative effect akin to ‘trade diversion effect’ found in literature on custom unions.
Indeed, Fuest et al. (2003) find that there are welfare gains from regional tax coordin-
ation, but that these gains are lower than those from worldwide coordination. Further,
the application of CTT, for example, for the euro-zone only would certainly induce
changes in the relative position of the euro versus the US dollar, as the vehicle currency
used in international trade and financial transactions as well as in official reserve hold-
ings. However, the direction of these changes may not necessarily be uni-directional
as often predicted by the financial community. The euro may—as result of CTT and
despite the penalty of transaction tax—become the more stable (and hence preferred)
currency for holding in agents’ portfolio. If the tax rate is kept small as considered
here, the positive effect of CTT on the euro may, indeed, outweigh the negative effect
vis-à-vis the dollar or yen. While the fears expressed by the financial community would
justify the lower end of the tax rate, the euro may emerge stronger rather than weaker
after an introduction of CTT.
It should also be noted that the tax incidence of CTT could be much deeper and
wider than hitherto suggested. An impact of CTT on real economic activities, as
43 See Boadway (Chapter 11, this volume) on the economics of global taxation and Sandmo (Chapter 3,
this volume) for similar issues facing environmental taxation.
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opposed to purely speculative financial activities, could be greater than what has been
acknowledged so far in literature. Hence, this is an additional factor for considering
a very low tax rate. CTT could become indeed a leaky bucket in this aspect, if it
discourages people from participating in international trade and investment. However,
these possible negative effects of CTT on the cross-border trade of goods and services
and direct investment should be assessed and balanced carefully in light of the sizeable
negative effects that excessively volatile exchange rates can have on international trade
and investment flows. The welfare loss from a currency or financial crisis that is endured
by the affected emerging economies and the global community at large is immeasurably
large. Hence, in assessing CTT as a tax instrument for global finance, it is important
to keep in mind that its benefits for achieving a global double dividend for the world
economy may not be negligible, particularly if CTT is successfully implemented in
conjunction with other measures of capital controls or in a multi-tier system.
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5
A Development-Focused Allocation
of the Special Drawing Rights
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION
The campaign for the issue of development-focused Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been on the development agenda for many
years. This was certainly reflected by the Brandt Commission’s report (1970). In more
recent times the campaign has been propelled, first, by the Asian financial crises as the
liquidity problems of developing nations took a new dimension with the collapse of
private capital markets, and then second, with the search for financing options towards
the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Since the Asian
crises broke, there has been a shrinking of capital flows to small nations, making it
more difficult for them to hold adequate reserves, even if they chose to borrow for that.
It is reckoned that when borrowing for reserves becomes difficult and a need is felt
to increase reserves, as after the Asian crisis, many poor nations are obliged to make
consumption and investment decisions that harm future growth and development.
This is one of the reasons for the growing calls for multilateral finance institutions to
be innovative in increasing the financing options available to these countries, including
an expanded and enhanced role for SDRs.
The SDRs are international finance instruments created for the purpose of providing
an increase in the world stock of monetary reserves from time to time without making
countries run surpluses or deficits. Indeed, the idea behind the SDRs is that large
imbalances force countries to incur costs in earning or borrowing reserves, and this
should be contained with the IMF allocation of SDRs. It was born out of what has
been referred to as Triffin’s dilemma (Triffin 1960): ‘whereby additions to official dollar
holdings were seen as undermining the stability of the system, given the tendency on
the part of some central banks to convert their dollar reserves into gold, thereby drawing
down the limited US gold stock’ (Clark and Polak 2002: 3).
Extending the uses to which SDRs can be put results from the growing demands on
the international financial system to respond to the development finance needs of
poor nations. Apart from the need to provide emergency funds in times of crises
and the whole area of crisis prevention, increasingly the facilitation of development
in poor countries and assistance for making the best policy decisions are considered
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crucial. It is the growing complexity of the requirements of the international financial
system that leads to the frequent suggestion that the IMF should increasingly play
the role of a lender of last resort, including the issuing of SDRs from time to time.
Some of the strongest advocates for this idea have been associated with the Fund.
Shortly before retirement as IMF managing director, Michel Camdessus proposed
that in times of a systemic credit crunch, ‘the IMF be authorized to inject additional
liquidity—and to withdraw it when the need has passed—in a manner analogous to
that of a national central bank, through the creation and selective allocation of SDRs’
(Camdessus 2000: 3).
But this chapter on SDRs separates, despite the obvious links, the issues of inter-
national liquidity reform and development finance. The focus here is on development
finance. The recent calls to redistribute SDRs for development purposes were given
a boost by the Zedillo Report (UN 2001) and by the appeal from George Soros
(2002), and the contributions from Stiglitz (2003). Proponents for the creation of
development SDRs argue that such additional funds for development can assist in
meeting the MDGs. Such SDR creation would be the means for reducing the costs
to developing countries of the increased holding of reserves, which has become quite
common after the 1997–8 East Asian crises. In the report of the Zedillo Panel, it
is argued that a resumption of the issue of SDRs would reduce the demand for
US-dollar holdings, a development that might discourage the indefinite increase of
US short-term debt. Soros (2002) suggests that there should be a resumption of
SDRs, by which developed countries would re-allocate their share first to the pro-
vision of global public goods, and secondly to supplement aid flows to individual
countries. If the approved allocation of 1997 were made active and the re-allocation
took place, he expects that US$18 billion could be made available for global public
goods or additional aid.
It is important that the arguments for the creation of SDRs for development are
explored in some detail, particularly from a developing-country perspective. While
showing the likely benefits of such SDRs on the development process in poor eco-
nomies, the arguments that are often raised against such an endeavour must be
explored, both with regard to the global economy and to the poor nations. The
entire exploration should investigate the feasibility (both technical and political) of
the undertaking, and the likely consequences on the overall flow of resources for
development.
This chapter discusses in Section 5.2 the historical development of SDRs, includ-
ing their purpose and how they are created. This is basically about regular SDRs
and the problems associated with their creation and allocation. Section 5.3 introduces
the recent proposals for development-oriented SDRs, and Section 5.4 analyses these
proposals with a focus on the arguments for and against them. In Section 5.5, the
chapter discusses the mechanisms proposed for the creation of development SDRs,
including the institutional and structural changes in international finance that may
support their creation. Section 5.6 concludes with an assessment of the effects of
development SDRs on the resource situation in poor countries and how they will be
perceived.
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5.2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SDRs
The SDRs are a special reserve asset allocated to IMF member countries participating
in the SDR department proportionate to their IMF quotas. SDRs are not a claim on the
IMF but are potentially a claim on the freely usable currencies of IMF members, in that
holders of SDRs can exchange their SDRs for these currencies (IMF 2002a). Its value
as a reserve asset comes from the commitments of members to hold and accept it. The
IMF members have, indeed, undertaken to honour all obligations related to the SDR
system. The Fund ensures that the SDRs’ claim on freely usable currencies is honoured
by first ‘designating IMF members with a strong external position to purchase SDRs
from members with weak external positions, and through the arrangement of voluntary
exchanges between participating members in a managed market’ (IMF 2002a). The
least developed countries (LDCs) may use the SDRs (i) to repay the IMF; (ii) to repay
Paris Club debt; (iii) to help countries in foreign exchange crisis get hard currency from
IMF by exchanging at the Fund their SDRs for US dollars with the IMF matching
them up with a source of dollars, and (iv) to release hard currency reserves for use in
such transactions.
Indeed, in the basic form, SDRs are promissory notes issued by the IMF to member
states on the basis of a quota that is related to their relative strength in the world
economy. Members that receive these notes may either hold them or exchange a part of
them over time for hard currency, through the Fund itself and through central banks.
In a regular sense, SDRs may be perceived as liquid assets that are created by the IMF in
the same manner that national monetary authorities issue their currencies as liabilities
against themselves and can affect the supply of money. In this limited context, the Fund
may behave like a central bank so long as it commands sufficient credibility. On the
other hand, however, because of the peculiar treatment that SDRs are given, such as the
fact that they are allocated by quotas and only central banks can hold them. No other
asset has to be exchanged for them, and they cannot be treated as money. If countries
received their allocations of SDRs and held them, there is no interest cost to them.1
Countries actually receive interest income from the Fund for their SDR holdings, but
they only pay interest at the same rate on their total cumulative allocations. When
countries seek to exchange SDRs for hard currencies, the new holders then earn the
accompanying interest from the Fund (Fig. 5.1). In effect, it is only when a country’s
holdings of SDRs are less than its cumulative allocation that it becomes a net payer of
interest. So, obviously when poor countries exchange SDRs for hard currency, they
have to pay the interest on these.
1 The SDR interest rate provides the basis for calculating the interest charges on regular (i.e. to say,
non-concessional) IMF financing and the interest paid to members who are creditors to the IMF. The
SDR interest rate is determined weekly and is based on a weighted average of representative interest rates on
short-term debt in the money markets of the SDR basket countries. The yields on three-month treasury bills
serve as the representative interest rates for the United States and the United Kingdom. In keeping with the
changes introduced to the SDR basket on 1 January 2001, the three-month Euribor (Euro Interbank Offered
Rate) became the representative rate for the euro area, replacing the national financial instruments of France
and Germany. The representative interest rate for the Japanese yen was changed from the three-month rate
on certificates of deposit to the yield on Japanese government thirteen-week financing bills.
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Figure 5.1. SDR flows
In addition to the general allocations of SDRs for the purpose of supplementing
existing official reserve assets of member countries, there is currently a proposal to
create a special one-time allocation of SDRs that would enable all IMF members to
receive such SDRs on an equitable basis, making amends for the fact that a fifth of the
membership have never received an SDR allocation. The proposal followed the fourth
amendment of the Articles of Agreement by the IMF board of governors in 1997, and
will be effective only when the United States gives its backing to what 73.34 per cent
of the total voting power already supports.
Even though the original intention behind the creation of SDRs was to increase
what was thought of as a total international liquidity, Clark and Polak (2002) argue that
that rationale is no longer relevant. They maintain that if international liquidity were
simply an aggregation of the foreign currency and gold holdings of all the economies
of the world, then there was adequate liquidity and this had been growing as fast as the
world’s economies, if not faster. Hence, the concept of aggregate international liquidity
was no longer relevant for creating SDRs. They also point out that the conditions
in the global economy that necessitated the creation of SDRs changed shortly after
these reserves were created. This included the adoption of flexible exchange rate
regimes, which may have reduced the size of the reserves needed, compared to what
was required to maintain a fixed exchange rate regime. But they argue that this situation
notwithstanding, there were still good enough reasons to create SDRs in view of
efficiency gains resulting from the low-cost access to reserves and the reduction in
systemic risk. Developing countries, which would otherwise incur costs in adding
to their international reserves, would thereby be enabled to do so costlessly. Their
subsequent increased readiness to hold reserves would reduce the risk of financial
crisis to them—and to the international system.
5.2.1. Trends in SDR Allocation and the Global Reserve System
There have so far been only two rounds of creation of SDRs, each spread over three
years. The first allocation was in 1970, for a total amount of SDR9.3 billion. The most
recent allocation, made on 1 January 1981, brought the cumulative total of SDR
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allocations to SDR21.4 billion. The IMF executive board discussed the possibility of
an SDR allocation during the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh basic periods, that is up
to 31 December 2001, but there has not been enough support for an allocation.
A major reason for no SDRs being allocated since 1981 is that industrial countries no
longer see clear benefits from receiving such allocations, particularly in the presence of
thriving capital markets with full capital mobility. Low-income developing countries,
with generally far less stable international earnings, could make very good use of
SDRs, but their small quotas mean that they get very small shares of any allocation
in relation to those of the big industrial countries that do not want or need them. But
any allocation that is not in accordance with IMF quotas would require amendment of
the Articles of Agreement. Thus, because of the need to amend the Articles, the 1997
agreement on a special one-time allocation of SDRs, which would equalize the ratio of
cumulative allocations to current quotas for all member countries, is unratified six years
later.
The situation has extensively reduced the role of SDRs as a reserve asset. By April
2002, SDRs accounted for less than 1.25 per cent of IMF members’ non-gold reserves,
even though the holding of reserves was growing worldwide (see Table 5.1). Indeed,
the developing countries added little to reserves between 1980 and 1995, but then
Table 5.1. Worldwide non-gold reserves, 1970–2000a (in billions of SDRs)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Advanced economies, of which:b 41.9 89.1 196.4 247.6 466.7 599.3 860.4
Canada 3.9 3.8 2.4 2.3 12.5 10.1 24.5
Hong Kong SAR —– —– —– —– 17.3 37.3 82.5
Japan 4.3 10.2 19.3 24.3 55.2 123.3 272.4
Korea 0.6 0.7 2.3 2.6 10.4 22.0 73.8
Emerging markets, of which:b 8.8 42.3 70.9 93.8 100.3 278.2 470.0
China —– —– 2.0 11.6 20.8 50.7 129.2
India 0.8 0.9 5.4 5.8 1.1 12.1 29.1
Mexico 0.6 1.2 2.3 4.5 6.9 11.3 27.3
Poland —– —– 0.1 0.8 3.2 9.9 20.4
Developing countriesc of which:b 3.7 9.4 25.5 25.5 19.2 31.1 65.8
Algeria 0.1 1.0 3.0 2.6 0.5 1.3 9.2
Kuwait 0.1 1.3 3.1 5.0 1.4 2.4 5.4
Libya 1.5 1.8 10.3 5.4 4.1 4.1 9.6
United Arab Emirates —– 0.8 1.6 2.9 3.2 5.0 10.4
Total 54.3 140.8 292.8 366.9 586.1 908.7 1 398.9
a The increase in worldwide reserves between 1970 and 1995 is slightly overestimated because data for a
few economies become available only in the latter part of the period.
b Economies with the largest increase in reserves (in billions of SDRs) between 1995 and 2000.
c Excluding economies that are included as emerging markets.
Source: Clark and Polak (2002).
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added SDR 37 billion in the following five years.2 When the Zedillo Panel called for
the resumption of the issue of SDRs, the panel members argued that, ‘the cessation of
allocations has severely prejudiced the interests of developing countries’ (UN 2001).
They suggested that developing countries were not in a position to borrow additional
reserves in the market on terms similar to SDRs. But many developing countries were
trying to build up their reserves in order to reduce their vulnerability to crises. With
the emerging markets included, they were estimated to hold reserves of over US$850
billion, which was almost US$300 billion more than before the Asian crisis. These
additional reserves had been borrowed largely on terms clearly more difficult than
the SDR issues. At the time, emerging markets paid an average premium of about
8 per cent more than the US Treasury bond rates. The panel noted that, ‘the result is
a large flow of what is sometimes called ‘reverse aid’, which in the aggregate is not far
short of the flow of conventional aid from the DAC countries’ (UN 2001).
Stiglitz estimates that there are currently US$2.4 trillion held in reserves around
the world, held in a variety of forms including US Treasury Bills for most developing
countries:
While the United States may benefit from the resulting increased demand for US Treasury Bills,
the cost to the developing countries is high. Today they receive a return of 1.25 per cent—a
negative real return rate—even though investments yield high returns in their own countries.
This is the price developing states have to pay to insure against unpredictable market events.
(Stiglitz 2003: 56)
There are a limited number of private financial instruments that are denominated in
SDRs. Because of their limited use, the main function of the SDRs’ is to serve as the
unit of account of the IMF and some other international organizations (IMF 2002a).
It is thus used almost exclusively in transactions between the IMF and its members.
5.2.2. The IMF, Developing Countries, and SDR Creation
The creation of SDRs has always been seen in developing countries as an inadequate but
necessary tool for countering the usual problem of low reserves. It has been perceived
as inadequate in relation to the financing needs arising from increasing volatility in
exchange rate instability and foreign exchange earnings. While inadequate, its creation
has sometimes been seen as an attempt by developed or industrial economies to cover
their reluctance to deal with the real financing issues confronting developing countries
through IMF that has for long been seen as a rich men’s club. Aboyade (1983) notes
strongly that,
The Fund has always related its (foreign) currency sales and stand-by facilities for member
countries to their respective quotas. This means the richer countries, which have (and have
always had) the highest quotas, can also borrow the most . . . It is generally unsympathetic to
exchange rate policies, which offer any strong prospect of affecting the existing pattern and
structure of international economic power, with the excuse that they may hurt international
2 This does not include the emerging markets.
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trade. Most of its innovations over the last decade (for example, the creation of SDRs and the
establishment of a Substitution Account) are more to help the currencies of the rich nations
and preserve international stability, than as direct answers to the clamour of the poor countries.
(Aboyade 1983: 30)
Wade (2002) comments on similar sentiments expressed by Triffin (1968) who had
suggested that since the allocation went strictly in proportion to the countries’ quotas,
it was ‘as indefensible economically as it (was) morally’. At the time, the two biggest
economies received one-third of the total. In Triffin’s (1968) view, ‘the SDR designers
had created an asset that made the rich even better off ’.
The role that the Fund’s board plays is crucial in understanding some of the senti-
ments often expressed about the issue of SDRs. The board of governors of the IMF (in
which all member governments are represented) has to approve each issue of SDRs by
an 85 per cent majority.3 The voting system is weighted so that a small number of indus-
trial countries can veto any new creation. This allows the United States alone to do the
same. It is the lack of interest of the industrial economies, for reasons already provided,
that has ensured that there was no new approval between 1978 and 1997. Opposition
from Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States effectively made
new allocations impossible in the period. The status quo is that any changes in the quota
arrangements would require an amendment to the IMF’s Articles of Agreement.
It is interesting that in 1997 when an attempt was made to issue new allocations in
order to make the cumulative proportions of SDRs received up to that time equal to
the various member-countries’ current quotas, this received a negative response only
outside of the Fund itself. Indeed, the necessary changes to bring about the Fourth
Amendment to the Articles of Agreement, which would allow an allocation other than
in proportion to current quotas, had been made, but the amendment failed year after
year to reach the required level of ratification by the 110 members who constitute
85 per cent of the voting power. By the end of April 2001, only 107 members had
ratified it. The main obstacle has been that the US Congress remained opposed to it,
despite the support of the Clinton administration.
The US Congress and other industrial country governments believe that there are a
number of good reasons why they should worry about changes in the power structure
that pertains at the IMF, particularly if that change means an increasing use of SDRs
for reserve holdings in many countries. Increasing the stock of SDRs would mean a
likely reduction in the holding for reserves of US bonds, ‘Certainly expansion of the
SDR stock touches America closely because of the prominence of US dollar holdings
among existing reserves. Cutting the world’s dependence on dollar reserves would
reduce Americans’ access to a deepening well of cheap credit’ (Clunies-Ross 2002: 30).
But economists at the Fund have made some of the strongest arguments for the
resumption of regular SDRs. Clark and Polak (2002) provide an interesting argument
3 The decision to make a general allocation has to be based on the finding that there is a long-term global
need to supplement existing reserve assets. The decision of the board of governors is on the basis of a
proposal by the managing director with the concurrence of the executive board, with an 85% majority of
the total voting power. Decisions on general allocations are made in the context of five-year basic periods.
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for allocating new SDRs. After indicating that the original justifications for creating
SDRs were no longer relevant as the concept of aggregate international liquidity lost
its meaning in the post-Bretton Woods era, they argue strongly that the individual
developing countries’ need for reserves was still significant, and this was important for
improving the operation of the international monetary system. Considering that most
countries still needed to increase their reserve holdings in view of expanding current
and capital account fluctuations, if countries were to attempt doing this by generating
a balance-of-payments surplus this would be costly in terms of foregone consumption
and investment. On the other hand, attempting to borrow such reserves on the inter-
national capital markets is very costly for poor countries, while some countries have no
access to such markets. They also indicate that while borrowed reserves may substi-
tute, to some extent, for owned reserves, ‘volatile capital flows demonstrate that undue
reliance on international capital markets for (the) purpose (of holding reserves) can be
risky’ (Clark and Polak 2002: 11). Their main argument (following an earlier point of
Mussa 1996) is that SDRs offer a costless reserve asset which, if properly managed
as required by the Articles of Agreement, leads to enormous efficiency gains for the
world economy compared to the cost of foregoing consumption and investment, and
the cost of borrowing from the capital markets. The risk involved in increasing SDR
allocations to developing countries can also be shown to not worsen. They observe
that:
a number of considerations suggest that the provision of reserves in the form of SDRs would in
fact reduce credit risk. Allocations of SDRs make more external resources available to a country,
enabling it to weather potential balance-of-payments crises without undue reliance on import
compression or the imposition of trade and other restrictions. (Clark and Polak 2002: 19)
Clark and Polak (2002) additionally argue that SDR allocations would contribute to
reducing systemic risk. This is because they are a permanent addition to the world’s
stock of reserves since the Fund is unlikely to cancel any stock of SDR holdings. They
contrast this with reserves acquired from borrowing on the capital market, which may
be ‘withdrawn under inauspicious circumstances’. The example from the crises of the
1990s that made it difficult for countries to refinance their debt is given to support this
point.
In the Zedillo Report, the panel members argue that now will be a good time for
resuming allocations, ‘in that the original concern was not just with the cost to a typical
country of having to earn or borrow a secular increase in its reserve holding, but also
with the impact on the financial fragility of the country issuing reserves’ (UN 2001).
They argue that the financial fragility of the countries that issued the reserves was
not much of a concern before, but it is now. This they attribute to the unprecedented
size of the US current account deficit. This is partly a consequence of the desire all over
to build up dollar reserves. These have become too large for comfort and a source of
discomfort in the financial markets. ‘Substantial SDR allocations might help to shrink
the US deficit while allowing other countries to continue to build up the reserves they
feel they need to guard against financial crises’ (UN 2001).
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5.3. PROPOSALS FOR A DEVELOPMENT-ORIENTED SDR
As already mentioned, there is a long history of proposals to resume allocations of SDRs
for specific purposes, often development, or to redistribute holdings of SDRs. Indeed,
it would appear that the campaign for SDRs to support development is being pushed
along two complementary lines. The first is for the resumption of the regular SDRs to
deal with what has become the frequent shortage of liquidity in developing countries
(Stiglitz 2003), while the second looks at the occasional injection that mainly targets the
developing countries (Soros 2002). The second is intended to be an allocation beyond
the scope of the regular SDR. It might have elements of regular SDRs (allocation
by quota) with a modification coming by way of donations to other users. Further
extensions of this might take the form of alterations to the agreed quota as was, indeed,
negotiated in 1997. It might, therefore, favour some countries and institutions, namely
those that may be assessed to be in need of development assistance well beyond what
traditional assistance packages may afford.
The IMF, as an institution, however, has tended over the years to view proposals
to finance specific development initiatives with SDRs more cautiously, suggesting that
the use of SDRs for such purposes would generally require a change in the Articles
of Agreement, except if industrialized countries voluntarily transferred their SDRs
to other countries. The Fund has always observed that there was nothing preventing
countries from engaging in such voluntary transfers. On the proposals to supplement
fund resources, the Fund has responded that:
To the extent that these proposals involve balance-of-payments financing with conditionality
they can be viewed as essentially substituting for an increase in IMF quotas or IMF borrowing.
The key difference among them is the degree of IMF involvement in intermediating redis-
tributed SDRs, and the implications of this for conditionality and the assumption of credit
risk. (IMF 2002b)
The IMF places SDR proposals into two broad categories as follows:
• Proposals to supplement Fund resources. These proposals seek to direct SDRs
allocated to industrial countries to countries with more severe international liquidity
needs.
• Proposals to finance development. These are generally of two types, those that
may involve voluntary donations to a prescribed holder or to another country and
not requiring a change in the Articles of Agreement; and those that call for a
redistribution of quotas.
These proposals may be classified further as those requiring mild reforms in the inter-
national financial system or no change to the status quo, and those requiring more radical
or substantial reforms that would imply changes to the governance arrangements of the
IMF. While the proposals from the Zedillo Panel seem to call for both broad categories
of change in the way SDRs were allocated, it may be noted that most of the calls over
the years have been related to the first category of change. A slight departure from the
category of mild reforms is the Soros proposal, the best-known scheme. A central part
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of the proposal from his book George Soros on Globalization (2002), is that there should
be periodic creations of SDRs and that the rich countries should agree to make their
allocations available for global public goods and for aid to development in individual
countries. He would like to see the process started with the activation of the proposed
allocation of 1997. The Soros proposal was intended to achieve additional aid resources
in a manner that was more or less automatic. The pooling of funds was also expected
to engender proper coordination. In this proposal, SDR donations from the industrial
economies would first be paid into an escrow account, and there would be no recorded
budgetary cost to them until the SDRs were withdrawn from the account in order to
pay for the approved development projects.
Stiglitz (2003) has suggested clearly there is a need for more than just a one-time
issuance of SDRs. He calls for a complete overhaul of the global reserve system, which
he blames for being at the centre of the failures of the global financial system. His
argument is also based on the fact that developing countries’ reserves are growing
much faster than they can afford to, as they set aside huge reserves against a variety
of contingencies, including decreases in foreign investor confidence and declines in
export demand. With imports growing at 10 per cent per annum, about US$160
billion has to be set aside each year for reserves, and a part of this could easily be
made available for health and education. In advocating more frequent issues of SDRs
to finance development, Stiglitz writes that:
Keynes, during the founding of the IMF, envisaged the issuance of ‘global greenbacks’, more
familiarly known as Special Drawing Rights (SDR) . . . Global greenbacks could be used to
finance global public goods, such as improving the environment, preventing the spread of
diseases like AIDS, increasing literacy in the developing world, and providing humanitarian and
broader development assistance. (Stiglitz 2003: 57)
Some countries may receive more than they put into reserves, which they can exchange
for conventional currencies, while countries receiving less than they put into reserves
may supplement these reserves, freeing up money that would otherwise have been set
aside.
Richard Cooper (2002) has proposed an amendment of the Articles of Agreement to
allow the IMF to create SDRs on a large enough and temporary basis to counter finan-
cial crises and to forestall creditor panic (Fig. 5.2). Interestingly, while the Monterrey
Conference on Financing Development discussed the various proposals for using SDRs
among other schemes, it did not provide support for any particular scheme.
5.4. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS FOR DEVELOPMENT SDR
The discussion here focuses on the perceived role of SDRs within the context of the
debate for and against the issuance of such development focused SDRs. Noting the
general concern about the effect of development SDRs on international stabilization,
Clunies-Ross (2002) poses the question of whether the use of specific-purpose SDRs for
allocating resources to global public goods is consistent with their use for stabilization
purposes as originally intended, and if so what should be the nature of the institutional
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Figure 5.2. Proposed SDR flows
changes required to bring that about. His response to these questions is that, with
minor modifications, it is possible to issue development SDRs for supplementing aid
and providing global public goods in a manner that does not compromise international
stabilization.
The idea that development SDRs will not harm global stabilization is even more
strongly put across by both Clark and Polak (2002) and also by Stiglitz (2003). The
latter has written that: ‘this scheme would not be inflationary: rather it would offset
the inherent downward bias of the current regime. Relative to global income—some
US$40 trillion—the magnitudes of monetary emissions would be minuscule’ (Stiglitz
2003: 5).
There appear to be quite strong arguments for the issuance of SDRs, both the regular
and the specific. But the arguments against cannot be dismissed.
5.4.1. The Argument for a Development SDR
Stiglitz sums up his discussion of the need for development SDRs as follows: ‘In
effect, these reserves are a commitment of the world to help each other in times of
difficulty . . . This policy would end the logic of instability that is built into the current
system, for it would allow some deficits without inevitable crisis’ (2003: 5).
As noted earlier, the idea behind the calls for these new issues of SDRs is basic-
ally to provide developing countries an opportunity to devote resources that would
otherwise have been devoted to enlarging reserves to providing services that facilitate
development.
But the calls for development SDRs go beyond the need for less expensive reserves,
as we saw with Stiglitz (2003). The growing calls for the creation of development
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SDRs are also closely associated with the need for a faster development of global
public goods a la Soros (2002) and Stiglitz (2003). The argument is that effective
delivery of global public goods enhances the achievement of the development goals
of poor nations. Some of the more comprehensive argumentation for the creation of
development SDRs has been put together by Clunies-Ross (2002). In his preamble
to the arguments for considering various ways for mobilizing resources for social and
economic development, including development SDRs, he indicates that the methods
and resources must be (i) technically and administratively accessible; (ii) unlikely to
impose any unduly high excess burden of costs through misallocation; (iii) equitably
distributed; (iv) not politically out of the question for ever, and (v) so far not fully
exploited. Clunies-Ross (2002) sees the attraction of SDRs as a source of globally
available funds, first, in the fact that it is created by an international institution, hence
belonging to the world as a whole, and making it useful for the maintenance of the
global public goods for global stability and full employment of resources. Second, he
anticipates that in certain circumstances the rise in the resulting world income and
output may either equal or exceed the value of the funds assigned for the purpose.
Third, since SDRs come to national monetary authorities without payment, and their
uses are somewhat restricted, those countries with more than adequate reserves could
give them up for global causes while incurring minimal overt sacrifices (Clunies-Ross
2002: 26).
Wade (2002) has had an interesting look at the Soros proposal for new SDRs, and
notes that, the ‘proposal focuses public attention on apparently arcane monetary issues,
which have a huge impact on the performance of the world economy yet receive rather
little public attention’. He suggests that the injection of a modest amount of US$27
billion of SDR equivalent under the proposal for the first issue makes it doable, and
this could produce better performance from the world economy as a whole. Wade
(2002) sees the link made by Soros between monetary/payment issues and the supply
of global public goods as credible ‘and the mechanism of choosing which goods will be
supplied, by whom, and financed by whom, is an interesting one when put alongside
the present arrangements’. In Soros’ proposal there is a group of eminent persons or
an independent jury, working with a trust fund, and chosen for the purpose of deciding
which global public goods may be funded. This is not left for the World Bank, currently
the most significant supplier of global public goods, to determine.
Wade (2002) notes that even though the proposal is quite modest in scale, it could
easily be enlarged to make it a significant contributor ‘to solving the chronic tendency
in the world economy at large towards excess capacity reflecting insufficient demand’.
If the possible uses of SDRs were broadened, Wade expects the allocations of these
development SDRs, which favour poor nations, to raise their consumption significantly.
He expects such a growing consumption to lead largely to an increasing demand for
goods from industrial economies. In effect, industrial economies do not necessarily
lose by consenting to the creation of the development SDRs.
Having observed that international agreement on assistance to poor nations often
takes too long to achieve, Clunies-Ross (2002) notes that the Soros proposal for regular
SDRs to be issued to member countries, with the richer ones among them donating
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theirs to aid and global public goods, has the advantage of ensuring that allocations to
such aid and global public goods do not have to wait for universal agreement.
5.4.2. The Argument ‘Against’ Development SDRs
The arguments against the issuance of development SDRs are basically an extension of
the arguments made against regular SDRs. These have been summarized by Lissaker’s
in the Pocantico Report (2003) as (i) legal, referring to the requirement that there must
be long-term global need to supplement international liquidity; (ii) moral, in that non-
conditional financing encourages bad policies; (iii) efficiency, implying that the SDRs
are unlikely to go to the developing countries; and (iv) historical, suggesting that the
environment of floating exchange rate regimes and the existence of multiple media
for reserve holdings made SDRs unnecessary. But these are the points that Clark and
Polak (2002) strongly argue against. In effect, the main arguments against the issue of
development SDRs on account of international stabilization derive from the anxiety
that not enough measures are being put in place to restrain the IMF from ‘flooding’
the financial markets with excess new liquidity and cash-strapped poor nations will go
on a spending spree.
In addition to the above arguments, most of the points of concern that have often
been raised about the use of SDRs for development are centred on a couple of issues.
First, it is not obvious what advantages the use of SDRs brings to poor developing
nations that are not derived from traditional aid packages. And second, the impact on
the stability of the world economy is not clear, and finally, the institutional adjustments
that are required for creating the special SDRs that affect country quotas are probably
not politically appealing to industrial economies and hence not likely to happen.
Wade (2002) points out the fact that Soros is not clear on what the poorer countries
would do with their SDR allocations. He notes that beyond the effect to be generated
by the global public goods, it is not obvious what direct benefits countries would
receive. ‘Presumably, the direct benefits are those they could have had all along from
conventional SDRs, and the Soros proposal does not contain anything new in this
respect.’
But Clunies-Ross discusses even more extensively the difficulty in identifying the
potential benefits from development SDRs. He sees a possible problem with generating
enough desire on the part of potential SDR holders to want them, particularly when
the recipient of the SDRs is not a central bank but a trust set up to administer global
public goods after these allocations have been transferred to the trust by a recipient
central bank. The problem arises from the obligation of interest payments on total
cumulative allocation. The interest would, in that case, have to be transferred to
whoever held the donated SDRs or spent their proceeds. Thus, the ‘development
SDRs’ would come to the governments or other agents representing their beneficiaries
not in the form of grants, but rather in the form of low-interest term loans. He explores
a number of possible uses of the development SDRs as follows:
If the global fund were to provide guarantees, for example, of markets for new drugs or vaccines,
these assets could be held costlessly against the call to make good the guarantees without having
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in that contingency to raise large amounts in the financial markets. Or, if one of the functions
of the fund were to reduce the debt burden of highly indebted poor countries, buying out their
debt by exchanging it for the proceeds (and the obligations) of SDRs could be valuable to these
debtor countries even though it left them with interest obligations at international short-term
rates. The servicing obligations would be much more favourable than those attached to many of
the loans that might be available to developing and transitional economies (though less so than
those on IDA loans). (Clunies-Ross 2002: 29)
He admits, however, that this ‘quirk of SDR arrangements does take some of the
attractiveness from the Soros and similar schemes’ (Clunies-Ross 2002: 28).
It has been suggested that new proposals for the creation of development SDRs
ignore the question of how to entice the US government into accepting the proposals
(Wade 2002). In view of this, it is obvious that if the new SDRs are seen as additional
grants to developing nations the US government will not be enthused about it. Aside
from its reluctance to see a reduction in the demand for dollar reserves, the US govern-
ment is also not very interested in seeing the IMF become a central bank to the world.
Indeed, Wade (2002) also suggests that the Soros proposal does not say enough on the
governance issues related to the creation of SDRs. The lack of clarity leaves the question
of how the global public goods would be prioritized unresolved. In the Soros proposal,
infectious diseases, judicial reform, education, and bridging the digital divide are
prioritized for attention. But this is observed to be different from the priority list of the
G7 countries. For the World Bank, infectious diseases, environmental improvement,
trade promotion, and greater financial stability should be at the top of the list for
global public goods. Under the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD),
the priority areas are given as (i) peace, security, and governance; (ii) investing in
Africa’s people; (iii) diversification of Africa’s production and exports; (iv) investing
in ICT (information and communication technology) and other basic infrastructure,
and (v) developing financing mechanisms. It is obvious that several different lists are
possible and accommodating all of them may lead to a longer list that may not easily
lend itself to feasible agreed actions. This point is buttressed by the fact that the Stiglitz
list is only a subset of all of these.
5.5. PROPOSED MECHANISMS FOR CREATING
DEVELOPMENT SDRs
A number of the proposals for the issue of development SDRs do not provide details
of how this can be done. A good example of this is the Stiglitz (2003) paper. Details of
what mechanisms may be applied in creating new SDRs for development can at best
be pieced together from several sources, and this is done in this section.
5.5.1. The IMF Articles of Agreement and the Creation
of a Development SDR
A complication would arise in the creation of development SDRs if the proposed
scheme were to make an allocation in other than exact proportion to IMF quotas. This
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would require an amendment of the IMF Articles of Agreement, and the difficulty
of meeting this requirement would, therefore, impede the use of SDRs in ad hoc
schemes intended to benefit particular groups of countries. If there were no changes
in the allocation quotas, in order for high-income recipients of SDRs to give them
up simply as grants to others would require no alteration to the Articles. It has been
pointed out by Boughton (2001) that the Fund’s executive board has already altered
the working practice to allow recipients of SDRs to use them as grants. The Fund
is, indeed, in a position to name a global fund that receives the grants from SDR
recipients as a ‘prescribed holder’, as has been done for some international institutions.
This will allow the global fund to hold SDRs and also to trade them with central
banks.
As indicated earlier, however, someone must bear the net interest cost of the SDRs
once they have been spent on global public goods or spent by recipient developing
countries. If it is not to be the donor countries themselves, then it must presumably be
the bodies (recipient governments or other agencies) that do the spending. From their
point of view, spending of the proceeds would in that case be like spending financed
by a low-interest loan. On the other hand if the donors were to bear the full interest
burden, the transfers of SDRs would entail the same costs to the donors themselves as
equal amounts of official development assistance (ODA) given in the form of grants,
and there would be no advantage in undertaking the process through SDRs.
Clunies-Ross (2002) discusses at length various scenarios for dealing with the interest
payment issue, if industrial countries were to decide to follow the Soros proposal for
donating any new issues of SDRs immediately to a global fund. The likely outcome
would be that the wealthier nations would essentially be providing only a termless loan
at a standard short-term interest rate to the global fund or poorer recipient countries,
and this may be utilized in any of the manners discussed earlier. It is, indeed, the lack
of clarity of whether or not donor countries should continue with the interest payment
that is the main issue. Making donor countries pay the interest effectively turns the
SDRs into additional financial assistance to the recipient.
5.5.2. Conditions for Creating Development SDRs and
Links to Debt Relief
It is important to point out that the Soros proposal for donations was intended to over-
come the difficulty that an alteration to the SDRs allocation by quotas was considered
unlikely to happen soon. While the quotas remained, voluntary donations were thus a
way of ensuring less antagonism from some industrial economies. Clunies-Ross (2002)
suggests, however, that eventually there might be possibilities for other allocations, as
was indeed the case with the (unratified) 1997 Fourth Amendment of the Articles of
Agreement, and that considerable discretion might be given (under guidelines) to the
management of the Fund.
If there is to be a special allocation outside the quotas, who should be eligible for
it? In the Soros proposal, the SDRs going to the global fund are all from donations,
so there is not a major problem. But it should be possible to link the gains from the
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new development SDRs to current initiatives on debt relief and the attainment of the
MDGs. If the concern with the new SDRs is the likely effect of rapid expansion in
international liquidity, one could limit the consideration for special allocation to the
heavily indebted poor country (HIPCs) only, instead of the low-income and middle-
income countries, as proposed by Clunies-Ross. It is observed from the enhanced
HIPC Initiative that countries will continue to borrow even as they receive relief in
order to settle other obligations in the pursuit of poverty reduction goals. It is import-
ant that payments on these do not slow down growth. It is obvious that debt relief
must be recognized by creditor countries as additional to new and increased ODA
with a focus on enhancing and sustaining both growth and poverty reduction expli-
citly. New SDRs that provide HIPC countries with an opportunity to engage in
further debt exchanges certainly enhance the benefits of their involvement in the HIPC
Initiative.
There is tension between quick debt relief and comprehensive country-owned
poverty reduction strategies. The solution to this problem is to make countries focus
on their medium- and long-term development frameworks, showing the anticipated
growth paths and how these promote poverty reduction. In this situation, new SDRs
that create new comfort levels in reserve holdings allow countries to pursue develop-
ment programmes of a longer orientation than the shorter-term programmes of the
last two decades under the direction of the Bretton Woods institutions. Essentially, the
development SDRs will provide them with termless credit facilities that have some-
what reduced short-term interest rates. In effect, specific or development SDRs may
be essential so long as there are HIPC countries that need greater liquidity than their
trade volumes would permit and want greater flexibility in the international financial
markets.
Linked to the conditions for creating development SDRs is the issue of their timing.
The report of the Zedillo Panel (UN 2001) indicates that there should be an immediate
resumption of the issue of regular SDRs. Throughout that report, there is emphasis
on the need to augment financial support to developing countries in a manner that
deals with their cyclical problems related to the nature of their engagement with
world trade. When compounded with the cyclical nature of international capital flows,
especially private, the need to develop mechanisms that are counter-cyclical cannot be
overemphasized.
5.5.3. Proposed Institutional Re-organization for
Creating a Development SDR
The forms that development SDRs may take are often linked to the question of whether
the IMF should behave increasingly like a central bank. Mohammed has noted that:
‘developing countries would continue to press for an exploration of the merits of
establishing an effective international lender of last resort, that is, one able to create
international liquidity freely and to deploy it rapidly to deal with widespread financial
crises’ (2000: 201).
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If SDRs are to be used actively to provide global public goods or aid to developing
countries, it is argued that the IMF needs to have the authority and structure to
take decisions and act upon them (though probably under imposed guidelines) as
independent central banks do. While the Soros proposal deals with the problems of
providing support for development largely through informal agreements to transfer
reserves from one party to another, there appears to be a major demand from develop-
ing countries for the formalization of such arrangements (Wade 2002). Clunies-Ross
(2002) suggests that it might be possible to begin with the informal approach to provid-
ing additional support for development with SDRs, but eventually to move to a more
formalized way of using SDR allocations so as to bring about both more targeted devel-
opment finance and counter-cyclical activity for international stabilization. This would
be effected by giving greater discretionary authority to the Fund’s structures, work-
ing through the managing director’s recommendations, in concert with the executive
board, to the board of governors. The managing director might, for example, be
empowered to seek authorization for allocation in a particular year to be made to a
certain group of countries only.
As the process of selective allocations of SDRs is formalized, it is inevitable that
the IMF would have to act a little more like a central bank—and that requires an
amendment of the Articles of Agreement: ‘to provide more powers to its existing
governing institutions, and possibly also delegation by them, or further amend-
ment, to give more actual decision-making power to say a technical committee
[operating of course under guidelines that the governing institutions had laid down]’
(Clunies-Ross 2002).
Putting together ideas from Soros’ proposal and sentiments from the Zedillo Panel,
Clunies-Ross (2002) outlines five stages that could be followed in promoting the use
of SDRs for stabilization and for the provision of global public goods. At the first
stage, the Fourth Amendment to the Articles of Agreement is to be ratified by the
US Congress in order to allow the 1997 allocation to proceed. This is followed at
the second stage by the high-income or industrial economies agreeing to donate their
new holdings to an appropriately constituted international body for the delivery of
global public goods. That body is to be accepted by all and made a prescribed holder
by the IMF. At the third stage, the IMF board of governors agree informally over a
period to accept recommendations from the managing director and the executive board
to issue and cancel SDRs according to an agreed formula that reflects a relationship
between the growth rate of total international reserves and the trend rate of growth
of real international transactions. At the fourth stage, the Articles of Agreement are
altered to allow the distribution to be done possibly according to criteria other than
the prescribed quota, while such alterations are approved each time by the board of
governors, following proposals from the managing director and the executive board.
Finally, the Articles of Agreement could be further altered to create a technical body,
which will work on the appropriate quantities of SDRs to be allocated and how these
can be timed. It is this body, guided by the executive board and the managing director,
which will generate the information necessary for decisionmaking by the board of
governors.
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5.6. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSALS FOR
DEVELOPMENT SDRs
There are two issues that we address in this concluding assessment, namely whether
development SDRs are likely to bring significant additional benefit to developing
countries, and the manner in which new SDR issues can be managed.
5.6.1. Development SDRs versus Other Forms of Assistance
In the work by Clark and Polak (2002) on regular SDRs, they draw attention to what
they refer to as ‘the allocation of SDRs versus the provision of conditional Fund
credit’. The question suggests that the perceived direct benefits of an expanded SDR
allocation to developing countries, even if it is not directed at development, need to be
more clearly identified. They are obviously concerned about the question of whether
regular conditional credit from the Fund does not deal with the problems that new
and regular SDRs are supposed to tackle, namely creating the means for increasing
reserve holdings. Clark and Polak (2002) cite the IMF’s 1965 annual report, which
observed that, ‘ideally countries’ need for additional liquidity could be met by adequate
increases in conditional liquidity. In practice, however, countries do not appear to treat
conditional and unconditional liquidity as interchangeable’. Clark and Polak (2002) fear
that inducing countries to meet their liquidity constraints with increased conditional
lending from the Fund would force them to adopt balance of payments programmes
that may have largely negative consequences for growth and development. But this
does not deal with the substitution of conditional credit by new grants. Ultimately,
should new grants not be preferred to new SDRs? Maybe that is what is intended by
proposing the new development SDRs.4
As indicated earlier, Wade (2002) questions in his critique of the Soros proposal
how developing countries would gain directly from a large increase in SDRs. He then
proposes his own list of what could be done with SDRs, but these are a basic extension
of what countries would generally do with owned reserves as opposed to borrowed
reserves.
Indeed, there are a number of people who have suggested that if the idea behind
the campaign for new development SDRs is simply a matter of getting more develop-
ment assistance for developing countries, then one should tackle the issue directly. In
response, it should be pointed out that it is more difficult to argue for increased ODA
which involves a significant direct cost to one party, namely the development assistance
donor, than for the SDRs, which involve no direct cost to those developed countries.
In our view, given the existence of traditional ODA, the question of whether or not
new SDRs should be created should ultimately be tied to the issue of whether such
SDRs are a substitute for ODA or complement it. The difference between SDRs and
other flows to developing countries lies in the fact that the use of SDRs is determined
4 Wade (2002) suggests that, ‘it is basically a way to arrange for the rich countries to cough up more grants
to poor countries. All the fancy talk is really just an elaboration of this very familiar idea’.
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largely by the recipient, and not by the donor. Recipient countries, therefore, are free
to use these essentially termless facilities over a period, despite the possible low short-
term interest costs if the recipients have to transact business with the development
SDR provider. A developing country that receives an SDR allocation targeted at such
countries basically has the option of using the opportunities created by the facility
to increase spending on items not typically funded by donor ODA. This includes
the massively expanded support to the private sector. This characteristic ensures that
additional SDRs without a decline in ODA will give developing countries greater
flexibility in managing their economies than they possibly will have with ODA only.
Using the development SDRs in a complementary manner is what may be useful.
If donor countries accept to continue paying the interest discussed earlier, this,
in effect, would be the main form of support for development that they are providing
under this arrangement. But such interest payment cannot be expected to continue
indefinitely. The time limits will be determined largely by the usual requirements for
assisting developing countries to overcome structural deficiencies.
5.6.2. Structuring the Issuance and Management of New SDR
There is the obvious question of how much development SDRs can be issued at
a time. Wade’s estimate of an equivalent of US$27 billion of SDR as the amount
required to satisfy the needs of the Soros’ proposal is comparable to the Clark and
Polak (2002) suggestion. They propose an annual issue of regular SDRs with an upper
limit of 10 per cent of combined quotas, which would yield about SDR20 billion.
Assuming that the annual issues suggested by Clark and Polak were utilized mainly
for development finance, with industrial economies donating their quota share for the
purpose, an amount of US$25–30 billion would be available as an additional resource
for development finance. And this is about one-half of the initial additional resources
needed for the achievement of the MDGs.
One area in which the creation of SDRs for global public goods is seen to be likely
to generate good outcomes for developing countries is governance. Wade (2002) thinks
that Soros’ ideas of establishing a trust fund with an independent jury, the shopping
for recipient programmes, and the addition of SDRs to the reserves of the poorer
member countries are important and should be treated seriously. The element of
having an independent third party organize the distribution of global public goods
reduces the influence of the World Bank in this area and supposedly brings greater
transparency and accountability into what poor nations may or may not have. Shopping
for recipient programmes ensures that developing countries are not saddled with what
some international technocrat believes is good for them.
But even more important is the question of which of the three possibilities should be
adopted in resuming SDR issues: (i) should the IMF allocate the SDRs differentially?
(ii) should the IMF allocation follow quotas, and should there be an international
agreement of donors to transfer according to some formula? and (iii) should the IMF
allocation follow quotas and individual members decide how to transfer their allocation?
This takes us back to the issue of whether or not the transfer arrangements should be
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more formalized. There seems to be the growing consensus that the third option is the
way to start, with a gradual shift to more structured transfers later. This is generally
seen by the supporters of the resumption of SDRs as the best chance of gaining wider
support.
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Proposals for new institutional arrangements for official development assistance (ODA)
that exploit techniques for securitization in the capital market can function as an
innovative source for generating funds necessary for the achievement of Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). The present chapter takes the proposal for an Inter-
national Finance Facility (IFF), published in the United Kingdom in January 2003
jointly by HM Treasury and the UK Department for International Development
(DFID) (HM Treasury–DFID 2003a,b) as a concrete illustration of this type of
proposals.1
The IFF proposal could be viewed as part of the ‘Global New Deal: A Modern
Marshall Plan for the Developing World’, which was put forward by the UK Treasury
in 2002 (HM Treasury 2002) to tackle poverty in the developing world.2
The generic features of the HM Treasury–DFID proposal on IFF are as follows:
1. A substantial increase in ODA of US$50 billion a year today to US$100 billion
per year.
2. Making a pre-commitment, so that the promises can be ‘banked’.
The chapter is part of the UNU–WIDER and UN–DESA project on Innovative Sources for Development
Finance directed by Tony Atkinson, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. The views expressed in the
chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily represent UN–DESA and UNU–WIDER. I am
most grateful to Tony Atkinson, Ernest Aryeetey, Nicholas Vaughan, and two anonymous referees for
comments and suggestions which substantially improved the Chapter. I am also indebted to Tony Addison,
Yilmaz Akyuz, Tony Burdon, Andrew Kenningham, Ian Kinniburgh, Tony Shorrocks, and Rachel Turner
for helpful background discussions. I would like also to thank the participants of the project meeting on
Innovative Sources for Development Finance (WIDER, Helsinki, May 2003) as well as the participants of
the Sharing Global Prosperity WIDER Conference (Helsinki, 6–7 September 2003) for their constructive
comments and suggestions. None of the above should, however, be held responsible for the views expressed
in the chapter.
1 The scheme has the full support, at the time of writing, of the United Kingdom and France while other
donors are still considering their position (Report of Pocantico Conference, New York, 29–31 May 2003).
2 See the HM Treasury website: www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/international_issues/
global_new_deal.
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3. Annual commitments would start from the roughly US$15–16 billion of aggregate
Monterrey and post-Monterrey additional sums pledged and would rise by 4 per
cent (in real terms) per year.
4. The increase is of limited duration, timed to achieve the internationally agreed
MDGs by 2015.
The above generic features of the IFF scheme seem to suggest that the proposal can be
analysed either as a net addition to existing development aid, or as a comparison with
‘straight’ ODA of the same net present value (NPV), or as a comparison with ODA
with the same time path.3 In the first case, we have all the benefits of the increased
flows, together with some potential problems related to absorptive-capacity constraints
of aid recipients. In the second case, we have the benefit of being able to bring forward
disbursements. Finally, in the third case, we have the certainty of the flows with the
difference being much smaller.
It is notable that the internationally agreed MDGs in Monterrey pose an important
challenge to the international community, namely to increase aid flows substantially to
meet the MDGs or to think of alternative ways of development financing.4 The joint
HM Treasury–DFID proposal on IFF focuses exactly on this important issue.5
In view of the significance of the above interesting and promising IFF proposal, the
present chapter will seek inter alia to contribute to the current debate on exploring
innovative ways to raise funds to meet the MDGs by:
1. Discussing in detail the IFF proposal, its main technical details and financial
structure (Section 6.2).
2. Elaborating administration and implementation issues of crucial importance in the
current proposal (Section 6.3).
3. Evaluating the proposal in terms of both its potential advantages (substantial
increase in aid flows, predictable and stable nature of flows over the next ten years,
tried and tested principle for raising finance in international capital markets, among
others) and its shortcomings (heavy reliance on political coordination among donor
countries, possible absorptive-capacity constraints in aid-recipient countries related
to the substantial increase in aid and continuous commitment on behalf of the donor
community towards the implementation of the IFF during the thirty years of its
life among others), as well as suggesting ways to strengthen further the proposal
(Section 6.4).
4. Summing up the key challenges for IFF (concluding Section 6.5).
3 Note that ODA flows are defined from the perspective of the donor countries.
4 See Atkinson (2003) for a detailed discussion on this.
5 It is notable that the IFF is an ongoing and evolving process at the time of writing thus the present
study cannot be considered as a final assessment of the proposal since its technical details, implementation
procedure, and overall administration structure can change dramatically in the very near future. Indeed,
HM Treasury and DFID are currently trying to iron out the technical details of the current proposal in the
aftermath of discussions at the G7 Meeting in Paris in February 2003 and the IMF–World Bank Spring
Meetings in April 2003.
112 G. Mavrotas
6.2. KEY FEATURES AND TECHNICAL DETAILS OF
THE PROPOSED FACILITY
According to the HM Treasury–DFID proposal on IFF, the Facility is specifically
designed to achieve both the additional finance and the value for money necessary to
reach the MDGs.6 The whole idea is based on securitization structures used extensively
in the capital markets, that is, leverage in additional finance by borrowing through
bonds issued in the international capital markets against long-term commitments for
aid by donor countries. Along these lines, the Facility would essentially frontload long-
term aid flows so that the MDGs are reached by 2015. The Facility will be structured
so that the bonds it issues can achieve the highest possible ratings. This will result in a
cost of leverage, which would be comparable to that achieved by existing multilateral
organizations.
At the same time, it is argued that the Facility is designed so that aid effectiveness
can be improved substantially by focusing aid disbursement on pro-poor priorities
of IFF aid-recipient countries and also by improving the predictability and stability
of longer-term aid. This, as has been recently argued, would strengthen recipients’
efforts to adopt policies that foster sustainable growth, create the right environment
for trade and investment, and ensure that the new resources are used efficiently for
poverty reduction.7
The Facility would involve two main parties, the donor countries and the recipient
countries. The donor countries will be the shareholders of the IFF and at the same time
party to the IFF’s Articles of Association; they will also make commitments to provide
annual payments to the Facility. Finally, they need to agree to a set of overarching
principles in relation to the effectiveness of their aid management and aid policies.
On the other hand, the recipient countries, according to the IFF proposal, will be
the world’s poorest countries. It is notable that the relevant HM Treasury–DFID
documents on IFF are not clear at all at this stage regarding which countries will be
in the final list of the world’s poorest countries eligible for IFF funding; obviously
the final decision/list of countries will be reached by discussion between all countries,
both donor and recipient, in future meetings in which the final proposal on IFF will be
discussed in detail. On this front, the IFF proposal states that countries which received
financing in the last IDA replenishment could be potential IFF-recipient countries
(although there is not any clear commitment in the proposal regarding this).8
6 The present section (as well as Section 6.3) draws heavily on recent documents published by
the HM Treasury and DFID on IFF (see www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/documents/international_issues/
int_gnd_intfinance.cfm) as well a technical note from the HM Treasury–DFID not in the public domain at
the time of writing. It is notable that there is no other bibliography on IFF (external to the HM Treasury–
DFID) at present apart from the relevant documents published by HM Treasury–DFID as well as press
releases following the Chancellor’s presentation of the Facility in recent G7 Meetings in Paris (February
2003) and Washington DC (IMF–World Bank Spring Meetings, April 2003).
7 Speech given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, at the Financing Sustainable
Development, Poverty Reduction, and the Private Sector Conference, London, 22 January 2003.
8 In view of the fact that the IFF is designed to help achieve the MDGs, and since its niche is in grants,
this would suggest the poorest countries.
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It is notable that the IFF will not disburse funds directly to recipient countries. On
the basis of the agreed IFF overarching principles (see relevant discussion below) it
will instead provide funds for disbursement by existing bilateral and multilateral aid-
delivery channels, which may include the World Bank and the Global Health Fund
as well as specific agencies of the governments of donor countries (e.g. DFID in the
United Kingdom). These agencies, both bilateral and multilateral, would be acting as
agents on behalf of the IFF. They would also manage the disbursements in line with
the allocation of funds agreed by the Facility.
The life of the Facility will be rather limited, in the sense that the IFF will terminate
upon repayment in full of all bonds issued and other liabilities incurred by the IFF.
A rough idea on how the Facility would work can be provided by the flow diagram
(Fig. 6.1).
The IFF proposal states that the Facility will be created by an international treaty
among participating donor countries (the shareholders of the IFF). Issues related to the
principal objectives of the IFF, its constitution and governance structure would not be
covered by the Articles of Association, which would be negotiated at an IFF founding
conference. The overarching principles (OPs) would also be defined by the Articles of
Association. The OPs, to which all donors would sign up, would have to be met for
the disbursement of all funds raised through the IFF. The plan is for OPs to be agreed
by donor countries at the founding conference and they could include conditions
such as that funds raised by the Facility must be disbursed to recipients on the basis
of sound aid-effectiveness principles as well as the domestic policy environment and
need. Although the proposal does not provide (at least at this stage) further details
regarding the precise nature of the OPs, it clearly states that the funds should be
(i) used for poverty reduction; (ii) not tied to contracts using specific national suppliers;










Figure 6.1. Overview of the IFF
Source: HM Treasury–DFID (2003a).
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mainly in grant form, including debt relief, with some highly concessional loans where
appropriate; and (v) targeted at low-income countries.
The assets of the Facility will consist primarily of donor commitments to provide
streams of annual payments to the IFF. Thus, the Facility will be relying on donor
commitments to meet its obligations under the bonds. The proposal also states that the
IFF’s ability to service the debt under the bonds will not depend on any repayment by
the recipient countries of the aid disbursed to them.9
Donors will contractually commit to provide streams of payments annually to the
Facility. The plan is for each stream to comprise fifteen annual payments (under
discussion at the moment). To decide on these commitments, donor countries should
meet on a regular basis. One option is for shareholders to participate in pledging
rounds on a tri-annual basis. Another option is that donor countries should participate
in rolling annual pledging rounds. It is notable that participation in one pledging round
would not commit a donor country to participate in following pledging rounds. This
is a potential weakness of the proposal in the sense that the continuous commitment of
the donor countries to the Facility, absolutely vital for its sustainability and success, is
not guaranteed (see Section 6.4 for further discussion).
Furthermore, donors will be contractually bound to make annual payments subject
to certain fundamental conditions being met by the recipient countries (called ‘high-
level financing conditions’; not precisely defined at the moment). These conditions
would be few according to the proposal, clearly defined in advance and capable of
independent determination; a possible financing condition is that a recipient is not
in protracted arrears to the IMF (International Monetary Fund); defined as continu-
ous arrears for more than six months. Note, however, that an IFF donor will not
be legally bound to make its annual payments to the Facility in regard to notional
amounts for a particular recipient if that recipient fails to meet the high-level financing
conditions.
Also, donors would be separately, not jointly, liable for making their payments to the
Facility and they would not have any responsibility for making good on payments for
which another donor country had defaulted. The IFF, on the other hand, will have the
right to suspend disbursements to programmes if any donor countries are in arrears
on any payments due to the Facility.
Regarding disbursements by the IFF, these will be linked to a stream of annual
payments. In the case where a recipient country programme disburses over five years,
it will be financed via payments from five streams. Furthermore, it would be possible
for donors to change the length of a specific stream subject to the minimum length
necessary to support a bond issuance. Note also that it is not necessary that every
payment profile should be considered as attached to a particular stream. The IFF
income will be the result of annual payments made each year by donor countries to the
Facility of an amount equal to their share of each outstanding committed stream.
9 It is notable that the bonds issued by the IFF will be backed by the aggregate of all donor commitments;
this will essentially provide bondholders with a direct claim against the IFF, if it fails to meet its obligations
under the bonds.
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Figure 6.2. Stylized representation of donor commitments
Source: HM Treasury–DFID (2003a).
Figure 6.2 shows how donor commitments to the Facility can be made through a
number of pledging rounds.
The above-stylized representation feeds into a broader illustrative model, which
assumes the following parameters:
(i) fifteen funding rounds, one every year;
(ii) a defined life-span of thirty years for the IFF;
(iii) disbursements of funds from the Facility increase from US$10 billion in the first
year to US$50 billion in 5 years, to remain constant for five years before declining
to zero over the final 5 years;
(iv) the average cost of funds for the IFF is 5 per cent;
(v) no more than 85 per cent of the net present value is raised as debt (the leverage
limit; see below).
In line with the above assumptions, Figs 6.3 and 6.4 show the funds which could
be raised based on annual donor contributions starting at US$3.65 billion, rising to
US$44 billion from 2017 to 2020 and thereafter falling (Fig. 6.3) and the resulting
profile of IFF bonds outstanding (Fig. 6.4).
The underlying assumption of the illustrative example of IFF income and disburse-
ment in Fig. 6.3 is that donors will commit themselves to provide constant nominal
streams of annual payments to the Facility. However, it may be possible that donor
commitments will be phased in a different way. It may be preferable, for instance, for
donors to provide a more even spread of aggregate payments across the lifetime of
the Facility, rising in line with donor income. This will result in the phased streams
illustrated in Fig. 6.5.
It is notable that in line with Fig. 6.5, disbursements as projected fall away sharply
after 2015. Most conventional wisdom would suppose, however, that if we were plan-
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Figure 6.4. IFF debt profile during the life of the Facility
Source: HM Treasury–DFID (2003a).
rather tend to disrupt economic stability. Added to this is the situation projected in
which (according to Fig. 6.5), from 2020 on to 2032, the extra donor contributions
(above the 2002 base) gradually rise until they are running at more than US$40 billion
a year (in 2002 prices) without a cent of this extra going to the recipient countries; it is
all debt-servicing and replenishment of the Facility’s reserves.10
Turning to leverage issues of crucial importance in the proposed Facility, in order
to achieve and preserve the highest possible ratings of all bonds issued by the IFF, the
Facility will limit the degree to which the donor commitments may be levered. More
10 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for raising this issue.
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Figure 6.5. Illustrative example of IFF income and disbursement patterns—phased streams
Source: HM Treasury–DFID (2003a).
precisely, at each disbursement the Facility will allocate a fixed proportion of the donor
commitment made by a donor country in the pledging round to that disbursement.
This allocation needs to take into account the prevailing cost of long-term debt for the
IFF in the donor country’s currency and the leverage limit.11
Under the assumption that donor commitments are binding and perceived as cred-
ible by financial markets, the IFF leverage would depend on a careful assessment of the
likelihood that the high-level financing conditions (see above) are met by the recipients
to whom finance raised through the Facility is disbursed. In case the high-level fin-
ancing condition is that recipients are not in protracted arrears to the IMF (see above)
then a careful assessment of the historical data, according to internal work by HM
Treasury, could provide a sound basis for preliminary work to evaluate the possible
leverage limit.
Internal work by HM Treasury includes some examples to illustrate the above. For
instance, the historical record of all IDA-eligible countries’ experience in going into
protracted arrears with the IMF has been considered and has been used as a basis for
projections. Under the assumption that commitments by donors are evenly distributed
across the 75 countries receiving funds in the IDA-13 replenishment, it was calculated
that it is 99 per cent likely that at least 87 per cent of the NPV of donor commitments
would actually be paid to the Facility.12
Relaxing the unrealistic assumption that donor countries are evenly distributed
across the IDA countries and in line with the disbursement profile of IDA-13, the
11 By the leverage limit it is assumed that only a certain proportion of the donors’ commitment would be
allocated to loan servicing; the rest would be a reserve kept in the Facility, principally to cover donor default,
either under the ‘high-level funding condition’ or otherwise.
12 This means that if the IFF were to borrow 87% of the net present value of donor commitments over
the next fifteen years, there would only be a 1% chance of the IFF not having sufficient funds to repay its
borrowings.
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leverage limit would now need to be lower in order to achieve and maintain AAA
equivalent ratings. The estimates in this case seem to suggest that it is 99 per cent
likely that at least 80 per cent of the net present value of donor commitments would
actually be paid to the Facility, compared to 87 per cent in the previous case.13
It is also notable that although the leverage applied to donor commitments will be
restricted by the leverage limit, the full value of donor commitments will be disbursed
over time in the sense that a lower leverage limit would affect the volume of funds
that could be disbursed in the early years of the Facility but not the cost of these
funds. More precisely, as the Facility receives annual payments from donors, the value
of donor commitments will rise relative to the funds disbursed. This will have two
possible effects: it will either reduce the level of commitments donors would need to
make for new programmes or release additional funds that may be disbursed under
existing (or proposed) programmes.
A relevant issue to the above discussion of the leverage limit is the rating of bonds.
The working assumption in the IFF proposal is that the Facility will operate under a
leverage limit that will enable bonds issued by the Facility to secure AAA/Aaa/AAA
ratings by Fitch/IBCA, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s, respectively.
The HM Treasury–DFID argue that under the assumption that the Facility operates
under a prudent leverage limit (in the range 80–87 per cent) and with AAA credit
ratings, it is expected that the IFF’s debt will be perceived by the market as a risk
comparable to the existing multilateral debt.
A rather dubious feature of the above interesting proposal and, at the same time,
an issue that possibly deserves further discussion is related to the ‘high-level financing
condition’, that is, the licence for a donor to stop servicing portion of the debt for which
it is responsible if the relevant recipient has, for example, defaulted on its obligations
to the IMF. It might well be argued that the servicing obligations should be treated
instead in the normal way (especially since the failings of the recipient country in no
way affect the capacity of the donor to service the loan) and since the cessation of
servicing by the donor constitutes in itself no punishment or deterrent for the erring
recipient. Building on this it might be suggested, for instance, to drop the high-level
financing condition and raise the leverage limit since no one would suffer from this or
would be subjected to moral hazard as a result.14
6.3. ADMINISTRATION AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
The present section briefly discusses a possible governance structure of the IFF by
drawing on an illustrative model used in the internal work by the HM Treasury
13 Clearly, the larger the portfolio of commitments and the more even the distribution, then the greater
the leverage, all other things being equal. However, it is rather unrealistic to assume that all countries have
the same probability of entering protracted arrears with the IMF. Countries receiving a high proportion of
funds within the IDA-13 replenishment would tend to have a lower probability of entering protracted arrears
with the IMF. Hence, while the more unequal distribution within IDA-13 would tend to lower the leverage,
this would be offset, to some extent, by the better creditworthiness of countries receiving an above-average
proportion of funds. 14 We thank an anonymous referee for alerting us on this issue.
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(work still in progress at the time of writing). Obviously, the final governance
structure has to be agreed at the establishment of the IFF at the founding con-
ference. One possible governance structure of the IFF might comprise two main
committees:
1. A shareholders’ committee comprising all of the shareholders of the IFF, each
appointed by a donor country. The committee would be responsible for ensur-
ing that the Facility is managed according to the Articles of Association (see
Section 6.2). The committee should meet annually to review the activities of
the IFF.
2. A management committee, which would be appointed by the shareholders, com-
prising the executive directors (each one to be appointed by the shareholders) in the
board of executive directors. The board of executive directors would be responsible
for overseeing the overall management of the IFF. It would be also responsible for
approving programmes to which the Facility can disburse and ensuring a prudent
borrowing strategy such that the IFF retains the highest possible credit ratings
(e.g., AAA type ratings). The committee would be chaired by a chief executive who
could be appointed for a fixed term by the shareholders by means of a transparent
and open process (further details on this not available at the time of writing).
A small team of professional staff might also be appointed by the chief executive
to carry out the treasury function of the Facility and to oversee the allocation of
funds.
Regarding the voting rights of the members of the management committee, it could
be suggested that these rights should reflect the level of participation of the shareholders
in the IFF. This would be subject to a maximum limit in the sense that no shareholder
can hold more than 49 per cent of the voting rights. In relation to the above, it might
be prudent for certain matters to be subject to approval by super-majority and/or veto
by one or more shareholders (again, discussion on these issues is still ongoing and a
final decision will be reached at the founding conference).
The main duties of the management committee would be to maintain the financial
integrity of the Facility, which may involve inter alia:
(i) deciding on the level of leverage to be achieved by the IFF;
(ii) establishing the bond issuance programme of the IFF;
(iii) deciding how much cash reserve the IFF will hold and how this will be managed;
(iv) deciding the appropriate strategy for the allocation of funds across recipient
countries to achieve an acceptable spread of risk;
(v) deciding how much finance will be disbursed each year.
Finally, the location of the main offices of the Facility needs to be decided at the IFF
founding conference.
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6.4. POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
THE IFF PROPOSAL
6.4.1. Potential advantages of the IFF
Revenue-raising potential and accelerating progress regarding the MDGs
Undoubtedly, a key advantage of the proposed Facility is its revenue-raising potential.
Indeed, the revenue-raising potential of the IFF is quite substantial. The Facility
could double existing ODA from US$50–100 billion per year during the crucial years
of 2010-15, thus allowing the MDGs to be met.15 This is a great advantage of the
proposed Facility combined with the plan to disburse grants rather than loans to
the recipient countries participating in the IFF, although some concessional loans
will also be disbursed where appropriate.16 In view of the above, the scheme can
deploy a critical mass of aid flows as investment over the next few years (in line with
the worked examples of Section 6.2 when it will have the most impact on achieving
the MDGs.
Predictable and stable aid
Another major advantage of the proposed Facility is related to the nature of the aid flows,
which will be disbursed to the IFF-recipient countries. The proposal clearly states that
the aid flows will be predictable and stable, thus minimizing the negative effects asso-
ciated with unpredictable and volatile aid. Indeed, unpredictable aid imposes a serious
constraint in recipient countries with regard to future public expenditure planning and
causes problems related to the achievement of sound macroeconomic management.17
Distinguishing predictable from unpredictable aid flows is also relevant to the issue
of aid heterogeneity, which has been neglected (until very recently) by the vast lit-
erature analysing the impact of aid in aid-recipient countries. More precisely, until
very recently existing evidence on the macroeconomic impact of aid lacked a systematic
treatment of the aid disaggregation issue and of the way different types of aid affect
key macroeconomic variables in aid-recipient countries. One of the main features of
the vast quantitative literature of the effectiveness of development aid in recipient
countries has been the employment of a single figure for aid. However, this is likely to
be misleading for reaching conclusions on aid effectiveness, since we can distinguish at
least four different categories of aid: project aid with a rather lengthy gestation period,
programme aid that disburses rapidly as free foreign exchange, technical assistance,
and food aid and other commodity aid which adds directly to consumption (Cassen
1994; Mavrotas 2002a, b). To the above four types of foreign aid, emergency or relief
15 This is equivalent to an average aid ratio of 0.47% of GNP, a clear departure from current levels.
16 This is an important comparative advantage of IFF in accelerating grant finance in view of the need to
make substantial progress regarding the MDGs.
17 Empirical findings of an important early study on the negative effects of unanticipated aid (Levy 1987),
clearly indicate different tendencies of anticipated and unanticipated aid in thirty-nine countries over the
period 1970-80: unanticipated aid was fully consumed but more than 40% of predictable aid was invested
thus contributing significantly to the growth process in recipient countries.
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aid could be added as a separate category, given its increasing importance in recent
years (Addison 2000).18
Recent work in this promising research area seems to suggest that aid disaggreg-
ation does matter for our overall understanding of the macroeconomic impact of aid
in aid-recipients (Mavrotas 2002a, 2003a, b; Mavrotas and Ouattara 2003a, b). The
relevant policy lessons for both the donor and aid-recipient communities are quite
significant: understanding how aid works, and in particular, how different types of aid
work is of paramount importance for designing and implementing policies aiming at
improving further aid effectiveness. However, there is a clear need for further work in
this promising area at the individual country, regional and global level so that important
conclusions and robust policy guidelines can be derived.
Comparative advantage compared to other proposed funding additional
to existing ODA: IFF vis-à-vis MCA
An advantage of IFF as compared to other possible ways of increasing aid flows so
that MDGs are achieved, and in particular the much discussed recently Millennium
Challenge Account (MCA) of the US administration, is that the IFF does not deal
with recipient countries on a bilateral basis only, as the MCA does.19 By doing so,
the MCA could possibly undermine significant progress made recently in improving
donor coordination (see, for instance, the recent Aid Harmonization Initiative on this
front). As has been recently argued, ‘backsliding in this area could condemn poor
countries to the unhappy position of having to court myriad donors and wade through
competing and conflicting regulations’ (Sperling and Hart 2003: 10).
A relevant question here might be, what would happen if the rest of the donor
countries, apart from the United States, set up a fund (let us say the IFF) with
the United States going its own way (with the MCA, for instance)—which, indeed, is
the most likely outcome in view of the recent US (but also German) opposition to the
IFF proposal at the IMF–WB Spring Meetings in Washington DC in April 2003 (see
further details later). Crowding-out issues are of relevance in this case (i.e. introducing
a new revenue source may displace other sources for development funding) under the
assumption that the IFF proposal would be finally accepted by some donor countries.
A proper discussion of the above issue should adopt a common framework to evaluate
18 There are three relevant points here: (i) different types of aid operate in different ways (and with
different lag-structure) in the recipient country thus resulting in different macro effects; (ii) because of
different conditions regarding each in different countries (e.g. the state of aid coordination may vary among
aid recipients), there is also an extra reason to expect different effects of aid in each country—the ceteris
paribus assumptions of the econometrics of aid may be disturbed by such considerations; (iii) and perhaps
most important, aid disaggregation might not matter so much if the proportions of different types of aid
were constant; if they were, there could be sense in a coefficient relating aid (measured by one number)
to some aspect of effectiveness; but if the proportions are changing, as they are, and changing in different
degrees for different countries, this will definitely disturb the empirical results (Mavrotas 2002a, b).
19 The US administration has recently proposed the creation of a federal corporation, separate from
the Agency for International Development, to administer its proposed fund by targeting a small group of
‘high-performing’ countries on the basis of some eligibility criteria. For a detailed discussion of MCA see
Radelet (2003), Brainard et al. (2003), and Catholic Relief Services Report on MCA (2002) among others.
122 G. Mavrotas
different forms of development financing including the proposed Facility (Atkinson,
Chapter 1, this volume).20
Indeed, this is also relevant to the IFF as compared to the IDA. IDA disbursed
US$5.6 billion (US$5 in 2001 [World Bank 2003]) in 2002. Recently there has been a
lot of discussion regarding the restructuring of IDA with a part of its lending being
in the form of grants rather than loans. The IDA-13 replenishment was approved in
mid-2002 and it was agreed that between 18 and 21 per cent of its overall resources
would be provided in the form of grants. Bearing also in mind that IDA focuses on
low-income countries, the question is, what would happen if the IFF was finally set up
to disburse aid (mostly in the form of grants as discussed in Section 6.2 with a focus
on low-income countries also). Most likely, the countries receiving aid flows from the
IFF would be the same countries receiving grants (but also loans) from IDA. This is
an important issue that needs to be addressed by the IFF proposal in view of the above
recent developments in the IDA.21
IFF is based on a tried and tested principle for raising finance in
international capital markets
It could be well argued that the securitization principle for raising finance through
the IFF has been tried and tested for raising finance in international capital markets,
thus adding significantly to the robustness of the overall proposal. Needless to say, the
overall success of the proposed Facility will also be determined by other factors, such
as the number of donors participating in the Facility (as well as their importance as
perceived in international capital markets) and their continuous commitment to the
Facility during its thirty-year life (see below for a discussion).
6.4.2. Potential Disadvantages of the Proposed Facility and
Issues for Further Discussion
Possible undesirable effects of increasing aid flows through the IFF
Doubling aid through IFF may cause some potential undesirable effects in aid-recipient
countries such as:
1. Absorptive-capacity problems (i.e. how recipient countries can cope with high levels
of aid) and diminishing marginal rates of return to increased aid;22
20 Obviously, in considering the likely extent of crowding out, the specification of the counter-factual is
also crucial (Atkinson 2003).
21 The reader can refer to a recent paper by Kapur (2002) on MDBs and IDA for a detailed discussion of
IDA restructuring and the ‘aidization’ of the World Bank.
22 It is notable that even if aid increases substantially by US$50 billion a year up to 2015, as the IFF
proposal predicts, this does not necessarily guarantee that the MDGs will be reached. This is also relevant
to absorptive-capacity issues; needless to say, this might be also the case with other types of development
financing under discussion in the international community at the time of writing. There is some degree of
optimism in the IFF proposal regarding this issue. It is assumed that by doubling aid flows through the
Facility the targets will be met. However, we should be a little sceptical about this, in view of the lessons
emerged from the voluminous literature on aid effectiveness, and particularly recent developments on this
front.
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2. Dutch-disease type of effects (i.e. the impact of aid on relative prices in aid-recipient
countries);
3. The impact of aid on the public sector in recipient countries (i.e. does aid result in
reduced taxation effort in recipient countries? How aid affects the fiscal sector of
the aid recipient).23
Absorptive-capacity issues
It has been recently estimated that if aid donors were to meet the ODA target of 0.7
per cent of donor country GNP, aid flows would increase to about US$175 billion, that
is more than three times the current levels. This, obviously, would help a lot with the
achievement of the MDGs, but at the same time it would pose a number of challenges
for aid-recipient countries at both the micro and the macro level (Heller and Gupta
2002). Although not implying an increase of aid flows equivalent to 0.7 per cent of
donor country GNP, the proposed IFF is associated with a sharp increase in aid in the
next decade up to 2015, which may pose crucial challenges for potential recipients of
IFF flows. An important relevant issue is the possible absorptive-capacity constraint
in a number of aid-recipient countries.24 More precisely, doubling aid through the
Facility would face diminishing marginal rates of return and this could become a
serious problem at very high aid-to-GDP ratios. However, doubling aid in real terms by
2005 would bring only fourteen countries with a combined population of 109 million
above 20 per cent aid/GNI. At the same time, it would be fair to say that there is
no evidence that countries which receive high levels of aid have performed poorly.
Some recent success stories in Africa clearly show how large amounts of aid can yield
substantial rates of return: Uganda received more than 20 per cent of aid as share of
GDP in the early 1990s but managed to register high growth rates above 7 per cent,
reducing at the same time poverty (mainly through the Poverty Eradication Action
Fund) by 20 per cent. Mozambique, with a 50 per cent aid-to-GDP ratio in the 1990s,
achieved high growth rates, reaching 12 per cent in 1998. Recipients with high aid
levels (above 20 per cent of income), most of them in Africa, increased on average
their per capita GDP by 1.3 per cent per year over the period 1995–2000 (World Bank
2003).25 Needless to say, these trends cannot suggest a robust conclusion regarding the
impact of aid on growth (and the overall effectiveness of development aid) in countries
receiving huge amounts of aid, since the aid-growth nexus can be affected by a number
of factors which are not captured by simple correlation statistics.
23 The above issues may be also relevant to all forms of increased transfer; for example, the absorptive-
capacity issue, the Dutch disease problem, and issues related to fiscal response could all arise if the transfer
was funded by a Tobin tax.
24 Absorptive-capacity constraints and recipient need may be more unpredictable and uncontrollable than
the steep bell-curve of rising and declining aid flows during the life of the Facility that the IFF seems to
suggest. Heller and Gupta (2002) have recently argued that donors should put funds in trust today in order
to finance increased aid in future when absorptive capacity allows.
25 This is lower than China and India but greater than the average for all low-income countries (World
Bank 2003).
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On the issue of diminishing marginal rates of return related to increased aid, HM
Treasury has recently argued that a minimum criterion for public investment, including
what comes through aid, is that the test discount rate must not be less than the rate
used by the donor country for domestic spending (currently 3.5 per cent in the United
Kingdom) or the social time preference rate of the recipient country, estimated at
5.8 per cent for low-income countries. IFF-related assistance at average rates of return
of 25 per cent (HM Treasury estimate) would yield returns of more than three times
the borrowing rate of 6 per cent, and far above test discount, and social time preference
rates.
Dutch disease effects
Regarding the Dutch disease type of effects, it may be well argued that large and
sustained aid flows (i.e. IFF-type flows) may cause some appreciation of the nominal
and real exchange rates in recipient countries. Indeed, since most aid is provided to
governments whose expenditure is mainly on non-tradables such as public services,
there is clearly a likelihood of short-run Dutch disease effects. In this case, aid may
have two effects: a distortionary effect on price incentives and a direct positive income
effect. Obviously, the final outcome will be determined by how the economy responds
to the distortion. However, if substantial aid flows are supported by appropriate eco-
nomic policies in recipient countries, the net gains to higher sustained levels of aid
will remain strongly positive and donors should therefore continue to make these
resources available to recipient countries pursuing sound macroeconomic policies
(DFID 2002).26
The impact of aid on the public sector
An issue relevant to potential absorptive-capacity problems in countries receiving large
amounts of aid through the IFF concerns the impact of aid on the public sector in
the aid-recipient economy. One of the key criticisms of the aid–growth literature is
that it fails to recognize explicitly that aid is given primarily to governments in aid-
recipient countries, and hence any impact of aid on the macroeconomy will depend
on government behaviour, in particular how fiscal decisions on taxation and expendit-
ure are effected by the presence of aid. This is exactly what motivates the so-called
‘fiscal response’ literature, that is, modelling how the impact of aid is mediated by
public sector behaviour.27 The analysis of fiscal response is also important because it
helps to open one of the many ‘black boxes’ of the aid–growth nexus (McGillivray
and Morrissey 2000; Mavrotas 2002a; Mavrotas and Ouattara 2003a). Long ago it
was argued that aid, inter alia, may have a negative effect on recipient economies
26 Potential Dutch disease effects of increased aid flows are also related to the classical ‘resource transfer
problem’ that has been discussed extensively in the trade literature. In the case of IFF, since the pattern of
transfers is advanced, the terms of trade effect may become more conspicuous relative to a smoother time
path; this may not necessarily outweigh the advantages of earlier disbursement, however, it needs to be put
into balance (see Atkinson, Chapter 2 in this volume). 27 The term is attributed to White (1992).
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since recipient-country governments often use aid money to increase government
consumption rather than direct aid flows towards developmental government invest-
ment (Griffin 1970). These potential negative effects of foreign aid could be viewed
further within the context of the fungibility literature; the impact of aid on fiscal vari-
ables in the recipient economy and the related issue of aid fungibility have been the
subject of a booming empirical literature in recent years. The ‘fiscal response’ literature,
however, is not conclusive about the overall impact of aid on the fiscal sector of recipient
countries.28
Issues related to donor coordination and commitment: the key-challenge
An issue very relevant to the overall success of proposals like the IFF is donor coordin-
ation: improving donor coordination (as well as maintaining it throughout the life of
the Facility) is absolutely vital for the successful completion of the IFF. This is one
of the disadvantages of the proposal, namely its heavy reliance on political coordin-
ation among the donor countries that will finally participate in the Facility. At the
same time, the underlying assumption in the IFF proposal is that there will be con-
tinuous commitment on behalf of the donor community towards the implementation
of the IFF during the thirty years of its life. This, to our view, is rather optimistic
since, in a dynamic and uncertain world, this type of commitment is rather difficult to
guarantee.
The conditions to be attached to the outflows from the Facility would be politically
difficult to be agreed by all donors participating in the IFF
The conditions related to the IFF (see the discussion on OPs in Section 6.2) will
be rather difficult to be agreed among donors and multilateral agencies participat-
ing in the Facility. Since the delivery channels of the IFF will be various (including
multilateral agencies and bilateral channels), there is no guarantee that the conditions
to be met by the recipients will necessarily be the same in all cases. Indeed, there
are plenty of reasons to argue the opposite, in view of the lack of consensus among
donors on issues related to the role of conditionality in development aid in the past.
This may also undermine one of the main advantages of the current IFF proposal,
namely that it will channel predictable and stable flows to low-income countries, thus
allowing them to adopt pro-poor growth strategies. If we assume that there will be
no widespread agreement regarding the OPs among donors participating in the IFF
but that instead different conditions will be adopted by different donors, this may
possibly make the disbursements less predictable and stable thus affecting the achieve-
ment of MDGs. However, possibly the right route for the IFF to take at this
stage is to link the whole effort with recent initiatives on the aid harmonization
front.29
28 See McGillivray and Morrissey (2000), McGillivray (2000), Mavrotas (2002a), and Mavrotas and
Ouattara (2003b) for a detailed discussion of the relevant literature.
29 See the High-Level Aid Harmonization Meeting in Rome, February 2003.
126 G. Mavrotas
Would the IFF be large enough (in terms of donor participation)
to be able to deliver what is being proposed?
Obviously, the issue (and the main challenge for the proposed Facility) is really whether
enough donor governments will commit enough money to get the Facility working to
the right scale (Financial Times 2003a). This clearly emphasizes that the biggest task
in the implementation of the IFF proposal is political. The proposal does not discuss
details regarding possible donor participation in the Facility in terms of the ‘right’
number and/or size needed to raise US$50 billion a year until 2015. However, this is a
crucial factor, which will eventually determine the future of this promising proposal.
If the HM Treasury–DFID manage to convince a substantial number of donors to
go ahead with the proposed Facility, even without the United States as an IFF donor
country (in view of the recent developments related to the MCA, see above), the Facility
may be in a position to deliver what it is promising at the moment. In the opposite
case, the prospects for the Facility would be rather bleak.
How would the IFF be treated in the national accounts of donor governments?:
Implications for debt/GDP ratios
Another potential disadvantage of the proposed Facility is related to the way it may
be treated in the national accounts of the donor countries participating in the Facility.
It may well be argued here that the future commitments of donor countries to the
Facility will be registered as government liabilities in the national accounts of the
donor countries resulting in higher debt-to-GDP ratios in these countries. This would
make the Facility rather unattractive to those donor countries wishing to reduce their
debt-to-GDP ratios.
Regarding the above issue, the HM Treasury–DFID argues in the revised proposal
(work still in progress) that the IFF is expected to be classified as an international
organization (under Eurostat guidelines) and so within in-the-rest-of-the-world sector
in national accounts and therefore outside the general government sector in indi-
vidual countries’ national accounts. Along these lines, the proposal goes further by
arguing that the Facility will be ‘owned’ by the several donor governments but will be
responsible for its own debt servicing, that is, bondholders will have no call on donor
governments participating in the Facility. HM Treasury–DFID also argue that donor
countries will need to consider whether, under their own accounting conventions, the
funds raised through the securitization process would be classified as IFF borrowing
rather than as borrowing by the individual donor governments.30
Under the assumption that the IFF will be classified in this manner, there is no
potential disadvantage arising from the Facility regarding its treatment in the national
accounts of the participating donor governments. However, as the proponents of the
Facility also admit, this will crucially depend on two factors, namely (i) the nature
of the donor commitments and (ii) the IFF’s decisionmaking process for allocating
30 In the former case, it is argued that the Facility’s disbursement of those funds would be recorded as
IFF expenditure rather than expenditure by the donor governments and government expenditure would be
recorded when donor governments make their actual payments to the Facility.
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funds for disbursement (to be agreed at the proposed founding conference). Needless
to say, even on the assumption that there is some ineluctable logic determining how
the presentation for national-accounts purposes should be done given the nature of the
financial obligations (which might make the first condition important), it is very hard
to see how the manner in which the allocation decisions are made with the borrowed
funds (the second condition) has any bearing on whether those funds should be counted
as donor-government borrowing.31
The IFF may imply a significant change in organizational terms since it
would involve a new international treaty and possibly substantial
organizational costs
It could well be argued that a new scheme, along the lines of the proposed IFF, implies
a significant change in organizational terms since it would involve a new international
treaty as well as potentially substantial organizational costs as compared to the existing
institutions. One might even go further to argue that it is rather unclear what advantage
the new Facility would provide as compared to existing institutional structures. Along
these lines, one might possibly wonder whether increasing the callable capital of the
existing MDBs could achieve similar results.
However, distinguishing between grants and non-concessional loans is crucial in
dealing with the above issue. In the case of non-concessional loans (which is not the
focus of the proposed Facility) the most efficient means would probably be an increase
in the callable capital of the existing MDBs. This would not be the case if we considered
grants (and concessional loans) as in the case of IFF, since the IFF would be a more
efficient way to finance grants and concessional loans than the callable-capital structure
of the MDBs. For example, IDA cannot borrow in the international capital markets
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) may not
give grants. In the latter case, internal work by the HM Treasury seems to suggest
that, if the World Bank itself were to finance loans on IDA-type concessional terms
through market borrowing, and wanted to maintain its status as a stand-alone financial
institution (without any donor subsidy), it would require an increase in capital at least
equal to the grant element of the loans and probably significantly more, reflecting credit
risk; this would result in a leverage which would be very low. Thus, it would be fair to
conclude that increasing the callable capital of the existing MDBs would be unable to
accelerate grant finance the way the IFF does.
Could the additionality of the money committed through the IFF be guaranteed?
Finally, an important issue is related to the additionality element of the proposed
Facility regarding existing ODA flows from donor countries. It would be difficult (if
not impossible) to guarantee that the money committed through the IFF would be
additional to ODA flows. Regarding this, it could possibly be argued that, even if
contributions are not entirely additional, the IFF process will bind them in and give
31 We are grateful to an anonymous referee on this point.
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them leverage. This is clearly an issue that needs further discussion and elaboration in
forthcoming G7 meetings.32
6.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In a globalized world, we need solutions of a global scale to deal with important global
issues (such as the MDGs). In view of this, a proposal to set up an IFF should, in
principle, be welcomed by the international community. In the present chapter, we
have discussed in detail the IFF, the joint HM Treasury–DFID proposal to increase
development aid substantially so that the MDGs are achieved by 2015. The main
conclusion of the chapter is that the proposed IFF is a promising and forward-looking
proposal, in view of the substantial increase in fresh, predictable, and stable aid it is
envisaging as well as its robust financial structure.
However, there are a number of concerns about some potential shortcomings of the
proposal, namely its underlying assumptions of continuous commitment on behalf of
the donor community towards the implementation of the IFF during the thirty years of
its life, and most importantly its heavy reliance on political coordination among donor
countries participating in the proposed Facility. Achieving its huge political task as well
as relaxing the crucial constraints on the successful implementation of this innovative
proposal would be the main future challenge of the IFF.33
Furthermore, the discussion of potential disadvantages of the proposed Facility,
particularly those related to donor coordination and continuous commitment of the
donor community during the life of the Facility to contribute to the IFF in line with the
Articles of Association, clearly suggests the need for future research to discuss in-depth
political economy aspects of sources of development finance, including the IFF, since
‘the political economy of different proposals is an important part of the story, requiring
a nuanced political analysis of the likely coalitions of support and opposition, as well
as a careful specification of the exact nature of the proposals’ (Atkinson 2003: 22).
To sum up, our own view is that this is a promising, forward-looking, and creative
proposal which needs to be carefully considered at international fora in the very near
future so that it is turned from a proposal into a practical solution to the problem
of development financing for the achievement of the MDGs. Obviously the political
constraints regarding the possible implementation of the proposal in the near future
are extremely important and should not be overlooked. Many donor countries and
international agencies may be sceptical about a proposal which may reduce part of their
autonomy and independence regarding aid allocation. Indeed this sort of scepticism
is reflected in some of the comments already made by some donors at the IMF–WB
Spring Meetings in April 2003. The United States and Germany, for instance, fear that
32 Furthermore, it is not very clear from the above proposal what happens after 2015 when a part of the
aid budget is diverted into funding the bonds that have been issued to support increased transfers prior
to 2015; in particular, it is not certain whether this intertemporal change in resource transfer will increase
welfare.
33 As has been correctly argued recently, ‘unless there is the commitment to implement the IFF, the
Facility will remain just a proposal’ (Financial Times, 21 February 2003a).
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the proposal may be impractical since it would bind the hands of future governments
and mortgage future aid budgets to repay the borrowings (Financial Times 2003b).
Others, however, including the IMF’s former managing director Horst Kohler and
France, welcomed the proposal thus crediting it with more time for further discussions
and revision at this stage.34
At the Pocantico Conference on Feasible Additional Sources of Finance for Devel-
opment (May 2003) an alternative option was discussed in case binding explicit
commitments from all potential major donors proved impossible to achieve. It has
been argued that it might be fruitful to ask the potential donors to issue the relev-
ant volumes of bonds on an individual basis, with the proceeds still to be used under
whatever ground-rules the donors corporately could agree to follow; each donor coun-
try’s own credit would then be at issue in maintaining the annual payments. Along
these lines, whatever bonds each had issued, these it would certainly service. However,
in view of the Facility’s multilateral approach to aid allocation, coordination issues
could be more difficult to deal with here as compared to the IFF option.
Accelerating aid flows through the IFF needs to take into account absorptive-
capacity constraints in aid-dependent economies to ensure that marginal returns do
not fall below the minimum thresholds we derived. In view of this, borrowing against
future aid, as proposed by the IFF, can be worthwhile provided returns exceed the
borrowing cost (Foster 2003).35
The final point to make is that arguing as well as campaigning for the IFF (as is the
case with other sources of development finance), even if the proposed Facility finally
does not succeed in being adopted in the near future, can be extremely valuable in
maintaining a sense of urgency over the need for additional finance for the achievement
of MDGs and in challenging the major economic powers to find an efficient way of
providing it. Furthermore, coalitions among donors trying to promote new major
34 The recent response of the IMF to the IFF proposal was overall positive, as reflected in the comments
made by its managing director at the recent Spring IMF–World Bank Meetings in Washington, DC: ‘I think
this is an intelligent idea. It raises a number of questions. I know that there is some skepticism, but I
do think we should remain open to this suggestion, because we need more financing for development.
We know that public budgets are tight and, therefore, we should also look to some creative ideas, and
this is one.’ Press conference at the IMF following the Spring Meetings, Washington, DC, April 2003
(www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2003/tr030410.htm).
35 Another fair point (raised by an anonymous referee) is that behind the IFF proposal seems to lie a
supposition about a rather strange pattern of discount rates (and productivity rates on investment) over time
within the recipient countries. The pattern of disbursements (as illustrated in Figs 6.3 and 6.5) seems to
make sense only on the assumption that the marginal productivity-of-investment function moves sharply
downward from 2015 to 2020. Although it makes sense (in view of the need to meet the internationally
agreed MDGs by 2015) to assume an upward sloping marginal productivity-of-investment function prior to
2015, it is not necessarily reasonable to assume a downward sloping curve after 2015. The present chapter
examines whether returns on investment in the recipients are likely to be high enough to justify borrowing
at AAA rates to finance them and concludes that they very probably are. However, one of the distinctive
features of the IFF is that it not only increases disbursements up to 2015 but also (in comparison with a
straight disbursement of the projected donor contributions as they occur) reduces them thereafter. Do we
know of any good reason why that is likely to be efficient? Or is it just an inefficiency that is worth accepting
because the whole package will generate more predictable donor contributions, one of the main advantages
of the above proposal?
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initiatives on the development finance front (such as the IFF) could be possibly more
efficient if they included politicians representing both North and South; this would
give to the proposed initiatives more international support and credibility as well as
higher chances of being finally adopted.
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7
Private Donations for International
Development
    
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in
his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.
Adam Smith (1759), The Theory of Moral Sentiments, chapter 1.
7.1. INTRODUCTION
Charitable giving is common, reflecting various ‘principles’ in human nature alluded to
by Adam Smith, as well as others that he did not identify. For example, 70 per cent of
American households give money to charity, with their donations summing to almost
US$150 billion in 1999—more than one and a half per cent of US national income.1 The
US heads the giving league in per capita terms as well as total amounts but there is a lot
of giving in other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
countries as well. Two-thirds of UK adults report making charitable donations in
2001, with an annual total of nearly US$10 billion. Recent changes to the UK tax
system have tried to encourage private philanthropy, and the evidence suggests that
much of the donor response could still be to come. Donations by private individuals
in Germany totalled about US$4 billion in 2000 and a similar amount was given in the
Netherlands in 1999.2 Econometric estimates of the response of charitable giving to
changes in incomes and prices imply that rising real income over the next 15–20 years
Very useful comments on earlier drafts were made by Tony Atkinson (several of which helped shape our
conclusions), other project participants, David Lewis, Sylke Schnepf, and OUP’s referees. We are grateful
for help in various ways to Jonathan Burton, Catherine Carnie, Susan Chisnall, Bill Cottle, Stephen Lee,
Liz Markus, Marjorie Newman Williams, Caroline Thomas, and Della Weight.
1 See www.access.mpr.org/civic_j/giving/resources/factoids.shtml. More recent figures for 2001 come
from www.independentsector.org/PDFs/GV01keyfind.pdf and show an even higher involvement in phil-
anthropy. See also the summary statistics in Andreoni (2001) who provides a concise review of the economic
theory of philanthropy, empirical literature from the United States and policy issues surrounding the tax
treatment of donations.
2 Figures for the United Kingdom and Germany taken from NCVO (2002) and Bundesarbeitsgemeinsch-
aft Sozialmarketing (2002). Figure for the Netherlands from Helmich (2003: 161). US dollar values obtained
with annual average exchange rates from the Bank of England website. The definition of donations may not
be the same in each country.
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should result in substantial additions to total donations and that tax incentives, where
not currently in place, could lever further sums.3
Philanthropy can come in-kind as well as cash. Gifts of time—‘volunteering’—are
the most important form to consider. Like charitable gifts in monetary form, voluntary
work is widespread in industrialized countries. In the twelve OECD countries covered
by Salamon et al. (1999), volunteer work was estimated to total over 16 million full-
time equivalent jobs, and to average nearly 7 per cent of all full-time non-agricultural
employment. This too could rise as a result, for example, of the ageing of OECD
countries’ populations and any trend towards early retirement.
But to what extent does development benefit from all this philanthropic effort?
This is the subject of Section 7.2. The answer is mixed. A great deal of phil-
anthropy in rich industrialized countries is aimed at domestic concerns, although
the evidence we have been able to assemble suggests that the picture is not the
same in every country. We discuss how donations for development may vary with
household income, of particular interest given a trend towards greater income inequal-
ity in some industrialized countries. The super-rich are treated as a special case.
Their ranks have recently produced several prominent examples of philanthropy
aimed at international development, notably the large sums given by Bill Gates and
Ted Turner.
The next question is why development may command only a small share of charitable
donations. Until we know this, the way forward for the future remains unclear. This
is dealt with in Section 7.3. The economic literature on philanthropy provides only
limited help and we, therefore, draw on literature on donor behaviour from other
disciplines, notably marketing.
Section 7.4 considers the special case of private donations to the UN agencies, one
group of major players in financing and promoting development. We consider the
particular problems faced by the UN and then focus on the Children’s Fund, United
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). This is by far and away the most successful UN
agency at collecting money from private individuals, raising more than US$350 million
each year (although we highlight the large variation in the per capita amounts among
OECD members). Could UNICEF’s success be emulated by other agencies? And
does the relationship between UNICEF donations and official overseas development
assistance suggest there is a problem of crowding-out?
Future prospects are discussed in Section 7.5. We include measures designed to
promote charitable donations in general, but focus on their particular relevance for
development. We cover the old issue of tax deductions, the new ‘global funds’ (intended
partly to attract money from the super-rich), corporate social responsibility and ‘cause-
related marketing’, the use of the Internet, and long-term donor education. Section 7.6
concludes.
3 For example, a regression of log gifts on log personal income for the US using annual data for 1974–95
given in Clotfelter (1997: table 2) yields an estimated elasticity of 1.12 (SE 0.03). The fact that the estimated
elasticity is greater than one means that gifts can be expected to rise more than proportionately with income.
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Three caveats on the scope of the chapter: first, we include under ‘development’
those donations that go for emergency relief, for example, the alleviation of famine
or the consequences of floods. The long-term impact of donations for emergencies
is clearly different from those for several other causes, for example, education or
vaccine research. Second, we focus much more on giving by households than by
firms. Direct corporate donations to charities are far smaller in aggregate than those
by private individuals and there is no particular reason to believe that they will
expand sharply.4 However, Section 7.5 provides some balance with our discussion
of corporate social responsibility and cause-related marketing. Third, for reasons of
space we concentrate on private donations in rich industrialized countries, ignor-
ing important traditions of domestic charity in developing countries, including
volunteering.5
7.2. DEVELOPMENT’S SHARE OF PHILANTHROPY
Oxfam, an international development charity, raised more voluntary income in 1996
than any other registered UK charity. But if one takes the top thirty fundraising UK
charities in that year, development’s share of their total voluntary income was less than
a quarter.6 Development’s share of private donations in the Netherlands is rather lower,
about 15 per cent (Helmich 2003: 161). The massive philanthropic effort in the United
States seems, on the face of it, to be even more domestically orientated. Less than
2 per cent of total household contributions went to ‘international’ charities in 1999.7
This contrasts with the 60 per cent that went to religious organizations although, as we
illustrate below, a slice of this may in fact be furthering international causes, including
development. On the other hand, Germany seems to be a country where a large share
of charitable donations go to fund overseas development, but we do not know whether
the situation there is more representative of other OECD countries than that in the
United Kingdom or the Netherlands. Almost three-quarters of total donations to the
4 Corporate donations in the United States to all causes totalled US$9 billion in 1998, far below the
US$135 billion of households (Andreoni 2001). Similarly, donations by firms in the UK in 2000/1 are
estimated to have been only £286 million compared to some £6 billion from households (Charities Aid
Foundation Briefing Paper March 2003).
5 For example, the giving of alms to the needy in one’s own society, the practice of zakat, is one of the
five main tenets of Islam. (Zakat should normally be paid at the rate of 2.5 per cent of annual income.) On
volunteering, the Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project at Johns Hopkins University has produced several
papers on developing countries that include this form of giving. (The border-line between ‘volunteering’
and inter-household transfers of time is a hazy one—helping family and neighbours is clearly very common
in all cultures.)
6 Pharoah and Tanner (1997) list the top thirty fundraising charities in 1996 by name of which we have
classified as ‘development’ the following: Oxfam, Red Cross, Save the Children, Actionaid, Christian Aid,
The Tear Fund, and WWWF. These seven charities’ voluntary income amounted to 23% of the total.
7 Sourced from www.independentsector.org/GandV/s_hous2.htm.
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sixteen German charities with the highest volume of gifts in 2000 were to what can be
classified broadly as development charities.8,9
Tastes for international development may, therefore, vary from country to country
as far as cash giving is concerned. Turning to volunteering however, the picture right
across the industrialized countries is one in which the great bulk of the labour involved
does not benefit international development charities.10 This comes as little surprise,
given that voluntary labour must typically be used domestically.11
The situation where development’s share is low might, paradoxically, seem encour-
aging for the future. The argument would run as follows. The evidence shows there
to be a great deal of philanthropy. Some of this could be shifted towards development
and away from the causes to which it is currently directed. Private donations for devel-
opment could, therefore, rise very substantially without households having to give any
more time or money in total. Imagine that households adopt a two-stage budgeting
process, first deciding on total allocations of time and money to charity and then decid-
ing how to divide those allocations between different causes. The job, it would seem,
is to influence the second-stage allocation. To date, economists have tended to look
only at the results of the first-stage allocation—at total donations. Theoretical models
of philanthropic behaviour do not identify motives for gifts to particular causes, and
empirical models of giving are estimated on data that measure just total gifts. But richer
data could be collected and insight gained into how donations could be shifted away
from domestic causes and towards development assistance.
But there is little reason to believe that households do allocate their time and money
to charity in this way. Gifts to one cause may not represent resources that can be
competed away by another. We have no direct evidence to cite on this issue, but simple
reflection on why people may donate to some specific named charities provides food
for thought. Table 7.1 shows the total annual income from all sources of several UK
development charities, both large and small, together with examples of charities serving
other causes that have similar income levels.
8 Eleven of the sixteen can be classified as development charities and their donations sum to 72% of the
total. We are grateful to Sylke Schnepf for this estimate. (Source as in footnote 3, although this source also
cites an earlier estimate by the Deutschen Spendeninstitus Krefeld that 75% of donations go to ‘national
projects’.)
9 Anheier and List (2000) attempt to bring together data for the mid-1990s on cross-border philanthropy
for the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan. Definitions vary substantially but broadly
speaking, their results suggest that private sector giving for development as the final cause was at the level
of about US$1–2 billion per year in the United States, US$1.5 billion in Germany, about US$1 billion in
the United Kingdom, and well less than these levels in Japan.
10 We base this conclusion on the data in Salamon et al. (1999) and Salamon and Sokolowski (2001).
The categories the authors use for ‘development’ and ‘international’ are probably too broad and narrow
respectively for our purposes.
11 Schemes also exist to transfer gifts in-kind in physical form to developing countries, for example,
old sewing machines and other tools (e.g. see www.findit.co.uk/charities/519568.htm). However, there
are obvious limits to this form of philanthropy. Transport costs may be excessive, many goods would be
inappropriate for the local setting, and there is the risk of undermining local production. This could be a
useful form for some corporate donations however, for example, medical supplies.
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Table 7.1. Examples of UK charities
Development charity Income
(£s, m)
Other charity Cause Income
(£s, m)
Oxfam 187 The National Trust Architecture & landscape 188
Red Cross 138 Barnado’s Children 125
Save the Children 116 Imperial Cancer Health 122
Action Aid 62 RSPCA Animal welfare 65
Catholic Agency for
International Development
40 Guide Dogs for
the Blind
Blind people 38
UNICEF 28 Shelter The homeless 27
Sightsavers International 14 NACRO Former criminal
offenders
13
Notes: Income is for 2000 and from all sources, including government grants, contributions from other
charities, donations from firms, investment income and the proceeds of trading, as well as gifts and legacies
from private individuals.
Source: Charity Commission on-line register.
Non-development charities cover many causes of which the table illustrates just
some of the main ones. The examples in the table include cases where it is possible to
imagine development charities being able to compete away part of the funding (although
whether that would be desirable for human welfare overall requires a value judgement
that we do not make here). Charities working for children in the developing world such
as Save the Children and UNICEF might view Barnado’s income as money that could
in principle come their way. Sightsavers International might consider the resources of
Guide Dogs for the Blind in the same light. But money given to the National Trust
for the preservation of Britain’s architectural heritage and landscape does not seem an
obvious target for a development charity. Similarly, the large sums of money given for
animal welfare in the United Kingdom may be hard to shift to the cause of human
welfare in developing countries.12
The table also illustrates the difficulties in classifying charities and hence in meas-
uring how much philanthropy is directed towards overseas development. We have
labelled both the Red Cross and Save the Children as development charities, but both
have programmes in the United Kingdom, with the Red Cross being particularly
12 We suspect that animal welfare charities may do particularly well in the United Kingdom compared
with those in other countries. Among charities with incomes in excess of £10 million in 2000, total income
of obvious animal charities came to about £250 million (including £17 million for the Cats’ Protection
League, £13 million for the Donkey Sanctuary, and £10 million for Battersea Dogs’ Home). (Our analysis
of information from the Charity Commission register.)
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active.13 The Catholic Agency for International Development (the English and Welsh
arm of Caritas Internationalis) is clearly a religious charity in one sense and we suspect
that in some classifications it would be labelled as such, despite its activity being firmly
in the field of development. Similarly, Save the Children and UNICEF could obviously
be labelled as children’s charities.14
Another implication of recognizing that people give to a wide variety of types of
charity is that the estimates of the response of total giving to changes in incomes and
prices from the empirical literature on the economics of philanthropy may not be very
useful in providing guidance into how donations for development will respond to future
changes in real income or tax treatment. Estimates vary considerably but a figure of 0.8
to 1.0 for the income ‘elasticity’ of total donations is perhaps broadly representative
(Clotfelter 1997; see also footnote 4). An elasticity of 1.0 implies that donations rise
proportionately with income. However, if charity indeed ‘begins at home’, and then
extends elsewhere, perhaps donations to fund development are a luxury in economic
terms, implying that donations rise more than proportionately with income. This
would mean a strong response of donations for development to rising incomes in the
future. The economic literature alas seems silent on this issue. It should also be noted
that the great bulk of empirical studies are from the United States and behavioural
response to income may be different in other countries. (We discuss price elasticities in
Section 7.5.) The notion of donations for development as a luxury would be consistent
with the rise of international development charities as a largely post-Second World
War phenomenon, something underlined by Mullin (2002) in the case of the United
Kingdom.15
The picture for total gifts, at least from US and UK data, seems to be that the rich
and the poor give higher proportions of their income than those on middle incomes.
This means that richer households provide the lion’s share of charitable donations. For
example, the one-in-seven American households with incomes of US$75,000 or more in
1996 provided about half of total contributions (Clotfelter 1997: table 3). In the United
Kingdom, persons giving more than £50 per month—‘elite donors’ in UK charity
parlance—represent just one in twelve of all persons who give, but their donations
make up nearly 60 per cent of the total; elite donors are concentrated in higher social
classes (NCVO 2002). Any greater propensity of the rich to donate means that there
is a silver lining to the cloud of sharply higher income inequality in recent years in the
United States and the United Kingdom (trends in other countries are less clear). The
share of the top 1 per cent in the United States rose from about 9 to 15 per cent of
13 The Red Cross spent £47 million in 2001 on ‘UK services’ and £70 million abroad. Save the Children
spent about £7.5 million on UK programmes from its total programme expenditure of £90 million. Oxfam
also has a small UK programme, spending less than £1 million in 2001. (Information taken from annual
reports available at www.redcross.org.uk, www.scfuk.org.uk and www.oxfam.org.uk.)
14 The UK survey drawn in footnote 3 shows 13% of donations going to ‘children and young people’
with ‘overseas relief ’ and ‘disaster relief ’ receiving just 12%. We do not know how Save the Children and
UNICEF were treated in this classification.
15 A different explanation in the case of the United Kingdom is that the rise coincided with the end of
the empire and tapped into some of the same motives that led people to work in colonial administration.
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gross personal income between the mid-1980s and late 1990s and from about 6 to
10 per cent in the United Kingdom (Atkinson 2002; Piketty and Saez 2003).
The case of the super-rich deserves special attention. Many large charitable founda-
tions in existence today are the result of a gift by a very rich individual in the past.
While the activities of a foundation are constrained by the original donor’s wishes,
boards of trustees may be able to interpret their trust deeds in ways that give them
a wide scope. This form of philanthropy typically has a firmly domestic concern in
the United States. For example, only US$1 billion of the 11 billion total given by US
foundations in 1994 was devoted to ‘international activities’, including those that do
not fund development in poorer countries (Anheier and List 2000: 108). However,
large foundations such as Ford and Rockefeller clearly do have development concerns.
With Rockefeller they have always been there, the trustees being charged to further
‘the well-being of mankind throughout the world’. Ford, on the other hand, acted as a
local philanthropy in Michigan from its founding in 1936 until 1950. The foundation
now has thirteen offices outside the United States: in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and
Russia. The Soros Foundations, a recent creation, have been prominent in the former
Soviet bloc countries in the 1990s.
Two prominent examples come from the United States in recent years of founda-
tions that have been established to finance aspects of international development. The
UN Foundation was set up in 1997 by Ted Turner with a promised endowment of
US$1 billion, about equivalent to the annual budget at that time of the UN Chil-
dren’s Fund, UNICEF. The Foundation works exclusively through UN agencies and
provides funds in four areas: (i) children’s health, (ii) the environment, (iii) peace,
security and human rights, and (iv) women and population. The Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, established in 2000, has a much weaker relationship with the UN as
we will explain later in the chapter—and a much larger budget following an endowment
of about US$24 billion. (To give a point of reference, the Ford Foundation’s assets are
currently about US$10 billion and the Rockefeller’s US$2.6 billion.) This is clearly
an absolutely vast sum of money for one individual to give to good causes, although in
fact it represents less than a fifth of what all US households give to charity every year.
Global health is one of the foundations’ four areas of activity and as of June 2003, this
had accounted for just over £3 billion in grants, or about half the total of all grants to
that date.16 The expenditure on health is focused on the prevention of transmission
of HIV in developing countries and the search for vaccines to combat AIDS, malaria,
and tuberculosis.
7.3. WHY DO PEOPLE GIVE—OR NOT GIVE—TO
DEVELOPMENT?
The economic literature on philanthropy has not typically sought to explain donations
to different causes, as we have already noted. Nor has it focused much on the demand
16 The Gates Foundation’s other concerns are domestic US causes relating to education, libraries and
the US Pacific North–West. See www.gatesfoundation.org.
Private Donations 139
side of the market—it has been the behaviour of donors rather than the actions of
different charities that has been the subject of attention.17 The behaviour of charit-
able organizations in trying to attract funds to their particular causes is important to
understand and, obviously, this behaviour is revealing about how the demand side of
the market actually perceives donor motives in relation to different aims.
The motives for giving identified in the economic literature include (i) altruism,
(ii) the ‘warm glow’ obtained from the act of giving, (iii) the receipt of material benefit
in return for the gift, and (iv) simple morality.18 To some extent, these are useful in
helping understand development’s share of charitable donations. Material benefit is
a clear motive for donation to some domestic charities. For example, giving to the
National Trust in the United Kingdom in the form of a subscription to membership
gives free access to a large number of stately homes and landscaped gardens. It is not
easy for a development charity to match such an offer. On the other hand, higher-order
morality may generate more funds for development than for dogs’ homes. Altruism
could lead donations to be skewed towards places where living standards are lowest in
order to get more ‘bang for the buck’ (development charities are quick to emphasize
the very low cost in Western terms of many of their interventions). Charities try to
generate ‘warm glow’ through such measures as sponsoring a child.
The marketing literature, as applied to charitable giving, provides more insight
on both motives for donors and the behaviour of charities. We draw on the review
in Sargeant (1999) who considers the insights from clinical psychology, social psy-
chology, anthropology, and sociology as well as economics. In trying to apply these
insights to the case of development we do not tailor our comments to particu-
lar countries, but the apparent variation in development’s share of total donations
discussed in Section 7.2 suggests that no common explanation exists across the
OECD area. Giving for international development must in part have specific national
determinants.
The marketing literature provides a quick answer to why ‘development’ charities
exist at all, rather than general-purpose charities that aim to help the poor wherever they
may be. A positive response from individuals to charities’ efforts to solicit contributions
is helped by branding and by a clear projection by a charity of its brand identity.
Potential contributors want a firm picture of the cause they are being asked to give
in aid of, and the brands they will be attracted to are those that are well-known and
trusted.
Individuals’ reaction to the ‘ask’ (which may come in a variety of forms) depends on
various factors, including the portrayal of the individuals in need, the fit of the charity
with a donor’s self image, and the degree of perceptual noise (whether competition
from other charities so confuses the donor that a lower level of total contributions
results).
17 Andreoni (1998) is a rare exception.
18 This listing follows the summary in Clotfelter (1997). The first three motives are consistent with
utility-maximization. Vickery (1962) and Boulding (1962) mention most of the motives that economists
have subsequently considered.
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The stimulus to the individual to donate is believed to be stronger the more urgent
the need can be demonstrated to be and the greater the degree of personal link that the
donor feels with the (eventual) recipient. The cause of long-term development does
not score well on either factor. A criterion of urgency obviously works in favour of
appeals for disaster relief in developing countries following, for example, a flood or a
famine. But by definition the achievement by 2015 of the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) hardly seems an urgent task. Similarly, long-term development suffers
in the competition for funds due to many donors’ desire to support short-term need
for a fairly narrow section of the community, factors that encourage donors to feel that
their relatively small contribution can make a real and immediate difference. In many
areas of development, however, need is typically persistent and very widespread.
One question here is how attitudes to urgency and duration of need vary across the
income distribution and by level of education. Higher socioeconomic status appears to
be associated with a greater willingness to give for longer-term causes. The Gates and
UN (i.e. Turner) Foundations would certainly seem to reflect this. But a longer-term
view may not necessarily help international causes. US data for 1973 show high-income
philanthropists (those with incomes of over US$0.7 million in 2003 terms) giving a
quarter of their donations to education, compared to only 1 per cent for those under
US$80,000 in current-day prices (Clotfelter 1997: table 5). But the vast majority of
this was almost certainly to benefit domestic causes, for example, alumni donations
to the alma mater. More research is needed on how giving for development varies by
income level.
Another factor found to favour donations is the existence of a sense of personal
contact with the beneficiary. This must have been in Adam Smith’s mind when he
wrote the words in the quotation at the start of the chapter: giving alms to the local
poor in the past would typically have meant that one saw the impact on welfare achieved
by the gift.19 Some donations of cash may continue to reflect personal contact in the
modern age. This is most obvious in the case of donations to local causes—again
development misses out—but it can be found in other situations too.20 For example, the
huge funds raised for cancer research and for the relief of those with cancer presumably
reflect the importance of cancer as a cause of death in rich industrialized countries.
Cancer sufferers and relatives of sufferers are obvious potential donors, as indeed
is the population as a whole—everyone is a potential sufferer with a non-negligible
probability, such is the sheer prevalence of different forms of this disease in OECD
countries.21 But fighting HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis—diseases so prevalent in the
south—seems much more remote.
19 Conniff (2003: 102) writes of the Duchess of Marlborough visiting the homes of poor families near
Blenheim Palace to distribute leftover food.
20 The network of about 1400 United Way organizations in the United States expressly raise money for
local purposes (to the tune of about US$4 billion per year).
21 The website of Cancer Research UK notes prominently that ‘more than one in three of us will develop
cancer at some point. Few of us go through life without coming into contact with the disease in some
way—either through personal experience or through that of a friend or family member’.
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Development charities sometimes find ways of introducing personal contact between
the donor and the needy. Charities that enable the donor to sponsor a child’s education
are one example. (We have already noted the ‘warm glow’ that this may generate.) This
also scores highly on the criterion of meeting long-term need and may appeal especially
to educated higher-income donors. However, such schemes are not without their critics.
They risk creating inequalities within families and within local communities, and they
may perpetuate a patriarchal relationship between North and South.
What about motives for giving in-kind? A lot of volunteering provides personal
contact with the recipient, but typically this will only be the case when the gift of
time benefits a local cause. An exception is when a person volunteers to go and work
in a developing country, organized for example by the US Peace Corps, the UK
charity Voluntary Service Overseas, or UN Volunteers. However, the opportunities for
doing this are obviously limited and the commitment of time is huge compared to that
involved with most local volunteering.
The final motive to consider, identified in both the economic and marketing liter-
atures on philanthropy, is the notion of obtaining visibility or standing in one’s social
group or in society at large. This may be particularly important for super-rich donors.
(Think of all the foundations named after their benefactors.) As we have emphas-
ized earlier, the motives and donor behaviour of the extreme upper tail of the income
distribution need special treatment, and the very rich have indeed been the subject
of considerable attention. Lundberg, in his 1960s investigation of The Rich and the
Super-Rich, argued that ‘the founding of foundations has the effect of altering opinion
in an unsophisticated population, turning the supposed bad guy into a supposed good
guy’ (1968: 467–8). Conniff, in his recent Natural History of the Rich, argues for a
more direct motive, reporting Ted Turner as saying ‘the more good I do, the more the
money has come in’ (2003: 104). On this view, improving one’s standing in society by
a spectacularly large gift can have very positive effects for the donor.
The different motives and behaviour of the super-rich have clear potential for
generating additional resources for development. Compared to small-scale donors,
who may favour a local or national cause with which they can easily identify, the
super-rich may be more likely to seek a global cause with a global stage as a return
for their generosity—the chance to be seen worldwide as a benefactor of mankind.
(This can be thought of as a material benefit that cannot be bought by smaller-scale
donations.) Of course, this is unlikely to be their only motive. Notions of civic respons-
ibility figure highly in the behaviour of some of the super-rich (the ‘simple morality’
listed at the start of this section), as may the idea that their money could really help
overcome the immense challenges posed by human development in poor countries. (In
this, the super-rich donor may simply be mirroring on a large scale the desire of the
low-income donor to make a difference, which we argue above works against giving
for long-term development.) This is not to argue that the super-rich will always favour
international development in their philanthropic behaviour (and the evidence is clearly
to the contrary) but it does mean that there may be significantly greater potential for
international development to benefit from the behaviour of the super-rich than from
the average donor.
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However, there are also many aspects of development activity and the working
systems of development agencies that discourage the wealthy potential donor. The
super-rich will demand a high degree of accountability and feedback on how their
money is used. They may also seek a high degree of involvement with the causes
selected for support—they are rarely passive donors. Large intergovernmental bod-
ies and international non-governmental organizaions (NGOs) have great difficulty
delivering on both these requirements. Complex and decentralized systems of pro-
gramme delivery make the right kind of specific and individualized feedback almost
impossible. Governance structures may not permit the level of involvement that is
sought. In Section 7.5, we describe the ‘global funds’ that have been set up by the G8
governments with the express purpose of brokering funds for development from the
super-rich and other large donors. This has been done in a way that is intended to
surmount problems of a lack of donor confidence.
To summarize: a range of motives affect philanthropic behaviour, and a consideration
of the factors at play in donor decisionmaking helps one understand why the cause of
development struggles at times to compete. Factors like scale and persistence of need,
empathy and relationship to recipient do not work in favour of development. However,
the possible motives of the super-rich provide some encouragement, although there
are practical constraints here that need to be overcome.
7.4. GIVING TO THE UN
Why does the UN need money from private individuals at all—surely it receives its
money from government contributions according to formulae that are laid down in
international treaties? This is a misconception of the UN’s organization and finances.
The development activities of the UN take place through its autonomous agencies—the
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Development Programme (UNDP), the World Food
Programme (WFP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health
Organization (WHO), the Population Fund (UNFPA), and so on.22 These agencies
are not ‘formula-funded’ and each relies on voluntary contributions. The contributions
come mainly from governments, but private individuals are another potential source.
What attractions do the UN agencies present to private donors? On the one hand,
they may be seen as able to work with and maybe influence governments in ways that
charities cannot. Their status as ‘international organizations’ and their senior staff ’s
status as diplomats help in this respect. For the same reason, they may be able to convey
more status on the large-scale donor. These are presumably the factors that led Ted
Turner to give US$1 billion to the UN rather than to a large international charity.23
However, the money was not given directly to the UN’s development agencies but
22 Technically the UN has agencies, funds, and programmes, each of which has slightly different status.
We term all of them here as ‘agencies’.
23 The UN Foundation’s website argues that ‘Mr Turner chose the United Nations as the
vehicle for his global gift because the UN alone provides the machinery to help find solu-
tions to international challenges, and to deal with pressing concerns facing people everywhere’
(www.unfoundation.org/about/about_overview.htm).
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was used to set-up the UN Foundation, which then makes grants to UN agencies for
specific projects within the Foundation’s areas of interest. The Foundation’s website
notes that Turner chose the president of the board of directors and that he is also a
member of the board himself.
The perceived power of the UN may encourage small-scale donors as well. However,
as with large donors, perceptions of waste and bloated bureaucracy need to be overcome.
Unlike Turner, the small donor cannot set up his or her own foundation and appoint
its board to control where the money goes, although anyone in fact is free to contribute
to the UN Foundation (via the Internet) and benefit from its independence from the
agencies’ control.24 And ‘brand’ is likely to be more important for the small donor who
may have difficulty in perceiving what the UN and its aims are, even at the level of the
individual agency.
The problems of the UN in raising money from the household sector are underlined
by considering the essentials of the process of private fundraising: selling ‘concep-
tual goods’ and interpreting a donor country’s local culture in a way that helps
sales. This requires the fundraiser to be closely in touch with the local market. But
the UN and other international agencies exist outside of national structures, in the
world of international civil service and intergovernmental relationships. Inevitably,
this makes them out of touch with national societies from which they might raise
money.
The implication is that, if UN agencies are to raise funds from households (and
firms) at the national level, then they must have a national presence at the coun-
try level to do the job. The only agency with this in place is the Children’s Fund,
UNICEF, which has a system of ‘national committees’ in thirty-seven countries. These
committees are not local branches of the UN agency. Rather, they are fully autonom-
ous national charities that are in effect franchized by UNICEF to use the name and
logo of the agency in order to raise money on its behalf. The national committees
are able to pitch their fundraising in line with local custom (e.g. children help the
US committee to raise money through ‘trick or treat’ at Halloween). As they are
national charities, donations to the committees qualify for income tax deductions in
countries where there is tax deductibility of charitable gifts, overcoming one of the
problems that is present in cross-border philanthropy. UNICEF is, indeed, the only
part of the UN to raise substantial sums of money from private individuals (leaving aside
the money donated by Ted Turner). The national committees raised some US$380
million in 2001, net of administration costs, or about one-third of UNICEF’s annual
budget.25
The varying degree of success with which the national committees (‘natcoms’
in UNICEF parlance) raise money is illustrated in Figs 7.1 and 7.2. The analysis
is restricted to the twenty-two committees in countries that are members of the
24 See www.unfoundation.org/donate/donate.htm.
25 By this we mean that the national committees transferred about US$380 million to UNICEF headquar-
ters after taking into account all local expenditures on fundraising and administration (UNICEF Annual
Report 2001). The amounts shown in Figs 7.1 and 7.2 refer to the same definition.






































Figure 7.1. UNICEF national committee contribution and national income, 2001
(US$ per capita)
Source: UNICEF Annual Report 2002 and World Bank (2003). The figure for New Zealand
natcom contribution is for 2002 and was kindly provided by the natcom itself (the UNICEF






































Figure 7.2. UNICEF national committee contribution and official ODA, 2001
(US$ per capita)
Source: UNICEF Annual Report 2002 and OECD DAC website. See sources for Fig. 7.1
on the New Zealand natcom contribution.
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OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC).26 Figure 7.1 plots the natcom
contribution to UNICEF’s funds in 2001 against national income, while Fig. 7.2 shows
how this contribution varies with each country’s level of official ODA, as measured by
the DAC. All amounts are shown in US dollars per capita. The natcom contributions
include resources raised from all sources except governments and hence include profits
from trading (e.g. greeting card sales) and corporate (cash) contributions, but private
donations should dominate the totals.
The range of natcom contributions is huge—from 9 cents per capita in New Zealand
to nearly $4 in Luxembourg. These extremes and the Netherlands and Switzerland
aside, other countries raised between 15 and 75 cents per capita. On average people
in richer countries do give more to UNICEF than people in poorer countries. The
elasticity estimated from the data implies that a 10 per cent increase in national income
leads to a 10 per cent increase in giving, but the relationship is not well determined.27
The natcoms’ success in raising funds must depend in addition on various other factors,
including national tastes for donating for development, competition from other child
and development charities, and the size and professionalism of the natcoms’ staff. For
example, contributions to UNICEF and to Save the Children may be viewed by donors
as close substitutes in countries where the latter organization is present.
One possibility is that private donations to natcoms are crowded-out by government
contributions to UNICEF, households withholding their contributions in the face
of government donations derived from their taxes. This would imply a degree of
sophistication that we do not believe is present in the typical UNICEF donor (the vast
majority of whom must be ignorant of the level of their government’s contribution).
But a negative association between government and private contributions could also
be observed as a result of natcom behaviour, with some natcoms focusing on soliciting
government funds on behalf of UNICEF (these do not enter the natcom figures in the
graphs) rather than going all-out for private donations. In fact, the correlation between
natcom contributions and government contributions to UNICEF turns out to be zero.
Figure 7.2 looks at what is probably a more interesting relationship—the association
between the natcom contributions and total government ODA (official development
assistance). Private individuals should be more aware of their government’s over-
all stance on overseas assistance than they are of government contributions to just
UNICEF. There seems no obvious picture of crowding-out, and if anything the oppos-
ite. Natcom contributions are higher where ODA is higher.28 Three Scandinavian
countries are exceptions to the rule, with much lower natcom contributions than one
would expect, given their levels of ODA. But these are all countries in which Save the
Children is very active, raising much more money than UNICEF.
26 These twenty-two committees account for over 95% of funds raised. The committees not included in
Figs 7.1 and 7.2 are those in Central and Eastern European countries, Hong Kong, South Korea, Andorra,
and San Marino.
27 A regression of log natcom contribution on log GNI (gross national income) yields a slope coefficient
of 0.97 with a standard error of 0.49 and a r-squared of 0.17.
28 The correlation between log natcom contribution and log ODA is 0.47. (A regression of the former on
the latter yields a slope parameter of 0.51 with standard error 0.21.)
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Could other UN agencies emulate UNICEF and develop networks of national com-
mittees to collect funds? We do not see this as very feasible (although UNHCR is
making moves in this direction). UNICEF’s natcoms have three advantages: (i) chil-
dren are a natural selling point; (ii) UNICEF is perceived as an agency that ‘does’
things (and the great majority of its staff do indeed work in developing countries rather
than in New York or regional headquarters); and (iii) its history as a post-Second World
War emergency relief organization in Western Europe.29 Some of these are shared by
other agencies, but the combination is probably unique.
7.5. SOME POSSIBLE WAYS FORWARD
Ways forward for increasing private donations for international development need to
neutralize the limiting factors we have identified in earlier sections and to exploit what
few advantages development may have in attracting funds. We do not attempt to list
all possible ways for raising more donations of money or time. Rather, our purpose is
to cover several areas that seem worthy of more thought or where prospects may be
particularly encouraging.
7.5.1. Tax Incentives to Donors
We start with an old issue—the tax incentives for charitable giving. These have been
the subject of intense investigation by economists since Vickery (1962) drew attention
to the anomalous state of the treatment of donations in the United States. In contrast
to other initiatives that try to change underlying attitudes towards giving, the aim here
can be seen as more limited: to change individuals’ budget constraints and in so doing
stimulate more donations conditional on their existing preferences.
What is the particular angle here for development finance? First, in countries where
charitable contributions do not benefit from deductibility for income tax purposes,
development would share in the increased philanthropy that a more favourable tax
treatment could induce. (The United Kingdom is an example of a country that has
recently introduced a much more favourable tax treatment of donations.) There appears
to be no special development angle in this case. But we have noted the absence of
econometric estimates of the price elasticity of donations by cause. It is possible that
donations to development are more price elastic than donations to other causes. And
with a progressive income tax, development will benefit more from deductibility than
other causes if the rich have a greater propensity to give for the needy in other countries,
since the price of giving falls as an individual’s marginal tax rate rises.
Second, governments could give more favourable tax treatment to donations to
development. After all, the case for any donation attracting a deduction depends in part
on whether it is aimed at furthering social objectives (e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980:
568). One could argue that governments have signed up to the MDGs in a way that
29 The Italian UNICEF natcom website notes the number of Italian women and children helped by
UNICEF in the late 1940s.
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they have not to the aims of many domestic charities. There would be administrative
difficulties in defining a qualifying donation. Charities could be classified as eligible
according to a criterion of, for example, the share of expenditure directed to developing
countries. Not only should this stimulate more donations to such charities, but it
would provide an incentive to other charities to spend money abroad so as to satisfy
the rules on qualification.30 That such a scheme is feasible in practice is demonstrated
by an example from the United Kingdom, in operation during 1998–2000 prior to the
extension of tax deductibility to donations to all causes. To qualify, donations had to
be to UK charities running projects in the areas of health, education, or poverty-relief
in eighty countries eligible for IDA/IBRD funding from the World Bank.31
The case for tax deductions has always been seen to rest as well on the size of the
price elasticity. With an elasticity greater than one in absolute size, the additional
contributions induced by the tax deduction outweigh the loss in government revenue
that the tax deduction implies. In this case, tax deductibility is an efficient way of
channelling resources to good causes, compared to a situation where no deduction is
given. Private individuals are induced to give more to charity by an extent that exceeds
the amount of foregone tax revenue the government could have contributed to charities
in the absence of the deduction. Curiously, there seems no mention of this in the case
made for the recent tax changes in the United Kingdom, where the arguments seem
based more on the notion of stimulating a culture of giving, that is, changing underlying
attitudes (HM Treasury and Home Office 2002). Put optimistically, if ‘herd behaviour’
to donate more is induced as a result of just some individuals responding to the tax
incentive, the long-run price elasticity for aggregate donations could exceed unity even
if the individual level short-run elasticities do not.
One means of providing a tax deduction is through employers. This method of
donation has the attraction to fundraisers of ‘locking-in’ the donor, if only due to the
effort required to overcome inertia to discontinue payments once started. ‘Payroll-
giving’ is widespread in the United States. By contrast, it is at a much lower level
in the United Kingdom, for example, only 20 per cent of employees have access to
a payroll-giving scheme and only about 2 per cent use it, a take-up rate of around
10 per cent compared to one of 35 per cent in the United States (HM Treasury and
Home Office 2002: para 2.12; CAF Research 2003). Organizing payroll-giving schemes
may also be seen as an example of ‘corporate social responsibility’ (see below).
7.5.2. The Super-rich and the Global Funds
Funds from the super-rich need to be attracted in ways that provide accountability and
visibility for the donor. Setting up the UN Foundation was the route chosen by Ted
Turner. But money from Bill Gates and others has been tempted into ‘global funds’.
30 Inducing domestic charities to take on a more international role might seem only a good thing: but
the change would threaten their brand identity and hence their donations, as well as create substantial
administrative costs as domestic charities sought international partners.
31 The scheme was known as Millennium Gift Aid. See Inland Revenue Press Release 111/98 31 July
1998 (www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/news/press.htm).
148 J. Micklewright and A. Wright
These have been set-up in the last few years with the express purpose of raising money
from governments, private individuals, and the corporate sector in a way that avoids
all these potential contributors’ concerns with traditional ways of giving large sums of
money to development, for example, direct to UN agencies. The funds, well described
by Clunies-Ross (2003), include the Vaccine Fund/Global Alliance for Vaccines and
Immunization (GAVI), the International Aids Vaccine Initiative (IAVI) and the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. But as the names indicate, these
funds are exclusively in the area of health—there is no global fund to fight illiteracy,
for example. Health seems especially attractive to a large donor looking for a problem
that can be solved by funding a ‘technical’ solution.
A natural reaction when thinking of the super-rich is to look to the United States,
as we have done in earlier sections of the chapter. But other countries also have many
very rich people, including some where we have seen a greater propensity among the
population at large to donate to development. Germany has the largest number of
billionaires outside the United States. Next comes Japan. Perhaps these are countries
where the super-rich need more courting. Surprisingly, after Germany, the European
country with the highest number of billionaires is Russia where most of them made
their fortunes in the 1990s by buying up the state oil industry when it was privatized.32
Important as the global funds are, the job in capturing some of the wealth of the
super-rich for international development is not just one of devising a suitable vehicle
to receive it. The wealth needs to be actively courted wherever it exists.
One hope is that the super-rich may compete for attention in their gifts so that imi-
tative behaviour results in positive spillovers. Conniff (2003) argues that Ted Turner’s
gift helped prod Bill Gates into action.
7.5.3. New Forms of Corporate Giving
We noted in the Introduction that cash donations by corporations to charitable causes
are minor compared to those by households and they seem likely to stay that way, at
least in the form that they have often taken in the past. The future of giving by firms
is seen by many to be in two areas: ‘cause-related marketing’, which started in earnest
in the 1980s, and ‘corporate social responsibility’, which has attracted a lot of recent
interest. An international development angle can be identified in both cases.
These forms of corporate giving have grown for two main reasons. First, businesses
have recognized that positive use of ethical messages can benefit their brands. Associ-
ating a product with a ‘good cause’ helps sales. The natural choice of good cause for a
multinational firm may be a development charity.
Second, firms are increasingly aware that their reputation for social responsibility—
in broad terms—is an important asset, to be developed and maintained from their
core budgets rather than from a peripheral benevolence fund. Seventy per cent of
people interviewed in a poll conducted in twelve European countries in 2000 said
32 See www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/learningenglish/news/words/business/030228_witn.shtml and
www.forbes.com/free_forbes/2003/0317/087.html.
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that a company’s commitment to social responsibility was important to them when
buying a product or service and around half said they would be willing to pay more
for products that are environmentally and socially responsible.33 Global corporations
working in developing countries have realized that they have to be particularly careful
in this regard. There is now greater awareness among the public in rich countries of
their activities and their employees’ working conditions due to various factors including
investigative journalism and improvements in communications via the Internet.
Multinationals have always had an interest in improving the education, health, and
other aspects of the living standards of their developing country workforces, although
this may have been muted when their demand was largely for unskilled labour that
was in abundant supply. This interest now works in constructive combination with
the public pressure that companies increasingly feel from their customer base in rich
countries. Customers and the media are now much more sensitive to issues around the
exploitation of labour by multinationals, for example, the alleged use in the past of
child workers by Nike and Gap.
Cause-related marketing is ‘a commercial activity by which businesses and charities
or causes form a partnership with each other to market an image, product or service for
mutual benefit’ (Business in the Community 2002). Carrying a charity logo or associat-
ing with a charity in some other way is simply another form of product differentiation
under imperfect competition. And buying products and services with these logos or
other association is argued to be an ‘easy, quick and efficient method for consumers
to support charities and good causes whilst going about their daily routine’ (Business
in the Community 2002). Some might argue that it is too quick and easy—with the
‘warm glow’ of donation emphasized in the economic theory of philanthropy coming
for too small an effort (i.e. the cost of purchase to the consumer of the warm-glow is
made too small).34
The sums that are currently raised for international development by cause-related
marketing are unclear. In the United Kingdom, Business in the Community has iden-
tified over £30 million for all causes during 2001 (not including the value of the
advertising achieved in the process for the charities concerned). But the top ten char-
ities that benefited are all domestic in purpose. This presumably reflects companies’
perceptions that most people want to help domestic rather than international causes,
as we have seen earlier to be the case with households’ cash donations. One interna-
tional example expressly benefiting development is the Change for Good scheme in
which international airlines collect leftover coins and notes for UNICEF from their
passengers. This has raised US$44 million since 1991 (UNICEF 2003: 31).
33 See www.mori.com/pubinfo/pdf/csrupdate.pdf. The same source contains examples of cor-
porate executives’ responses to surveys in which they recognize the consumer concern. See also
www2.bitc.org.uk/resources/research/statbank.
34 Cause-related marketing illustrates the fact that corporate and household sector giving are not always
separable—this is giving that results from the combined action of individuals and firms. This includes
situations where the firm donates following a private individual’s action, as is the case for example with the
Hunger Site, and those where the individual donates within a framework organized by a firm, as in Change
for Good.
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‘Corporate social responsibility’ could cover a very wide range of possible activ-
ities and many firms, including multinationals working in developing countries,
now express an open commitment to behaviour that would seem encouraging for
the cause of international development. (See, for example, the ‘business principles’
listed on the Shell website.)35 However, the interpretation of what this implies needs
leadership within the development arena so as to maximize the return from the appar-
ent willingness to act. Capacity is also needed at the local level within developing
countries.
One example of global leadership is the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition
(GAIN), which establishes national food fortification networks. GAIN operates as a
power broker to get the multinational food companies to adopt goals that local and
national companies actually set and share. The aim in effect is to lock a multinational
corporation into a national plan that is beyond its own goals.
The cynic might argue that a cover of ‘social responsibility’ may allow corporations
to interpret development policy in the way that suits them best and such fears may
be natural in view of past exploitation. However, we tend towards the pragmatic view
that there can be benefits for all if corporations are not treated like the enemy, and
we see this as a largely untapped resource for development with important potential.
While cause-related marketing may generate extra cash to meet the cost of reaching
the MDGs, corporate social responsibility might be seen as reducing that cost.
7.5.4. The Internet
Continued growth in the use of the Internet can benefit development giving in at
least four ways. First, the Internet helps global communication and the provision of
information about the needs of developing countries. (An example is OneWorld.net.)
We have noted how this may increase the pressure on firms to act in socially responsible
ways. It should also help development education more broadly (see below).
Second, online giving is an additional method of delivering a cash donation to a
charity. The effort needed to donate in this way is in general less than that with postal
donations or those made via the telephone. The donor’s transaction costs in the broad
sense are reduced. While online giving benefits all charitable causes (and the same
is true of online charity auctions), international development might arguably benefit
more due to the inherently global nature of the Internet. There is no physical border
to overcome in this form of cross-border giving. For example, we noted earlier that
anyone can donate to the UN Foundation online. On the other hand, residents of
countries with tax-deductibility for charitable donations will typically be unable to
deduct a direct cross-border donation. (The World Food Programme circumvents this
problem for US citizens by directing the donor to the US Friends of the WFP while
35 Available at: www.shell.com/home/Framework?siteId=shellreport2002-en. Under the heading ‘Social
performance’ elsewhere in the website, Shell argues that ‘wherever we work we are part of a local community.
We will constantly look for appropriate ways to contribute to the general wellbeing of the community and
the broader societies that grant our licence to operate’. As part of this, about US$40 million was spent by
individual Shell companies on ‘social investment’ in low- and middle-income countries in 2002.
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the main UNICEF website invites donors to go to the site of their country’s natcom.)
Removing such blocks to cross-border giving would be a useful step, although many
donors may still prefer to give to a domestic branch of an international charity on
grounds of trust.
Third, the Internet also provides another medium for donation of time, through
‘online volunteering’. In this case, an even more obvious constraint to cross-border
giving is removed. The organization NetAid works with UN Volunteers to enable
people in industrialized countries (or indeed anywhere) to contribute their time to work
on development projects from home. NetAid brings together individuals wanting to
volunteer with organizations needing labour.
Fourth, there are the ‘click for good’ websites. The individual clicks on a button and a
sponsoring firm makes a donation to a named charity, typically worth a few US cents.36
This is a form of cause-related marketing and the site itself may in fact be run for profit.
Again, these schemes can benefit all causes but one of the most successful, which is
said to have inspired others, was originally aimed firmly at international development:
the Hunger Site. Visits to the Hunger Site raised US$0.5 million for the World Food
Programme in 1999 and US$2.6 million in 2000—with an average of nearly 8 million
visits per month.37 However, the history of the site also illustrates the shifting nature
of this form of funding. The Hunger Site changed hands in 2001. Funds raised are
now split between two charities working to alleviate hunger—one of them solely in the
United States. The Hunger Site still receives over 3 million visits per month (and the
sister site the Child Health site, which largely benefits the developing world, about
2 million visits) but the amount of food donated in 2002 as a result was less than a third
of that in 2000.38
7.5.5. Donor Education
One long-term objective of the development charities must be to change donor pre-
ferences towards giving for international development (as distinct from lobbying for
changes to their budget constraints via tax deductions or by reducing their transaction
costs via expansion of online donation). The importance of ‘donor education’ has long
been recognized in, for example, the United Kingdom where investment in advocacy
campaigns by the large development charities (e.g. Oxfam, Save the Children, Action
Aid, and the UNICEF Natcom) has been partly justified on these grounds. The hope
is that a sense of global responsibility will be encouraged by educating the public on
the complex inter-relationships between the north and south (including perhaps that
36 Summaries and lists of click for good sites can be found for example at www.quickdonations.com/ and
dir.yahoo.com/society_and_culture/issues_and_causes/philanthropy/free_donations/.
37 Statistics on visits to the Hunger Site and its sister sites are from www.thehungersite.com. The sums
raised for the World Food Programme (WFP) are given in annual reports available from www.wfp.org.
38 Figures for visits refer to 2003. The owners’ more recent Animal Rescue site, devoted to animal welfare
in the United States, became their leader during 2003 with over 3.5 million visits per month. In June 2003
the Hunger Site provided 198 tons of food for people while the Animal Rescue Site provided 530 tons for
animals.
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‘misery breeds hate’) and by challenging the traditional views of charitable giving as
passive handouts from the powerful to the powerless.
Advocacy campaigns by charities are entirely complementary to the aim of changing
public attitudes so as to support higher tax-financed government spending on ODA.
McDonnell et al. (2003: 15) argue that more is being done in OECD countries by
charities to inform the public about development cooperation than is done by gov-
ernments. Not surprisingly, government spending on development information varies
substantially from country to country. While the US government spent less than 1 US
cent per capita in 2001, and several other countries (including Germany, France, Japan
and Italy) spent less than 10 cents, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and
Sweden all spent more than $1 (McDonnell et al. 2003: figure 2). Television is probably
the primary medium through which people receive information about development, so
trends in the amount and content of television coverage are important. In the United
Kingdom, there has been a long-term decline in factual coverage of developing world
issues since the late 1980s.39 Media coverage of developing countries is also reported
to have fallen in Italy (McDonnell et al. 2003: 13).
Investment in ‘education for development’ among young people through the formal
school system has been considered by some to hold particular potential. The belief
is that promoting a change in behaviour among the older generation may be a losing
battle but that young people can be encouraged to see that tackling the extremes of
global inequality is essential for the future survival of the planet. School age children
obviously make only very small contributions to charity but, if their commitment to
global development causes is won, the young are likely to demonstrate great longevity
as donors. And some of them will grow up to hold influence in politics and business and
be able to exert power in favour of development objectives. Investment in educating
(and courting) the super-rich may also be sensible.
7.6. CONCLUSIONS
Faced with an estimated cost each year of US$50 billion for meeting the MDGs, there
is a temptation to dismiss private donations as a marginal source of funding. Even
Ted Turner’s endowment of US$1 billion seems small compared to the extent of the
need, while such sums as the US$4 million per year raised by UNICEF’s Change for
Good may appear tiny. But taken together, the sums currently being given from all
sources, big and small, are substantial. Our ‘back of the envelope’ estimate is about
US$17 billion from the OECD countries for 2001, which may be compared with the
total for their ODA in that year of US$52 billion (although we stress that the former
is a very rough guess while the latter is a fact).40 We have also identified a number
39 This is the conclusion of a series of reports from the Third World and Environmental Broadcasting
Project, 3WE (available at: www.epolitix.com/forum/3we?default.htm).
40 These figures both refer to the DAC countries only. Our figure of US$17 billion for private donations
assumes that the share of national income going to all forms of charity is 0.5% (other than in countries where
we have a better estimate: Germany 0.25%, Netherlands 1.0%, United Kingdom 0.7%, and the United
States 1.5%). We then assume that development gets 15% of these total donations (again with variation
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of possibilities for expansion. Were these to produce an increase of 30 per cent in the
total given for development, then our estimate of the current level of donations implies
that US$5 billion of the estimated US$50 billion needed would be raised. And even
if this total seems relatively minor compared to the need, private donations play an
important psychological role. Individuals’ example may encourage governments to be
more generous.
If private donations stimulate government generosity, then notions of crowding-out
of donations for development by ODA are way off the mark, both in terms of the sign
of the association and the direction of causality. However, this is not something we
have been able to assess properly. (Our data show UNICEF donations and ODA to
be positively correlated, but more investigation is needed, taking donations to other
organizations into account as well.)
Private donations are also likely to be affected by some other forms of development
finance covered in the UNU-WIDER project on Innovative Sources for Development
Finance. In the case of an international lottery, considered by Addison and Chowdhury
(Chapter 8, this volume), the impact might be negative, with lottery ticket purchasers
reducing their direct donations to ‘good causes’. (This possibility was the subject of
much discussion when the United Kingdom introduced a national lottery in the 1990s.)
In the case of remittances, dealt with by Solimano (Chapter 9, this volume), it is more a
question of the dividing line being blurred. Where an individual migrant sends money
to his or her relatives back home, this is clearly a remittance. The status is less clear
for organized donations from associations of the South’s diaspora who are resident
in the North, for example, expatriate Bangladeshi communities.41 Such associations
are structures outside of the main development charities and are an important and
under-researched resource. A migrant may stimulate donations from others as well as
remit to his or her own family.
This leads logically to our final comment: it is important to repeat our warning in
the introduction that the chapter concentrates on donations from the North, to the
exclusion of domestic philanthropy in the South. A complete appraisal of the potential
for private donations to help the funding of the MDGs would clearly cover both North
and South.
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A Global Lottery and a Global
Premium Bond
    . 
8.1. INTRODUCTION
The use of lotteries by national and local/regional governments to raise funds for
public sector and charity projects is now commonplace across the world. In 2001, there
were at least 177 public (national and local government) lotteries in operation, with
combined sales amounting to over US$120 billion (see Table 8.1). Given the scale of the
revenues raised, it is natural to ask whether lotteries could also be used to provide funds
for global development programmes. Proposals to establish a global lottery to fund UN
development activities have circulated since at least the early 1970s. In 1994, Erskine
Childers and Brian Urquhart proposed that: ‘One possibility for income moving more
directly to the UN—but still with government licensing in each country—would
be an annual United Nations Lottery, administered by a special authority under the
Secretary-General’ (Childers and Urquhart 1994: 155). The idea of a global lottery
has recently been given a major impetus by a former President of Finland, Mr Martti
Ahtisaari, together with the Finnish NGO (non-governmental organization), Crisis
Management Initiative (CMI), and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.
In this chapter, we evaluate proposals for a global lottery. We also propose a
complement to the global lottery, namely a global premium bond (which we dub
the ‘global ERNIE’, after the UK’s long-running premium bond scheme). The return
on both a lottery ticket and a premium bond depends on a random prize draw but,
unlike a lottery ticket, a buyer of a premium bond does not lose the initial stake:
consequently this instrument has the characteristics of a savings product, making it
potentially attractive to ethical investors.
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1996 289.0 14,900.0 2,888.7 56,274.4 42,394.3 3,951.9 120,698.3
1997 280.0 14,300.0 2,600.0 55,000.0 42,600.0 4,200.0 118,980.0
1998 272.8 13,391.0 2,334.8 61,246.6 42,825.6 4,114.9 124,185.7
1999 190.8 14,561.6 2,469.5 63,481.1 43,607.4 3,738.3 128,048.7
2000 289.0 36,200.0 3,100.0 54,455.5 45,997.0 na 140,041.5
2001 621.6 16,649.7 2,039.4 54,821.5 49,390.0 2,888.9 126,411.1
Source: The Gaming Industry News Site, available at: www.lotteryinsider.com.au/stats/world.htm.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 8.2 discusses how a global lottery
might work and evaluates the issues in the following sub-sections: lottery operators
and their regulation (8.2.1), the market for lotteries (8.2.2), competition between the
global lottery and national lotteries (8.2.3), the challenge posed by Internet gambling
(8.2.4), revenue-raising potential (8.2.5), cross-county equity (8.2.6), distributional
and welfare effects (8.2.7), ethical issues (8.2.8), and development education (8.2.9).
Section 8.3 discusses the potential for a global premium bond; we summarize the UK
scheme as a model for a global version (8.3.1) and we set out the modalities of a global
premium bond and highlight its differences with a global lottery (8.3.2). We conclude
(Section 8.4) that global versions of both a lottery and a premium bond are viable and
complementary in mobilizing more development finance.
8.2. A GLOBAL LOTTERY
How would a global lottery function? Discussions of a global lottery yield two basic
possibilities. The first is for national lotteries to run national versions of the global
lottery game. The second is a single global lottery sold worldwide and run by one
organization. The proposal developed by the CMI, hereafter referred to as the CMI
proposal, adopts the first approach (see Ahde et al. 2002). As far as we know, the second
approach has not been formally proposed by anyone, but it comes up in discussion
because of the possibilities now offered by the Internet. In both versions an agreed
international framework is necessary to regulate the lottery organizer(s) and to transfer
the money into a global lottery fund to be run by the UN or another agency (and
distributed from there to programmes engaged in development and the provision of
global public goods).1
1 On global public goods see Kaul et al. (2003).
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Lottery products consist of games such as Lotto where the winners are deter-
mined by a random draw of numbers, conducted at regular intervals (often weekly in
national lotteries) and instant products such as ticket lotteries (‘scratch cards’) and video
lottery terminals (electronic games of chance often simulating popular casino games). A
national Lotto game is organizationally more complex and requires more infrastructure
than instant games (for this reason, the CMI proposal argues for the introduction
of instant ticket lotteries first and a Lotto game at a later stage). Lottery proceeds
are divided between winning players, administrative costs, and beneficiaries. In state
lotteries in the United States, the proportions are roughly 40–50 per cent (winners),
15–20 per cent (administration), and 30–45 per cent (beneficiaries) (Clotfelter and
Cook 1989: 164–5) and the proportions are roughly similar in European lotteries. A
key issue for the global lottery is whether to share some of the beneficiaries’ portion with
national beneficiaries before transferring any money to a global lottery fund. This is a
feature of the CMI proposal, which argues that otherwise a global lottery, in competing
against national lotteries, may be opposed by governments and national charities. We
return to the issue of competition between the global lottery and national lotteries later
in the chapter.
National legislatures would be subject to lobbying for and against the global lottery
and national debates would inevitably (and rightly) raise questions regarding the basic
structure of the global lottery as well as its objectives and ethics. This needs to be
paralleled by a well-structured and focused international debate, and international
civil society has become very active on issues of international finance in recent years.
Before proceeding further, we must note several other lottery possibilities which are
distinct from the global lottery itself. The first is to make development a beneficiary
of existing national lotteries. The second is to liberalize national lottery markets in
developed countries to permit the marketing of developing-country lotteries. The
third is for a developing country (or group of countries) to create their own world
lottery product, with themselves as the main beneficiaries. We do not discuss these
options in this chapter, but if properly organized they could provide further sources
of development finance in addition to the global lottery.
Having set the scene, we now turn to the issues in detail, including our evaluation
of the global lottery and its possible modus operandi.
8.2.1. Lottery Operators and Their Regulation
National lottery operators range from government agencies and state-owned corpora-
tions (as in Sweden) to private corporations, licensed and regulated by government
(as in the United Kingdom). About one-third of the world’s lotteries are government
agencies, and two-thirds are private corporations operating under licence or corpora-
tions owned by local or national governments. Accordingly, there is a range of options
regarding private versus public providers—whichever version of the global lottery is
adopted (the single global lottery or national global lotteries).
The alternative merits of private versus public lottery operation have been exten-
sively debated; older lotteries are often state-run, but newer lotteries tend to be
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private operators who hold the license until the next round of competitive tendering
(the United Kingdom, a latecomer to national lotteries, opted for private operation on
the grounds that it would raise more revenue than a state-run lottery). If the global
lottery is put out to competitive tender for private operation, then the process must be
transparent and well regulated. Competitive tendering captures some of the monopoly
rents associated with being a lottery provider, thereby raising the amount generated
for beneficiaries (development programmes in the case of the global lottery). However,
in countries where private operators hold the market monopoly for a fixed period,
a national version of the global lottery could not be introduced until the expiry (or
renegotiation) of their licenses. Current as well as prospective lottery providers would
inevitably lobby to influence the process by which a global lottery is introduced.
It is imperative to run the global lottery efficiently and honestly. This requires a
governance structure—to set policy in an overall framework of objectives—as well as
regulatory mechanisms. Regulation is by no means straightforward, and economics now
has much to say on such problems as ‘regulatory capture’. Regulating a single global
lottery provider, but with a worldwide operation, is obviously a different challenge to
regulating numerous, but national, providers of a global lottery. If the single global
provider sells the lottery through the Internet, then the issue of regulation becomes
bound up with the larger issue of how to effectively regulate e-commerce (Clarke
and Dempsey 2001; O’Connor 2003). If the national variant of the global lottery is
chosen, then national lottery operators will fall under the purview of national regu-
latory authorities, but these vary considerably in their effectiveness. Hence, national
regulatory authorities must be overseen by an international authority to ensure that
the high standards of a global lottery are met. The World Lottery Association (WLA),
a respected international organization with a large membership of national and state
lotteries, could play an important role in this regard. Whatever form of international
regulatory system is chosen, it must have the ability to impose sanctions and to dere-
gister national global lotteries, which fail to meet the required standards. This will
necessitate the creation of a suitable legal framework. And international bodies such
as the UN will have to exercise final oversight.
8.2.2. The Market for Lotteries
In a Lotto game, players buy tickets where they choose n numbers from a possible
available N numbers and winners receive a share of the prize pool; the design of the
game affects the mean, variance and skewness of the prize distribution (Walker and
Young 2001: 703; Garrett and Sobel 2002). Empirical evidence shows that ticket sales
are an increasing function of the skewness of the prize distribution; players display a
preference for games with very few large prizes and some small prizes (Creigh-Tyte
and Farrell 1998: 4; Walker and Young 2000: 15). This ‘long-shot’ bias is evident in
other types of gambling (Forrest 2003). Empirical studies show that rollovers (when
nobody wins the top prize and the jackpot is added to the jackpot of the next draw)
raise sales not only for the draw in question but also for successive draws (Farrell et al.
1999). This is referred to as the ‘halo’ effect in the industry. Most lotteries suffer
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from ‘fatigue’; once the initial excitement of the launch wears off, revenues tend to
stagnate or even decline (Creigh-Tyte and Farrell 2003). Periodic redesigns of lotteries
are often used to raise excitement and bolster flagging sales—for instance reducing the
probability of jackpot winners (e.g. by raising N) thereby making rollovers more likely.
Since the expected return is lower than the stake, lottery-ticket purchases have
puzzled economists and non-pecuniary motives have been much emphasized (Farrell
and Hartley 1998). There is a tendency to focus on altruism as a motive for buyers
if the lottery funds ‘good causes’, as with the proposed global lottery or the existing
UK national lottery. It is certainly the case that charity-run lotteries can raise size-
able sums; in the United States about US$6 billion is raised annually in this way,
while UK charities derive 8 per cent of their income from their own lotteries (Douglas
1995; Morgan 2000). But some of this may simply be substitution from other forms
of charitable giving; there is no evidence on additionality. Evidence on whether the
use of funds affects the demand for lottery products is decidedly mixed. In the case of
the UK national lottery, ‘there is no evidence to suggest that play would be sensitive
to the distribution of funds even though individuals may express disapproval over it’
(Walker and Young 2000: 29). However, the US state-governments, which earmark
lottery proceeds to public goods (e.g. to education), have higher average per capita
lottery expenditures than the states which do not (Morgan 2000). And experimental
evidence—whereby laboratory participants are asked to choose between lotteries—
shows that changes in the desirability of the public good significantly affect gambling
behaviour, with gambling falling as the desirability of the offered good falls (Morgan
and Sefton 2000). The public goods provided by US state-lotteries benefit many players
personally (e.g. as parents). This effect may arise for global lottery players in developing
countries, but for players in developed countries it may be of little importance unless
development education convinces them that the global lottery will fund global public
goods that benefit them personally (see Section 8.2.9 on development education).
In summary, it appears that the global lottery will face the same design issues as exist-
ing lotteries if the objective is to maximize revenues, that is, skew the prize structure
towards a few large prizes and encourage rollovers to combat lottery fatigue. The devel-
opment and global public goods funded by the global lottery will attract people (who
we shall call ‘global altruists’) who are motivated by a desire to help poor countries and
combat world problems. And the global lottery’s design will determine its entertain-
ment value relative to other lotteries and other forms of gambling, and its entertainment
characteristics will significantly affect sales. However, we have not yet finished discuss-
ing the market for the global lottery since there is the important issue of competition
between the global lottery and national lotteries, to which we must now turn.
8.2.3. Competition Between the Global Lottery and
National Lotteries
Running right through the debate is a concern that the global lottery may take too much
market share from existing national lotteries, leading to opposition by the beneficiaries
of existing lotteries (national charities as well as regional and central governments).
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The fear is, therefore, that the global lottery may never get off the ground. Such
opposition can certainly be vocal. In the United Kingdom, for instance, charities
lobbied hard against the introduction of a national lottery in 1994, fearing its effects on
their own charity-lotteries as well as charitable donations overall (UK Parliament 2001).
A global lottery would also take market share from private gambling operators; these
might be considered ‘fair game’ for competition—especially when they are unregulated
and untaxed Internet operations (see next section). However, the taxation of licensed
gambling provides substantial revenue (especially for state governments in Australia
and the United States). Private commercial operators will therefore have powerful
political friends to lobby against the global lottery’s introduction.
Recall that the mean, variance, and skewness of the prize distribution all affect
lottery demand, with the empirical evidence showing that ticket buyers prefer higher
mean, lower variance, and skewness towards very large prizes (Clotfelter and Cook
1989; Walker and Young 2000: 25). For buyers the global lottery may be more (or
less) attractive than competing lotteries along some or all of these moments of the
prize-distribution.2 Moreover, if a single global lottery is run through the Internet, it
will have large economies of scale and its administrative costs will be lower than the
aggregate of the administrative costs of existing national lotteries. It would, therefore,
have more money to distribute as prizes, another factor giving the global lottery a
competitive edge.3 Hence, in order to reduce opposition by stakeholders in national
lotteries to the global lottery’s introduction, it would be necessary to reduce the size
of the top prize and the frequency of rollovers (by increasing the odds of winning
the top prize). If the global lottery is adjusted in this way, then it will not maximize
sales or funds for development, given what we know about the demand for lottery
products.
One extra twist arises when the global lottery takes the form of national versions
rather than a single globally marketed version. If a national version of the global lottery
is designed to have the same prize distribution as the existing national lottery (in order to
equalize its attractiveness), then national versions of the global lottery will have differ-
ent prize distributions across countries since the prize distributions of national lotteries
show cross-country variation. If the differences in the distributions of national global
lotteries are significantly large, and the transactions costs of cross-border purchase are
low, then buyers may prefer to purchase another country’s version of the global lottery.
There already exist cross-border ‘grey markets’ in national lotteries, despite national
legal prohibitions (e.g. intermediaries sell UK national lottery tickets at a premium in
2 Assessing the attractiveness of different lotteries to ticket buyers is complicated by the fact that the
comparison is between different prize distributions, and not just over the mean prize (given that buyers
are influenced by variance and skewness of the distribution in addition to the mean). Such comparisons
therefore face the same issues encountered in comparing, for example, distributions of household income
and expenditure.
3 Note that a single monopoly lottery can maximize its revenues by offering a very large jackpot but if a
new entrant into a field with a number of existing lotteries attempts to maximize revenues in this way, it will
face retaliation; for example, existing lotteries will raise their maximum prize above the level offered by the
new entrant, and will reduce the number of smaller prizes. Some existing national lotteries might respond
in this way to the introduction of a global lottery.
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Hong Kong). Hence, national lotteries could lose revenues even if their own national
global lottery is designed to give an equivalent return.4
Any opposition to the global lottery may be reduced if the formula for distributing the
resulting global lottery funds (together with their use) are perceived to be in national
interests, particularly when global concerns regarding the environment, health and
security are seen as bearing on national interests (Section 8.2.6 below discusses the for-
mula). Moreover, if a single global lottery had jackpots sufficiently large to attract pure
gamblers, then it might take substantial market shares away from private commercial
gambling (which is a US$1 trillion market, Gaming Board for Great Britain 2003); this
would then permit generous ‘compensation’ to national causes that lose market share
to the global lottery.
In summary, to get the necessary support to sell the global lottery in national markets,
it is probably the case that the global lottery has to be designed so that it does not
maximize sales. Nevertheless, it could still raise significant amounts given the size of
the world market for gambling products (and the expected growth in that market).
8.2.4. The Challenge Posed by Internet Gambling
The first proposals for a global lottery arose before the Internet age. However, the
revolution in information and communications technologies (ICT) is transforming the
gambling industry, and this is challenging traditional gambling products including
lotteries (the Internet reduces the transaction costs of gambling, especially across
borders, and it offers new products which are attractive to gamblers).
A report undertaken for the UK Home Office by the Gaming Board for Great
Britain estimates that Internet gambling contributes some US$32 billion to an annual
global gambling turnover of close to US$1 trillion (a market share of about 3.2 per
cent); online lotteries account for US$7.5 billion of the US$32 billion (Gaming Board
for Great Britain 2003, data for 2001). Most of the online lotteries are run by private
operators for private profit, although charities are now moving into this area. The
growth of online lotteries (and online gambling) is not confined to developed countries.
Indian states such as Maharashtra and Sikkim now operate competing online lotteries
using public computer terminals, and private companies compete vigorously for the
business of setting up and running India’s online state lotteries (BBC 2002a).
Table 8.2 shows the wide range of countries, which provide a base for online
gambling. Much of the online gambling is lightly regulated, if at all, and private oper-
ators tend to base themselves in jurisdictions with the least regulation, for example,
small islands in the Caribbean but also traditional tax havens such as Gibraltar and
the British Channel islands. Sophisticated Internet casinos targeted to the large Asian
markets operate from the Caribbean. Case law is still being created in the area of Inter-
net gambling as new operators seek to exploit loopholes in existing national laws, or
4 A single global lottery would eliminate the international grey market arising from multiple national
versions of the global lottery (and the rents to intermediaries running the grey market would be transferred
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circumvent those laws entirely. The refusal of some credit card companies to process
Internet bets has slowed the market’s growth. Although this threatens some existing
operators, the long-term prospects for the Internet market remain strong since major
(licensed) casinos are determined to win market share and are influencing US legisla-
tion to this effect—and they have political allies in states keen to expand their revenues
from gambling taxes (Wall Street Journal 2003).
In summary, the global lottery will enter a crowded market-place in many countries.
In developed countries gamblers can choose not only between a variety of national
lottery products but also between an increasingly large menu of gambling options,
reflecting the growth of Internet gambling as well as the recent liberalization of major
gambling markets such as the United Kingdom. Asia’s high-growth gambling markets
are now well-served by both domestic and Internet gambling products, many of which
are provided by large commercial operators with a sophisticated knowledge of the
market and the new technologies. A global lottery would face much less competition
in the smaller countries of sub-Saharan Africa, but this is neither a large market
nor a growing market. These are all factors to keep in mind as we now turn to the
revenue-raising potential of the global lottery.
8.2.5. Revenue-Raising Potential
The global lottery will raise money from (i) people who substitute in from other forms
of gambling (including national lotteries) or are so motivated that they increase their
total gambling expenditures, and (ii) ‘new players’ who do not otherwise participate in
lotteries but who are now motivated to do so (including global altruists).
Any assessment of the likely revenue-raising potential of the global lottery must be
highly speculative. Table 8.1 shows recent trends in world lottery sales by region. The
total size of world lottery market sales is over US$120 billion. The largest market is
Europe (US$54.8 billion in 2001), followed by North America (US$49.4 billion) and
Asia and the Middle East (US$16.7 billion). The global gambling industry had a gross
turnover of US$950 billion in 2001, generating gross profits of about US$200 billion
and net revenues for the industry of US$115 billion after taxes, levies, and payments
to charities (Global Betting and Gaming Consultants 2002; Gaming Board for Great
Britain 2003).
Of the gross profits (US$200 billion) the largest share is provided by lotteries (about
US$62 billion), followed by gaming machines (US$58 billion) and casinos (US$50
billion) (Global Betting and Gaming Consultants 2002). The largest gambling profits
are derived from the markets of United States (about US$61 billion) and Japan (US$48
billion), followed by the United Kingdom, Australia, Spain, Canada, Italy, France,
India, and Germany; these markets range from US$10 billion in the United Kingdom
to about US$4 billion in Germany (Global Betting and Gaming Consultants 2002).
From these data, we can make two points regarding revenue-raising potential. First,
the global lottery will generate most of its funds from the developed countries (although
India is a significant potential market in the developing world). Second, these large
markets are subject to intense and growing competition in the provision of gambling
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products. Take, for example, the United States, which is the largest market. In 1975
there were thirteen US state-lotteries but by 1999 there were 37, and the 1990s saw the
creation of hundreds of legal casinos as fiscal pressures on state governments, and a
political reluctance to tax, drove the relaxation of previously tightly controlled markets
(Shiller 2000: 41). Similar forces are evident in Australia, India, and South Africa.
If the global lottery took 10 per cent of the 2001 global lottery gross profit (US$62
billion), then it would raise US$6.2 billion annually. This compares to total official
development assistance (ODA) of US$59.5 billion in 2001, or aid grants of US$38.3
billion in 2001 (OECD–DAC data from www.oecd.org/dac).
Developing more sophisticated estimates of global lottery revenues depends on mak-
ing assumptions regarding the amount that the global lottery will ‘capture’ from the
existing lotteries, substitution away from other forms of gambling, and the amount
from new players (including global altruists). All of these assumptions hinge in one
way or another on the effectiveness of the marketing of the global lottery, both to pure
gamblers and global altruists.
Experience from introducing new national lotteries shows that revenue generation
can stagnate as the novelty wears off. This may also be the case for the global lottery.
This must be taken into account in the disbursement of funds to development pro-
grammes, so as not to endanger delivery (i.e. any special development fund for this
purpose may need to retain sizeable reserves). However, the global lottery has a major
advantage over national lotteries: its global sales will not suffer as much from the busi-
ness cycle fluctuations that affect national lottery proceeds, and demand will grow with
global income.
8.2.6. Cross-Country Equity
As we discussed, countries differ substantially in the potential national market for the
lottery. The CMI proposal is for a portion of the national global lottery to be distributed
within the country concerned, in order to offset any negative impact on the revenue
raised through existing lotteries or the causes they fund.
How should that portion be determined? Should the portion retained by the country
be the same across all countries or should it vary according to the level of development
(weights based on per capita income) or some form of poverty weighting (using weights
derived from UNDP’s Human Development Index for instance?). This issue applies
not just to the global lottery as an instrument of innovative finance for developing
countries, but also to other instruments such as global taxation (and it is part and
parcel of any discussion on regional fiscal arrangements such as the European Union’s
system of contributions and rebates).
We do not resolve this issue here, but a simple example highlights the problem. India
has a gross national income of US$460 per capita and a population of over one billion;
Nicaragua has roughly the same per capita income (US$420) and a population of only
5 million (World Bank 2002: 232–3). For simplicity, assume that per capita annual
expenditure on the global lottery is one dollar in each country, so that India sells
US$1 billion of tickets per year and Nicaragua sells US$5 million (Indians currently
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spend US$10 billion annually on lottery tickets; BBC 2002a). If each country transfers
the same percentage to the global lottery fund, then India makes a much larger absolute
transfer into the fund than Nicaragua. Although large countries will also retain higher
absolute amounts for their own causes (including poverty reduction), they may still balk
at the scale of their transfers to the global lottery fund and argue for higher percentage
retentions for their national causes. There may be a case for a sliding scale; countries
with a GNI (gross national income) below some pre-determined level (X ) would keep
100 per cent, and countries with a GNI more than X would keep a fraction that falls
as their GNI rises.
8.2.7. Distributional and Welfare Effects
Empirical evidence for developed countries shows that low-income groups spend a
larger proportion of their income on lotteries than higher-income groups.5 This implies
that lotteries are a regressive way of financing public spending, an aspect that has
been much emphasized by their critics (e.g. see, Reno 1997; Fekjoer 2002).6 For each
dollar bet, the average US state lottery pays 55 cents in prizes, spends 12 cents on
retailer commissions and other operating costs, which leaves 33 cents for the state
(Clotfelter 2000). Clotfelter and Cook (1989) call this an ‘implicit tax’ because it has
the same effect as a tax on lottery expenditures. Clotfelter (2000: 4) concludes that ‘if
it were an excise tax, it would amount to a 50 per cent tax on the cost of operating
a lottery (67 cents), making it much higher than the excise taxes we place on alcohol or
tobacco products’.
UK evidence shows that higher-income groups are more likely to play in rollover
weeks when the expected return is higher, presumably because their time carries
a higher opportunity cost or they have many other forms of entertainment (Farrell
and Walker 1997). Hence, lottery design affects the regressivity of the tax, and if the
competitiveness of the global lottery relative to national lotteries is reduced by lowering
the top prize (as discussed in Section 8.2.3) then the global lottery tax is likely to be
more regressive than existing national and state lotteries.
Compared to ODA financed through an income tax, the global lottery is regressive
in its effect on the distribution of income in developed countries. But compared to
nothing (i.e. lower development financing in the lottery’s absence), it is progressive
in terms of the world income distribution—provided that the additional development
programmes funded by the global lottery are pro-poor in their impact. When the lottery
finances programmes with positive externalities for everyone (e.g. efforts to preserve
environmental capital and combat global warming), then the poor benefit along with
the non-poor, and these benefits increase when the ‘global bad’ is especially acute for
5 In the United States, the 1999 national survey on gambling behaviour found that households with
incomes in the range of US$50,000–99,000 spent an average of US$301 per year, while households with an
income less than US$10,000 spent an average of US$520 on lotteries in a year (Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis 2003).
6 See Clotfelter and Cook (1989: 222–3) on defining regressivity in the context of lotteries.
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the poor (e.g. they suffer disproportionately from flooding and drought due to global
climate change). Finally, when the poor themselves buy lottery tickets (as many do in
South Asia) then as a group the expenditure effect is negative (recall that the expected
return in buying a lottery ticket is less than the stake) but some individuals, the winners,
may be lifted out of poverty. In summary, the lottery’s welfare and distributional effects
can be viewed from several different perspectives, some of them more favourable than
others.
8.2.8. Ethical Issues
Although many countries run lotteries, there are also many critics, and the ethics of the
global lottery must be taken seriously and debated at national and international levels.
Some religious groups discourage their members from buying lottery tickets, but prac-
tices vary widely. Muslim countries vary in their tolerance for lotteries: Bangladesh,
Malaysia, and Pakistan have active state lotteries, whereas Saudi Arabia does not. The
Catholic religion does not expressly forbid lotteries or gambling, provided that the
gambler acts freely and without unjust compulsion.7 Many local-level church organ-
izations raise funds from their own lotteries, but gambling is not universally tolerated
across all Christian groups. Again, religious organizations would have an important
part to play in the national and international debate on the global lottery.
Many people welcome the opportunity to participate in lotteries, judging by the
numbers who buy tickets. But equally, gambling addiction can result in personal ruin;
of the 125 million Americans who gambled in 1998, some 7.5 million were estimated to
be ‘problem gamblers’ (Shiller 2000: 41 citing data collected by the National Gambling
Impact Study Commission). Moreover, gambling addiction appears to be more preval-
ent in men than women, with catastrophic effects on the household when, as in many
countries, men control most of the households’ cash income by virtue of their greater
participation in wage labour, etc. (see Kearney 2002 on the impact of US state lotteries
on consumer expenditures).
So in ‘social lotteries’, there is always an uneasy tension between the desire to raise
money to do good, and the recognition that one is providing a potentially addictive
route to ruin, even if only for a small minority of people. For this reason some US
state lotteries set aside funds for projects to reduce gambling addiction and some states
impose strict controls on advertising (Clotfelter 2000).
The evidence on problem gambling in lotteries is mixed. Griffiths and Wood (1999)
review the European research on addiction to lottery gambling. The most addictive
forms of gambling are those that give purchasers the chance to gamble continuously
(thus slot machines are the most addictive). This also makes scratch cards more of a
problem than weekly or bi-weekly lotteries. They conclude that:
With regards to weekly or bi-weekly lotteries there is little evidence Europe-wide that they are
addictive. This is primarily because of their low event frequency (i.e. there are a number of days
7 See the Catholic Encyclopaedia at: www.newadvent.org/cathen/06375b.htm.
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gap between knowing the result of each gamble) . . . Scratch cards and VLTs [Video Lottery
Terminals] appear to be a different proposition to a discontinuous lottery game and appear
to have the potential to promote repetitive habit patterns. Although the evidence is somewhat
sparse, there does appear to be evidence in a number of countries . . . that scratch cards are a
problem to a small minority of people . . . . (Griffiths and Wood 1999: 21)
In India, lottery gambling has become a matter of public debate, particularly regard-
ing gambling addiction among the poor, and its encouragement by lottery companies.8
India’s Lotteries (Regulation) Act 1998, bans single digit lotteries and instant lotteries,
and bills have been submitted to parliament to ban all lotteries (meeting fierce resist-
ance from state governments, many of which have become increasingly dependent on
lottery revenues).
There is also concern over the potentially negative effects of very large prizes on
winners (e.g. in press reports regarding family breakdown following lottery wins),
leading to the argument that small prizes may be preferable. However, this creates a
problem for maximizing lottery revenues given the positive effect of very large prizes
on demand. Prizes could be paid in annuities (an option that is offered to winners in
the United States), which may reduce such negative social impact.
Despite these problems, many observers might reasonably argue that the ethical
case for a global lottery is strong and, indeed, that it is stronger than the case for many
existing national lotteries (where national taxation offers more possibilities for meeting
social goals if the ethical case for lotteries is in doubt). That is, given the extent of current
global problems as well the scale of world poverty and the urgent need to eradicate it—
recently reaffirmed by the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)—
‘exceptional’ financing measures are required above and beyond raising foreign aid.
And the ethical case for the global lottery will strengthen as the funds it raises deliver
tangible progress in meeting the MDGs by their target date of 2015.
8.2.9. The Global Lottery’s Role in Development Education
The global lottery has considerable potential as a vehicle for conveying information
about development via local sales points together with the national and international
media (e.g. through regular advertisements and programmes on commercial (e.g. CNN)
and public/semi-commercial TV and radio services (e.g. BBC World).
A single global lottery might be superior to many national versions in its develop-
ment education impact. Any global televised prize draw would command substantial
audiences, affording a unique opportunity to publicize the impact of the funds raised.
It would also provide potential for raising additional and large sums from the associ-
ated advertising in what could be a peak-viewing slot for a large global audience (for
comparison, advertisers paid US$2 million for a 30-second TV spot during the broad-
cast of the 2002 US Super Bowl). Any hint of malpractice in the lottery operation or
8 In 2002, an Indian builder earning US$3 a day won a US$1 million jackpot in an online lottery and was
taken on a nationwide promotional tour by the lottery company (BBC 2002b).
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misuse of funds would undermine the positive development-education role: caution is
therefore recommended.
Development education might be promoted by offering, in addition to a standard
global lottery ticket, a menu of lottery tickets (each with the same expected return),
the funds from which are earmarked to important causes; for example, tickets to fund
primary education, improvements in the livelihoods of poor women, or HIV/AIDS
programmes. This might also have positive effects for total funds raised since pro-
spective buyers favour different causes. However, this could reduce the incentive for
governments to fund these activities from general taxation or appropriate user charges,
thus reducing the net impact—in terms of actual services created—from lottery funds
themselves. This issue needs further investigation.
8.3. A GLOBAL PREMIUM BOND
8.3.1. Experiences with National Premium Bonds
We now turn to a measure, which can complement the global lottery, namely a global
premium savings bond modelled on the long-running and successful UK scheme. We
describe the UK scheme (and other national premium bond schemes in this section)
before turning to the possible structure of the global premium bond in the next section.
In the UK premium bond scheme, people buy savings bonds, each with a unique
number that is entered every month in a prize draw, with prizes ranging from £50
to £1 million (a random number generator, nicknamed ERNIE, picks the winners).9
The size of the total prize allocation is set so that the expected return is equivalent
to the yield on UK government stock. Individual bondholders will receive a return
above or below the average expected return—depending on their luck and the size of
their bond holdings—but in aggregate bondholders get the average if they hold the
maximum permitted amount of bonds (which is £30,000 per person). Winners can
opt to reinvest their winnings and many people accumulate sizeable holdings in this
way (and since the maximum is per person, not per household, families can potentially
hold significant wealth in premium bonds). With average luck, a holder of £30,000 of
bonds will win 12 prizes per year; given the minimum prize of £50, such an average
winner will take home a minimum of £600 per year in prizes. Annual premium bond
sales are presently running at £21.4 billion (US$34 billion) in the United Kingdom.
Bangladesh and Ireland have similar premium bond schemes. In Bangladesh the
‘prize bond scheme’ has operated for at least thirty years; the top prize is approximately
US$2000 and there are many small prizes (there is no limit to the amount that may
be held in prize bonds and the prizes are drawn quarterly). For fiscal year 2001–02,
US$815 million was held in prize bonds (Bangladesh Bank 2003).
Premium bondholders never lose their investment (unless the government defaults)
but the return depends on their luck. Hence, an individual’s return can be above or
below that on an interest-bearing deposit account or other types of government bonds.
9 The UK premium bond is managed by the National Savings and Investments Office and is described
at: www.nsandi.com.
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Investors, who buy premium bonds rather than conventional government bonds, have a
preference for skewness in the distribution of returns (also the characteristic of lottery
tickets). Many investors favour premium bonds to interest-bearing deposits when
interest rates are low (as at present). Their return may fail to match the inflation rate
but this is the case for most government bonds.10 Premium bonds are much less risky
than equities and may produce higher returns than equities over the short-to-medium
term given the greater volatility of equity markets. They are also suitable for people
in retirement, or closer to retirement, when the main concern is to earn an income
from investment in a way that protects the accumulated capital. In addition, winnings
are tax free in the United Kingdom; accordingly, higher-rate taxpayers often hold the
maximum allowable amount of premium bonds.
However, at this point we should issue a note of caution. Buying premium bonds
does contain an element of gambling. You could view a premium bond as equivalent to
saving in a savings bank and then using all of the interest in each period to buy lottery
tickets. A premium bond offers you the ability to gamble with fewer transactions costs.
That said, premium bonds and lottery tickets are incomplete substitutes for three
reasons. First, the top prize on a UK premium bond is much less than a UK national
lottery jackpot and the prize distribution is less skewed towards very large prizes
than is the lottery; given gamblers’ preference for skewness, many will still prefer to
buy lottery tickets.11 Second, you cannot choose the numbers of your UK premium
bond (bondholders are allocated a number), whereas this is important to the lottery’s
entertainment value.12 Third, a premium bond offers less ex post regret. If you buy £100
of lottery tickets over a year and win nothing, then you lose £100, but if you buy £100 of
premium bonds and win nothing then you forfeit the interest from holding the money
in a savings account (or other alternative investment). This is important given that
most people consistently overestimate expected returns—whether on lottery tickets,
premium bonds, or equities (see Clotfelter and Cook 1989 on lotteries and Shiller 2000:
142 on ‘irrational exuberance’ in equity markets).
In summary, a premium bond is like a lottery ticket in that the return depends
on a random prize draw, but otherwise the premium bond is a savings instrument
(with some entertainment value) whereas a lottery ticket is closer to other types of
entertainment expenditure. Hence it can make financial sense to make a sizeable
investment in premium bonds while it is very unwise to bet a large sum on a lot-
tery. Premium bonds have a potentially wider market since their purchase is more
socially acceptable to groups who otherwise avoid lotteries; in the United Kingdom,
they are often given as gifts, especially to children (also the case with Bangladesh’s prize
bonds).
10 United States Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) are a major exception.
11 The take-up of premium bonds in the United Kingdom was quite slow until the prize structure was
redesigned to make it more appealing to gamblers (Rayner 1969, 1970).
12 It may be possible to design a system whereby premium bondholders select their draw numbers each
month if they wish; the bond number would then carry a permanent reference number purely to record
ownership.
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8.3.2. The Modalities of A Global Premium Bond
Whereas a global lottery can be run in either national versions or a single (interna-
tional) version (see Section 8.2), a global premium bond (which henceforth we shall
call a ‘global ERNIE’) is a more complex instrument and would be best managed
by a single organization (selling the bonds through national sales offices and/or the
Internet). It is advantageous, for reasons discussed later, for the global ERNIE to
be denominated in a major currency (or basket of major currencies to offset exchange
rate risk for bondholders). The flow of funds in and out of the global ERNIE will
be subject to changes in its rate of return relative to other financial instruments
(e.g. other bonds and equities). The global ERNIE must be liquid and well managed
(and its credibility will be strengthened if the world’s financial authorities conduct
close oversight).
A premium bond is a debt instrument, the bondholder lends his or her money and
is entitled to repayment upon request, in contrast to a lottery ticket that is a non-
refundable expenditure.13 This has implications for the use to which the money can
be put. A global lottery can provide grant finance for development purposes, whereas
a global ERNIE is more suited to providing loan finance. If the UK model is followed
and the expected return for an individual holding the maximum permitted amount
of bonds is linked to the return on a comparable financial instrument (for instance, a
weighted average of the yield on a basket of developed-country government bonds)
then this (plus associated administrative costs) sets a lower bound on the lending rate
unless some element of subsidy from other sources is provided (from the funds raised
by the global lottery, for example). This means that eligible borrowers, who could
be developing-country governments, NGOs and international organizations, could
borrow on terms as good as those facing rich-country governments (but on less
concessional terms than IDA, unless a subsidy is provided).
Default by borrowers is always possible, but this is true for any loan instrument;
thus the desirability of ERNIE funded-lending is bound up with the larger question of
whether grants or loans are preferable for low-income countries, an issue which is hotly
debated in the context of the heavily indebted poor country (HIPC) Initiative (Addison
et al. 2004). Default could, in extremis, be absorbed by lowering the rate of expected
return to bondholders and raising the lending rate to borrowers, but this would reduce
the attractiveness of global ERNIEs to investors. Large-scale default would throw into
question the repayment of the principal, with potentially fatal results for the viability
of the scheme. In addition, since bonds are redeemable on demand, whereas loans are
long-term, there is mismatch in the maturity structure of assets and liabilities. This
mismatch is similar to that found in bond-financed mortgage markets and in the United
States the government acts as the guarantor (through Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae).
In the case of the global ERNIE, the guarantors could be rich-country governments
(the G7 group) or emerging economies with sizeable foreign-exchange reserves (for
instance, China and India).
13 UK Premium bonds do not have a fixed term (as is the case with government and corporate debt).
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As a financial instrument the global ERNIE would have the following qualities:
1. It would be an attractive savings instrument in its own right, particularly for ‘ethical’
investors. Ethical investment products are a rapidly growing market, both for indi-
viduals (e.g. pension investment) but also for charitable foundations (a large market).
From the perspectives of risk management and return, ethical investors need to hold
bonds but they face a dilemma in holding government paper; they cannot avoid fin-
ancing categories of state spending (e.g. the military, nuclear power, etc.) that they
deem to be unethical (whereas ethical investors in equities can pick and choose
across companies, excluding those that are unethical). This class of investors will
provide a strong source of demand for a global ERNIE.
2. The global ERNIE would widen the range of savings instruments open to indi-
viduals and organizations (including NGOs as well as private and public organ-
izations) in developing countries that are often ill-served by domestic financial
instruments. It would provide a useful hedge against the inflation and currency
risk arising from holding savings in domestic assets, especially in countries with
weak currencies and high inflation, since it will be denominated in a convertible
foreign currency (or preferably a basket of foreign currencies so as to stabilize its
global purchasing power—this also reduces the exchange rate risk for bond buyers
in major currency countries). Migrants making remittances home could also pur-
chase global ERNIEs for their families (see Chapter 9, this volume). Note that a
conventional international bond, if made available to developing-country citizens,
could also fulfil the function of widening the range of savings instruments, so this
benefit is not exclusive to the global ERNIE alone.
3. Global ERNIE’s would be a suitable charity gift, including transfers between indi-
viduals or groups in developed and developing countries, and such gifts and bequests
could be exempted from taxation under national legislation to increase their attract-
iveness (however, a limit on purchases would be necessary to avoid the crowding-out
of taxable bonds). International charities could also hold global ERNIEs on behalf
of community organizations in countries and localities with insecure property rights
and poor communications.
4. The global ERNIE may over time establish itself as a collateral instrument that
people can borrow against in their domestic capital markets, both informal and
formal (to the advantage of poorer ERNIE holders who can diversify their collat-
eral away from traditional instruments such as land, cattle, jewellery, and bonded
labour).14
These potential development and welfare benefits of a global ERNIE are independent
of the use to which the funds are put by international development agencies (and would
also apply to any conventional bond made available to developing-country buyers which
14 If ERNIEs were bearer bonds, then their use as collateral would be facilitated but this is almost certainly
ruled out by the necessity to impose a maximum limit on the holding per person (as in the UK scheme) and
the ease with which bearer bonds can be used in money laundering.
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indicates an important gap in the market irrespective of whether one favours a global
premium bond or not).15
In summary, the global lottery is superior to the global ERNIE from the perspective
of the final user of the funds, since the lottery can provide finance on grant terms.
But the lottery does not offer a savings instrument, whereas the premium bond does
and, provided that the risks of borrower default are contained, the global ERNIE
could be attractive to investors in both developed and developing countries. This
would facilitate ethical investment in developing countries and provide individuals
and organizations in developing countries with access to an international financial
instrument.
The global ERNIE may be more ethically acceptable to those who disagree with
gambling in general. Since the funds raised by existing national premium bonds are
not earmarked to charitable causes (as is often the case with government lotteries),
but instead form part of general government funding, there would not be the level of
resistance among national charities that poses a political problem for the global lottery
(rather the opposition might arise from ministers of finance who see the global ERNIE
as taking market share from their country’s domestic debt instruments).
Finally there is an issue of sequencing the introduction of the global lottery and
the global premium bond. As we noted in Section 8.2.1, the introduction of the global
lottery may be delayed when national lottery suppliers hold licences for defined periods.
Being a different product, the global premium bond could be introduced earlier.
8.4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter has discussed the present proposals for a global lottery. This has
potential for raising finance for development programmes and programmes to provide
global public goods. In addition, we have proposed a global premium bond as an
additional instrument. Both the lottery and the global ERNIE could have strong devel-
opment education benefits, an important consideration in these days of ‘aid fatigue’,
when the case for helping poor countries and poor people must again capture the pub-
lic’s imagination. But for this reason, both schemes must meet the highest possible
ethical standards.
The global ICT revolution is fundamentally changing the market for gambling. It is
now possible to conceive of running the global lottery from a single organization via the
Internet. This would have significantly lower administrative costs than selling national
versions of the global lottery through national lottery agencies; a single authority would
be easier to regulate than many national authorities and it would have potentially greater
reach than national schemes. But for these reasons it may face more political opposition
than nationally run versions of the global lottery if it is seen to take money from national
charities and treasuries. We do not envision nationally run versions of the global ERNIE
since this is a more complex financial instrument than the lottery.
15 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this point.
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The market for gambling is also being liberalized in many countries. Liberalization
is driven by the fiscal needs of central and local governments (including the increas-
ing importance of gambling taxes arising from political opposition to other forms of
taxation), the liberalization of cross-border transactions in services (e.g. EU harmon-
ization) and more permissive social attitudes to gambling. In the United Kingdom for
example, the report of the Gambling Review Body, chaired by Sir Alan Budd, recom-
mended relaxing legal restrictions on the advertising and promotion of gambling, in
part to create a fairer and more competitive market for gamblers (UK Department for
Culture, Media and Sport 2003). A global lottery will have to compete in an increasingly
vigorous market.
Global altruism can play a big role in encouraging sales of the global lottery—hence
the importance of the development education component—but sizeable sales depend
as well on its attractiveness to gamblers relative to other gambling products, including
those now provided commercially via the Internet. In contrast, the attractiveness of the
global ERNIE depends more on its merits as a savings instruments and we argue that it
could find a strong place in the growing market for ethical investments. Whatever the
final design of such schemes, it is imperative that we move ahead with further debate
on these and other innovative forms of development finance.
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Remittances from migrants are a growing and relatively stable, market-based external
source of development finance. Remittances bring foreign exchange, are a complement
for national savings, and provide a source of finance for capital formation (mainly
small-scale projects). Through these mechanisms, remittances can support economic
growth in recipient countries. As remittances depend on flows of people that are often
less volatile than capital flows, remittances are expected to be more stable than such
capital flows as portfolio investment and international bank credit. Remittances are also
an international redistribution from low-income migrants to their families in the home
country. These transfers act as the international mechanism of social protection based
on private transfers. The sustainability of remittances over time depends on various
factors such as the anticipated flow of migration, and whether the migrants come alone
or with their family, and how this changes over time.1
It is also important to recognize that benefits from remittances for the receiving
countries have to be compared with the potential costs of emigration for the developing
countries in terms of the loss of scarce human skills (the so-called brain drain phe-
nomenon). Thus, a certain tradeoff is generated between the inflow of foreign exchange
and external savings through remittances and the outflow of skilled individuals.2
Currently, remittances—after foreign direct investment—are the second most
important source of external finance for developing countries. Moreover, they surpass
foreign aid. There are twenty countries that are the main recipients of remit-
tances. These twenty low- to medium-income developing economies capture around
80 per cent of total worker remittances to the developing world. In terms of value, the
Very useful comments by Tony Atkinson are greatly appreciated, as are the comments received from
participants at the workshop of the UNU-WIDER project ‘Innovative Sources for Development Finance’
in Helsinki on 17–18 May 2003. Efficient assistance by Claudio Aravena is greatly appreciated.
1 Leaving their families at home, new immigrants may initially go to the foreign country alone. Later, as
their employment situation in the host country is stabilized, they tend to bring their families. This may have
implications for the flow of remittances and their persistence over time, as families are often the main recipi-
ents of remittances. 2 See Ellerman (2003) and Solimano (2002a) for a discussion of these issues.
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three main recipient countries are India, Mexico, and the Philippines, while the three
main source countries are the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Germany.
The international market for remittances (from a social point of view) is segmented
and inefficient, as is reflected by the high costs of intermediation. Money transmitter
operators dominating the market charge high fees and use overvalued exchange rates.
Commercial banks in both the source and recipient countries have a low share of
the global remittances market. Empirical evidence, however, shows that the costs of
remittances are lower when sent through banks than through money transfer operators
(MTOs).
There is, however, room for leveraging a greater value for remittances if international
money transfers were conducted at lower costs. The amount of remittances is below the
socially optimal level associated with a more competitive cost structure in the market for
remittances (causing, therefore, a deadweight loss for both the sender and the receiver
of a remittance). The development potential of remittances is thus diminished under
current market realities.
The chapter is organized in seven sections in addition to the introduction. Section 9.2
discusses global and regional trends in remittance flows and their growing import-
ance as a source of external transfers to developing countries. Section 9.3 examines
measurement issues and discusses the main micro-motives for remittances and their
implications for stability across cycles, while Section 9.4 analyses the development
impact of remittances (effects on savings, investment, growth, poverty, income distri-
bution). Section 9.5 overviews the international market for remittances and provides
evidence on the costs of sending remittances to various country groups. Section 9.6
highlights policies for reducing the costs of sending remittances and thus enhancing
their developmental impact. Section 9.7 concludes.
9.2. GLOBAL AND REGIONAL TRENDS IN
REMITTANCE FLOWS
In a world of volatile capital flows, remittances3 are a stabilizing component of external
resources transfers to the developing world. Remittances are the financial counter-
part of the outflow of people, and migration flows have been growing in the last two
decades in response to expanding opportunities in advanced economies compared to
developing countries. Remittances to the developing world have increased steadily
from around US$15 billion in 1980 to 80 billion in 2002. This represents an annual
rate of increase of 7.7 per cent (see Table 9.1).4 At the regional level, the highest
rate of increase in the flow of remittances is to Latin American and the Caribbean
with 12.4 per cent per annum, followed by East Asia and the Pacific with 11 per cent
per year. The lowest annual growth rate in remittances is to sub-Saharan Africa with
5.2 per cent. As shown in Table 9.1, in 2002 Latin America and the Caribbean have
3 Remittances are defined as the sum of workers remittances and compensation of employees.
4 As remittances are also sent through informal and un-recorded channels, official data may underestimate


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9.2. Remittancesa received by country groups, 1995–2001
(in billions of US$)
Countries 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Upper middle income 13.7 13.6 14.3 16.3 15.7 16.6 17.2
Share of remittances in all countries 16.1 15.4 13.8 16.2 15.0 15.9 15.4
Lower middle income 20.7 21.2 24.2 24.1 27.2 28.3 30.0
Share of remittances in all countries 24.3 24.0 23.5 24.0 26.0 27.0 26.9
Low income 13.5 17.8 24.2 19.1 21.8 19.7 25.1
Share of remittances in all countries 15.9 20.2 23.5 19.0 20.8 18.8 22.5
All developing 47.9 52.6 62.7 59.5 64.7 64.6 72.3
Share of remittances in all countries 56.3 59.6 60.7 59.2 61.7 61.7 64.8
Industrial countries 37.2 35.7 40.5 41.0 40.2 40.1 39.3
Share of remittances in all countries 43.7 40.4 39.3 40.8 38.3 38.3 35.2
All countries 85.1 88.3 103.2 100.5 104.9 104.7 111.6
Share of remittances in all countries 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: a Remittances are calculated as the sum of workers’ remittances and compensation of employees.
Source: IMF (2003).
the highest level of remittances, totalling US$25 billion, followed by South Asia with
16 billion, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) with 14 billion, and East Asia
and the Pacific with 11 billion. Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest level of remittances,
US$4 billion.
In terms of the distribution of remittances by levels of per capita income,
the developing-country group received 65 per cent of world remittances. In turn, the
lower middle-income and low-income groups received a higher proportion than the
upper middle-income countries (Table 9.2).
In 2002, for the developing-country group, worker remittances represented on aver-
age 1.3 per cent of GDP, 55.9 per cent of FDI flows, and nearly 140 per cent of the
aid flows (Table 9.3). These coefficients vary from region to region. The proportion
of worker remittances in GDP is the highest in the MENA region (3 per cent in 2002)
and the lowest in the East Asia and Pacific region (0.7 per cent). Remittances as a pro-
portion of FDI are the highest in the MENA region (466.7 per cent in 2002) and the
lowest in East Asia and Pacific (19.3 per cent). In turn, the proportion of remittances
in foreign aid is the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa, reflecting both lower remittances
and high aid flows to this region.
In terms of total resource flows, remittances are the second largest component of
external resource flows to developing countries after FDI (Table 9.4 and Fig. 9.1).
Remittances have been larger than aid flows as a source of external development
finance since 1997. In 2001, foreign aid represented 18 per cent of total external
finance flows while remittances were 25 per cent. Interestingly, as mentioned earlier,
remittances are much more stable than other capital flows. Mainly bank credit and
portfolio investment are considered volatile components of external resource flows.
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Table 9.3. Remittancesa received by developing countries, 1996–2002
Countries 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 (est.)
East Asia and Pacific
as % of GDP 1.0 1.3 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7
as % of FDI inflows 16.2 22.8 14.4 21.7 23.4 21.3 19.3
as % of aid flows 125.0 215.2 103.8 112.8 128.8 152.9 n.a.
Europe and Central
Asia
as % of GDP 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.0
as % of FDI inflows 38.0 32.6 35.4 28.6 29.8 29.6 34.5
as % of aid flows 89.9 126.8 131.4 84.4 90.6 97.8 n.a.
Latin America and the
Caribbean
as % of GDP 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
as % of FDI inflows 28.8 20.6 20.2 19.2 25.3 32.6 59.5
as % of aid flows 232.7 302.2 328.9 359.6 505.3 434.6 n.a.
Middle East and North
Africa
as % of GDP 3.4 3.0 3.1 2.9 2.8 3.0 3.0
as % of FDI inflows 1,300.0 151.6 137.3 328.1 436.0 238.2 466.7
as % of aid flows 171.7 195.8 219.1 244.2 294.6 335.9 n.a.
South Asia
as % of GDP 3.7 3.8 3.1 3.2 2.6 2.6 2.6
as % of FDI inflows 351.4 298.0 380.0 487.1 435.5 363.4 320.0
as % of aid flows 236.5 339.5 271.4 351.2 321.4 252.5 n.a.
Sub-Saharan Africa
as % of GDP 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.3 0.7 0.7 1.1
as % of FDI inflows 62.8 46.9 55.4 43.2 32.8 17.4 57.1
as % of aid flows 18.0 28.6 27.1 28.7 16.4 18.9 n.a.
Developing countries
as % of GDP 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3
as % of FDI inflows 41.2 37.0 34.1 36.1 40.2 42.1 55.9
as % of aid flows 101.3 134.5 118.3 123.5 127.9 139.0 n.a.
Notes: a Remittances are calculated as the sum of workers’ remittances and compensation of employees;
FDI is foreign direct investment; Aid flows are official development assistance; n.a. means not available.
Source: IMF (2003).
The quantitative importance of these components of private capital flows is still
significant (nearly 30 per cent of total resource flows, on average, to developing
countries between 1991 and 2000). These components are an important source of
macroeconomic volatility. Often private capital flows do lead the macroeconomic cycles.
In contrast, remittances can be even counter-cyclical, as emigrants send money home
during bad times to provide income support.
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Table 9.4. Resource flows to developing countries, 1991–2002
(current US$ billions and %)
Remittancesa Aid flowsb Other official FDI Other private Total
flowsc flowsd
US$ % US$ % US$ % US$ % US$ % US$ %
1991 33.1 21 49.5 32 11.4 7 35.7 23 26.3 17 156 100
1992 37.2 19 46.4 24 10.1 5 47.1 24 52.2 27 193 100
1993 38.9 15 41.7 16 11.9 5 66.6 26 100.2 39 259.3 100
1994 44.1 16 48.1 18 −0.1 0 90.0 34 85.6 32 267.7 100
1995 47.9 15 61.0 19 8.9 3 105.0 33 99.1 31 322.3 100
1996 52.6 14 51.9 14 −7.8 −2 128.0 34 148.44 40 372.9 100
1997 62.7 15 46.6 11 7.2 2 169.0 41 131.37 31 417.2 100
1998 59.5 15 50.3 12 16.2 4 175.0 43 108.75 27 409.3 100
1999 64.7 19 52.4 15 5.0 1 179.0 52 45.09 13 346.6 100
2000 64.6 19 50.5 15 −3.0 −1 161.0 48 65.15 19 338.0 100
2001 72.3 25 52.0 18 n.a. n.a. 172.0 60 −11.73 −4 284.3 100
2002 (est.) 80.0 36 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 143.0 64 n.a. n.a. 223.0 100
Average:
1991–2001
52.51 18 50.04 18 5.98 2 120.75 38 77.32 25 306.04 100
Notes:
a Remittances are calculated as the sum of workers’ remittances and compensation of employees;
b Aid flows are official development assistance and official aid;
c Other official flows are total official flows (official development fin.a.nce), net of aid flows;
d Other private flows are portfolio flows, and bank and trade; n.a. not available.







1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Years
Remittances Aid flows Others official flows
FDI Other private flows
2001
Figure 9.1. Long-term resource flows to developing countries, 1991–2001
Source: IMF (2003).
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At the individual country level, remittances are relatively concentrated in the group
of twenty developing countries that capture around 80 per cent of total remittances
to the developing world (Fig. 9.2). In turn, the GDP of these twenty countries
represents approximately 60 per cent of the GDP of the developing world (World
Bank 2003). In 2001, the main recipient of worker remittances was India, receiv-
ing an annual flow of US$10 billion, followed by Mexico with 9.9 billion and the
Philippines with 6.4 billion. At the lower end of this group of twenty developing-
country recipients of worker remittances are Thailand, China, and Sri Lanka. The
country ranking, however, changes, when remittances are measured as shares of GDP,
on which measure the top three economies are Tonga, Lesotho, and Jordan with remit-
tances ranging between 20 and 40 per cent of GDP. At the lower end are the Philippines,
Uganda, Ecuador and Sri Lanka, with shares between 7 and 9 per cent of GDP
(Fig. 9.3).
On the other side, the top twenty source countries of remittances in 2001 are headed
by the United States with US$ 28.4 billion, followed by Saudi Arabia with 15.1 billion
and Germany with 8.2 billion (see Fig. 9.4). At the lower end of the top twenty sending























































































































Figure 9.2. Top twenty developing-country recipients of workers’ remittances, 2001
(in billions of dollars)




















































































































Figure 9.3. Top twenty developing-country recipients of workers’ remittances, 2001
(as percentage of GDP)





















































































































Figure 9.4. Top twenty country sources of remittance payments, 2001
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Next we turn to the motives for remittances that may shed some light on the empirical
behaviour of remittances reviewed in this section.
9.3. MEASUREMENT, MICRO-MOTIVES FOR REMITTANCES
AND CYCLICAL BEHAVIOUR
In this section, we review (i) measurement issues; (ii) the micro-motives for remittances,
and (iii) the stability of remittances during the cycle.5
9.3.1. Definition and Measurement Issues
The economic significance of remittances often goes beyond what is suggested by
the official balance-of-payments statistics in the sending and receiving countries. The
important concept for measuring the economic impact of remittances is the resource
transfer—monetary or in-kind—made by a migrant to his home country. Monetary
transfers in dollars directly increase the availability of foreign exchange in the migrant’s
country of origin, whereas remittances in-kind save foreign exchange for the recipi-
ent country. This distinction is important, as there are several modalities for sending
remittances. Some of these are recorded while others are not. For example, when remit-
tances are sent through the formal channels, they are recorded in the receiving country’s
balance-of-payments current account. Conversely, remittances sent informally in cash,
for example through couriers, are unrecorded in official statistics. Remittances can be
in-kind, for example, goods sent to households in the home country. Only part of the
later are recorded as imports. Migrants may also make donations in the host country to
institutions like the church or other charitable organizations formed by co-nationals.
They can also make numerous payments (insurance premiums, school tuition, inter-
national airfares paid directly to airlines) on behalf of relatives or friends from their
home country.6 Although most of these payments should, in the economic sense, be
treated as ‘remittances’, they rarely are recorded as such. In sum, these considerations
should be borne in mind in assessing the true magnitude of remittance transfers based
on official statistics, which as noted above, tend to underestimate their full economic
impact.
In general, data on remittances are available from three items in balance-of-payments
reports at country level:7 (i) worker remittances (money sent by workers living abroad
for more than one year); (ii) compensation of employees (gross earnings of foreigners
residing abroad for less than a year; and (iii) migrant transfer (net worth of migrants
moving from one country to another) (see Gammeltoft 2002).
5 This section draws largely on Solimano (2003). 6 See Brown (1997).
7 Data for different countries are compiled in the IMF (International Monetary Fund) Balance of Payments
Statistical Yearbook.
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9.3.2. Microeconomic Motivations to Remit
The analytical literature8 on motives for remittances can be summarized in four
approaches.
The altruistic motive
Under the altruistic view, the migrant sends remittances home because he cares about
the well-being of his or her family in the home country, and a remittance satisfies
the emigrant’s concern for the welfare of his family. Furthermore, it is an empirical
regularity that the migrant generally has a higher education level than family mem-
bers who stay at home. When a migrant goes to a country where the average wage
and per capita income are higher than at home, his income level, once he secures a
job, can be expected to be better than that of comparable workers at home. The main
prediction of the altruistic motive is that remittances tend to decrease over time,9 as
the attachment to family gradually weakens over time when members are in different
countries. Furthermore, the migrant may plan to stay abroad for an extended period
(or eventually retire there), subsequently bringing his family to his adopted country.
This, of course, reduces remittances. The converse case is the return-migration
in which the migrant brings fresh funds on his return home, raising remittances the
one time.
The self-interest motive
Opposite to the altruistic motive is the emigrant who sends remittances to the home
country mainly for economic reasons and financial self-interest. In this scenario, the
successful emigrant saves money in a foreign country, creating the dilemma as to how
to accumulate wealth (in which assets) and where (in which country). An obvious
place to invest at least part of the assets is in the home country, buying property, land,
financial assets, etc., where these assets may earn a higher rate of return than in the host
country, albeit with a greater risk profile. These assets can be administered on behalf of
the migrant by the family, who acts as a trusted agent. Expectations of an inheritance
from the emigrant’s parents may be another motivation for remittances. In this case,
family members who have contributed to the increasing family wealth (e.g., by sending
remittances) become the obvious candidates of future inheritance.
Implicit family contract 1: loan repayment
Economic theory has developed explanations of the remittances process, which take
the family—rather than the individual—as the main unit of analysis.10 The theory
assumes that a family develops an implicit contract with the individual (the migrant)
who chooses to live abroad, and those who stay at home. The implicit contract has
an intertemporal dimension, say various years or even decades, as the time-horizon,
and combines elements of investment and repayment. In the loan repayment theory,
8 References of this literature are Stark (1991), Brown (1997), Poirine (1997), Smith (2003).
9 See Stark (1991, chapter 16).
10 See Poirine (1997) and Brown (1997) for an elaboration on this specification of remittances.
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the family invests in the education of the emigrant and usually finances the migration
costs (travel and subsistence in the host country). This is the loan (investment) element
of the theory. The repayment part comes after the migrant settles abroad, his income
profile starts to rise over time and he is in a position to start repaying the loan (principal
and interests) back to the family in the form of remittances. Thus the family invests
in a higher yielding ‘asset’—the migrant—who earns a higher income in a foreign
country than other family members living and working at home. This model predicts
various time profiles of remittances, depending on the length of time it takes for the
migrant to become established in the foreign labour market and on the duration of his
stay abroad. The quicker the migrant’s integration into the labour market of the new
country, the faster the flow of remittances. Amounts to be remitted will depend, among
other things, on the income profile of the migrant. In this model, remittances do not
need to decrease over time as they do in the altruistic model.
Implicit family contract 2: co-insurance
Another variant of the theory of remittances as an implicit family contract between the
migrant and those at home is based on the notion of risk diversification. The idea is
simple: insurance markets and capital markets in the real world are incomplete, and
risks cannot be diversified because of the absence of financial assets that edge risk. In
addition, constraints to borrowing, a particularly serious problem for poor migrants,
limit the ability to smooth consumption or finance investment. Assuming that economic
risks between the sending and foreign country are not positively correlated, then it
becomes a convenient strategy for the family as a whole to send abroad some of its
members (often the most educated) to diversify economic risks. The migrant, then,
can help to support his family in bad times at home. Conversely, for the migrant, having
a family in the home country is insurance against bad times that may also occur in the
adopted country. Here, emigration becomes a co-insurance strategy, with remittance
playing the role of an insurance claim. As in any contract, there is the potential problem
of enforcement (e.g. ensuring that the terms of the contract are respected by all parties).
However, in principle, enforcement can be expected to be simpler due to the fact that
these are implicit family contracts, which are helped by family trust and altruism
(a feature often absent in legally sanctioned contracts).
9.3.3. Stability of Remittances in the Economic Cycle
As mentioned in the previous section, worker remittances are more stable than portfolio
investments and bank credit. Remittances can even be counter-cyclical. The different
motives to remit reviewed above can shed some light in explaining this behaviour. In
the model of remittances based on altruism, the migrant can increase his remittances
when there is an economic downturn in the home country (as income of the migrant’s
family declines). In this case, a remittance would be the equivalent of a private ‘welfare
payment’ sent from abroad to help smooth the consumption of the recipient at home.
However, business cycles may be internationally synchronized. The growing economic
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interdependencies of globalization make this a more plausible case. In this situation, a
recession in the receiving country may be positively correlated with a recession in the
source country, so that the ability of the immigrant worker to send remittances may
be hampered by economic conditions in the host country. This is a real possibility,
although the sender may also draw on existing savings to maintain a steady flow of
remittances.
If remittances were driven by the portfolio decisions of the migrant (remittances
driven by investment), again the relevant issue would be the correlation between the
rate of return of the assets in the host country and the rate of return on the assets at
home. Here international correlation of the business cycle matters, as does the degree
of financial integration between the source and the receiving country. In the model of
remittances as mechanisms of co-insurance, risk diversification may call for a steady
flow of remittances if business cycles are not fully positively correlated between the
source and the receiving country.
9.4. THE DEVELOPMENT IMPACT OF REMITTANCES
Remittances have a potential positive impact as a development tool for the recipi-
ent countries. The development effects of remittances can be decomposed into its
impact on savings, investment, growth, consumption, and poverty and income dis-
tribution. Remittances’ impact on growth in the receiving economies is likely to
act through savings and investment as well as short-run effects on the aggregate
demand and output through consumption. Also the indirect effect of migration
on output depends on the productivity level of the emigrant in the home coun-
try before departure. The total saving effect of remittances comes from the sum
of foreign savings and domestic savings effects. Worker remittances are a compon-
ent of foreign savings and they complement national savings by increasing the total
pool of resources available for investment. Part of the savings effects of remit-
tances takes place in the ‘community’. In fact, migrant associations, often called
hometown associations (HTAs) in the United States, organize migrants from vari-
ous Latin American countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
and the Dominican Republic. HTAs regularly send donations to finance investment
in community projects and local development in the home countries.11 Migrants’
associations of former El Salvadorians send home donations of about US$10,000 per
year, while those of Mexicans send home between US$5,000–25,000 per year (see
Ellerman 2003). These are small numbers but in the recipient countries these sums
can still have an impact. In the Mexican state of Zacatecas, the federal and local
government match every dollar (it may be a two-for-one or three-for-one) donated
by HTAs to local projects oriented to small infrastructure projects on water treat-
ment, schools, roads, parks, etc. Through this programme, more than 400 projects
11 See chapter by Micklewright and Wright in this volume on the role of private donations, mainly from
foundations and other vehicles, as a source of development finance.
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in Zacatecas have been completed in eight years. Total investment made by migrants
to these projects amounts to around US$4.5 million (World Bank 2002). In this way,
public savings are mobilized to finance small community projects, along with the
remittances.
The previous discussion suggests that the direct effects of remittances on investment
are bound to be on small community projects. Ratha (2003) cites instances of positive
effects on investment in such receiving countries as Mexico, Egypt, and sub-Saharan
Africa, where remittances have financed the building of schools, clinics, and other
infrastructure. In addition, return-migrants bring fresh capital that can help finance
investment projects.
Remittances also finance consumption; thus, private savings will increase pro-
portionally less than an increase in income from external remittances. A study of
remittances for Ecuador (Bendixen and Associates 2003) shows that around 60 per cent
of remittances to that country are spent on food, medicine, housing rent, and other
basic commodities; less than 5 per cent of remittances are used for the acquisition of
residential property.
The combined effects of remittances on investment and consumption can increase
output and growth. The sustainability of this effect is an open discussion. If remit-
tances are a response to recent migration, remittances may be transitory and thus their
effect on investment, consumption and growth can be more of a temporary nature. In
contrast, if migrants form associations and their commitment to their home country
becomes ‘institutionalized’, then the positive developmental effects of their remittances
may become more permanent.
The indirect growth effect of remittances on growth (or output) depends on the type
of emigrant leaving home, the state of the labour market, and the productivity of the
emigrant. If the emigrant is unskilled with low productivity, or an unemployed worker,
reflecting slack and excess supply in the labour market, then the effect of emigration
on output in the home country is bound to be small. In contrast, if the emigrant is a
highly skilled worker, an information technology expert or an entrepreneur with a high
direct and indirect contribution to output, the adverse growth effect of high-skilled
emigration is bound to be large (see Solimano 2001, 2002a).
One negative effect of (substantial) remittances is the possibility that they produce
the so-called ‘Dutch disease’ effect.12 In countries receiving substantial amounts in
remittances, there is a tendency for the real exchange rate to appreciate which then
penalizes non-traditional exports and hampers the development of the tradable goods
sector.
Remittances may also have a poverty reducing and income distribution effect. As men-
tioned above, the recipient of remittances is often a low-income family whose offspring
has left the country to work abroad. In a way, emigration is an effort to escape poverty
12 This effect is extensive to all kinds of transfers, not only to remittances.
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at home13 and to improve the income-earning capacity of the emigrant by attempting
to enter a foreign labour market in a richer country. At the same time, remittances
serve to alleviate the poverty of the migrant’s family in the home country by supple-
menting its income through transfers. The negative side of this is that remittances may
create a ‘culture of dependence’ on the income from remittances. This, in turn, can
impair efforts to escape poverty through education and work. The distributive effect
of remittances is another dimension of the development effects of remittances.14 Stark
(1991) studies the effects of remittances on domestic inequality in two Mexican vil-
lages near the US border in which villagers engage in internal rural–urban migration
as well as in migration to the United States. The study finds that remittances from
internal migrants are correlated more with the years of schooling than remittances
from international migrants to the United States, as the later often go to low-skilled
labour-intensive jobs. Stark (1991) generalizes that the inequality impact of changes in
remittances depends on the recipients’ position in the village income distribution scale,
the share of remittances in the village incomes and the distribution of the remittances
themselves. These variables in turn depend on the distribution of human capital (edu-
cation and skills) among the villagers and the migration opportunities of the villages.
Another piece of evidence is provided by Ratha (2003) who reports that a household
data survey for Pakistan shows that the share of income originating from external
transfers increases with the income level (the households with the highest incomes
receive the largest shares of their income from remittances). So remittances might
appear to be increasing local inequality However, income distribution between countries
may eventually improve with remittances, as income is redistributed from source coun-
tries with a higher income level to receiving countries with a lower income per capita.
As seen in Section 9.2, remittances represent a very significant share of GDP in several
low-income countries.
A final remark here: the development effect of remittances depends on the ‘life-
cycle’ of the whole migration process at the country level. In fact, in instances where
the source countries have expanding economies with rising per capita incomes, the dif-
ferentials across countries in the income per head will diminish, reducing the incentives
for emigration. Thus, the relative importance of remittances is likely to decline as a
country moves up the development ladder. This is valid mainly for remittances from
low-skilled migrants, however. In the case of highly skilled well-educated individuals,
migration flows are likely to continue at the high per capita income levels, as has been
seen within the European Union or between Europe and the United States. In this case,
remittances may continue although their economic effects are probably quite differ-
ent than those discussed earlier when the recipients of remittances are the developing
countries.
13 However, extreme poverty may also impede emigration, as the very poor may not be able to finance
the costs of migrating to a foreign country.
14 The distributive effects of remittances in the home country are more ambiguous. The issue is
investigated in Barham and Boucher (1998).
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9.5. THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
FOR REMITTANCES
Remittances are channelled through financial entities such as MTOs, post offices,
travel agencies, couriers, informal financial institutions, etc. MTOs owned and run by
immigrants (or naturalized citizens of the same ethnic or national group) are denomin-
ated as ‘ethnic stores’. Commercial banks are also in the remittances business, but are
generally not important players (see Table 9.5). These financial intermediaries often
charge fees for money transfers well above their marginal costs (see Orozco 2003). The
most important MTO at the global level is Western Union with branches in many
countries, followed by MoneyGram and Thomas Cook. The less competitive, more
concentrated and more segmented the market for remittances, the higher the costs
of the remittances. There are a number of reasons why the international market for
remittances tends to be a thin and poorly competitive (only few players dominate the
market and costs of intermediation are high). First, the legal status of the migrant send-
ing the remittance is not always regularized. Some migrants have resident (working)
visas, others are waiting for their visas to be processed and others are simply ‘illegal’.
Commercial banks are reluctant to enter the financial services market for low-income
migrants whose immigration status often is not regularized.15 The result is a less com-
petitive market, where furthermore migrants are not well integrated as customers in
the formal banking circuits. Second, it is important to note that worker remittances
are small-scale transactions. In Latin America, the typical remittance per migrant is
in the range of US$200–300 per month.16 As individual transactions (remittances) are
small, service standardization is needed for the remittances market to become a prof-
itable activity at competitive fees. In this context, high fees may compensate for the
cost of small transactions.17 Finally, other factors that affect the market for remittances
include exchange rate risk, government regulations for foreign exchange transactions
in the receiving country and regulations in the sending country such as licensing costs.
Costs of remittances
Let us turn now to the efficiency of the market for remittances to the Andean region.
If the costs of remittances are above the marginal cost (including a normal return to
capital) of sending money, then the amount of the remittances is below the socially
optimal level. As a consequence, consumption, investment, and output opportunities
foregone in the receiving country cannot be realized.
15 In the United States, banks request people (migrants) to provide a tax identification number, TIN,
as a requisite for opening a bank account. In addition, some banks have recently accepted consular iden-
tification cards for opening bank accounts. Many migrants are totally compliant with tax returns even if
their immigration status is not regular. 16 See Orozco (2002) and Solimano (2003).
17 In the aggregate, however, this is a sector that mobilizes a large volume of resources: aggregate
remittances for Latin America were on the order of US$32 billion in 2002 for the main twelve recipient
countries in Latin America (see IMF 2003).
192 A. Solimano
The work by Orozco (2001, 2002) highlights two main cost components of sending
remittances:
Total charges for remittances = explicit fee + exchange rate spread.
Companies charge a (explicit) fee that can be a percentage of the amount remitted
or a fixed amount (often in dollars). The fee usually depends on the services offered
(speed and type of delivery, etc.). The exchange rate spread is the difference between
the exchange rate applied by the MTO to convert dollars into local currency and the
market (e.g. interbank) exchange rate. MTOs usually offer the sender a less favourable
exchange rate than the market rate. This is an additional source of profits for companies
transmitting money and an additional cost component for the user.
The average cost of sending a remittance of US$200 through a commercial bank
to selected non-Latin American countries is 7 per cent compared to the 12 per cent
charged by such MTOs as Western Union and MoneyGram (Table 9.6).18 Clearly,
sending money through the bank is less expensive than sending it through the MTOs.
Banks also offer a variety of money transfer services and charges decline substantially
when the remittance is deposited with the same bank at both source and destination





Number of companies reviewed All businesses
Banks MTOsa Other
Philippines United States 5 14 5 24










Portugal France, USA 3 2 5







Bangladesh UK 1 3 4
Ghana UK 7 7
Notes: a Money transfer operators.
Source: Orozco (2003).
18 Table 9.5 reports the countries and companies studied to determine the costs of remittances according
to major source/destination countries and type of financial operator.
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Table 9.6. Average costs of sending money to
selected non-Latin American countries
Type For a remittance of US$200
FX % Fee % Total %
Bank 1.0 6.5 7.0
Major MTO 1.7 10.9 12.0
Source: Orozco (2003).
Table 9.7. Charges by types of operators for sending a
remittance of US$200 to selected countries (%)
Country Type of business
Bank Ethnic store/ Major MTO
exchange house
Egypt — — 13.8
Philippines 8.0 10.1 10.3
India 6.0 2.5 13.8
Greece 6.8 — 9.5
Pakistan 0.4 3.0 13.0
Portugal 3.4 — 12.3
Turkey 3.1 — 9.5
Mozambique 1.0 —
Mean 7.0 6.0 12.0
Source: Orozco (2003).
countries. Foreign exchange spreads represent around 14 per cent of the total costs
of remittances to non-Latin American countries. However, the country averages mask
significant cross-country differences in the costs of sending remittances. For example,
according to Table 9.7 drawn from Orozco (2003), the cost of sending money through
banks is the lowest for Pakistan and the highest for the Philippines. These costs are
much more uniform but also higher when money is sent through the major MTOs (in
the range of 9.5–13.8 per cent).
The cost of sending money from the United States to Latin America is in the range
of 8–9 per cent (see Table 9.8). Interestingly, as a share of total costs, the component
of exchange rate spreads is twice as high for remittances to Latin American than to
non-Latin American destinations. In fact, the exchange rate spread component for the
latter is around 14 per cent of total costs of sending a remittance while it is nearly 28 per
cent for Latin American recipients. Finally, let us look at the costs of remittances for the
Andean region. Table 9.9 provides the average cost or charge of sending remittances
of US$200, 250, and 300 to Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. The
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Table 9.8. Average charges for sending a remittance of
US$200 from the United States to Latin America
(in US$ dollars, and as %)
Charges November 2001 November 2002
US$ % US$ %
Total charge 20.06 10.10 17.02 8.50
FX charge 4.73 2.44 2.97 1.48
Fee charge 15.33 7.66 14.05 7.02
Source: Orozco (2003).
Table 9.9. Cost of remittances from the United States to the Andean Countries
(in local currency versus US$, averages per country)
Amount Country Currency Exchange Fee charge Total charge
Level % Level % Level %
US$200 Colombia Local 9.30 4.65 10.67 5.33 19.96 9.98
Dollar 0.00 0.00 12.33 6.17 12.33 6.17
Ecuador Dollar 0.00 0.00 11.23 5.62 11.23 5.62
Bolivia Local 6.50 3.25 21.00 10.50 27.50 13.75
Dollar 0.00 0.00 16.80 8.40 16.80 8.40
Peru Local −3.54 −1.77 18.50 9.25 14.96 7.48
Dollar 0.00 0.00 13.00 6.50 13.00 6.50
Venezuela Local 12.04 6.02 15.00 7.50 27.04 13.52
Dollar 0.00 0.00 21.00 10.50 21.00 10.50
US$250 Colombia Local 11.62 4.65 13.25 5.30 24.87 9.95
Dollar 0.00 0.00 15.39 6.16 15.39 6.16
Ecuador Dollar 0.00 0.00 13.96 5.58 13.96 5.58
Bolivia Local 8.12 3.25 27.00 10.80 35.12 14.05
Dollar 0.00 0.00 20.80 8.32 20.80 8.32
Peru Local −4.42 −1.77 22.50 9.00 18.08 7.23
Dollar 0.00 0.00 16.25 6.50 16.25 6.50
Venezuela Local 15.05 6.02 18.75 7.50 33.80 13.52
Dollar 0.00 0.00 25.00 10.00 25.00 10.00
US$300 Colombia Local 13.95 4.65 14.88 4.96 28.82 9.61
Dollar 0.00 0.00 17.22 5.74 17.22 5.74
Ecuador Dollar 0.00 0.00 15.38 5.13 15.38 5.13
Bolivia Local 9.75 3.25 27.00 9.00 36.75 12.25
Dollar 0.00 0.00 22.40 7.47 22.40 7.47
Peru Local −5.31 −1.77 24.00 8.00 18.69 6.23
Dollar 0.00 0.00 17.83 5.94 17.83 5.94
Venezuela Local 18.05 6.02 20.00 6.67 38.05 12.68
Dollar 0.00 0.00 29.00 9.67 29.00 9.67
Source: Solimano (2003).
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data are based on a survey conducted in January 2003 of MTOs and ethnic stores in
the United States that are engaged in the remittances industry with these countries.19
Table 9.9 gives the costs of a money transfer to be delivered in dollars and in local
currency. The percentage charges are systematically lower across countries for dollar
remittances than local currency remittances, ranging from 3 to 5 percentage points. For
remittances of US$200–250, the costs vary from 5.6 to 13.8 per cent, and for amounts
of US$300, between 5.1 and 12.7 per cent. In general, charges decline with the amount
remitted, but there are significant differences in individual countries. Ecuador has the
lowest charges and Venezuela the highest. An important factor explaining the lower
charges for money remitted to Ecuador is that the exchange rate spread component of
total costs (for the sender) is eliminated because the country’s official currency is the
US dollar. This is an important result: Ecuador, the Andean economy to have adopted
the US dollar, enjoys lower costs for remittances than an economy with a national
currency.20
9.6. POLICIES TO REDUCE COSTS OF REMITTANCES
AND ENHANCE THEIR DEVELOPMENT IMPACT
As we have documented in this chapter, the cost of sending money transfers to devel-
oping countries is high, and this leads to an inefficient level of transfers. How to reduce
the costs of sending money abroad? How to increase competition in the international
market for transfers? How to enhance the development impact of remittances in the
receiving countries? Measures are needed on both the sending side as well as the
recipient side.
9.6.1. The Sending-Country Perspective
‘Formalization’ of the legal status of the migrant would certainly promote greater
access by the migrant to a variety of bank services, including remittances services.
This should lower the costs of remittances. For example, the use of ATM cards for
making transfers rather than the current, more costly methods can be an effective
mechanism for reducing the costs of remittances.
Another factor that apparently prevents a competitive atmosphere in the remittances
business in the United States is the cost of procuring a license for becoming an MTO,
which is about US$100,000 per each state where operations are to be conducted.
Prospective money operators find this cost high.
It is important also to avoid increases in transaction costs, or to add to the regu-
lations governing worker remittances to reflect the mounting controls on financial
intermediaries for preventing money laundering or the financing of terrorism.
19 See Solimano (2003).
20 See Beckerman and Solimano (2002) for an analysis of the macroeconomic and social impact of official
dollarization in Ecuador.
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In sum, we believe that increasing the efficiency of the market for remittances
requires:
(i) The costs of licensing for new operators to be contained or reduced so as to make
the process of certification of new financial intermediaries in the remittances
business less costly and more expedite.
(ii) The process of granting residence visas and/or citizenship to be expedited so as
to avoid long visa processing periods for migrants (which currently can take up
to several years, at least in the United States). This would help to regularize the
immigrant sector, inviting commercial banks to target the financial needs of the
migrants.
(iii) Domestic banks (particularly those with an international scope) to be encouraged
to develop new product lines for migrants such as chequeing or savings account,
remittances services, etc. The creation of ‘banks for migrants’ is an idea worth
exploring.
The remittance-receiving nations would benefit from a more efficient and less costly
market for remittances. Currently, a significant slice of remittances goes to operators
as profits rather than to families of migrants in developing countries. This has adverse
efficiency effects and is socially regressive.
9.6.2. The Recipient-Country Perspective
From the viewpoint of recipient countries, leveraging remittances and enhancing their
productive use for development are two important issues. There are various mech-
anisms for leveraging remittances in the receiving countries: governments and local
financial institutions can issue bonds targeted for emigrants, who would thus earn
interest, and it would create a more attractive instrument for channelling remittances.
In addition, housing and education accounts can be created to channel remittances to
various productive uses in the home country, such as investment in durables (housing)
and education (investment in human capital).
The development of alliances between domestic banks in the receiving countries and
banks, credit unions and MTOs in the sending nations can help to increase efficiency
and reduce costs in the remittances market. Mechanisms to ensure a productive use
of remittances include the mobilization of HTAs similar to those that have evolved in
the United States in recent years (Mexican migrants have been very active in creating
HTAs and are being helped by their government in this effort).
Finally, taxing remittances (mainly worker remittances) in the sending countries or
in the receiving economies does not seem to be a good idea.21 These are transfers,
sent in general by and to low-income groups. So, it is doubly inequitable that such
flows, based on income that has already subject to the income tax system of the sending
country, should be taxed. In receiving countries, remittances are a source of foreign
exchange, a complement of national savings and a transfer to low- to medium-income
21 Another possibility is to make remittances tax deductible.
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groups. It is unclear what the social gain would be if governments were to interfere
directly with these income flows in any way to diminish them.
9.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter examines the developmental and financial dimensions of remittances from
international migrants. Remittances are currently the second most important source
of development finance at the global level after FDI. Also, they are more stable than
private capital flows such as portfolio investment and bank credit. The sustainability
over time of remittances as a source of income for developing countries depends also
on the cycle of migration (recent versus older migration) and the expected flows of
migration. Remittances have become a very significant source of development finance
for several developing countries. They are a source of foreign exchange; they support
the consumption levels of low-to-middle-income families and constitute a direct source
for funding small, community–oriented investment projects through the migrants’
associations that send donations home in support of these projects (the so-called ‘com-
munity remittances’). From a social point of view, remittances can have a positive
poverty-reducing effect, as families receiving remittances from migrants are often
low-income people. However, the recipient syndrome of relying on remittances for
income should be avoided. Properly mobilized remittances can contribute to increased
investment in basic infrastructure such as water, roads, low-income housing, school-
buildings, investment in human capital (education), and help to finance micro and
small-scale firms. For remittance-sending countries, remittances represent a market-
based international transfer to developing countries that indirectly reduces the demand
for ODA.
Still, we have to recognize that earning foreign exchange through remittances entails
an implicit tradeoff in the form of an outflow of skilled manpower from the sending
countries.
Currently, the potential development impact of remittances is impaired, in part, by
the existence of a costly, concentrated and poorly competitive international market for
remittances. Empirical evidence shows that the costs of remittances are above what the
marginal costs of (electronically) transferring funds provided that electronic transfers
are possible. Although the involvement of commercial banks in the remittances market
is still small, evidence shows that the costs of sending remittances tend to be lower when
transferred through banks rather than through international MTOs. In addition, there
are differences in the costs of sending remittances to non-Latin American countries
compared to Latin American countries: the exchange rate spread component is higher
for remittances sent to Latin American countries than to non-Latin American coun-
tries. Our empirical analysis, based on a detailed survey of MTOs in the United States
who operate within the Andean region, shows that the total cost of remittances for these
countries vary from 5 to 12 per cent of the value remitted depending on the type of
currency to be delivered, destination country, type of financial operator involved, and
other factors. Reducing the costs of sending remittances by, say, 5 percentage points
could increase the amount of remittances received by developing countries by a few
billion.
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What can be done to increase competition and reduce costs in the remittances
market? In the sending countries, facilitating the process of opening bank accounts for
immigrants could be an important step for integrating the migrant community into
the financial system of the host country. This would increase competition and reduce
the costs of remittances. On the other hand, the costs of licensing for new operators
and other regulations on the part of banks and non-bank intermediaries wishing to
provide services for migrants should be minimal to as to avoid creating entry barriers
into the this market. Also, efforts for controlling money laundering or the financing
of terrorism should not unnecessarily increase the costs to emigrants of sending home
remittances. On the recipient side, the issuance of remittance bonds, the opening of
foreign currency accounts for migrant workers in the home country, the creation of
facilities for voluntary donations to projects are all measures to leverage remittances
for development. In turn, the creation of education and housing accounts at home for
migrants could help to enhance the productive and social use of remittances proceeds.
Also encouraging the return of emigrants—bringing fresh capital, new ideas, and
international contacts—can be a promising way to attract remittances for growth and
development in receiving countries.
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Transfers by governments to low-income countries, whether to their governments or
their citizens, through agencies such as the UN, or directly, are part of the global fiscal
system of taxes and subsidies. We can think about optimal global taxes and subsidies,
as they might be instituted by a world government. There is no possibility that such
a system will be implemented, but it might provide a reference point to illuminate or
suggest more realistic policy options; or a moral challenge that will merely leave us
deeply uncomfortable.
Here is a specific, too simple model, of a kind many of us have used to think about
optimal national tax systems. It is a timeless model, where income and consumption
are the same, and people’s labour is the only input into production of goods that will
be used for private or government consumption. People have utility u(c, ), where
c is income, net of taxes and subsidies, and  is labour supplied. u is, as we usu-
ally assume, concave, increasing in the first argument, decreasing in the second. The
difference between people is that they have different productivities w. Assuming com-
petitive conditions, a person’s income before taxes and subsidies is w. This income is
the base for determining transfers, whether to or from the individual.
If an optimal system of transfers is one that maximizes the sum of individual utilities,
it is to be expected that it would involve substantial positive taxes on almost every-
one in the richer countries and substantial transfers to the majority of households in
lower-income countries. There would also be transfers to governments in low-income
countries to pay for public consumption. One would imagine that the optimal provision
of public facilities like police and security, water supply, roads, schools, and health care
would be rather similar in real (PPP, purchasing power parity) per capita terms among
countries, and indeed that might be the most dramatic difference between an optimal
world economy and a system of optimal national economies with only small transfers
between nations.
Because of incentive considerations, marginal tax rates would not necessarily be any
higher in an optimal world than in optimal nations, even if average tax rates would
Paper prepared for the UNU-WIDER Conference on Sharing Global Prosperity, September 2003, Helsinki,
Finland.
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be higher in rich countries, and lower (even sometimes negative) in poorer ones. It
is interesting to consider this further. Unfortunately, there is a terrible lack of good
general propositions in optimal tax theory: we must rely on qualitative differences that
can be seen in numerical examples, or differences that are clear between extreme cases,
and are likely to apply to most intermediate cases in a similar way.
It seems that world inequality in relative incomes is somewhat greater than inequality
within most (but certainly not all) countries. We may take it that something similar is
true of inequality in wage rates, though that is not easy to observe directly. Differences
between countries in lifetime hours of work, though certainly quite marked, are clearly
not at all as large as differences of income, and therefore inequality of wage rates should
be somewhat similar to inequality of incomes. The question then is how inequality of
wage rates affects optimal tax rates, most particularly marginal tax rates. The answer
we expect is that greater inequality will be associated with higher marginal tax rates.
At the extreme of perfect equality, taxation can be lumpsum, with everyone paying
the same amount of tax, and a marginal tax rate of zero. Thus, at least at small degrees
of inequality, marginal tax rates should increase with inequality. (At the same time, we
should remember that two-class models have been constructed in which the optimal
marginal tax rates are negative (Allen 1982), though they are probably not too close to
reality.) At the opposite extreme, when there are only very high-productivity people
and very low-productivity people, the optimal schedule c = x(w) must be close to
one of the high-w people’s indifference curves. According to a familiar argument, we
would want the high-w person to choose a point on that schedule where the slope was
equal to the wage. Her marginal tax rate would be zero (just as in the no-inequality
case), but she would still pay a substantial total tax, to be compared with the subsidy
received by low-w individuals. The zero marginal tax rate feature is an artefact of the
unrealistic assumption that it is perfectly known what the highest w (though the w of
any particular individual is unknown to the taxing authority); but we can still derive
instruction from this crude model.
One measure of progressivity in the tax system (though not one that has been used
to my knowledge) is the difference in tax paid by richest and poorest divided by the
difference in incomes. Call this the incremental tax rate. It is an average of marginal
tax rates across the whole income range. As a particularly simple case, take a two-class
economy with pure redistribution, that is to say, no public consumption. Compare
across models with the same average product per person, but low and high wages
diverging. When the divergence is large, all the work is done by those with high w. In a
wide range of cases (with utility additively separable in the two arguments) it is found
that the incremental tax rate converges to one as the high wage tends to infinity. There
is a sense, therefore, in which as inequality increases, the progressivity of the system
increases, and indeed with this measure becomes as great as possible, despite the fact
that the marginal tax rate at the highest income levels is zero.
We do not have to rely on extreme examples of this kind for evidence that, on
average, marginal tax rates increase as inequality increases. Numerical calculations
have supported this conjecture. But, particularly at higher income levels, the rate at
which marginal tax rates increase as inequality increases turns out to be quite slow.
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The simplest tax system is a linear one, creating a universal budget constraint
c = (1 − t)w + b
with constant marginal tax rate t applying at all income levels and a fixed lumpsum
payment b. b is roughly equivalent to personal allowances in the income tax, along with
welfare benefits and education and publicly provided health expenditures. Consider-
ing that greater inequality seems to imply greater marginal tax rates, but that world
inequality is, in proportional terms, not much greater than inequality within most
countries, we would expect a world optimal system to have a slightly larger level of t
than is optimal for single nations without significant international transfers, whereas b
would be much smaller than is appropriate for high-income countries, and larger, no
doubt considerably larger, than would be appropriate for low-income countries (if they
were to implement such a safety net). The different level of b is primarily dictated by
the different level of average product in the different countries and the world.
As a consequence, people whose productivity is high even within a rich country
would have a budget constraint not very different from that they currently experience,
since the lumpsum element of the tax system is (and should be) small relative to their
after-tax labour income. Paradoxically, the introduction of a world optimal tax/subsidy
system would have the greatest negative impact (in relative terms) on middle-income
people, while the greatest positive impact would, of course, be for people with the lowest
productivity. In a sense, an optimal tax system will go far to extract as much revenue
as possible from the richest in society, so that any further revenue requirement, as a
result of joining a redistributive world tax system (or, more moderately, for increased
foreign aid) will have to be drawn, to a considerable extent, from those in the middle
of the income distribution.
10.2. TAXATION FOR AID
It is natural, then, to consider nations whose governments choose some fixed level of
development assistance, presumably not the level that would be implicit in a world-
optimal tax and transfer system, but where, within each country, national welfare is
maximized. The arguments already developed can be modified to address the question
how taxes should change if there is to be an increase in the development assistance grant.
When doing calculations of optimal linear income taxation, Nicholas Stern noticed
that an increase in the revenue requirement for public consumption had little effect
on the marginal tax rate: additional expenditure was to be financed to a considerable
extent by a reduction on the lumpsum subsidy which we have denoted by b. This
observation corresponds closely to the argument developed in the previous section.
It is difficult to tell how general or relevant this result is. One way of throwing some
light on the question is to look at the inverse problem and ask for what utility functions
the result would be exactly true in the simple model we are using. The answer is that the
optimal marginal tax rate is independent of the government expenditure requirement
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when (and, in a certain sense, only when)
u(c, ) = −(k − c)m − m, k > 0, m > 0.
It is shown in an appendix that this utility function implies the stated result: the neces-
sity theorem is more involved and less interesting and is omitted. This is certainly a
somewhat peculiar utility function, with a maximum level of desirable consumption,
and no upper bound to the labour that a person can supply. Yet it may not be a bad
approximation to people’s consumption/labour preferences. It shows that in accept-
able models, it is optimal to finance increased government consumption entirely by
reduction of the uniform subsidy. Indeed it shows, implicitly, that there must be accept-
able models in which the marginal tax rate would actually fall when the government
expenditure requirement increased.
The conclusion is that, broadly, increased aid should come from everyone. That is
to say, if it is generally recognized that development assistance does more good than
had previously been appreciated, it is implied that the tax structure should be modified
in such a way as to generate more revenue in an optimal manner, and that may involve
only small increases in taxes on labour (and commodities).
A dual question to this is whether, when it is recognized that new revenue raising
taxes are desirable, for example, to reduce smoking, or consumption of cholesterol, or
environmentally damaging goods, it follows that more should be spent on foreign aid
(and desirable public goods). No, it does not follow.
The simplest example uses the same model as before. Suppose it is newly recognized
that production brings about global warming. In the model, we cannot allow for some
kinds of production doing that and others not, nor for the damage occurring at a
later date than the production. These would just complicate the analysis and lead
to broadly the same conclusions. For simplicity, suppose that the damaging effect of
global warming is just a reduction in production (actually at a different time, but all
periods are combined together here). In the model, everyone’s productivity is reduced
from w to kw, where k is a positive number less than one. Since individual producers
do not recognize the external impact of production, the competitive level of wages is
still w. One further simplification gives a neat, clean result: it will be assumed that
utility is a homogeneous function of consumption c.
The optimal budget constraint, with a given level of foreign aid, is then
c = (1 − t)kw + bk,
where the optimal levels of t and b are independent of k.
This conclusion follows from the fact that one feasible tax system is preferred to
another in the economy with k = 1, then both these tax systems remain feasible for the
economy with externality, if modified by the introduction of the factor k as above. And,
furthermore, everyone’s utility is multiplied by a factor that is a power of k. Thus the
order of preference between the two tax systems remains the same. Consequently, the
optimal tax system is deduced from the original optimal system simply by introducing
the factor k.
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The actual marginal tax rate is changed, of course. Denoting it by t′, we have
t′ = 1 − (1 − t)k = 1 − k + kt,
which is greater than t, and grows as k diminishes. It is true then that taxation (of labour
or, equivalently, goods) should be increased because of the environmental externality;
but the uniform subsidy b should be reduced to kb. People will be worse off than they
would have been if there were no externality, and their marginal utility of income (of b)
will be reduced. Consequently, the domestic welfare cost of giving foreign aid, or of
any revenue for public spending, is reduced. It follows that the case for foreign aid is
less strong.
It may be argued that it is a different matter if new taxes are introduced because of
a previously existing externality that had not been recognized. For this to modify the
conclusion, one must accept the idea that people recognized the reduced marginal util-
ity of income implied by environmental effects, but did not recognize the need for and
desirability of controlling policies. Then the optimal-tax account is not really appro-
priate to the issue. In effect, I have argued that people’s apparently simple-minded
intuition that increased (environmental) taxes make them worse off is essentially cor-
rect, and that governments should not be told that they are in some sense better off
and can afford to be more generous when they find that they ought to introduce these
new taxes.
10.3. INTERNATIONAL IMPACT AND FACTOR MOBILITY
In the previous section, it was taken for granted that there was well-defined mem-
bership of the welfare function, which is to say that there is no doubt as to whose
utility counts in determining the optimal tax system. In fact, there is considerable
movement of people, both long term and short term. In reality, tax laws are applied
in a bewildering mixture to residents, migrants, absentees, and nationals. It would be
hard to construct a rationale for the way they are applied. Some few countries apply
income taxation to nationals (or those with rights to reside and work) even when they
have been resident abroad for some time. Surprisingly, it is unusual for the tax law to
discriminate substantially against visitors or residents who are not entitled to vote.
The citizens of low-income countries often receive substantial remittances from
nationals or relatives abroad. It is a major source of foreign assistance. It is an attractive
proposal, then, that countries should tax their nationals (Bhagwati and Wilson 1989).
Nationals of low-income countries abroad are generally much more prosperous than
the average domestic resident. Such a move would surely benefit residents. The pro-
posal envisaged double taxation, with nationals abroad paying taxes both to country
of residence and country of nationality. It would be tidier and more natural to have an
international agreement whereby income taxation applied to nationals, not to residents,
with countries reporting people’s income to their country of nationality.
The practical difficulties are considerable. Price levels vary considerably among
countries. While there is no way of measuring PPP ‘correctly’—it is impossible to give
a rigorous definition of the concept—clearly some adjustment would have to be made.
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A much more serious difficulty is that different countries use commodity taxation and
factor-income taxation in different proportions. It is hard, too, to see how dual nation-
ality (which is often a desirable status) should be handled, and how family taxation
(dependent allowances and joint taxation) should operate when different members of
the household have different nationalities. Probably the most serious objection is that
many people would be sufficiently unaltruistic or unpatriotic that they would adopt a
national flag of convenience. It is a matter of regret, but the idea of reconstructing the
international allocation of tax bases is not worth pursuing.
10.4. SUPRANATIONAL TAXATION
A world agency might be given some taxation power, but probably not simply for
development assistance. There are many cases where countries should negotiate to
ensure that taxation on some commodity is at more or less the same rate in different
countries. The European Union has been trying to achieve ‘harmonization’ of many
taxes, without committing itself to anything like an equal tax-rate principle. It has not
created any supranational taxes. On the other hand, the Common Agricultural Policy
constitutes a system of supranational subsidies. Also there are rules for transfers of parts
of tax revenues to central funds, which come close to creating supranational taxes.
There are cases where efficient and reliable administration seems to suggest a supra-
national agency. Taxes on the combustion of hydrocarbons might well have been done
that way (except that we know it would not be accepted by many governments). At
least a tax on aircraft fuel, which is much to be desired, could be administered supra-
nationally. The Tobin tax, on foreign exchange transactions, could also be done that
way. The main point is to ensure common tax rates for tax rates in different locations.
If there were such supranational taxes, should the revenue be used for aid? There
is no particular reason why the international nature of the revenue flow constitutes
an argument for using the revenue for an international cause. Presumably, interna-
tional causes would include financing UN administration, refugees, and UN military
operations as well as development aid. But the connection is merely terminological.
The existence of international revenue, if any, does not strengthen the claims of devel-
opment assistance (and these other international expenditures), and it is hard to see
why governments or voters would think it. The best one can say is that it might be
politically possible for a novel revenue source to be used for purposes that international
civil servants and members of NGOs find attractive, because its novelty might mean
that other claimants, such as national governments, would not be quick to secure it
for themselves.
It is also possible for a supranational agency to undertake profit-making activities,
the proceeds from which could be available for aid. In effect, the World Bank is such
an agency, using borrowing and lending as its instruments. It is hard to think of other
opportunities. Production should require little skill, and yet the operation should be
profitable. The proposal of a global lottery is an interesting and promising one, since
lotteries appear to constitute an industry where entrants can still make substantial
profits, presumably because of national regulation. It is only socially optimal to have
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a high cost of gambling (which is what these profitable lotteries provide), if gambling
ought to be discouraged. It is then rather dubious to try to increase supply. It is a bit
like increasing the production of tobacco or other drugs as a way of getting revenue.
10.5. SUBSIDIES AND TRANSFERS
Subsidies are as much a part of public finance as taxes. We should, therefore, look at
the expenditure side of development assistance as well as at the generation of revenue
for it.
The general tax model we started with does not at first sight appear to describe very
well the way that development assistance operates. Provision of schools and health
care is rather close to the idea of a general uniform subsidy, if everyone is entitled to
the same facilities, or at least does not pay or have entitlement related to income. The
distribution of food aid can locally be of similar character. Grants to governments seem
rather different. But where the recipient government is efficient and not corrupt, these
grants do also fit the model fairly well, with the government using the funds as part
of its revenues, influencing the level of subsidies to individual households as well as
taxes. When aid is given in the form of finance for public projects, whether as pure
aid or loans with concessionary terms, that should mean that part of government
expenditure is being paid for by aid, so that required tax revenue within the recipient
country is reduced.
It is clear that the form of the tax/subsidy system within the recipient countries is
of great importance. Generally, in the lower-income countries, these systems are not
very progressive as tax systems. It is supposed to be difficult to redistribute in poor,
particularly in agricultural, countries. No doubt, the leakages from a general system
of subsidies to farming households, both through administrative costs and corruption,
are great. That reduces the marginal social value of subsidies (represented by b in the
model), and means that the optimal tax system should be less progressive than would
otherwise have been desirable. There are also leakages in the collection of taxes and in
the disbursement of funds for public or private investment. The latter makes public
spending (g) less desirable than otherwise. The former consideration has ambiguous
implications: the adverse incentive effects of higher marginal tax rates may be less when
there is considerable evasion. Though one must allow for unfair variation in effective
(as opposed to legislated) tax rates, higher legislated rates may be needed to raise the
actual tax revenue.
The main issue is what form the tax system should take when there are substantial
errors in the observation of income, or, equivalently, in the transfers (whether taxes or
subsidies). Little work has been done on the problem. A preliminary conclusion, from a
model with no explicit incentive effects, is that the formal (i.e. legislated) progressivity
of the system should not necessarily be less because of measurement errors.
On balance, subsidy leakages probably imply that the tax system should be somewhat
less progressive than in high-income countries. But there is nevertheless a strong case
for bringing pressure on recipient countries to make their systems more redistributive,
pressure that might well take the form of aid conditionality. Certain forms of aid
Global Public Economics 207
are much less at the mercy of corruption and ineffiency than others, particularly aid
programmes that are directly administered by international agencies, or at least that
is what one hopes. One should perhaps question the common assumption that aid
is always best given in the form of capital investment, rather than for consumption.
Perhaps gifts of money (like the model) are best?
10.6. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS AND TAXATION
Private voluntary contributions to development assistance are not negligible. When
one remembers that much official aid has been in the form of concessionary loans,
and the official figures have included many expenditures that are really only aid to
manufacturers in the donor country and of little net benefit (after loan repayments)
to the recipient, one realizes that private aid has been a quite substantial proportion of
total aid to developing countries. It is worth modelling, so that we can consider whether
and how it is to be increased.
Suppose people make voluntary contributions to aid because the income that
recipients get contributes to their utility. (This assumption is not consistent with
experimental evidence that people would not give more to larger groups.) Denote
contributions by xi. According to the hypothesis,







This way of modelling has different people with different income yi , and places
different weight on the value of aid receipts. The amount people give provides
some information about the value placed on aid, but of course is also influenced by
their income.
Consider what would maximize the sum of utilities. Maximizing
∑
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yields a very different outcome: much larger values of contributions to aid are implied.
A similar result is obtained if we seek to maximize the median voter’s utility. To do this
calculation, of course we need to know incomes and the value placed on recipient utility.
Income we may observe directly. ai should be deduced from the amount an individual
would choose to give. We can arrange for the value placed on aid to be revealed by
individual choice if we introduce matching grants, so that a voluntary contribution x
is expanded to Mx. (A more general function could be used.) The matching element
comes from compulsory contributions, that is, taxation. We can let it be a proportional
tax on income.
This will not in equilibrium bring about the welfare maximum, but a second-best.
The second-best would be the welfare maximum if everyone were identical. In that case
the optimal value of M is the number of people. More generally, we get a moderately
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complicated expression approximately equal to the number of people. When people all





This is an absurdly large number, of course, and would mean people made extremely
small individual contributions that get multiplied up to aid that would be a substantial
part of total incomes. People could not calculate correctly. One cannot really take the
result seriously, and yet it suggests a case for much more generous matching than
is provided by tax systems in which voluntary contributions to charitable causes are
simply tax exempt.
10.7. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE EXPANSION
On the whole a public finance approach to development assistance is not sympathetic
to some of the main proposals for expansion, using revenue from environmental taxes
or a Tobin tax. Yet it acknowledges a strong case for increasing aid by government and
by individuals. Two proposals that are rather utopian suggest themselves from a public
finance perspective:
1. Introduce a voluntary additional income tax to be used for development assistance,
this tax to be matched by a substantial multiplier from general revenues. The indi-
vidual would choose what percentage rate should be applied to income. Matching
by a double contribution from general revenues would not be unjustified.
2. High-income countries with particularly low tax systems, which are to a consid-
erable extent tax havens, might be induced by international pressure to institute a
supplementary income tax on income arising in their territories, the income from
which should be used for development aid.
APPENDIX: CONDITIONS FOR MARGINAL TAX RATES TO BE
INDEPENDENT OF THE REVENUE REQUIREMENT
It will be verified that when the sum of utilities is maximized, utility functions take
the form
u(c, ) = −(k − c)m − m, k > 0, m > 0,
the budget constraint is
c = (1 − t)w + b
and the overall resource constraint is
E[c − w] = g
(where we use the operator E for averaging over the population), then, regardless of
the distribution of marginal products w, optimal t is independent of g.
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Utility maximization by the consumer implies that for someone with wage w, 
maximizes −[k − (1 − t)w − b]m − m, so that
(1 − t)w[k − (1 − t)w − b]m−1 = m−1.
Solving this equation for , and introducing the temporary notation v = (1 − t)w,
we have
 = (v1/(1−m) + v)−1(k − b)
and from this we deduce that
c = k − (v−m/(1−m) + 1)−1(k − b)
Substituting these expressions into the utility function, we find that a w-person’s
utility is
−(v−m/(1−m) + 1)1−m(k − b)m.






subject to the resource constraint, which we can now calculate: it is
t




(k − b) = b + g,
which can be rewritten to give a formula for k − b:
k − b =
{
1 + t
















This has to be maximized with respect to t (remember that v = (1 − t)w). g appears
in the maximand only in the final factor, which does not involve t. Therefore the level
of g does not affect the maximizing value of t. The result claimed is proved.
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This chapter draws on ideas from the fiscal federalism literature—where transfers from
better-off to less well-off regions are the norm—for guidance in the search for innovat-
ive new approaches to development finance. While it may be fanciful—or utopian—at
present to regard the world as a whole as a federation, thinking of it in this way is an
interesting point of reference. A global equalization scheme mimicking the way in which
redistributive finance occurs in a federation would lead to a pattern of official aid that
differs considerably from what we observe in practice. Contemplating such a scheme
and the principles behind it helps us understand how far problems with different pro-
posals for development funding are the result of the fact that there is no counterpart of
a central government, and how far they are the inevitable outcome of the cooperative
interaction of political entities with different objectives and interests.
It is worth highlighting at the outset some similarities and differences between
decisionmaking and institutions in federations and those that might be feasible in
a global setting. We have in mind relatively decentralized federations in which
sub-national governments have independent fiscal responsibilities. Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) examples include Australia,
Canada, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States, while Argentina, Brazil, India,
and Malaysia are examples from the developing world.
The similarities arise from the fact that, in both instances, the population is divided
among governing states that have more or less autonomous authority over their
fiscal affairs. Subnational governments, like nation-states, raise revenues to provide
goods, services, and transfers to their residents. Moreover, the decisions of indi-
vidual subnational governments may be taken independently of those of others. This
decentralization of authority gives rise to a number of relevant consequences.
Differences in average incomes. Residents of different states will inevitably have different
average incomes, and the states themselves will also be endowed with different amounts
Prepared for the UNU-WIDER project on Innovative Sources of Development Finance. The many
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of natural wealth. As well, there will be different degrees of social and economic
development. The disparities among subnations within nations may not be as great
as those between nations. Nonetheless, qualitatively similar issues arise with respect
to the desire to address these inequities through redistributive policies—the vertical
equity issue.
Differences in fiscal capacity. Related to the previous point, the decentralization of fiscal
responsibility will inevitably lead to states differing in their abilities to raise revenues
and in their needs for public expenditures. This implies that different levels of public
services can be provided at given tax rates across states. In the absence of corrective
measures, this can compromise efficiency in the allocation of resources across states by
giving rise to fiscally induced relocation. As originally observed by Buchanan (1950),
it also precludes the equal treatment of equals—horizontal equity—across the group of
states as a whole.
Spillover benefits and costs. Some policy issues transcend state borders and can only
be addressed by coordinated policies. Thus, nationwide public goods (e.g. defence)
provide benefits indiscriminately to residents of different subnational jurisdictions.
Spillover benefits or costs may occur from public goods and services that are delivered
at the subnational level (transportation facilities, cross-border pollution). And, goals
of redistributive equity (income redistribution, poverty alleviation, equality of oppor-
tunity, social insurance) may be viewed as national goals, analogous to national
public goods. Decentralization can cause inefficiencies to the extent that cross-border
spillovers of these sorts occur.
Fiscal externalities. Related to the above, fiscal decisions taken by one government
have indirect consequences for other governments because of the interdependency of
markets for products and factors of production. Tax or expenditure changes in one
jurisdiction may influence the allocation of factors or products across jurisdictions
(fiscal competition). Alternatively, the burden of tax changes in one jurisdiction may
be partly borne by agents in other jurisdictions, either at the same or a different
level (tax exporting, vertical fiscal externalities). These fiscal externalities give rise to
inefficiencies in the allocation of resources both within and across jurisdictions (Dahlby
1996).
Of course, offsetting these adverse consequences of decentralization are the bene-
fits (Oates 1999). Subnational levels of government can design their government
programmes with the needs, preferences, and values of local residents in mind.
Moreover, they might be able to deliver public services and target transfers to
their citizens more efficiently than a centralized government. The latter may be
less informed and less accountable to local citizens. An important dimension of the
case for decentralization is that it applies particularly to public services and tar-
geted transfers that are important instruments for addressing economic and social
development goals and redistributive equity more generally. Intergovernmental fiscal
arrangements in federations are in large part devoted to ensuring that subnational
governments have the capacity, the incentives and the discretion for delivering these
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programmes in a way that fosters equity and efficiency in the nation as a whole (Boadway
2001).
Parallel to these similarities, there are some critical differences between the situation
faced by a federation comprised of autonomous subnational governments and the
world economy comprised of independent nation-states. For one, the degree of mobil-
ity across state borders is typically much higher in federations than internationally.
Citizens can move freely across borders; a common currency and a common set of legal
and property rights institutions apply; and policies are better coordinated. While these
differences in mobility lead to greater efficiency in the allocation of resources in the
internal economic union, they also result in greater opportunities for inter-state extern-
alities and spillovers, and therefore the need for coordinated or harmonized policies.
Another important difference is that there is likely to be much more consensus
within federations than across nations for addressing the consequences of inequality of
resources, incomes, and opportunities across states. The fact of common nationhood
may imply that, despite the possibly lower degree of inequality across subnational
jurisdictions, the will to redistribute—the sense of national solidarity—may be higher
than exists between nation-states. And, the concern for horizontal equity may be more
of a policy issue across subnational governments in a federation than across nations in
the world economy.
The most important difference is that a federation has a national government with
substantive powers to address the adverse consequences of decentralized decision-
making. These powers typically include some degree of influence or even coercion
over subnational governments. An important dimension of decisionmaking in a fed-
eration is the assignment of responsibilities between the national and subnational
governments. Ideally, this is done in a way that represents the most reasonable com-
promise between achieving the benefits of decentralization while facilitating national
equity and efficiency objectives. This is typically fostered by an asymmetric division
of revenue-raising and expenditure responsibilities—a vertical fiscal gap—with the
national government retaining the lion’s share of revenue-raising, and transferring
revenues in excess of its own requirements to the subnational governments. Federal
government presence in the most important tax fields along with its ability to design
appropriate transfers to subnational governments provides it with the instruments
for addressing issues of redistributive equity, and avoiding to the greatest possible
extent the adverse consequences of fiscal externalities and differences in fiscal capa-
city. Moreover, the fiscal dominance of the national government enables it to play an
influential role in harmonizing taxation and expenditure policies of the subnational
governments to enhance the functioning of the federation.
The presence of a central government that attends to issues of nationwide interest
and has the coercive powers of taxation and spending distinguishes a federation from
a community of nations, whether that is the entire world or regional groupings like
the European Union. Since these latter groups have no strong central government,
the ability to raise revenues and to address matters of internation redistribution and
efficiency are considerably compromised. These tasks must necessarily be based on
voluntary agreement, perhaps facilitated by the delegation of administrative authority
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to a central institution. Nonetheless, the manner in which federal governments raise
revenues for the purposes of development-type objectives might be instructive as a
benchmark against which to evaluate possible new revenue sources to finance worldwide
development.
A natural starting point is to contemplate the case in which there is a national govern-
ment overseeing a fairly decentralized federal system consisting of several autonomous
subnational governments with independent fiscal authority. Both the accepted prin-
ciples and the practice of fiscal federalism should be instructive in this regard. Using
this as a benchmark, we can then consider financing arrangements in the more realistic
situation in which a world government does not exist or does not have the coercive
financial authority required to achieve the benchmark outcome. As a step towards that,
we contemplate the hypothetical case of a federation without a central government
after having discussed fiscal arrangements in a representative federation.
11.2. REVENUE-RAISING IN A FEDERAL SETTING
In a federation, the national and subnational levels of government typically share the
responsibilities for redistributive equity, poverty alleviation, and development. Many
of the nation’s public services, targeted transfers, and development investments are
provided under the authority of subnational governments. As well, the latter typically
apply redistributive tax-transfer systems alongside the national government, although
the degree varies from federation to federation. The national government assumes
overriding authority for ensuring that minimum standards of redistributive equity and
opportunities apply nationwide. Even where subnational governments are responsible
for delivering important programmes for economic development, opportunity, and
poverty alleviation, the federal government ordinarily assumes a significant share of the
financial costs. In keeping with the project objectives, our concern is with the revenue
sources used to fund these programmes rather than the design of the programmes
themselves.
We focus on an idealized federation, one that draws on best practices around the
world. In such a federation, expenditure responsibility will be more decentralized
than revenue decisions: there will be a vertical fiscal gap. The delivery of import-
ant public goods and services—including those in the health, education, and welfare
areas that serve important redistributive purposes—will be assigned to subnational
governments. The national government’s dominance in raising revenue flows partly
from the desire to maintain an efficient and fair national tax system, and partly from a
need to finance transfers to the subnational level. As discussed below, these transfers
enable federal government to achieve horizontal balance in the federation. They also
enable federal government to exert influence over subnational programme design to
insure that national objectives are met. Both the assignment of taxes and the design of
the intergovernmental transfer system are relevant for our discussion of global revenue
sources, and we consider them in turn. Before doing so, it is worth highlighting the
nature of economic objectives in a federation and how responsibility for them is shared
between levels of government.
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In a unitary state, economic objectives can be conceptualized by a national ‘social
welfare function’ which encompasses efficiency and equity objectives. Equity can be
further disaggregated into vertical and horizontal equity dimensions in which com-
parable persons are treated comparably by the public sector (horizontal equity), and
a common degree of redistribution (vertical equity) applies nationwide: all citizens
have equal weight regardless of where they reside. In a federation, equity becomes
blurred since persons are simultaneously citizens of two jurisdictions, national and
subnational. Vertical equity becomes a shared objective with the two levels of govern-
ment both implementing policies that redistribute. The extent to which vertical equity
is regarded as a national or a subnational concern depends upon the extent to which
social citizenship is viewed as being at the national versus the subnational level, and
that varies from federation to federation. Generally, there is a compromise in which
subnational standards of vertical equity interact with national ones. In these circum-
stances, horizontal equity can be violated for two reasons. First, if subnations adopt
differing degrees of redistribution, there cannot be horizontal equity nationwide, and
this can be regarded as a tolerable cost of achieving the diversity that federalism brings.
Second, decentralization itself implies that different subnations will have different
abilities to deliver comparable average levels of public programmes at comparable tax
rates. Even if it is desirable that subnations have some responsibility for determining
the extent of redistribution among their own residents, it might still be desirable to
ensure that they have the opportunities to provide comparable services at tax rates
that are comparable in other subnations if they so wish. This objective of enabling all
subnations to have the potential to implement comparable programmes at comparable
tax rates—potential horizontal equity—is referred to below as fiscal equity. It is a main
objective of intergovernmental transfers.
11.2.1. Assignment of Revenue-Raising Authority
The principles of assigning revenue-raising responsibility in federations have been
widely documented, and the practice has been informed by the principles (McLure
1983). Since the tax-transfer system serves both a redistributive and a revenue-raising
objective, issues of fairness, efficiency, and administrative simplicity all have a bearing.
At the same time, specific forms of taxation may be used as a device for correcting inef-
ficiencies in the allocation of resources that might arise because of externalities. Taxes
may also serve as user fees or earmarking devices where one wants to abide by benefit
taxation in limited areas or to create entitlements. It is generally agreed that the national
government assumes major responsibility for nationwide efficiency—efficiency in the
‘internal economic union’—as well as sharing responsibility for redistributive equity.
Moreover, the assignment of taxes should take account of the consequences of decen-
tralization mentioned above: induced differences in per capita incomes and in fiscal
capacity, spillovers, and fiscal externalities.
These principles suggest that the national government should be assigned tax-
bases that are important for redistributive purposes, those that are mobile across
subnational boundaries, those that are unevenly distributed across jurisdictions, and
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those that might be difficult to administer at the subnational level. By the same
token, subnational governments might be given access to taxbases that are not crit-
ical for redistribution, taxbases that are immobile, taxbases that do not induce large
differences in fiscal capacity, and taxbases that are relatively easy to administer.
With respect to the use of taxes as corrective devices or as sources of earmarked
funds, their use depends on the jurisdictional scope of the activity to which they are
directed.
By these criteria, the national government might have prior access to direct taxes
on individuals, businesses, and major natural resources. Subnational governments
might rely on property taxes, payroll taxes, and various forms of consumption tax.
This presumes that while businesses and capital might be highly mobile across sub-
national boundaries, labour is not likely to be as mobile. Indeed, in what follows, we
shall basically ignore issues associated with labour migration. Specific taxes used to
price externalities might be applied nationally if the externality is national in scope
(environmental externalities that cross subnational borders) or at the subnational level
for externalities that are more local in nature (local congestion or pollution). This is
necessary to ensure that the responsible level of government has an incentive to take
account of all of the externalities: if externalities are nationwide, subnational govern-
ments will have no incentive to respond to those that spill over into neighbouring
jurisdictions and will therefore tend to set the tax rate too low.
These considerations are not cut and dried. There may be conflicts among the cri-
teria, and in some instances there are mechanisms for resolving such conflicts. Natural
resources are both immobile and unevenly distributed among regions, and that leads to
conflicting arguments about assignment. If it is important for subnational governments
to have control over the development and taxation of natural resources, the immobility
argument might hold sway. In this case, their unequal distribution will give rise to dif-
ferences in subnational fiscal capacities that can be addressed by a system of equalizing
intergovernmental transfers. Consumption taxes (such as a value-added tax) might be
difficult to administer at the subnational level. Some taxbases can readily be used at
both levels of government through harmonization agreements, so subnational govern-
ments can piggyback on personal taxes set by the national government. This provides
both levels with access to a broad-based revenue source, while at the same time allowing
the national government to dominate the choice of base and rate structure. As well,
many of the administrative problems of subnational taxes can be resolved through the
use of a single revenue-collection agency that serves both levels of government. The
relevant point is that in a modern decentralized federation, it is desirable that both
levels of government have discretionary access to broad-based revenue sources. This
can be accomplished in ways that do not compromise either the optimal design of such
taxes or the costs of administering them by suitable institutions of tax harmonization
and coordination.
While broad-based taxes are ideal for revenue-raising and have suitable equity and
efficiency properties, there are a number of narrow-based revenue sources that are
used with other objectives in mind. In some cases, the fact that they raise revenues is a
bonus, or a ‘double dividend’. It is worth considering these individually since in some
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cases they are related to taxes that might be considered suitable as worldwide revenue
sources.
Trade taxes
Taxes on international trade are used in OECD countries as instruments of industrial
policy rather than for raising revenue, and are typically national government policy
instruments. On normative grounds, economists might regard the case for them to be
weak, at least in countries that have ready access to broader sources of revenue. The
motive for using trade taxes may be political, or it may be strategic (to exploit terms of
trade advantages). In either case, by protecting local producers, they lead to worldwide
production inefficiency, and one would not be tempted to view them as a model for
raising revenues at the world level. This is particularly the case if trade taxes protect
producers from imports of LDCs.
Specific excise taxes
Although the bulk of tax revenues in federations comes from broad-based taxes, taxes
on specific commodities are often used as well. Common bases include tobacco, alcohol,
and petroleum products, luxury items, and some services such as hotels and commun-
ications. Specific excises may be viewed as efficient revenue sources to the extent that
demands are inelastic, despite the fact that this very inelasticity also renders them
highly inequitable. In the case of luxuries, they may serve redistributive objectives.
They may be used for tax exporting purposes. Subnational governments often use
them for revenue-raising purposes in federations where tax powers are otherwise highly
centralized. Perhaps the most important motive is as deviced for addressing external-
ities arising from the consumption of particular goods, such as health, or policing costs
due to tobacco and alcohol consumption or congestion from petroleum products. To
the extent that this is a justifiable motive, they provide a free source of revenue as a
side benefit to the government that levies them, which typically includes subnational
governments. It seems equally likely that the motive for these taxes is paternalistic—to
discourage persons from consuming the goods in question (hence, the term ‘sin taxes’).
Environmental taxes and levies
Related to the externality argument is the more general use of taxes as devices for coping
with environmental pollution (Sandmo 2000). In fact, despite the economic arguments
for using taxes for this purpose, the extent of their use is limited. More often than not,
regulatory remedies or subsidies are used and the potential double dividend is not
exploited. Although there may be political economy reasons for this, there may also be
serious monitoring and administrative costs associated with environmental taxes.
Gambling
Revenues from gambling of various sorts can be important, especially for subnational
governments. In fact, gambling revenues are effectively equivalent to excise taxes, and
as such are every bit as inequitable as taxes on tobacco and alcohol. However, one
National Taxation and Global Taxation 217
feature of them worth noting is that their revenues are often at least partly earmarked
for charitable purposes. This may make them a candidate for development financing,
despite their adverse distributive properties (Addison and Chowdhury, Chapter 8, this
volume). It seems likely that earmarked gambling revenues partly displace revenues
that would otherwise be summoned for redistributive purposes.
Capital transaction taxes
Subnational governments often also impose taxes on various types of transactions, such
as land sales, financial transactions, and charges on financial intermediaries. These may
be regarded as revenue sources that are easily administered, or as taxes that can be
exported to non-residents. Otherwise, the economic case for them is not at all clear.
User fees
Lower-level governments are often encouraged to use user fees to help finance public
services. These can range from prices charged for local services (water, electricity,
garbage) to school fees and user charges for health services. Since user charges are
paid by those whom the services benefit, they have no potential as sources of finance
for redistributive purposes except to the extent that the prices themselves are income-
tested. The case for them as subnational revenue sources is sometimes based on the
argument that redistribution should be a national responsibility.
Seigniorage
National governments obtain small amounts of financing from changes in the money
supply. This can be a relatively costless source of revenue unless inflationary finance is
used. In that case, inflation will impose its own tax on the economy.
While the revenue raised by these narrow taxes is relatively small, some of them can
be important for subnational governments whose own revenue-raising capabilities are
limited. Indeed, it can be argued that in some federations, subnational governments
tend to rely too heavily on narrow taxbases with the result that the efficiency of the
tax system is compromised. Unless narrow taxes have their own efficiency advantages,
it is much fairer and more efficient to use broad-based taxes at both national and
subnational levels of government. Moreover, the simultaneous use of broad taxbases
can be achieved by agreements that retain a harmonized taxbase across the nation while
at the same time allowing both levels of government to have the discretion to set their
own rates.
There is a further complication in federations that is relevant for the case of world
development financing. In a decentralized federation, subnational governments typ-
ically engage in redistributive policies alongside those of the national government.
National redistributive policies can crowd out subnational redistributive policies. This
is compounded by the fact that fiscal competition among subnations can induce a so-
called ‘race-for-the-bottom’ in redistributive policies. In order to attract businesses
and highly skilled persons, subnational redistribution is competed down. This leads to
an important role for intergovernmental transfers to which we now turn.
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11.2.2. Intergovernmental Transfers
In a federation, resources are transferred from the better-off to the less well-off via both
the interpersonal tax-transfer system and intergovernmental transfers. The relative
roles ascribed to these two mechanisms reflect the redistributive responsibilities that
the national government assumes. One can roughly think of the former as addressing
vertical equity objectives and the latter horizontal equity (or fiscal equity) objectives.
The reasoning is as follows.
Redistributive objectives are achieved by a number of instruments, including the
income tax-transfer system, social insurance, in-kind transfers to the needy, and the
provision of public services like health care and education. These diverse instruments
reflect both the multiple facets of redistribution policy and the usefulness of certain
types of policies as effective targeting devices. In federations, it is common for many
of these policies to be delivered by subnational governments, which finance part of
the costs from their own sources. The national government typically retains sufficient
influence over the structure of the income tax-transfer system, even if it is co-occupied
by subnational governments. But it also has an interest in influencing subnational
governments to design their programmes so that national norms of redistributive
equity are satisfied. This is sometimes written into the nation’s constitution. The
national government relies on its system of intergovernmental transfers to pursue
the national interest in a decentralized federation. (The same transfers also aim at
enhancing efficiency in the internal economic union.) It is partly because of the need
for transfers from the national to the subnational governments that a vertical fiscal gap
is required.
Transfers take two broad forms. First, they may be used as an instrument for influen-
cing programme design of subnational governments. Broad conditions can be attached
setting out minimum standards that programmes in areas like health, education, and
welfare must satisfy to be eligible for the transfers. The extent of intrusiveness of such
conditions varies from nation to nation, and is a source of concern in many federations.
Conditional transfers are directed at vertical equity objectives, such as ensuring that
adequate levels of equality of opportunity and public services for the needy are being
provided at the subnational level. Such conditionality has its parallel in development
financing, despite the absence of the analogue of a national government.
Second, and more relevant for our purposes, transfers fulfil an equalization role.
When the provision and partial financing of public services are decentralized to sub-
national governments, different subnations will have different abilities to provide
common levels of public services, resulting in horizontal inequities across the fed-
eration. The argument is best illustrated, following Buchanan (1950), using a simple
example as a benchmark. Consider a federation in which subnations differ in per cap-
ita incomes. Suppose subnational governments levy a proportional income tax and use
the proceeds to provide equal per capita public services to all residents. (These are of
the nature of private services rather than public goods, along the lines of important
public services actually decentralized in federations.) If all subnational governments
levied the same rate of tax, the level of public services provided per capita would differ
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systematically with per capita subnational incomes. Put differently, the net fiscal benefit
(NFB) received per person of a given income level in a given subnation—the differ-
ence between the value of the public service provided and the tax payment—would
differ across subnations, and the difference would be the same for all income levels.
Nationwide horizontal equity would be violated. To correct for this horizontal inequity,
a system of equalization transfers could be instituted which effectively compensated
different subnations for differences in the amount of tax revenue they could raise by
applying the common tax rate to the incomes of their residents.
With such an equalization system in place, the level of public services provided in
each subnation would be the same, and horizontal equity would be satisfied. In fact,
the outcome of the unitary state would be replicated. Interestingly, economic efficiency
would be served as well. The same NFB differentials that give rise to horizontal inequity
also provide a fiscal incentive for households and businesses to be misallocated among
subnational jurisdictions (Buchanan 1952). This is a rare instance in economics in
which equity and efficiency arguments are mutually reinforcing.
This simple example is a caricature of reality, but it does serve to illustrate the
main point. Equalizing transfers enable different subnational governments to provide
comparable levels of public services at comparable levels of taxation. In the real world,
things are more complicated than in the simple benchmark example, and these com-
plications affect the form of equalization transfers. Some of the complications are as
follows:
Subnational budgets may have differing degrees of progressivity than assumed in the
benchmark case, where proportional taxes are used to finance equal per capita benefits.
If subnational budgets are more progressive than that, a greater degree of equalization
will be needed to eliminate NFB differentials (and replicate the financial features of the
unitary state). By the same token, if they are less progressive, less equalization is called
for. In the limit, if the benefit principle is applied at the subnational level, no NFBs
would arise and no equalization would be called for on horizontal equity grounds.
There are other sources of NFB differentials besides differences in per capita
incomes. For one, public services may not be made available equally to all persons,
but may be targeted to certain groups in the society—school age children, the elderly,
the disabled, the ill, the needy, and so on. Different subnations with different popu-
lation mixes will have different needs for public expenditures if they are to provide
comparable levels of these kinds of services to their populations. For another, sub-
national governments may have access to source-based tax revenues such as those on
natural resources, and this may give rise to significant differences in revenue-raising
capacity. An equalization scheme should compensate for differences in needs and in
capacities to obtain revenues generated at source.
In the benchmark case it was presumed that all subnational jurisdictions would
behave alike, so that with full equalization, the outcome of a unitary state would be
replicated. In fact, the essence of federalism is that different states have different needs
and preferences for public goods and services, and exercise their discretion in very
different ways. In these circumstances, there is a conflict between the desire to achieve
horizontal equity and the desire to have subnational governments exercise their own
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discretion. The compromise typically made is to arrange the equalization system so
that subnations have the potential to provide comparable levels of public services at
comparable levels of taxation without being compelled to conform. Fiscal equity is
fulfilled when this potential is achieved.
Some public expenditure takes the form of public goods rather than public services
that are private in nature. In this case, the appropriate amount of equalization for
horizontal or fiscal equity purposes becomes much more complicated, since there are
economies of scale in the consumption of public goods. In fact, it seems more likely
that the expenditure responsibilities decentralized to subnational governments are
dominated by those that take the form of public services of a private nature.
Equalization according to these principles is employed in most federations (the
major exception being the United States), as well as in many unitary states with
respect to local governments. The nature of the schemes depends upon the extent
of fiscal decentralization. In cases where expenditures are much more decentralized
than taxes, equalization can be based largely on differences in need. Expenditure needs
can be measured as crudely as total population, or they can be based on estimates of
the standard costs of providing services of various sorts to particular segments of the
population. In federations with more decentralized revenue-raising, equalization can
also be based on the ability to raise revenues, and this can also take varying degrees
of sophistication. In some cases, the ability to raise revenues from a representative
tax system can be used. Alternatively, some more crude macro-based measure such
as per capita incomes might suffice. Moreover, equalization can be based on ‘gross’
as opposed to ‘net’ systems. Net equalization refers to a purely redistributive system
whereby revenues to transfer to the subnational governments with below-average fiscal
capacity come from levies imposed on those above the average. However, equalization
more often takes the gross form whereby the national government makes transfers
to some or all subnational governments and finances them out of national general
revenues. In this case, the allocation of transfers is based on relative fiscal capacities
among subnations. The two cases differ mainly in the extent of vertical fiscal gap used
to finance the system.
In either case, the important point is that the financing of public services provided
by less well-off subnational jurisdictions comes partly from transfers from better-off
jurisdictions. These public services are a very important element in the arsenal of
instruments used to address issues of redistributive equity and economic and social
development. They are arguably more important than the redistribution that takes
place as part of the national interpersonal tax-transfer system. The use of intergovern-
mental transfers for horizontal or fiscal equity purposes is therefore of great importance
from a national equity point of view.
11.2.3. Cooperative Behaviour by Subnational Governments
Despite the reliance on the national government as an institution for fostering national
equity and efficiency objectives in a federation, it is useful to consider the possibility
that subnational governments might also take initiatives voluntarily to achieve or to
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thwart these same objectives. Here and in Section 11.2.4, we take up these possibilities,
with special emphasis on the revenue-raising function of subnational governments. In
decentralized federations, subnational governments can have significant discretion
in designing their programmes and in choosing their revenue structures. While this
discretion enables them to serve their local residents more effectively, it also has the
potential to induce inefficiencies and inequities in the national economic union. Some
of these inefficiencies and inequities could be ameliorated by the harmonization of
policies either undertaken voluntarily or negotiated collectively.
With respect to voluntary policy harmonization, the record is mixed. In the
decentralized federations of Canada and the United States, opportunities do exist
for subnational governments to harmonize their broad-based revenue sources. Canada
has a formal mechanism for harmonizing personal and corporate income taxes, and
provinces may choose to participate. The harmonization is limited to harmonizing
taxbases and allowing for a single tax collection agency: provinces are allowed full
discretion over tax rates. While most provinces participate in the personal income tax
harmonization agreements, the largest provinces accounting for three-quarters of tax-
able income do not participate in the case of the corporate tax. On the other hand, for
those that do not participate, their tax systems do not deviate significantly from those
of the participating provinces. No doubt this is partly for historical reasons, since the
current system evolved from one in which the national government was the sole income
tax user. The record with respect to other taxes is more dismal. There is relatively little
harmonization of provincial sales taxes with the national sales tax system, despite the
possibility offered to them. And, for taxes that are mainly in provincial jurisdiction
(resource taxes, property taxes), there is virtually no harmonization, much to the detri-
ment of national efficiency. In the United States, there is even less harmonization, of
either income taxes or state sales taxes. This may reflect in part the much larger number
of US states than Canadian provinces. With respect to public services and transfers
delivered by the provinces and states, there is again no voluntary harmonization (apart
from that induced by national conditional transfers). On the contrary, there is some
evidence that such programmes are used in a strategic way, such as to attract only the
most desirable households to the jurisdiction.
Negotiated intergovernmental agreements that exist tend to involve both the national
and subnational governments. As well, they are somewhat difficult to negotiate and
turn out to be ineffective. A prime example of this is the Agreement on Internal Trade
in Canada, whose purpose and features are much like trade liberalization agreements
among groups of nations (NAFTA, EU, WTO). While the articles of the agreement
are potentially far-reaching, in practice the agreement is ineffective because it relies
on voluntary compliance for enforcement. This is a consequence of the need to have
unanimous agreement and of the fact that the fallback position is for the national
government to assume responsibility for efficiency in the internal economic union.
There are many examples of bilateral agreements between the national government
and individual subnational governments. But virtually all such agreements concern
the interest of the residents of the subnational government involved. There are almost
no agreements involving inter-jurisdictional redistribution.
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This mixed record of the effectiveness of intergovernmental agreements is again a
reflection of the primary role that a national government plays in a federation. This
tempers the lessons that can be learned for situations in which there is no effective
central authority to mediate, influence, and coerce state behaviour.
11.2.4. Freeriding by Subnational Governments
Not only might it be difficult to rely on subnational government to behave harmoni-
ously, their behaviour might be overtly non-cooperative. This possibility exists because,
as mentioned, a subnational government’s policies can have an impact on residents or
government budgets in other jurisdictions. We have mentioned fiscal competition that
arises between subnational governments as a result of these fiscal externality effects.
However, there can also be forms of vertical interaction between subnational and
national governments—so-called vertical fiscal externalities—that can be detrimental
to national efficiency and equity. These can take various forms (Keen 1998).
First, the fact that the two levels of government are taxing the same agents implies
that policy changes at one level affect the budget at another. For example, if a sub-
national government increases its income tax rate, and if income is variable, the induced
reduction in the base will also reduce national tax revenues. Technically speaking, the
marginal social cost of revenues will be perceived by the subnational government to
be too low. It can effectively spread part of the burden of raising its revenues to other
jurisdictions.
Second, national government redistribution can crowd out redistribution at the
subnational level. Potentially subnational governments can exploit this by limiting their
own redistribution on the expectation that the national government will compensate.
Third, interdependence will arise if taxes paid at one level of government are deducti-
ble from taxable income at another level. A subnational tax that is progressive could
become regressive if it can be deducted before levying a progressive federal tax.
Finally, subnational governments can sometimes manipulate the amount of transfers
they receive from the national government through their fiscal policies. In the extreme
case, they can exploit any soft budget constraint that might apply between the national
and subnational governments. The existence of these opportunities depends on the
design of the transfer system and on the ability of the national government to commit
itself to a given level of transfers regardless of the fiscal choices taken by subnational
governments.
11.2.5. Summary
In a well-functioning federation, subnational governments are assigned responsibility
not only for local public goods but also for policies that are crucial to the efficient and
equitable functioning of the national economic union. These include important public
services like health, education, and social services, as well as some targeted transfers.
Although this decentralization is motivated by concerns with efficiency and catering
to local preferences and needs, the national government has a clear interest in the
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standards with which subnational programmes might conform. To ensure that national
norms of efficiency, equity, and development are addressed, the national government
typically retains a dominant position in the interpersonal tax-transfer system, which
is one instrument for vertical equity. It also makes substantial transfers to subnational
governments to equalize the capacity of subnations to provide comparable levels of
public services at comparable levels of tax rates, and to ensure that they have the
incentive to provide programmes in conformity with the national interest. This implies
a vertical fiscal gap, with the national government collecting more revenue than it needs
for its own purpose and transferring the remainder to the subnational governments.
The latter are assigned sufficient revenue sources of their own, especially broad-based
ones, to ensure that they are accountable to their constituents for the programmes
they deliver. Ideally, their taxes are harmonized with those of the national government,
and they are fully responsible for raising marginal revenues for determining the sizes
of their budgets. The object of the national/subnational fiscal arrangements is to obtain
the benefits of decentralized decisionmaking while at the same time avoiding its costs.
The oversight role of the national government is critical to this objective.
11.3. A FEDERATION WITH NO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
In a federation, the national government plays a critical role in pursuit of redistributive
equity alongside subnational governments that deliver important public services. The
balance between the two levels has shifted over the past several decades. Subnational
governments have become more important as the role of public services like health,
education, and social services as major redistributive devices has grown, and the virtues
of decentralization have been realized. In some federations (Canada), the national
government’s expenditures are predominantly transfers, while those of the provinces
are mainly on goods and services. This decentralization has put some stress on the
ability of the national government to impose its redistributive objectives.
In the limit, decentralization would result in a federation with a weak national
government. In this section, we pose the hypothetical question of how redistributive
goals might be achieved in the limiting case where there is no effective national gov-
ernment. This serves as a useful benchmark against which to address similar issues
globally.
It is worth first pausing to reflect on the nature of redistributive objectives in a federal
setting, loose or otherwise. Redistribution is a key role of governments in any OECD
nation. A cursory look at government budgets will confirm that a high proportion of
spending is devoted to programmes with redistributive intent, not just those involving
income redistribution but also public goods and services. For example, public spending
on education, health, and social services would be hard to justify on purely efficiency
grounds. While it might be possible to conceive of sizeable redistribution being the
consequence of a political process that reflects purely the self-interest of the voting
population, these considerations alone seem inadequate to account for the scale of
redistribution one actually observes. It seems more likely that there is some more fun-
damental social consensus or solidarity underlying the phenomenon. Some observers
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have equated this solidarity with a notion of social citizenship: one’s membership in a
nation entitles one not just to the legal and political rights that come with citizenship,
but also with social and economic rights (Purdy 2001). In other words, the political
community is also a sharing community, as if reflecting some social contract. These
rights of social citizenship may be written into the national constitution, or they may
simply reflect an ongoing social consensus. The extent of the social consensus will
vary from nation to nation, and will vary within nations from time to time as political
outcomes change.
In a federation, social citizenship is blurred by the fact that one is a citizen both of
the country as a whole and of a subnation. There are two simultaneous concepts of
solidarity, one nationwide and one subnational. The balance between these two levels
of solidarity can be the source of considerable tension within federations: to what
extent should national solidarity trump subnational solidarity? That is, to what extent
should redistribution be the role of the national as opposed to the subnational govern-
ments? The compromise will vary from federation to federation: national solidarity
may be relatively more important in, say, Germany than in Belgium, where subnational
solidarity in the linguistic communities is also important.
But even in highly decentralized federations, the relevance of social citizenship at
the national level remains strong. The Canadian case represents a good example of this,
given that it is one of the most decentralized federations in the world (although even
here subnational solidarity in certain regions can be important). The provinces deliver
all the important public services and raise a substantial proportion of their own reven-
ues through broad-based taxes. A great deal of redistribution occurs at the subnational
level of government. The national government also engages in redistribution, largely
through the tax-transfer system. But, much of its redistributive activity involves inter-
governmental transfers, and much of this is directed at achieving fiscal equity among
provinces. Social citizenship is thus a compromise: the national government provides
transfers to the provinces out of national general revenues to ensure that provinces have
the potential for providing reasonably comparable public services at reasonably com-
parable levels of taxation. The provinces then choose their own fiscal policies more or
less unfettered by national constraint. Even in this highly decentralized fiscal system, a
high degree of consensus seems to exist for national social citizenship. Nonetheless, that
consensus is perceptibly weakening as the nation gradually becomes more decentral-
ized, although the direction of causation is unclear. Moreover, many of the instruments
used to achieve social citizenship are the legislative responsibility of the provinces.
In contemplating a federation without a national government, two key differences
with a standard federation must then be recognized. The first is that government-to-
government transfers will be relevant for redistribution among regions since there is
no national government that can collect revenues nationwide to transfer to subnational
governments or their citizens. Second, the issue must be faced as to the degree of
social consensus that exists for ensuring that citizens of different jurisdictions have
comparable capacities for providing public services and engaging in redistribution of
all forms. One presumes that national social citizenship becomes much weaker in this
context, and the extent of intergovernmental transfers that citizens might wish their
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subnational governments to engage in will be less than in a full-fledged federation with
a purposeful national government.
Let us presume that there is at least some degree of social consensus for redistribution
from citizens of better-off subnations to those of less well-off subnations. Moreover, the
principle of subsidiarity can be taken for granted: subnational governments are accep-
ted as being those most capable of implementing redistributive policies within their
own jurisdictions. Thus, the relevant form of redistribution is subnation to subnation.
We consider some features that such redistribution might take, treating separately the
cases in which subnational governments do and do not coordinate their activities.
11.3.1. Non-Cooperative Subnational Redistribution
To the extent that a consensus exists for some degree of solidarity among all citizens in
the nation, individual subnational governments in better-off regions acting on behalf of
their own citizens will want to make transfers to less well-off jurisdictions. The situation
is analogous to nations voluntarily contributing to an international public good: here the
public good is the total amount of the transfer, from which all nations simultaneously
benefit. The economics literature has developed the characteristics of the outcomes
that might be expected in a setting in which several nations make independent (non-
cooperative) contributions to an international public good (Sandler 1992; Boadway and
Hayashi 1999). Although the models are simplistic and the assumptions strong, the
message of that literature is stark, even if it has only an element of truth. In fact, no
matter how far the degree of solidarity or social citizenship extends across subnational
borders, the outcomes that are predicted when subnational governments behave non-
cooperatively differ considerably from those that could be expected to occur if a national
government were overseeing interregional redistribution. The following summarizes
some of the relevant results.
The total level of transfers—the sum of the transfers of all better-off jurisdictions—
is less than the optimal level. There is a free-riding problem associated with each
nation’s contributions, implying that each subnation contributes less than it would in
a coordinated approach, such as with a national government.
Subnations that have the highest per capita incomes will contribute proportionately
more of their incomes to international public goods than they would in the coordin-
ated setting. This is the phenomenon of disproportionate burden sharing, and is a
consequence of the Shibata–Warr neutrality theorem whereby income redistributions
among contributors are fully offset by changes in contributions in equilibrium.1 In
1 This theorem says that when a public good is financed by voluntary donations, the equilibrium level of
public good is independent of the distribution of income. Any redistribution of income among contributors
will be completely offset in equilibrium by equal changes in contributions, at least as long as contributions
are not driven to zero. Thus, contributions by higher-income contributors will exceed those by lower-
income contributors precisely by the difference in incomes. Moreover, any incremental contribution by the
government will crowd out private donations on a one-for-one basis. See Shibata (1971) and Warr (1983).
These results are based on models in which contributions finance pure public goods, and preferences are
identical among contributors.
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the context of these models of voluntary contributions to public goods, if contributing
nations differ only in per capita incomes (but have the same populations), differences
in per capita incomes will result in differences in per capita contributions of the same
amount in equilibrium.
Subnations with the highest populations will contribute disproportionately more
of their incomes to international public goods than those with lower populations.
This reflects the fact that, the larger the population, the higher proportion of bene-
fits of the contribution that are internalized. As a result, persons in more populous
donor nations will tend to be worse off, all else equal. Combined with the previ-
ous result, we might expect to see countries with higher incomes and populations
contributing disproportionately more to international public goods, while countries
with high per capita incomes and low populations may contribute more or less as
a proportion of their incomes than those with low per capita incomes and high
populations.
Increased contributions to the less well-off subnations from some outside source
will crowd out voluntary transfers. Indeed, if increased contributions were financed by
taxes imposed on the contributing subnations, the crowding-out would be full.
These predictions are somewhat surprising, but they are also cautionary. They
point out the inefficiency and inequity of a system of voluntary transfers—inefficiency
because the amount transferred is less than all contributing jurisdictions would agree
to, and inequity because the contributions in equilibrium may bear no close rela-
tion to a jurisdiction’s well-being or ability to pay. The predictions also indicate that
introducing small increments of transfers into a world in which subnations are mak-
ing voluntary contributions can be effectively pointless. Thus, additional sources of
revenues made available by, say, a new global tax source could largely crowd out vol-
untary subnational transfers. Equivalently, if the subnations collectively agreed to
provide additional financing for transfers, this additional contribution would crowd
out their voluntary transfers on a one-for-one basis, at least until the latter were fully
crowded out.
The literature also suggests that the freerider effects of a voluntary contribution
equilibrium could be undone by a system of incentives. If subsidies are provided for
voluntary transfers—analogous to the tax incentives that are provided for individual
contributions to charity—efficiency could be restored. Such a scheme would require
either some national authority or coordinated action by the subnational governments,
as well as some source of revenue to finance the subsidies. All of these are ruled out in
the non-cooperative case.
11.3.2. Cooperative Subnational Redistribution
Given that non-cooperative subnational outcomes are likely to lead to inadequate
levels of interstate redistribution and inequitable distributions of burdens, it is natural
to consider the possibility of cooperative behaviour among subnational governments.
Cooperative outcomes should be possible since all jurisdictions can potentially gain
relative to the non-cooperative case. Moreover, cooperative solutions should in
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principle lead to a fully efficient outcome in the sense that, as in the case with
standard public goods, the sum of the marginal benefits to all donor subnations from
redistribution equals the sum of the marginal costs.
In contemplating such cooperative solutions, we immediately confront the problems
that arise in arranging the terms of the cooperative bargain when the gains from the
bargain must somehow be divided among the various subnations. A cooperative out-
come must achieve unanimous agreement, and this is notoriously difficult, especially
where many governments are party to the negotiations. This is particularly the case
when all subnations are involved, both net donors and net recipients of the transfers.
As well, some dispute settlement mechanism is required to ensure that all subnational
governments abide by the agreement. In the absence of a central authority, this is dif-
ficult to achieve. As mentioned above, the record of achieving unanimous agreement
among subnational governments in a federal setting is not encouraging.
On the other hand, among nation-states progress has been made with respect to such
agreements, although success has been much more pronounced where pure efficiency
gains are at stake than those involving redistribution. The European Union is a case in
point, where agreements exist in a variety of areas including agriculture, competition
policy, science and technology, regional policy, trade, and even social policy (Artis
and Nixson 2001). In some cases, agreement was a long time coming and many com-
promises were involved. Moreover, sometimes the agreements were asymmetric in the
sense that different countries participated to differing extents. Perhaps this illustrates
that with enough persistence, agreements can be reached among nations even where
redistributive policies are involved.
We proceed by setting aside the difficulty of bargaining to obtain some insight into
the kinds of agreements that should be possible among subnational governments acting
in the absence of a national government. In principle, these ought to be able to mimic
what a benevolent central government acting on the basis of a national consensus would
implement. Taking that as a reference point, we can imagine two sorts of institutional
mechanisms being negotiated among subnational governments to finance redistribu-
tion from better-off to less well-off subnations—taxes on the better-off states or taxes
on agents or their transactions. Since our focus is on the financing of development
assistance rather than its use, we concentrate on the source of funds.
Taxes on subnational governments
Subnational governments might agree to tax themselves, that is, to make equaliza-
tion transfers for the purpose of redistributing to the less well-off subnations. The
question then is how the transfers ought to be distributed among the contributing
subnations. The answer depends upon a judgement as to what constitutes a fair
allocation of the burdens of the transfers. Following the above discussion of inter-
governmental transfers in a federation, the concept of fairness applied to subnational
jurisdictions is different from that applied to individuals in the case of a personal
tax system. This is because the subnation consists of a distribution of households
of different incomes. Presumably, in our hypothetical federation without a national
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government, subnational governments would assume full responsibility for vertical
equity within their borders. They may choose differing degrees of progressivity
because of different subnational consensuses about the desirable amount of redis-
tribution. Fiscal competition pressures may also affect their policies of redistribution.
In either case, there is little that a system of transfers from jurisdictions can, or should,
do to rectify this. To the extent that different jurisdictions have different prefer-
ences for redistribution, there is no good reason to override those differences. And,
dealing with the adverse effects of fiscal competition for intra-jurisdictional redistribu-
tion is something with which a system of intergovernmental transfers cannot cope.
Addressing that problem is, after all, one of the roles of a national government in a
federation.
Given this, a suitable basis for fairness in a federation with only subnational
governments is fiscal equity. Full fiscal equity is equivalent to taking the norm-
ative position that citizenship in the nation carries with it some obligation of
equal treatment nationwide, tempered only by the fact that subnational govern-
ments should have the discretion for designing programmes for vertical equity
within their jurisdictions. Equivalently, full fiscal equity involves ensuring that
each subnational government has the potential to be able to provide comparable
public programmes at comparable tax rates to the residents of their respective
jurisdictions.
In the context of a highly decentralized federation without a national govern-
ment, the rights of social citizenship in this full sense may not reflect a societal
consensus. Instead, the consensus might be that full fiscal equity is too extreme,
and that some partial notion of fiscal equity is acceptable. In this case, the objective
of the transfer system would still be to redress differences in the ability of subna-
tional governments to provide programmes to their citizens at given tax rates, but
now only partially, so fiscal equity is imperfectly achieved. There is still no particular
reason to override the redistribution subnational governments undertake in their own
jurisdictions.
Whatever degree of fiscal equity is deemed appropriate, the base that is suitable
for determining the fair set of transfers is the same: only the rate of equaliza-
tion applied to that base needs to differ. We have discussed in broad terms the
principles of equalization in a federal setting. Those same design principles would
apply here, although the degree to which equalization is pursued might differ.
If full fiscal equity were the criterion—and this is a useful benchmark to use—
transfers would equalize the ability of all subnational governments to provide
comparable levels of public services at comparable tax rates. The precise equaliza-
tion formula would include elements reflecting both revenue-raising capacity and
expenditure needs, and would depend on the policies implemented by the rep-
resentative subnational government, including both their tax structures and their
expenditure programmes. A conventional standard case that informs the revenue
equalization system in some federations is as follows. Suppose subnational taxes
are roughly proportional to income when taken as a whole. And suppose that pub-
lic services provided roughly equal per capita benefits to all households. Then
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an ideal equalization system for full fiscal equity purposes would be designed as
follows:
1. Representative taxbases would be constructed for all taxes used by subnational
governments. From this would be calculated the per capita base for each tax source
in each subnation (bij for taxbase i in subnation j), and the average per capita taxbase
nationwide for taxbase i (Bi).
2. Nationwide average tax rates (ti) would be calculated as the ratio of total subnational
tax revenue from the base to the nationwide size of the base.
3. The per capita equalization entitlement for a subnation j from a taxbase i would be
calculated as ti(Bi − bij).
4. The above calculation would be done for each subnation and each tax type.
A subnation’s total equalization entitlement would be the sum of all per capita enti-
tlements (positive and negative) from all tax sources multiplied by its population:∑
I ti(Bi − bij)Nj .
5. The sum of entitlements over all subnations would be zero. Those with superior
revenue-raising ability would be positive, and those with deficient revenue-raising
ability would be negative.
In the above calculation—referred to as the representative tax system approach—
the use of national average subnational government tax rates ensures full revenue
equalization. This rough and ready approach to equalization would be appropri-
ate if subnational fiscal structures roughly corresponded to those of the standard
case.
Since spending programmes are targeted to particular groups in the population
rather than being of equal per capita benefit to all, equalization entitlements can be
adjusted to account for the fact that different subnations have different expenditure
needs arising from their differing population mixes. A representative expenditure-
needs approach, analogous to the above, could be used. Differences among subnations
in the per capita cost of providing a given level of a particular type of public service
would be equalized. The procedure would be to estimate a national average cost of
providing a unit of service to a person of a given demographic group. This cost would
be combined with the number of persons of that group in each subnation to determine
expenditure need for that service. Deviations from the average would then be equalized.
If the consensus is for less than full fiscal equity (or if the sum total of transfers is set
exogenously), the above procedure could be revised accordingly. We can concentrate on
the implications of partial fiscal equity for donor subnations. The simplest procedure
would be to reduce each subnation’s assessed equalization entitlement proportionately
from the full equalization case. This would be equivalent to equalizing differences
in per capita taxbases by less than national average tax rates, in the case of revenue
equalization, and reducing the unit cost used for equalizing needs differences. Applying
this procedure to the donor subnations would imply that proportionately less than full
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fiscal equity was implemented not only between donor and recipient subnations, but
also among all donors.2
The above procedures, though not unlike what is done in various federations on
either the revenue or the expenditure-needs sides, appear to be complicated. Some
observers have argued for a simpler procedure, such as basing equalization on a single
macro measure, such as per capita subnational income or consumption. This is the
approach used by the European Union, whose budget is financed by a proportionate
levy on member states’ GDP. Though this leads to a simpler calculation, it is conceptu-
ally problematic. Macro indicators are unlikely to be an accurate reflection of either the
revenue-raising capacity of subnational governments or their needs for expenditures.
For example, they do not take account of the fact that different taxbases (e.g. resources
versus capital income versus consumption) have different revenue-raising potential
and typically are taxed at very different rates. Those who propose macro formulas
typically have objectives other than simplicity in mind. Some treat inter-jurisdictional
redistribution as being analogous to interpersonal redistribution and view the base as
comparable to the ability to pay of the representative household (Barro 2002). However,
as we have argued, there is a fundamental difference between interpersonal redistri-
bution and inter-jurisdictional redistribution, the former being directed at vertical
equity and the latter at horizontal equity. Nonetheless, if subnational tax structures are
sufficiently different, the representative tax system approach to equalization becomes
difficult to implement, and one may be forced back to a simple macro measure.
While agreement on the set of subnational transfers is primarily a matter of fiscal
equity, subnational agreement may go beyond that to include some provisions for
harmonizing vertical equity within subnational governments. This could be a way of
dealing with the tendency for subnational governments to compete down their redis-
tribution programmes. It might also reflect a national consensus for norms of vertical
equity or social citizenship, analogous to the harmonization of social protection in
the European Union. However, the existence of harmonized systems of social protec-
tion does not detract from the principles outlined above for the design of a system of
equalization transfers.
Taxes on agents
An alternative means of raising revenues to transfer to less well-off regions is for
subnational governments to agree to tax agents directly. This is natural to consider
since it has the potential to mimic what a national government would do. The manner
in which tax revenues might be raised cooperatively depends on the structure of the tax
systems employed by subnational governments, as well as on the normative objectives
of the national tax, including especially whether there should be common standards
of equity applying nationwide (despite the absence of a national government). Some
considerations are as follows.
2 Note that this procedure would leave the list of donor nations unchanged: all those with per capita
taxbases above the world average would be included. One could also adapt to a lower level of transfers by
removing less well-off middle-income countries from the list of donors.
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A key factor in contemplating a new national tax in an otherwise fully decentralized
system of subnational governments is the perceived nature of nationwide equity. If the
view is taken that vertical equity is the responsibility of subnational governments, the
most that might be expected from a national tax is that some degree of fiscal equity
is achieved. Then, the ideal tax would be one that mimics the equalization scheme
outlined above. A single tax at a common rate on a broad base would not be perfect
since the revenues raised from each jurisdiction would not reflect its tax capacity or its
own expenditure needs. If a separate tax rate could be applied in each jurisdiction, any
pattern of subnational incidence could be achieved, but one presumes that differential
tax rates across subnations would not be an easy thing to negotiate.
Nonetheless, a broad-based tax at uniform rates would be an approximation of a
fiscally equitable outcome. It would correspond with the macro approach to equaliza-
tion. Suitable taxbases might include consumption or income. Indeed, if the tax were
a direct one, it could be progressive. That would be appropriate if the vertical equity
were the responsibility of the national government.
Even if there is agreement for a broad taxbase, there would be problems with admin-
istering the tax. In an ideal situation—such as exists in some federations—the taxbase
would be harmonized among subnational governments. A national tax could be piggy-
backed onto those levied by subnational governments. There are different forms this
could take, depending on the taxbase used. In the case of personal income taxes,
a national surtax could be imposed on each agent’s subnational income tax liabilities
(in which case subnational progressivity is retained) or on subnational taxbases. In the
case of sales taxation, if a multi-stage tax is used subnationally, the national surcharge
could be limited to the final stage. This would, however, require a significant degree
of harmonization among subnational sales tax systems. In the absence of such har-
monization, piggybacking would be problematic since the amount of revenue raised in
each subnational jurisdiction would vary arbitrarily with the definition of the taxbase.
If piggybacking is not feasible, the national tax would have to be collected on its own,
but with significant administrative costs.
Suppose, however, that a broad-based national tax is implemented. A further prob-
lem concerns the crowding-out of subnational government voluntary transfers. In the
hypothetical context we are imagining of a nation without a national government, it is
likely that better-off subnational governments would make voluntary transfers to less
well-off ones as long as there were significant disparities in well-being among subn-
ations. The parallel is with voluntary intergovernmental transfers among nations in
the real world. In the case of subnations, the case for voluntary transfers would be
stronger because of the presumed solidarity among national citizens residing in differ-
ent subnational jurisdictions. To the extent that voluntary inter-jurisdictional transfers
were undertaken—albeit inefficiently as discussed earlier—theoretical reasoning would
suggest that they would be crowded out, perhaps on a close to one-for-one basis
(the Shibata–Warr theorem). While that is not necessarily bad, given that the pat-
tern of voluntary transfers is likely to be unrelated to a reasonable national equitable
criterion, it does imply that more of a burden would be placed on raising reven-
ues than would otherwise be the case. One way out of this dilemma would be for
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subnational cooperation to include elements of both taxes on states and taxes on
agents.
An alternative to a new national tax imposed on a broad base would be one imposed
on a narrower base. This might be attractive for three reasons. First, a narrow-based tax,
such as one on a readily identifiable class of transactions, might be easy to administer in
the absence of a national government. But, there are serious problems with a narrow-
based tax whose only attraction is ease of administration. To the extent that the demand
for the taxed item were elastic, inefficiencies would result. On the other hand, for less
elastic bases, the tax would likely have adverse equity properties in the sense that
their incidence would fall disproportionately on lower income persons. Moreover, the
incidence of the tax by subnational jurisdiction would bear no close relation to fiscal
equity.
Second, the inefficiencies of a narrow tax will be avoided to the extent that the trans-
action involved emits adverse national externalities. (If the externalities are localized,
presumably they will be taken care of by subnational tax systems.) In this case, the
revenues raised are seemingly costless from an economic point of view: the double-
dividend argument (Sandmo, Chapter 3, this volume). However, relying solely on
double-dividend taxation to raise revenues for the benefit of less well-off jurisdictions
is not without problems. These tax revenues will have a strong tendency to crowd
out voluntary transfers made by subnational jurisdictions or their residents. Also, the
implicit incidence of these revenues on donor subnations will not correspond with what
might be considered fair on fiscal equity grounds. However, this problem of the fair-
ness of donor burden-sharing may be regarded as less pressing given that fiscal equity
between donor subnations as a whole and recipient subnations has been improved. If
the revenues raised from such seemingly costless means are insufficient, they could
be supplemented by inter-jurisdictional transfers that took account of fiscal equity
considerations.
Third, another efficiency-improving revenue source that might be collected on a
coordinated basis is capital income taxation in one of its forms. Standard tax competi-
tion principles suggest that subnational jurisdictions would compete down the tax rate
on capital income relative to the optimal level. (There are considerations that temper
this effect, such as the so-called hold-up problem that leads capital tax rates to be
excessive.) To the extent that this is the case, a coordinated agreement to impose a
national capital tax would yield a ‘free’ source of revenue along the lines of the double
dividend from externality taxes. Similar considerations as to the usefulness of this
source of finance apply.
11.4. IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL REVENUE SOURCES
There are both parallels and differences between a hypothetical federation of subna-
tions with no national government and the global economy consisting of many national
governments. In both cases, a number of states exercise independent authority with no
oversight from an upper-level government. Some states will be better off than others
in one or more of the following senses: their average incomes are higher, they have
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greater endowments of resources, their level of economic and social development is
higher, and the needs for public services and infrastructure are easier to meet. They
exercise their fiscal authority not only to provide public goods that would not other-
wise be provided by the private sector, but more important, to promote redistributive
equity through the tax-transfer system and the provision of important public services.
And, since the states interact with one another in a broader economy, there will be
various forms of fiscal spillover and fiscal competition that can lead to inefficiencies
in resource allocation. There will presumably be some consensus by the citizens of
better-off states to redistribute to those of less well-off states, whether out of altruistic
motives or as a matter of ethical conviction. Taken together, the inefficiency of state
fiscal interaction and the consensus to make it possible for citizens in less well-off
states to advance imply that there is some collective gain to be had from coordinated
decisionmaking. Uncoordinated state decisionmaking will lead to the same sort of inef-
ficiencies and inequities in the global economy of nations as in the national economy of
subnations.
Despite these similarities, the differences among nations are likely to be more pro-
nounced than among subnations. Income and development disparities across nations
are likely to be more pronounced. Cultural, linguistic, religious, and ethnic differences
will be greater. Institutional differences will be sharper. National political decision-
making will give rise to greater variations in national policy choices than is the case
across subnations within a given country.
These differences will be reflected in the international policy imperatives that will
arise. National economies are likely to be more highly integrated than the world eco-
nomy, although this distinction is becoming blurred with globalization. Labour is
less mobile internationally, interdependencies in markets for goods and services are
less, and the importance of spillovers crossing national borders might also be less. At
the same time, because of the distinct sovereign nature of nations, certain types of
transactions between them might be much harder to monitor, regulate, and tax in an
international setting than within nations. Good examples of this are financial capital
and certain types of e-commerce. Nations are not able to tax these types of transactions
at rates as high as they might prefer. With respect to world equity, it may be the case
that the level of solidarity or social citizenship is less at the global level than the national
level, so there may be more tolerance for fiscal inequity among nations than among
subnations within a country.
The conceptual basis for addressing the inefficiencies and inequities in a world of
nations—particularly the manner of raising revenues for international redistributive
purposes—is similar to that in a highly decentralized federation in some fundamental
respects. The sovereignty of nations implies that vertical equity among their citizens
is primarily their responsibility. This is an issue of some importance from the point of
view of considering new sources of global revenue, and the use to which it will be put.
If one accepts the view that vertical equity is best ‘assigned’ to national governments,
the main purpose of state-to-state redistribution is to achieve inter-state fiscal equity
at least to some degree, that is, to reduce the gaps among nations in their ability to
provide comparable public services and transfers at comparable levels of taxation.
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This argument that pursuing fiscal equity is the appropriate basis for designing a
system of development assistance is not innocuous. If instead one takes the view that
the objective should be to further some notion of world vertical equity, the nature
of optimal development assistance financing would be different. The criterion for
financing development assistance would be vertical equity among individuals in the
world rather than fiscal equity among nations. Financial instruments would then be
judged and designed according to the incidence on persons of different income groups
regardless of where they reside rather than their incidence on nations according to
their abilities to finance public services. In other words, the ideal would be a system
of progressive inter-personal taxes and transfers—a world income tax system—as
opposed to a system of inter-state equalization transfers. On the other hand, the
clearest message that comes out of the fiscal federalism literature seems to be: it should
be fiscal equity among states rather than vertical equity among individuals that informs the
design of a financing development financing system.
This point of view presumes that nations are best placed to assume responsibility for
vertical equity within their jurisdictions. That involves a serious value judgement and
is also subject to some important caveats. For one, donor countries may not accept the
view that recipient countries should be (or can be) responsible for redistributive equity
within their own borders. Donors may be ‘paternalistic’ about national preferences for
redistribution, just like altruistic donors within a country may prefer their charitable
donations or the transfers of their governments to be tied to certain uses by recipients
rather than having no strings attached. Second, even if donor countries are willing to
accept recipient nations’ responsibility for vertical equity, there is still the possibility
that fiscal competition entails inadequate levels of redistribution because of the race-
to-the-bottom. These caveats need not be of primary concern to us to the extent that
we focus on the raising of revenues from donor countries rather than their use by
recipients.
What do these principles suggest about suitable sources of new revenues for financing
development? Three separate classes of fiscal revenue sources can be distinguished:
taxes on nations, taxes on global externalities, and taxes on transactions for which
national tax rates have been competed down because of international mobility.3
11.4.1. Taxes on Nations: A Global Equalization Scheme
A system of taxes on the better-off nations to finance new development assistance for
less well-off nations—effectively, a global equalization system—represents a purely
redistributive source of revenue. It is the preferred form of redistributive taxation to
the extent that one accepts the argument that vertical redistribution among households
is the responsibility of nations themselves. An appropriate criterion for determining the
allocation of tax burdens among nations is fiscal equity: a nation’s contribution should
be related to its ability to provide some international standard of public services and
3 Other sources of revenue that are less related to our topic are discussed elsewhere in this volume, such
as a global lottery, SDRs, private donations, and emigrants’ remittances.
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redistributive transfers to its citizens at comparable levels of taxation.4 The principle
of fiscal equity and how it could be made operational by a system of equalizing taxes
and transfers has been discussed above. Here we point out the special problems that
arise in an international setting.
Since there is no world government, donor nations must agree cooperatively on the
system of taxes to impose on themselves. This is a serious issue both because achieving
unanimous agreement is difficult when the sharing of burdens is at stake and because
there may be disagreement about the principles that should be used. One advantage
of the fiscal equity criterion is that it is a principle that can be defended on normative
grounds, and that is used in a federal context.
Even if fiscal equity is a suitable objective, the global societal consensus may not be
for full fiscal equity, that is, full social citizenship. Agreement must then be reached on
the degree of partial fiscal equity to be pursued.
Consensus may differ among donor countries. It may then be sensible to begin with
agreement among a subset of countries, what is referred to as flexible fiscal architecture
and discussed in Atkinson (Chapter 2, this volume).
Putting fiscal equity into operation is more difficult in a global setting than in a federal
setting. In the latter, subnational government tax-expenditure policies are likely to be
much less diverse than is the case among nations. That means devising a representative
standard level and mix of public services, transfers, and taxes against which to measure
each nation’s capacity is much more difficult internationally than among subnations in
a federation.
A system of national contributions should take account of contributions that nations
would otherwise be making voluntarily. There are two dimensions to this. First, fiscal
equity would suggest that a nation’s assigned contribution or tax take account of
all voluntary contributions that the nation might make. Second, the possibility of
crowding-out discussed earlier must be addressed. The system could give not only
credit for such transfers but perhaps also an additional incentive, much as national tax
systems give additional incentives for household voluntary contributions. If the agree-
ment were only among a subset of nations, the additional problem must be recognized
that voluntary contributions of non-participants could be crowded out.
Given these difficulties, especially that of devising a suitable measure of a nation’s
capacity to pay, it may be necessary to fall back on a macro indicator of fiscal equity. It
would have to be one that can be measured on a consistent basis across nations and that
also is a rough index of fiscal equity. The one that comes to mind is the nation’s GDP.
11.4.2. Taxes on International Externalities
To the extent that certain types of activities give rise to externalities that transcend
borders, taxes on these transactions would be potentially efficient sources of financing
4 One could argue that a similar criterion should determine the allocation of development finance among
less well-off nations, but the use of the funds is not our concern.
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for global use. This is fully considered in Sandmo (Chapter 3), so there is little need
to dwell on it here. However, some issues can be raised.
International agreement is obviously needed here as well in order to establish the
authority to implement such a tax. The tax may be implemented by an international
tax-collecting administration, or individual nations could be entrusted with collecting
the tax and turning the proceeds over to an international authority.
The global externality tax (or taxes) will at least partly displace national taxes that are
already in place. This implies that some revenues that are currently going to national
governments will be diverted to a world authority. Some account would have to be
taken of this at least for some period of transition. That might be easiest to do to if
nations also have a tax against which credit can be given.
There will undoubtedly be design and compliance problems associated with extern-
alities taxation to the extent that a given type of externality can come from diverse
sources, some of which are difficult to monitor.
A global externality tax system will do little to address the fiscal equity objective, at
least among donor nations. However, it will serve to reduce fiscal inequities between
donor and recipient nations.
The problem of crowding-out of voluntary national contributions will apply with
respect to revenues generated from this source as well.
Despite these problems, it is difficult to argue against ‘free’ revenues that can be
obtained from a tax on global externalities. Presumably the same principle would
apply to obtaining revenues from the use of world resources that are not owned by any
nation. Thus, valuable resources from international waters (fish, minerals, etc.) and
the use of the atmosphere or outer space, such as by satellites, might be regarded as
legitimate common property resources of the world community.
11.4.3. Taxes on Internationally Mobile Taxbases
A third main source of finance for development use might be global taxation of taxbases
that nations are liable to compete away because of international mobility, or that they
underutilize because of monitoring problems. Examples include capital, especially
financial capital, income (Grabel 2003), currency transactions (Nissanke, Chapter 4,
this volume) and the taxation of internet transactions involving services that are difficult
to monitor when they cross borders. In principle, international agreement should be
possible for a harmonized increase in taxes of these types, given that non-cooperative
tax competition is responsible for their low equilibrium tax rates. However, there
are significant problems with relying on such taxes for financing new development
assistance.
The incidence of these taxes will not bear a close relationship with fiscal equity
considerations, so they may not be regarded as ‘fair’ taxes. In the absence of a need
for development assistance, cooperative agreements on taxing mobile taxbases would
likely lead to the taxes collected being returned to the nation of origin.
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There will be significant administrative and compliance problems associated with
taxing these transactions unless an international tax administration is instituted with
significant powers of audit and information gathering.
Crowding-out of national voluntary contributions will be an issue.
These considerations would also apply to global taxes levied on specific transactions
simply because they are good revenue sources. Narrow-based taxes will either be distor-
tionary or inequitable, and their incidence among nations would bear little resemblance
to a fair allocation based on fiscal equity.
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The aim of this project has been to advance thinking about new sources of finance for
development. This final chapter draws together the main conclusions and considers
how we can move forward towards concrete action.
12.1. THE CHALLENGE
Our starting point has been the widely recognized need for additional development
funding if the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are to be achieved by 2015. All
figures are estimates, and involve matters of judgement, but there is broad agreement
about the magnitude. It seems reasonable to take a figure of additional US$50 billion,
about the present total of official development assistance (ODA), as being required
annually to achieve the international development goals. This means that we have
either to double existing official development assistance or to find alternative sources
of comparable magnitude or to abandon the MDGs. Here, we do not accept the
third answer. The choice in raising additional funds is, therefore, between ODA and
alternative sources—or a balance of the two.
This sharp presentation of the problem serves to focus our treatment of new and
alternative sources of funding. First, we are primarily concerned with the contribution of
these sources to the finance of development. Many of the proposals have multiple objectives.
The creation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) was first proposed to ease problems of
international liquidity, but here (Chapter 5) we are concerned with their potential role
for development purposes. The Tobin tax was first proposed as a means of coping with
financial volatility. Here (Chapter 4) we are primarily concerned with its potential as a
generator of revenue to be used to finance development. Remittances from emigrants
are used for many purposes, notably the financing of consumption by their families
who have stayed. This consumption is important, but our concern here (Chapter 9) is
with the contribution of remittances to funding investment for the future.
Our focus means secondly that we are principally concerned with comparing different
ways of funding the MDGs. If a particular proposal is found to have shortcomings,
this is not the end of the matter. We have to ask—what is the alternative? In the
course of the book, we have made use of the insights of public economics, applied at a
global plane. One of these insights is that one needs to specify the comparison. If the
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proposal were not to be adopted, what would come in its place? Here, in considering
proposals for new sources, we ask how they would differ from an increase in ODA.
How would their economic and social impact differ from that of an ODA increase? Or,
more cynically, how far are different proposals simply different ways of dressing up an
increased transfer from rich to poor countries?
In comparison with ODA, the closest are the proposal for the International Finance
Facility (IFF) (Chapter 6), involving a forward commitment by donors of development
funding, and for a development-focused allocation of SDRs (Chapter 5), which again
involves the sovereign actions of governments. The other proposals are distinctly dif-
ferent, involving either global taxation or a global lottery or increased private transfers.
12.1.1. What’s New?
Some of the proposals discussed in the book have been the subject of a large literature:
the Tobin tax, for example. There have been a number of valuable overviews of the
field, to which we have referred in Chapter 1. But our book is not without novelty.
Even in the case of the Tobin tax, the fact that we are concentrating primarily on
its revenue potential gives a different emphasis to Chapter 4, reflected in its title. In
other cases, the field is less well tilled. In the case of the IFF, Chapter 6 provides,
to our knowledge, the first external analysis of this proposal. There is relatively little
economic literature on private donations for international development and the reasons
why people give for one cause rather than another (Chapter 7). By applying approaches
from public economics, we can derive new insights. This applies to the lessons from
fiscal federalism (Chapter 11) that can be applied to multi-level policymaking with
global concerns and national governments. It applies to the equivalence of taxes and
the auctioning of quotas (Chapter 3).
The book contains some new ideas. Attention has been paid recently to the global
lottery, but the authors of Chapter 8 have come up with a totally new mechanism—the
global premium bond. The analysis of fiscal architecture in Chapters 2 and 11 has
suggested the novel idea that national and individual taxbases can be divorced. By
applying a method of subsidiarity, the national liability can be determined according to
one formula, but national governments can choose to raise the revenue by other means.
There is the application of the ideas of stochastic dominance to competition between
the prize structures of different lotteries (Chapter 8).
12.2. CONCLUSIONS: NEW SOURCES OF FINANCE
Table 12.1 summarizes the main conclusions with regard to the seven proposals for
new sources of development finance considered here. In each case, there is a brief
description, and a summary of the potential contribution to the funding of develop-
ment. The first conclusion is that the two global taxes considered could yield revenue of
the magnitude required (tax on carbon use) or at least half of the requirement (CTT at
a wholesale rate of 2 basis points). Moreover, the tax rates required for this purpose are


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































taxes on allocational grounds. The Tobin taxes proposed to ‘put sand in the wheels of
international finance’ have been of the order of 10 or 20 basis points—ten times that
considered here. The energy tax considered in Chapter 3 has a rate per metric ton of a
tenth or a twentieth of those typically considered in the literature on global warming.
The taxes are not, therefore, guaranteed to have the major behavioural impact, dis-
couraging pollution and speculation, which has been sought. This conclusion has both
negative and positive aspects. On the minus side, it means that the double dividend—
of revenue plus improved functioning of the economy—may fall short on the second
dimension. But it is revenue that is our concern here. The second aspect is positive,
which is that the much more modest tax rates envisaged here are more acceptable and
less likely to have disruptive economic consequences.
The second conclusion is that there are alternatives to global taxation. The IFF pro-
posed by the UK government could, if it attracts sufficient support from other major
donors, yield flows over the crucial period up to 2015 of the magnitude required. It
is, of course, open to question how far this differs at heart from a commitment to
expand ODA. The creation of SDRs for development purposes has been envisaged as
raising some US$25–30 billion. This means that it could contribute a significant part
of the total, but would need to be combined with other measures, particularly if such
allocations were only to be made less frequently than annually. One such additional
source is the global lottery, which is potentially the source of significant revenues,
if agreement can be reached with national lotteries. A global premium bond could
provide a flow of loan funding that would not be otherwise be available. Supporting
roles could be played by increased remittances from emigrants, and, on a more modest
scale, increased private donations.
In each case, however, we have to consider the extent of additionality. The third
conclusion is that there is a distinct risk of crowding-out. A country signing up
to the IFF may implicitly offset this commitment against its regular ODA. The
same may apply to countries that transfer any new SDR allocation. Agreement to
the introduction of a global tax may mean that governments feel less pressure to
increase their ODA, or that firms are less likely to contribute to charitable funding
of development. Measures to stimulate private donations may adversely affect other
forms of giving. Issuing a global premium bond may crowd out other borrowing for
development purposes, although this is less likely if it is targeted at the individual
investor.
The next column in Table 12.1 summarizes the contribution to generating a double
dividend. In other words, how far do the proposals have other advantages apart from
the revenue raised? As already noted, the proposed tax rates are much lower than those
advocated for other purposes, but both energy use and currency transactions taxes
have potential to act as corrective taxes. There is an allocational benefit rather than a
deadweight loss. In the same way, tax incentives to private donations and remittances
by emigrants may act to encourage an activity that is undersupplied, a gift benefiting
the recipient as well as the sender. The fourth conclusion is that there are possible double
dividends, but they are a by-product but not the primary rationale of the proposals.
The double dividend argument should not be over-sold.
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The existence of a double dividend does not mean that there is no cost. With an
ordinary tax, the burden of a tax generating $x billion can be said to consist of two
parts: the $x billion that taxpayers hand over, and the additional deadweight cost (excess
burden) due to the distortion of economic decisions. Where there is a double dividend,
the second element becomes a benefit: decisions are improved by the corrective tax.
But revenue is still raised. There are good reasons to expect that the taxes will be
passed on to final users. This applies to energy taxes, where we have to follow through
the full input-output implications. People tend to think immediately of the impact of a
carbon tax on the fuel and transport costs of households, but energy costs enter also as
inputs in other sectors. The operating costs of the financial sector, for example, will be
increased, so that part may appear as higher prices for apparently unrelated products.
In the case of the Tobin tax, we can regard it as an excise tax on all purchases according
to their foreign exchange content. One disadvantage of the tax is that the final incidence
is not easily determined. Part of the burden may well fall on developing countries: for
instance, if the tax reduces the effective flow of remittances from emigrants. The other
measures, too, may have costs. The increase in ODA that is effectively envisaged under
the IFF has to be financed, and the future commitments may affect the budgetary
position of donor countries. Tax relief for remittances by emigrants has a cost to the
host countries. The fifth conclusion is that it is illusory to suppose that simply adopting
an alternative funding route avoids all cost.
In considering both double dividends and cost burdens, one important consideration
is the impact on the macroeconomy. It is the specific purpose of some measures, such
as the creation of SDRs, to stimulate the world economy. Given that there is significant
unemployment, and under-use of productive capacity, it may be possible to generate
new resources at little or no real cost. Donor countries may, via the IFF, be able to engage
in borrowing in a way that acts as a macroeconomic stimulus. In the opposite direction,
a significant increase in funding for development may run into the absorption, or
transfer, problems considered in Chapters 2 and 6. We have not attempted here to
assess these macroeconomic arguments, but they are potentially important. A sixth
conclusion is that the policy towards funding the MDGs has to be seen in conjunction
with stimulating the global economy and with an eye to the absorption issue.
The fourth column in Table 12.1 identifies the main disadvantages of the different
proposals. One common element is, seventh conclusion, the fact that we have only limited
understanding of the economic impact of the different proposals, which is, of course,
highly relevant to judging their final cost, as noted above. The final incidence of a
global tax, such as the carbon tax, depends on the responses of firms and households
that determine the ultimate general equilibrium. We can only guess that the impact of
a currency transactions tax will be larger in countries more engaged in international
trade. Views about the macroeconomic impact of SDR creation depend on how one
believes that the world economy operates. We know relatively little about the impact of
remittances from migrant workers. We know little about what influences the destination
of private giving.
In considering the disadvantages, we need to bear in mind that we are comparing
alternative ways of increasing development funding. Take, for example, the argument
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that the burden of a global lottery falls on low-income groups (discussed in Chapters 2
and 8). If the choice is a global lottery or nothing, then it seems likely that the recipients
of the benefits from global lottery funding have lower incomes than the poor in rich
countries who play the lottery. If, however, the alternative is increased ODA financed
by higher income taxation, then the distributional argument does not favour the lottery.
The final column in Table 12.1 lists the main obstacles to the proposals. This
naturally leads one to ask how they can be overcome. This is in part a question of
design. How can they be made more compelling? In this book, we have identified
a number of routes by which the design can be refined. In the case of the global
lottery, the prize structure can be constructed in a way that helps differentiate the
product from that of national lotteries and to avoid the possibly negative effects of
astronomical prizes. We have described ways of increasing the efficiency of the market
for remittances.
Overcoming the obstacles is in part a matter for political action. In the next section,
we consider the possible role of different actors.
12.3. THE WAY FORWARD
How can we achieve the target level of an annual increase of US$50 billion in resources
for development? The first point to be made is that the increase could quite realistically
be achieved via ODA. Viewed in relation to previous aid achievements and aspirations,
the US$50 billion increase seems quite feasible. If donors were to raise their ODA
to 0.5 per cent of GNP, then the US$50 billion additional ODA would have been
realized. Nor is an increase of ODA by existing donors the only route by which ODA
could be increased. The world distribution of income is changing. The growth of
middle-income countries means that they can be expected to come into the equation.
The funding of the MDGs could be achieved solely by increasing ODA. At the same
time, it would require a step change from the present, going considerably beyond what
has so far been promised. This is not going to be achieved overnight. The widening of
the circle of aid donors is equally going to take time. Time is, however, of the essence.
For this reason alone, it may be necessary to consider new sources. It may indeed be
that consideration of negative aspects of alternatives may lead donor countries to be
more willing to make the step change in ODA. In this book, we have considered seven
such sources. While a carbon tax on its own might be sufficient to raise the required
funds, this is not true of the other proposals and it is likely that any programme will
consist of a package of measures. Such a package could be constructed by the UN and
other international agencies, which would monitor its introduction. The enactment of
the package would, however, involve a large cast of actors. Indeed, it is important from
the standpoint of democratic accountability that there should be the widest possible
engagement.
To begin with, there is an essential role for the individual citizen. Individuals can
contribute significantly both by their private support and by their influence on govern-
ments. Individuals make generous donations to charity, but relatively little goes to
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development purposes. We have seen how there is considerable scope for the globaliza-
tion of charitable giving. Increased support for development charities serves both the
direct purpose of helping poor countries and the indirect purpose of demonstrating to
governments of rich countries the concerns of their voters.
National governments are indeed the key actors. First, they have considerable inde-
pendent impact. Acting alone, the government of a rich country can take steps to
increase the flows of finance for development. A single country could, for example,
allow income tax deductions for taxpayers making contributions to hometown associa-
tions (Chapter 9) that are funding community projects in the home country. A single
country could launch a premium bond dedicated to development funding. A single
country could decide to allocate to development purposes part of the proceeds from its
national lottery. A single country could match out of public funds the amounts donated
by its citizens to development charities.
Matching also applies at the national level, and governments may be more will-
ing to provide funding where other countries are also participating. The logic of the
International Finance Facility is that a number of countries join together in making the
commitment. This brings us to the class of proposals where common action is required
but it is sufficient for a significant subset of countries to agree. This includes the IFF
and the global lottery. Finally, there are those proposals where the involvement of all
donor countries is effectively necessary. This includes the creation of new SDRs and
(probably) the carbon tax.
Our focus has been on the role of high-income countries, but, as stressed at the
outset, we do not believe that this is the only important aspect. Within the context
of the proposals considered here, there is much that developing countries can do to
facilitate their effective enactment and to take forward the necessary dialogue.
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